

HISTORY OF CHINA AND JAPAN

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Unit - I

Background – Chinese Revolution of 1911 – Causes – Dr. Sun Yat Sen – Tung Meng Hui – Kuo-Min-Tang – Impact of the Revolution – Yuan Shi Kai – China in First World War – May Fourth Movement.

Objectives

- To study the background of the Chinese Revolution of 1911.
- To the role of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, Tung Meng Hui.
- To the political developments under Yuan Shi Kai the First World War.
- To the impact of the May Fourth Movement.

Background – Chinese Revolution of 1911

The story of the great Chinese Revolution of 1911-12 will probably never be told fully or accurately. China is a continent in its vast area. Its population is one fourth of the whole human race. The country is not opened up by roads or railways and travel generally is arduous and slow ; exaggeration among the people, as among all Orientals, is second nature. And so it would be at once impossible for any one man closely to follow up and widely and accurately to write of the Revolution which broke out at Wuchang last year, tracing it up to the present moment and getting a clean political and international outlook whilst doing so. Although I have endeavoured by careful study to get into focus with doings all over the Empire, I confess that I have been unable to secure unimpeachable information on any part of China other than that in which I was living (I speak of the interior of China, for it was easy enough to be kept informed in the main centres and the treaty ports whilst the telegraph lines were intact). Had there been roads and rail- ways and communication of a kind to render it physically possible to move about, even then this would have been impossible; for soon after the Revolution broke the anti-foreign spirit and the outlawry shown in many parts of the country forbade any European going far from the treaty ports—and, of course, practically all foreigners were ordered to the coast by their consuls. Had a man a workable knowledge of the Chinese language in character, it would have been foolish to form one's opinions from the rumours that were printed everywhere in the Chinese Press. And so it comes about that only upon those things which one saw and did is a man justified to write.

The reader, if he knows China, will need no further explanation, for readily will he recognise my meaning. He will understand by experience what a mass of inconsistency and incongruity China and her people are. But to the Westerner who has never been into China nor rubbed shoulders closely with this peculiar people it will perhaps be necessary to add that life in China, in all its forms and phases, is fraught with such a truly remarkable atmosphere of the unexpected that to write on any Chinese man, woman, custom, habit, place, or thing one is able only to generalize unless he goes into the tedium of particularizing. To get into line it is necessary so to cut down and to prune and generally to reinterpret that when one has told his story there seems to be very little at all in it. But those who have lived in China know the conditions. They will have absorbed this incomprehensible spirit of the country, will understand what is written and what is more important still, will magnetically feel what is left out which the writer on Chinese affairs would have said. When in writing upon men and things Chinese you think you have pruned down all apparent misinterpretation or misrepresentation, you find there is still a little pruning left to be done; you prune again, and in the end you find you often are, to the Western mind, misinterpreting and misrepresenting facts merely because you have left out that which, to you, with your Chinese eyes, appeared untrue. You see a thing in China and you think that you understand it. You fix it in your mind and tell yourself that you have absorbed it, whatever it may be, and that you now have the final thought and word and correct meaning. But after a little time you find, by a peculiar process of Chinese national twisting and shifting, no matter what you see, hear, think, believe, your final thought and word and correct meaning are changed completely.

This, perhaps, describes the political atmosphere during the Revolution. Into everything there came an exasperating suspense, a terrible tangle of all national affairs, as there still must be for a very long time to come. Therefore to the man who sets out to write a detailed history of China's Revolution, and correctly to diagnose the effect of one event upon another in a consecutive and truthful line, there at once appears a formidable task.

What the author has set out to do in this volume is to tell of what he saw and understood, and then to put into print carefully considered opinion on the general situation and a historical survey of revolutions and main events in China that have led up

to the Revolution of last October. This Revolution, although out breaking prematurely, was all wonderfully planned. "The movement began to take definite shape about fifteen or sixteen years ago," says Sun Yat Sen, the greatest of Chinese revolutionists, though he had been interested in the movement for a longer time than that. "Three years ago we were ready to take over Wuchang, Canton, and Nanking, but we were waiting to gain control of the Peking soldiers. We had been working for some time through the students." Following the war with Japan, the Peking Government began to organise its new army, sending students abroad to be trained to take charge of the army. It was at once seen that if the Manchus were able to organise and control a modern army it would greatly strengthen their position, and the Revolutionary party set to work to counteract their efforts. They worked through the students, so that when they returned to China to take positions as officers in the army they came as revolutionists. The outbreak could not have been postponed for more than a few months, but it did occur before it was expected. We knew that we had Wuchang, Nanking, and Canton, but there was a preliminary outbreak at Canton, then another one last summer. Then when the outbreak at Wuchang occurred it was no longer possible to postpone action, for the Government would have begun to disarm the soldiers who sympathized with us. At Canton they scattered our sympathizers over the province, so that it was very difficult to concentrate them. If our original plan had been carried out, there would have been very little fighting. Canton, Nanking, and Wuchang would have quietly gone over to us, and then all the troops could have marched on Peking if necessary. We have always had half of the Peking troops with us."

Thus declared Sun Yat Sen - and there is little doubt he was right. The hitherto irremediable suppression of the individual qualities and national aspirations of the people arrested the intellectual, the moral, and the material development of China. The aid of revolution was invoked to extirpate the primary cause, and China now proclaimed the resultant overthrow of the despotic sway wielded by the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a Republic. The substitution of a Republic for a Monarchical form of government was not the fruit of a transient passion; it was the natural outcome of a long-cherished desire for broad-based freedom, making for permanent contentment and uninterrupted advancement. It was the formal declaration of the will of the Chinese nation.

In a manifesto issued to all friendly nations from the Republic of China, when Sun Yat Sen was appointed Provisional President, it was declared that “we, the Chinese people, are peaceful and law-abiding. We have waged no war except in self - defence. We have borne our grievances during two hundred and sixty- seven years of Manchu misrule with patience and forbearance. We have by peaceful means endeavoured to redress our wrongs, secure our liberty, and ensure our progress, but we have failed. Oppressed beyond human endurance we deemed it our inalienable right as well as our sacred duty to appeal to arms to deliver ourselves and our posterity from the yoke to which we have so long been subjected, and for the first time in our history inglorious bondage has been transformed to an inspiring freedom splendid with a lustrous light of opportunity. The policy of the Manchu Dynasty has been one of unequivocal seclusion and unyielding tyranny. Beneath it we have bitterly suffered, and we now submit to the free peoples of the world the reasons justifying the Revolution and the inauguration of our present government. Prior to the usurpation of the Throne by the Manchus, the land was open to foreign intercourse, and religious tolerance existed, as is evidenced by the writings of Marco Polo and the inscription on the Nestorian Tablet of Sian-fu. Dominated by ignorance and selfishness, the Manchus closed the land to the outer world, and plunged the Chinese people into a state of benighted mentality, calculated to operate inversely to their natural talents and capabilities, thus committing a crime against humanity and the civilized nations almost impossible of expiation.”

And there can be no doubt that, actuated by a perpetual desire for the subjugation of the Chinese, by a vicious craving for aggrandizement and wealth, the Manchus had governed China to the lasting injury and detriment of the people, creating privileges and monopolies and erecting about themselves barriers of exclusion in national custom and personal conduct which were rigorously maintained throughout the centuries. They had levied irregular and un whole - some taxes upon the Chinese without their consent restricted foreign trade to treaty ports, placed likin embargoes upon merchandise in transit, and obstructed internal commerce. They had retarded the creation of industrial enterprises, rendered impossible the development of natural resources, and willfully neglected to safeguard vested interests. They had denied the people a regular system and impartial administration of justice ; inflicted unusual and cruel punishments upon all

persons charged with offences, whether innocent or guilty ; and frequently had encroached upon Chinese sacred rights without due process of law. They had connived at official corruption, sold offices to the highest bidder, and had subordinated merit to influence. They repeatedly rejected the Chinese people's most reasonable demand for better government, and reluctantly conceded pseudo-reforms under most urgent pressure, making promises without intention of fulfilling them.

Thus the manifesto showed up the weak spots in the Manchu governmental policy. And it continued : " To remedy these evils and render possible the entrance of China to the family of nations, we have fought and formed our Government ; lest our good intentions should be misunderstood, we now publicly and unreservedly declare the following to be our promises :

"All treaties entered into by the Manchu Government before the date of the Revolution will be continually effective up to the time of their termination; but any and all entered into after the commencement of the Revolution will be repudiated.

"All foreign loans or indemnities incurred by the Manchu Government before the Revolution will be acknowledged without any alteration of terms ; but all payments made to and loans incurred by the Manchu Government after the commencement of the Revolution will be repudiated.

"All concessions granted to foreign nations or their nationals by the Manchu Government before the Revolution will be respected, but any and all granted after the commencement of the Revolution will be repudiated.

"All persons and property of any foreign nation within the jurisdiction of the Republic of China will be respected and protected.

" It will be our constant aim and firm Endeavour to build upon a stable and enduring foundation a national structure compatible with the potentialities of our long neglected country.

" We will strive to elevate our people, secure them in peace, and legislate for their prosperity."

At this juncture it were idle to investigate how far these ideals have been reached. There has as yet been no time for deep national reforms to have been worked, and it is not the ambition of this volume to go deeply; into political actualities. But no one,

realising now that the Manchu rule in China has passed for ever, will doubt that, with such excellent qualities of common sense and eminent industry as the Chinese possess, we shall see a nation move that may move the world with it. The day will assuredly come, perhaps it is not so very far distant, when the Occidental observer will look around to see the globe girdled with an indissoluble bond of Chinese peoples, no longer too weak for aggression, but independent in all departments of national life. They will be taken up as equals into social relations of the white races. They are now struggling among themselves, asking merely to be allowed to fight out their own civil battles and order their own civil affairs. They will make mistakes, but probably will profit by them. The day will come when Chinese will no longer be elbowed and hustled by their haughtier Occidental neighbours, but perhaps instead we shall find ourselves entered into no easy international and commercial competition with people whom not so long since we looked down upon as servile and considered fit only to minister to our needs in manual ways. The problems that loom across the threshold of the future of this newly emancipated race, however, surpass in magnitude any that civilisation has hitherto had to encounter. There are clear indications of progress, but they are not yet clear enough. China has to be remade, and those engaged in the project may blunder because of the varied and widely varying patterns they have in stock to choose from.

Certain phases of development we are sure of. We are able to place our fingers upon certain points in China's national propaganda and say with certainty that such and such a line is bound to be followed, such and such a thing bound to happen. But, generally speaking, China is a land of unintelligibility ; the best advice one can give is to "wait and see."

Dr. Sun Yat Sen

Sun Yat-SEN for many years has been known the world over as the most effective Revolutionary China has ever produced. For many years he had been the leader of a revolutionary movement among Chinese abroad, and his life was practically devoted to travelling to foreign countries, keeping his exiled countrymen versed upon the latest political phases of China.

At the time of the Peace Conference the situation had become so strained, there were so many parties all genuinely anxious to assume control—out of the best motives

probably—that it seemed necessary for one strong man to come in safely to direct the Revolutionary cause. That strong man was Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It was known on the day the Conference met that Sun Yat-sen was in Singapore. For many days the people had been looking for him, and disappointment was freely expressed in Shanghai more particularly (where he was best known) because of his non-appearance. It seemed that he was now, at the moment when he could do his country the most good, determined to stay away. After the Conference had broken up, however, Sun arrived, and immediately the people took him to their hearts, recognising in him the one man who now would be strong enough to establish a stable Government.

Sun cannot be called a typical Chinese ; he is a typical and extremely able Chinese of the new school. He has lived most of his life abroad, and from his earliest years, when in Canton he attended the London Mission with his Christian parents, has been constantly in close touch with men and things foreign. As has been said, practically all his life, but particularly since 1895, Sun has been looked upon as the most active Revolutionary among the Chinese. His escapes at the hand of the Chinese Government had been many. For years he had been banished, and his head was ever sought after. His deliverances had been marvellous. Newspapermen the world over have constantly interviewed Sun in his wanderings, and it is felt that so much is known of President Sun that nothing of a general nature need be added here. It will be more interesting to pass on to see what Dr. Sun has to say, in a remarkably well written story, of the reason why his country is in revolt.

The conspiracy in which I took part as a leader at Canton in October, 1895," wrote Dr. Sun Yat-sen, " was one of a series which must ultimately triumph in the establishment of a Constitution in our Empire. The whole of the people in China, excepting the Imperial agents, who profit in purse and power by the outrages they are able to perpetrate, are with us. The good, well-governed people of America will not fail to understand that Chinese numbering many millions in their own land and thousands in exile, could not entertain such feelings about their Empire without good cause. Over each province there is what the English would call a Governor. There are no laws, as you know laws. The Governor of each province makes his own laws. The will of each officer is the law. The people have no voice. There is no appeal against the law created for his

own purposes by the officer or the Governor, no matter how unjust, no matter how cruelly carried out. These Governors universally persecute the people and grow wealthy by squeezing them all into poverty. Taxes, as taxation is understood by Americans, are unknown. We pay only a land tax, but the Governors and officers take money from the masses by innumerable systems of extortion. Every time a Governor or magistrate or chief officer takes charge of a district, the first thing he does is to find out who are the rich, who are favourably disposed toward him and who against him. He selects first one of those whom he has reason to believe dislikes him, forces one of those on his side to make a criminal charge against the selected man, and has him arrested on the charge, which is invariably false. The Governor enriches himself by each case, as the only thing in the nature of a law he knows is that of the Dynasty, empowering him to take as his own as much as he likes, usually the whole of the property of every man whom he arrests and punishes. The arrested man has no appeal. He has no advocates. He has no hearing. Only his accusers are heard. Then he is barbarously tortured to confess the guilt he knows not.

“ The terrible injustice of this procedure is to be seen in that a magistrate or chief officer never visits that punishment upon any one who has Imperial influence. Yet any man who has influence with the magistrate or is in any way a creature of his, can arrest, by his own will, any person against whom he has a grievance, choose any crime he likes to name for the purpose, drag the person before the magistrate, accuse him, and ask that he be punished. Again, the accused person has no appeal, no defence. He is merely faced with the accusation, and if he denies it, is put under torture for three days. If at the end of three days the accused refuses to confess himself guilty, punishment is meted to him in severity according to the influence of the accuser, and the necessity the magistrate feels of appeasing him. The punishment for every offence charged, from petty larceny upward, is almost invariably beheading. Beheading saves prison expense, and effectually silences the accused. So much aloof do the Mandarins keep from the people that many are usually ignorant of this terrible work of the officers of the Dynasty, and when told of it, refuse to believe. Some Mandarins refuse to believe, out of fear of incurring the displeasure of officers. The un- happy masses know the truth too well. The intelligent, the most enlightened, know of it. Exiles in all other parts of the world know of it. Bitter hatred of

the Dynasty and of the Imperial officers prevails in every province of the Empire. There is a great democracy in the Empire, waiting and praying for the moment when their organisation can be made efficient and the Dynasty removed and replaced by a constitutional government.

Our conspiracy to seize Canton failed, yet we are filled with hope. Our greatest hope is to make the Bible and education, as we have come to know them by residence in America and Europe, the means of conveying to our unhappy fellow-countrymen what blessings may lie in the way of just laws, what relief from their sufferings may be found through civilisation. ,We intend to try every means in our power to seize the country and create a government without bloodshed. I think we shall, but if I am doomed to disappointment in this, then there is no engine in warfare we can invoke to our aid that we will hesitate to use. Our four hundred millions must, and shall, be released from the cruel tyranny of barbaric misrule and be brought to enjoy the blessings of control by a merciful, just government, by the arts of civilisation.

The conspiracy at Canton, though it failed, was but a momentary repulse and has in no way damped our ardour. A brief history of the conspiracy and my own adventures connected with it may convey some ideas of the difficulties which still lie before us, yet which we know we shall in due time surmount. .We have a head, a chief, and a body of leaders, all earnest, intelligent, courageous men. They were elected according to constitutional principles by a body of us, who met, necessarily, in secret. We have a branch of our Society in every province. Our meetings of the leaders were held at various houses, the rendezvous being constantly changed. We had between thirty and forty centres in the districts of the town, with members ready to ride at a given moment to the number of at least one thousand in each centre to take control of the public affairs of the district. Communications with each of these districts were made by the employment of messengers. Our communications were by word of mouth. Our intention was to attack no individual person.

There is no Government, no organisation, no legal system, no form of official control except the influential citizens, who, under the favour of the magistrate or Governor of the province, usurp the use of the Imperial commissioners and soldiers to carry out their barbarous tyranny. We had no ruling body, officials, or officers as such

institutions are understood by Europeans, to seize. We had elected bodies of our followers who had been taught a system of constitutional rule, for each district, all ready to take office at a given signal and put the system into practice. The soldiers were ready to join us. For the soldiers are as great sufferers from tyranny as the poor masses.

Now, herein lay our chief difficulty. To effect revolution in China would be easy but for one thing the great difficulty in controlling the citizens. The people, never having known laws, never having been used to any proper discipline, are utterly demoralised. Life and property would be in danger from the masses the moment they became excited. From the soldiers, who are of the most degraded class, we expected trouble. They would certainly engage in looting the moment they had discovered a change in the order of things.

“ The only problem we had to solve in order to completely succeed was how to control the people, to make order a certainty, simultaneously with the establishment of a form of government, and how to check the excitement and outrages of the inhabitants while they were being taught to realise the fact that the long-endured tyranny was overcome. For months we worked hard completing our plans to this end, and things had reached that condition that each of the thirty odd leaders had an armed bodyguard of one hundred men. This gave us three thousand armed men on the spot. Another three thousand were to join us from another province on a given date. With this body of men, armed, not to attack any officials, but to control the masses of people and make them obey our constitutional laws, we should have in a few hours reached the dynasty pf impotence.

“Unhappily, we had to contend with the possibilities of disloyalty among our own followers. So great is the fear of the torture-chamber. Into so many tributaries does the main stream of corruption flow. However, all was prepared. A date was fixed—one day in October, 1895. We leaders met to receive a telegram from our agent in Hongkong, who was to inform us that all was right the moment he knew the three thousand men had set out to our assistance. At the same time, he was to dispatch a chartered steamer up the Canton River, laden with arms for the three thousand men who were to control the people and keep order, and bringing seven hundred coolies to do the fetching and carrying, the labourer’s work needful to carry out the scheme of establishing our Government. We met

at the rendezvous at Canton, runners and every one at hand. The message arrived to say that all was right. We dispatched our runners to let every one be prepared at every centre, burned our papers, and proceeded to disband ourselves into units, each to carry out his own allotted portion of revolution. The moment before we disbanded a second message arrived saying, ‘Something has happened, the three thousand men cannot come.’ Our runners were out, and could not be overtaken and recalled. We had to trust to the discretion of the centres to await the men. The only thing we could do, for the time being, to divert suspicion, was to wire our Hongkong agent to keep back the coolies. He misunderstood. The coolies arrived. No one received them. They wandered about, not knowing what they were in Canton for.

So the conspiracy was thwarted. The runners had accessed the people, and set tongues wagging. The Viceroy had been told, ‘Something is going to happen.’ He would not believe his informant, and all might have become quiet, but the arrival of the coolies confirmed the information. The Government did not start. The unhappy coolies were hunted by the Imperial Commissioner and his staff, and many of them beheaded. We leaders dispersed ; many fled into the interior. The Commissioner and Imperial Guard sought the leaders. They seized and beheaded sixteen persons, only seven of whom had anything to do with the movement. The remainder were occupants of houses where it was supposed some of us had met. The leaders all got away. I went on board my own steam-launch and sailed down to Hongkong, where I stayed a week. The Imperial officers were seeking me, and I passed them several times in the street without their recognising me. At the end of the week, during which I had made arrangements for my family, my wife and children and my mother, to follow me, I stepped on board a steamer under the eyes of my stupid pursuers without their noticing me. When I arrived in London, I was captured for the first time, after having been pursued around the world for one year. But the fault was not that of the English people. Indeed, the noble-hearted way in which the English people came to my assistance, and rescued me from the death for which I was assuredly destined, make us shed tears of gratitude.

“In saving my life the English people have earned the love of every one of our millions of cruelly ill- used people, and strengthened our hope of one day soon enjoying

the blessing of a just government, such as that which has made your mighty nation so great and so good."

English friends on this occasion had warned him to steer a wide course away from the Chinese Legation, for there he would technically be on Chinese soil and could be arrested, but these friends either neglected to tell Dr. Sun where the Legation was or he forgot the directions they gave him. At any rate, one day as he was walking through a certain street two Chinese accosted him. They asked him to go with them to their lodging, where they could discuss the Revolution at home. When he demurred they seized him and pushed him through the door of a nearby house. It was the Chinese Legation.

A white man, who was Sir Halliday Macartney, English Secretary of the Legation, told Sun that he was under arrest and that he would be secretly taken out of London and back to Canton. The prisoner was locked in a room on the top floor of the Legation until arrangements could be made for the official kidnapping. Dr. Sun tried throwing messages out of the window weighted with coins, but one of them was picked up by one of the Legation servants and shown to the Minister, and the windows were nailed up.

In his desperation Sun managed to bribe an English servant to carry a message, telling of his plight, to a Dr. Cantlie, one of his friends. Dr. Cantlie laid the matter before the Government, which took immediate action. The building was hedged about by detectives and policemen so closely that the prisoner could not be smuggled out to a steamer. Finally, seeing the futility of longer holding him, the Chinese Minister turned Sun loose.

The nervy little doctor Went right back to the Far East and began to hatch another Revolution against his enemies.

This time it was from Japan that he operated. But because he was not thoroughly wise in the matter of some Japanese business policies he wa9 swindled out of all the funds he had raised to buy arms by one Nakimura.

He left Japan and went to live in Singapore. He slipped into China again and started another uprising. This, too, was ill-timed, and many patriots lost their heads under the executioner's heavy blade.

Dr. Sun managed to slip across the lower border into Annam disguised as a blind beggar. No sooner was he across the border than he began again, wandering from one Chinese colony to another in Annam, in Tongkin, down in the Straits Settlements, over in the Philippines—always preaching revolution.

In 1898 K'ang Yu-wei, one of the reformers whom Sun had been allied with, travelled too fast in his efforts to win the ear of the puppet Emperor, was betrayed by Yuan Shih K'ai, so it was said, and had to flee to save his head. Then the Empress-Dowager laid a heavy hand upon all reformers within reach. Once more Sun escaped. After the Boxer uprising, which was not at all of Sun's doing and was entirely out of sympathy with his schemes, the Empress -Dowager seemed to be bitten by the general sentiment for reform and she promised much for China that raised the hopes of the new element. But like most Manchu promises, they were not to be depended on.

Drilled in the United States

Back Sun went to America, and he added a new detail to his propaganda. He found a young graduate of Leland Stanford University, Homer Lee, who was military mad and incidentally an enthusiast on the subject of freedom for China. Lee was made General of the Reform Cadets, who were Chinese youths of San Francisco, fitted out with uniforms and guns and taught to do the hay foot, straw foot in hired halls night after night.

The idea spread to other cities in the United States and to Manila. The Reform Cadets became a widespread organisation. American drillmasters were hired to coach them ; they had target practice and they gave exhibition drills.

Out in San Francisco the agents of the Chinese Government once tried to prevail upon the city and State authorities to break up the organisation because it was technically an armed band of aliens on American soil. The effort failed.

Such was the man who may become yet the greatest man among the Chinese in his own country as he has been out of it. In due course Dr. Sun Yat-sen was proclaimed President, with a provisional Government at Nanking.

Sun Yat-sen, revolutionist in the most conservative land under heaven, fugitive for fifteen years from the keenest and most relentless trailers of men, hidden spirit of strange secret societies whose ramifications have made mole tracks through every land

where Chinamen are—this man is now President of the Republic of China by decree of the Provisional Military Assembly at Nanking.

Out of the underground passages of plot and intrigue the nature of which no Occidental could hope to understand, and through which this wiry little man has been wriggling and back tracking for more than a dozen years, a new national figure suddenly jumps to command the attention of the world. During years past the world has occasionally caught glimpses of the round black head and narrow, ascetic features of this Dr. Sun, now in Singapore, now in London, now in San Francisco.

There had been little paragraphs in the world's news about an agitator, a Radical, who seemed to be tilting with straws at the impregnable citadel of the Manchu clan in Peking. The Revolution began in China and even then, when the name of Sun Yat-sen was coupled with it people outside of China cracked jokes about a faker, a charlatan, who was trying to capitalise the upheaval at home for his own benefit.

Then over night things happened in China. The next morning the world learned at its breakfast-table that out of the welter and uproar of revolution in old China a leader had arisen to gird an ancient land under new harness of government. And it also became manifest that the Revolution, which had started by concerted movements in the heart of China and spread with the rapidity of a powder-train, and the little man who had been dodging and twisting through the world for so many years were closely related extraordinarily so.

Sun Yat-sen started many revolutions. Each was stronger than the last ; each achieved a little more. The final one, striven for and plotted through channels not yet known, has succeeded. Sun Yat-sen was the man of the hour in China.

Yet the fact that his head was worth hundreds of "shoes" of silver during all the latter years of his activity has been one of the lightest burdens that Dr. Sun has carried about on his narrow shoulders. He took long chances, apparently he suffered many close calls from death, but he persisted

I believe that when he was a young man he was studying medicine under the care of an English physician in Hongkong. Thence he went to England and after study in a preparatory school he was graduated from a medical college and returned to China. He

practised the new medicine, against which there was a violent prejudice on the part of the Chinese in Macao, in Canton and Hongkong.

Dr. Sun is forty-three now, he was scarcely more than twenty-five when he began to move for the spreading of a revolutionary spirit in the hearts of his country-men. Just where he began and with what material nobody but the closest of his associates knows.

It seems that his first idea was for reform through peaceful means, if it were possible for the Chinese people to penetrate the jealous conservatism of the Manchu masters. To this end the little doctor began to organise clubs of advanced thinkers among the young Chinese of the south.

For some time during the early part of 1912 things seemed to go fairly smoothly, and President Sun seemed to have been successful in winning the confidence of Yuan Shih K'ai, when, like a bombshell, the press of the world (especially the London Times) deprecated one of the messages Sun sent to Yuan. This strengthened the Imperial cause. Abdication of the Court, which had definitely been fixed, did not take place. Several of the Manchu princes refused to clear out, for many days the complex situation at Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, and Wuchang rendered it impossible for one to see what would eventuate.

The Court, however, did abdicate, and left the ground clear. There was a continuous rumpus in Peking during the following three months, and in March of 1912 the capital was in a big uproar—the soldiers broke loose, there was much pillaging and looting, Yuan Shih K'ai seemed entirely to have lost the situation and the whole country seemed to be lost. Yuan Shih K'ai meantime had been proclaimed President, Dr. Sun gracefully withdrawing in his favour. A big discussion took place over the site for the capital, and just as Yuan was about to come down to Nanking to settle matters the outbreak at Peking quashed the whole affair. But this was only one of the political troubles. Some adjusted themselves : others did not. There was a lack of money. Soldiers, going unpaid, took the law into their own hands, and looted on a great scale. The banditti rose up in formidable strength. Officialdom was abused. Decapitations were rife. Up to the end of March the interior of China was devoid of all law and order. In the coast places and big towns where order was fairly easy to maintain, officials were busy making laws and drawing up reforms. But whilst reforms were being thus aimed at in some places, in

others there was absolute chaos. The old order had been taken away, and there was nothing better to put up in its place.

But it is hopeless to give a correct comprehensive estimate of what was being done. All we knew was that China was changing—in some places for the worse, in others for the better, but changing irrevocably, and it was only in the final balancing could one see how things were to “pan out.”

On March 10, 1912, Yuan Shih K'ai took the Oath, which read as follows

“ Since the Republic has been established, many works have now to be performed. I shall endeavour faithfully to develop the Republic, to sweep away the disadvantages attached to absolute monarchy, to observe the laws of the Constitution, to increase the welfare of the country, to cement together a strong nation which shall embrace all five races. When the National Assembly elects a permanent President, I shall retire. This I swear before the Chinese Republic.”

Tung Meng Hui

After the failure of the 1895 insurrection Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan. There he met other like minded intellectuals and members of the secret societies. During the first decade of the twentieth there were several societies which sprang up with the purpose of overthrowing the Ch'ing. For example, the Aigou hsueh she (Society for Patriotic Studies) was started to involve people in direct fighting. In various places, in Shanghai and Hunan province, revolts were attempted. In 1903 in Hunan the Hun hsing Hui (China Revival society) organized a revolt led by Huang Hsing. Most of these attempts ended in failure and their leaders fled to Japan, a country considered safe for all these political "dissidents".

In July 1905 most of these dissidents met in Japan and from this meeting was born the Tung meng hui. The Tung meng hui was formed by merging the Hsing Chug hui (Revive China society), the Hua Hsing hui (the China Revival society) and the Ktung Fu hlii-(Restoration society). The establishment of the Tung meng hui represented a definite step in the direction of different small groups, with shared goals and objectives, coming together to work immediately. Members of the Tung meng hui were bound by oaths of brotherhood which were in the tradition of the secret societies. An example of such an oath of brotherhood is :

I swear under heaven, that I will do my utmost for the expulsion of the Manchus, the restoration of Chinese sovereignty, the establishment of the Republic and the equalization of land rights. I swear to be faithful to these principles.

The oath included deposing the Manchus, regaining the sovereign rights that had been lost by China to the foreign powers and creation of a republic. Anti-Manchuism from all these goals was to take a centre stage. The best example of anti-Manchu propaganda was a popular booklet, The Revolutionary Army, written by an ardent nationalist and revolutionary Tso,Jung. He exhorted the Chinese to "annihilate the five million and more of fury and homed Manchu race ... if China is to be independent, if China is to survive in the new world of the twentieth century"

Following were the basic goals of this united party :

- 1) It was committed to the creation and the establishment of a republic.
- 2) The ideas which it enunciated as the basis of its actions were enshrined in the San min chu-i (The three people's principles) as expounded by Sun Yat-Sen. ,The three principles were nationalism, democracy and thirdly, the people's livelihood or what has often been referred to as socialism.

The first among the San min chu-i was nationalism. Its chief characteristic was an open and unabashed anti-Manchu stand. Though implicitly it suggested an antiimperialist stand as well, however, hatred of the Manchus took precedence over a strong and outright anti-imperialist stand.

Democracy implied the establishment of a republican constitution and government with equal rights for all citizens. It stood for the separation of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary which was radical departure from the traditional imperial system.

The third principle aimed at improving the general condition of the people. Here it must be noted that Sun was influenced by the ideas of Henry George, who advocated a single tax to appropriate increases in land values and thus to check the enrichment of speculators and monopolists in a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing society. The objective was a commitment to a prevailing principle of the common good as well as to contain the speculation in land values produced by industrialization and urbanization.

However, there were several problems with these stated principles of the Tung meng hui. The emphasis on Chinese nationalism was unduly concentrated on the ouster of the Manchus, who had in any case been quite sinicized over three centuries. Scant attention was paid to the more serious problem facing China, that of the presence of the Western and Japanese imperialist powers.

The second principle of establishing a republic took little note of the need to prepare strong ground on which it would be erected. Further, even though the goal was a republic, Sun too was to advocate, like Liang, a period of tutelage. This latter was to be used during the 1920's to perpetuate army rule.

The most astonishing and disappointing was the principle of the people's livelihood. It ignored the basic problem of China, the agrarian crisis and the wretched condition of the Chinese peasantry which constituted the bulk of the Chinese population. Despite major drawbacks in the stated goals, Sun and the Tung meng hui gained wide support. Agitated young students were drawn to Sun's grand vision and his conviction that the establishment of a modern republic could be achieved easily and that henceforth China's problems of subordination would miraculously disappear. Wang's ideas of more gradual change seemed outdated and not in step with the demands of the time.

Sun Tat-sen's radical utopia and optimism obscured some major problems in pursuing the goal of establishing a republic. Armed rebellion as a strategy was adopted in an effort to establish revolutionary bases in the various provinces against the Ch'ing. Between 1908-1911 eight such insurrections were attempted in the southern provinces of Kwantung and Kwangsi. These two provinces had active secret societies and further, it was possible to smuggle in arms and funds because of this region's proximity to Hong Kong and Indo-China. All such efforts failed due to a variety of reasons. Faulty organization, lack of co-ordination and a total underestimation of the ability of the state to effectively deal with such challenges. The state ruthlessly suppressed them. There were other problems as well. Within the Tung Meng Hui divergent views emerged. Certain members of the party were attracted by ideas of anarchism and questioned the leadership of Sun.

The day though was not far off when these radical activists were joined by disgruntled gentry and demoralised army officers against the Ch'ing.

The 1911 Revolution

The work of Sun and his party had been concentrated in the southern provinces. Rebellions broke out in the Yangzi basin in the summer of 1911 which accelerated the forces of revolution.

Two major developments, the agitation to protect and recover railway rights in Sichuan province and the revolt of the Wuchang army provided the immediate situation in which the Ch'ing collapsed.

Protection of the Sichuan Railways

In May 1911 the movement which began in Sichuan to protect railways proved to be the prelude to the revolution. On May 9th 1911, the Ch'ing announced the nationalization of all railways. This announcement was accompanied by news of a large foreign loan of 60,000 pounds sterling being taken by the Ch'ing. This decree and the loan were seen by the provincial gentry as yet another evidence of the Ch'ing disinterest in assisting Chinese entrepreneurship.

Further as already mentioned, the provincial gentry had developed large interests in modernizing economy and had invested heavily in developmental activities like the building of railways. In 1904 the Sichuan Hankou Provincial Company had been formed. The work of building the railway line had begun. The Company had raised funds of about 16 million taels from a surcharge on land and voluntary contributions. Many interests were involved and the compensation that the state offered was considered insufficient.

Several different groups responded for a variety of reasons. Patriots were outraged by the financial dependence on the foreigner. The financiers and the gentry whose interests were directly hurt were in the forefront of the movement. The provincial assembly that had come into existence as a result of the constitutional changes introduced by the Ch'ing saw the nationalization of railways as a threat not only to provincial economic independence but also as a threat to their provincial political autonomy.

A Railway Protection League (Pao1utun~cbihihui) was formed with the backing of the provincial assembly and the gentry. Petitions were circulated and demonstrations organized. When these had no effect, the shareholders of the Company met in the capital Chengdu on August 24, 1911 and decided to escalate the scale of protest by closing

shops and schools, refusing to pay taxes and forming local self-defense militia to meet any eventuality.

When the Governor-general of the province had the leaders arrested on September 7, several thousand people protested. In the ensuing turmoil 10 people were killed.

What had started off as a move to protect the rights of the gentry now took a new turn. The Railway Protection League was composed of constitutionalists defending their privileges. Now new social forces entered the fray. The secret society, Kelao hui (Society of Brothers and Elders) supported rebellious peasant bands. They were joined by revolutionary students who had returned from Japan.

The government worried by the events in Sichuan ordered the Hubei New Army to move to Sichuan. This further intensified the strife. Meanwhile the events of Sichuan were overshadowed by the outbreak of rebellion in the garrison stationed in Wuchang.

The Wuchang Rebellion ,This rebellion which began on 10th October 1911 is traditionally celebrated as the "double ten" rising and as marking the beginning of the 1911 Revolution. Though the roots of the latter revolution go back in time to a complex set of developments, nevertheless the rising of the Wuchang garrison proved to be the last straw.

This rebellion was the work of members of the New army. They belonged to the Literary Study Society (Wenhsueh she) which had contacts with the revolutionary intellectuals of Hunan, Hubei and Sichuan, and had formed the Kungjin hui (Common Advancement Association). Though the latter had links with the Tung meng hui it worked closely with the Literary Study Society. The two societies together had begun secret preparations for a revolt in October of 1911.

A bomb accidentally exploded at the offices of the Common Advancement Association. To forestall reprisals from the police, the revolutionaries decided to act. On the evening of October 10, 1911 four battalions of the New Army mutinied. They took the arsenal and attacked the government buildings. In panic the Governor, Ruicheng cheng and the commander of the army left down. By the morning of the 11th, Wuchang was in the hands of the rebels. Since they did not have any well known leader, they turned to Li Yipan-hung, a brigade commander and pressurised him to accept the post as head of the military government of the Chinese republic and Tang Hua-lung, the chairman of the

provincial assembly was made responsible for civil matters. Both the leaders chosen held moderate to conservative views and to them fell the task of expanding the revolution.

Declaration of Independence by the Provinces

The example of watching was quickly followed by other provinces which declared themselves independent. In October the provinces of Hubei, Hunan, unnan, Shensi and Shanhsien declared themselves independent. urin member, JiangxiJiangsu, Chejiang, Fujian, Suchus followed in declaring independence. By November 27,1911, the Ch'ing were left with control over only Manchuria, Henan, Chili and Shantung.

The social forces that brought about these provincial independence declarations varied from region to region. Secret societies and the New Armies actively participated in this. For the most part the leadership was in the hands of the provisional assemblies and the chambers of commerce. The state officials flexor in some cases joined hands with the revolutionaries. For example, in Jiangxi and Kwantung the governors themselves announced secession. Generally, it was altogether a peaceful transition.

The Ch'ing Response

The Ch'ing government responded by sending 12 units of the Beiyang army. The problem, however, was that the troops were loyal to the commander Yuan Shi-Kai, who was called out of retirement to deal with the "rebels". The regent Zai-feng had to accept all the conditions of Yuan. Yuan used the opportunity to consolidate his position and gain the sympathy of the rebels as well. He demanded that the Ch'ing pardon the rebels and create a parliament. The members of the National Assembly had on October 27 demanded that a constitution be prepared forthwith, a parliament convened and a general amnesty declared. Fearing a revolt from the Beiyang army itself, the Ch'ing declared a constitution with nineteen articles and Yuan Shi-Kai, the commander of the imperial forces was now made prime minister.

Yuan Shi-Kai moved quickly in a counter-offensive and took Hankou and Hanyang. This offensive was stopped at this stage. It has been suggested that this was because Yuan wanted to further his own ambitions. There was also the considerable strength of the rebels. A truce was signed on December 1st.

The foreign powers preferred neutrality. This was because the theme of anti-imperialism remained muted and the new leaders were willing to accommodate their interests and wught their tacit support.

The Chinese Republic

Curiously enough, when the revolution did break out, Sun Yat-Sen was in the United States. There were differences between there evolutionary intellectuals on the one hand and the gentry and militarists on the other. After a series of provincial meetings it was decided that China would have a presidential government with sun Yat-Sen unanimously selected as the first president. The Chinese Republic was inaugurated on January 1, 1912' at Nanking.

The new Republic faced a great threat from YuanShi-Kai and his army. At this juncture, to avert a crisis and to protect the fledgling republic, Sun Yat-Sen offered to resign in favour of Yuan if the lat premised to support the new republic.

Yuan negotiated with the Nanking government and engineered.the'abdication of the last of the Manchu emperors. On February 12,19 12, the Hsuan-tung Emperor(1ater known as He-~ry Pu-yi) bowed "to the Mandate of Heaven manifested in the wishes of the people", and abdicated thereby ending the Ch'ing dimity and the an Chinese monarchy. A final imperial proclamation guaranteed Yuan's position :"Let Yuan ShiKai organize with full powers a provisional republic an government and confer with the republican army as to the methods of union, thus assuring peace to the people and tranquility to the people." On March 10, 1912, Yuan was established as provisional president until parliament was elected and a full constitutional government established.

After Math

The end of Manchu rule was achieved with relative ease but soon the fundamental weaknesses of the Revolution surfaced. Yuan, as president, was not-transmitted to the principle of representative government and sought every opportunity to subvert the parliamentary process. He would not tolerate any challenge to his power from anyone.

Soon after the revolution, political groups had organized themselves into something like political parties and were gearing themselves for the parliamentary elections. Liang Ti Chao had organized the former reformers into the Democratic party (mi & chu dang) which later was amalgamated into the Progressive Party (Chinpu taxg).

The greatest challenge to Yuan came from the Kuomintang (the National people's party) organized by former members of the Tung meng hui. This party had been formed by Song Jiao-ren, an associate of sun Yat-sen.

In 1913, the first parliamentary elections in Republican China were held. The Kuomintang was easily the most successful of the three parties. This euphoria, however, did not last very long. Yuan moved quickly and cracked down on the revolutionaries and had Song Jiaoren assimilated in Shanghai in March 1913 in a bid to check any threat to his own position.

This assassination outraged the Chinese. At this time Yuan also came into attack for having taken a foreign loan on onerous terms. Yuan borrowed money to the tune of 25 million pounds sterling from a six power consortium of British, French, German, Russian, American and Japanese banks. In return the consortium demanded and received a monopoly of loans and reserved the salt taxes as security.

In an attempt at regaining some measure of autonomy against Yuan's highhandedness, during July and August of 1913, seven provincial governments, though ill prepared, declared their independence of Yuan's government in a short lived "second revolution". This revolution was quickly suppressed. Sun Yat-Sen Huang Hsing and others once again fled to Japan to work out their future strategy. Generals of the Beiyang army extended their control as governors of the provinces. The last vestiges of any resistance vanished. By the end of 1913, Yuan tried to arrogate to himself all powers thereby making the parliamentary assembly meaningless.

The revolution thus had an all too brief existence. It had achieved the destruction of a monarchical system and replaced it with a republic. The foundations of this republic were weak. The social forces that brought about this revolution, the gentry and the army had little to offer in the long run. The revolutionary intellectuals were ineffectual without a strong social base or military power. Most significantly it was a revolution that had ignored the bulk of the Chinese people, the peasantry. It was essentially a struggle among the dominant social groups, a struggle in which centrifugal forces were to undermine the basic goal of the 1911 Revolution of a strong unified republic.

Kuo-Min-Tang

The Kuomintang Party (KMT), established in 1912, ruled China from 1927 until 1948 before moving to Taiwan. The origins of the Kuomintang could be traced back to the decline of the Qing Empire. However, the party that held the mantle of the Chinese Revolution and ushered China into an era without Imperial rule had been forced to retreat outside of China. In recent years, the KMT failed to win the presidency in the 2016 and 2020 elections in Taiwan, raising questions over its legitimacy and relevance in a younger world. Due to this history, it becomes important to understand the KMT's evolution, as it is yet another example of an older party fighting for relevance in the young and contemporary world. While the KMT has made significant gains in the recent legislative elections and will have its eyes set on the presidential elections in 2024, this paper will trace the history of the Kuomintang and look at how it sailed through history and made alterations to its styles to adapt to the changing times.

Background The KMT is the oldest party in East Asia. The emergence of the Kuomintang party is synonymous with the decline of the Qing Dynasty and the emergence of Sun Yat-sen. The Qing dynasty had promoted itself into a conquering force and ruled China for 268 years. Several internal turmoils during the Qing dynasty ended in devastating rebellions that eventually led to the empire's downfall.

The crippled Qing Dynasty was eventually ousted in 1912, ending China's long imperial period. Sun Yat-sen was elected the provisional President of the newly established Republic of China. During this time, Sun Yat-sen decided to convert his revolutionary society into a political party, forming the Kuomintang.

At this time, the Kuomintang, the National People's Party, was essentially an amalgamation of small political groups. However, the KMT emerged as the dominant political party in China and won the first-ever national elections in 1913. However, shortly after the new republic had been established, a power struggle broke out between the then President Yuan Shi-kai and the new bicameral National Assembly, which the Kuomintang heavily dominated. As a result, KMT was declared an illegal organization in November 1913, and the National Assembly was disbanded the following year.

In 1919, Sun re-established the Kuomintang to counter the weak government in Beijing. The KMT, which was rebuilt with Soviet assistance, was a tightly organised

Leninist political party in command of an army strong enough to defeat the warlords. Until now, the Leninist organisation of the party still persists.

The principles of the people posited by Sun Yat-sen in his writings could be seen as the guiding principles of the Kuomintang Party since its inception. These principles still continue to guide the ideological base of the party. Sun promoted the three principles of the people throughout the revolution, including the principle of Nationalism, Democracy and livelihood.

Chiang Kai-shek and Military Dictatorship

Following the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek, the Republic of China (ROC) army, and the government fled to Taiwan. Close to two million mainlanders sought refuge on the island. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT were not welcomed with open arms by the island's Indigenous population. Additionally, when the KMT government was still in power on the mainland, it enforced martial law on the island in response to widespread protests demanding government reforms. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT used to pretext of a possible China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) invasion to justify the upholding of martial law.

During the reign of Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang was essentially at the helm of a oneparty authoritarian political system. This was a big deviation from the founding principles of the party outlined by Sun Yat-sen in his writings and the model of government the KMT was attempting to establish in the Republic of China when it was established in the mainland. Following the loss of the mainland, the KMT also needed to undergo several changes to adapt to its new territory and rule it effectively. In the early 1950s, the KMT was essentially a demoralised and disorganised party. Firstly, Chiang Kai-shek set up a reform committee led by middle-aged loyalists. A process to re-register all members were initiated. Many viewed as disloyal, incompetent, or corrupt were purged from the party. The reforms started showing their effects, and the party emerged with fresh new leaders. Further, Taiwan's economic success also played a key role in the KMT's ability to gain domestic legitimacy.

The KMT also maintained its power during the martial law period through the flawed political system of the country. The system was inherited from when it governed China and is based on the 1947 ROC constitution. The policy structure was maintained

due to publicly outlined desires to retake the mainland. To hold new elections just in Taiwan would have undermined the ROC's claim to be the government of China.

Provincial governments and governors were responsible for running the affairs of Taiwan province. As a result, the Provincial Assembly became the highest elected office in Taiwan. However, during this time, Taiwan's democracy was merely a façade and was still a one party state.

Shift from Authoritarianism to Taiwanisation and Democratization

Taiwan was moving away from strict authoritarianism by the 1980s. Changes in the party were noticeable after Chiang Kai-shek's passing away and the accession of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo. Ching-kuo's political strength allowed him to launch the party's Taiwanisation drive. As a result, younger and well-educated Taiwanese and Mainlander technocrats were promoted to higher positions in both the party and the government.

The major steps to democratise Taiwan effectively came after 1987. Martial law was lifted, and public rallies and mass media restrictions were removed. The Democratic People's Party (DPP) was established in 1986 despite the ban on forming political parties, formally removed only in 1989. Lee Teng-hui became the first Taiwanese President who was born in Taiwan. During his time in office, he oversaw widespread constitutional changes, which led Taiwan to a more democratic political layout. In 1996, in the first-ever direct Presidential elections, he was democratically elected for a second term with a landslide victory.

The formation of the DPP also saw the first actual opposition to the KMT in Taiwan. The DPP started off as a relatively moderate party, promoting democracy and Taiwanese selfdetermination rather than outright independence. However, in the subsequent years, it became more radical. It adopted more extreme positions on Taiwan's independence and a new constitution. Even though its vote share was just 21.1 per cent in the 1996 presidential elections, it began to cover grounds in the following years. Since the arrival of the DPP and the democratisation of Taiwan, shifts could also be noticed in the ideologies of the KMT. The KMT, which was the pioneer of Chinese nationalism and unification, moved to the centre on national identity to compete with the DPP. Following a defeat in the 2000 elections, the KMT emphasised economic issues more, dropped its attacks on Taiwan's independence, and employed a mixed identity message.

A Young Taiwan and an Aging Kuomintang

The rise of Lee Teng-hui as the steward for Taiwan's democratisation shifted the regime's focus towards Taiwan itself. The party's long-standing aspiration of controlling the mainland was more or less given up and more focus was placed on Taiwan. A gradual increase in Taiwanese identity could also be observed from this point onwards. Election results and the years that followed the expulsion of Lee Teng-hui from the party have proven that he was indeed right in being pro-Taiwan. The Taiwanese youth sees the KMT's primary goal of reunification as the agenda of an older generation as opposed to today's democratic Taiwan. The KMT's last President was Ma Ying-jeou, whose tenure saw the Sunflower Movement, which was a protest against an agreement with the mainland that the people feared would undermine Taiwanese democracy and independence. The population clearly did not prefer closer political and economic ties with China. 2016 saw the emergence of DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen as the President. Tsai has openly rejected the 1992 consensus, and her rise reflects the current political scenario in Taiwan. The KMT needs to initiate fundamental political shifts and promote a message that will resonate with the party's members and attract new voters.

Political impact

- **Establishment of a one-party state:** The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) in the Chinese Civil War and established the PRC as a single-party state under the leadership of Mao Zedong.
- **Centralized authority:** The new communist government implemented a highly centralized system, ending the political fragmentation and weak rule that had plagued China since the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.
- **International realignment:** The revolution significantly altered the global balance of power by creating the world's largest communist state. It shifted Cold War dynamics, leading the United States to suspend diplomatic ties with the PRC for decades and intervene against Chinese-backed forces in Korea and Southeast Asia.
- **Factional struggles and purges:** The post-revolutionary period was marked by power struggles within the CCP, most notably the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which saw the persecution and purging of millions of people.

Economic Impact

- **Initial disruption and recovery:** The civil war severely damaged the Chinese economy. However, the new communist government stabilized the currency and halted hyperinflation by 1951, laying the groundwork for economic recovery.
- **Collectivization and state control:** Under Mao, the economy was reorganized around Soviet-style central planning. Private property was outlawed, and the collectivization of agriculture and industry was enacted, with the state monopolizing the market.
- **Economic failures and reforms:** Maoist economic campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) and the Cultural Revolution, devastated the economy and caused mass starvation. Following Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping initiated market-oriented reforms that transformed China into a global economic power.
- **Shift from plan to market:** The reforms after 1978 gradually dismantled the command economy, introduced market forces, and opened China to foreign investment through measures like Special Economic Zones. The non-state sector became the primary engine of China's immense economic growth.

Social and cultural impact

- **Land redistribution:** The revolution led to significant land reform that liquidated the feudal landlord class and redistributed land to peasants, which earned the CCP widespread support in rural areas.
- **Social mobility shift:** The revolution fundamentally altered the social hierarchy. It promoted the social and educational status of children from peasant and worker backgrounds while disadvantaging those from formerly privileged classes. While some intergenerational advantages persisted, the initial shift was profound.
- **Disruption of traditional values:** Traditional Confucian values and family structures were aggressively challenged and dismantled, most severely during the Cultural Revolution, when children were encouraged to denounce their parents and teachers.
- **Repression of intellectuals:** The Cultural Revolution severely disrupted education and intellectual life. Schools were closed, universities were dismantled,

and intellectuals and academics were persecuted and sent to the countryside for re-education.

- **Damage to public trust:** The violence, purges, and chaos of the Cultural Revolution led to widespread distrust and disillusionment with the CCP, creating a lasting "legitimacy deficit" among many urban Chinese.

Yuan Shi Kai

The century-old negative image of Yuan Shikai, the first president of the Republic of China (1912–16), is now deeply embedded in modern Chinese culture and history. He is decried as the most despicable traitor who sold out the reformers of 1898; he is denounced as the most regressive of politicians who defended an obsolete feudal system; he is reviled as the most notorious usurper who snatched away the fruits of the 1911 Revolution; he is condemned as a most ruthless dictator who concentrated power in his own hands during his presidency; and he is slammed as the most reactionary of warlords, who commanded a powerful army personally loyal to himself.¹ Given such accusations, it suits Yuan's fellow Chinese to view him as a stereotypical historical villain (fanmianlishirenwu).² Strangely enough, this negative image was well-preserved throughout the twentieth century and has even slipped uncritically into the new millennium. More oddly, this hideous effigy has been preserved both in the oral tradition and in written annals so well that he has become a prominent target of perpetual censure. Everything about Yuan seems to be negative, starting with his birth and ending with his death. All that occurred in between is dismissed as disgraceful. Indeed, Yuan has cast a lengthening sinister shadow upon twentieth-century culture in both Mainland China and Taiwan.

This phantasmagoric image of Yuan Shikai is now deeply imprinted on the collective memory of the Chinese people. A careful survey of the aforementioned "judgments" indicates that these negative images developed in accordance with the needs of political creeds and through the following perspectives: as an outgrowth of class categorization, whereby Yuan was relegated to the feudal class; as a consequence of revolutionary judgment, in that Yuan was viewed as a counter-revolutionary; as the outcome of a moralistic verdict, in that Yuan was railed against as a traitor to the reformers. Needless to say, these political verdicts have forestalled a deeper and more

impartial inquiry, and meanwhile, the majority of Chinese in both Mainland China and Taiwan have been influenced by this long-nurtured negative perspective. All of this has resulted in only a cursory study of Yuan. He epitomizes the dark side of history, he is an easy target for popular opprobrium, and he is a synonym for dishonour. Over the past century, few other men have been weighed down with such a villainous image.

The unique consensus between Mainland China and Taiwan on Yuan Shikai reflects the evolving political climate. The Nationalist Party's view is that Yuan was an enemy who suppressed Sun Yat-sen and his fellow Nationalists, betrayed the 1911 Revolution, and usurped the newly established republic for which Sun and his followers had sacrificed so many lives. According to the Chinese Communist Party, all of the previous regimes, including Yuan's, were reactionary, oppressive, and tyrannical and the Communists would have to topple them if history did not intervene first. With such a mindset, it is no wonder that Yuan's ignoble image has survived across the 1949 demarcation line and that his infamy persists on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Yuan Shikai's villainy is often mentioned in Chinese letters of all sorts. Almost all history textbooks comment negatively on him, as do other publications. Historical developments and regime changes have done nothing to weaken his unshakable infamy. We encounter this view of him in official documents, and meanwhile, individual writers have gone out of their way to criticize him. Political authors and civilian writers alike have adopted the same stance. For example, the earliest published work about Yuan is Huang Yi's *Yuanshidaoguoji* (Records Revealing the Way Yuan Shikai Usurped the Nation), published in 1916, in which Yuan is depicted as an immoral traitor and a cunning political operator. Huang Yi declares Yuan a "national thief" (guozei).³ In 1935, Bai Jiao, a Shanghai-based journalist, used the term "stealing the nation" (daoguo) to depict Yuan's machinations around the 1911 Revolution.⁴ But neither of these authors has been as influential as Chen Boda, a Communist theorist and Mao Zedong's personal secretary, who in 1946 bluntly labelled Yuan the "Great National Usurper" (Qieguodadao). And Chen's nomenclature has persisted in Chinese popular culture throughout the ensuing decades right down to this day.

but this is not so. A careful reading of primary sources indicates that many people actually admired him, or at least judged him a bit more fairly. Family members described

him as a strict but loving father to his children, a filial son to his parents, and a trustworthy man to his friends.⁶ When he became president, his long-time followers compiled a book highlighting his talent, sagacity, and bravery. His subordinates spoke highly of him – for instance, Gu Weijun (V.K. Wellington Koo; 1887–1985), a famous Chinese Nationalist diplomat, who once worked under Yuan, praised him as a remarkable figure, an intelligent man, and an admirable patriot.⁸ Foreign diplomats, including American and British ambassadors, offered positive comments on Yuan. Western missionaries complimented him as a patriot, a talented person, and a modernizer. American missionary Gilbert Reid esteemed Yuan as “a faultless man,” though he added that Yuan “unfortunately went astray because of misguidance.”

The 1990s saw a dramatic overhaul of Yuan’s evaluation. After nearly a century of violent revolutionary movements and mass political campaigns, the Chinese began to enjoy the fruits of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, which had been launched more than a decade earlier. As the country embarked on reform, the Chinese economy soared and citizens’ living standards rose significantly. Some Chinese scholars openly questioned whether revolution was the only approach to national salvation, and the country as a whole endorsed a more gentle approach to reform. All of this has affected current perceptions of Yuan. A voluminous literature about him has come into being. A few dozen biographies, hundreds of journal articles, and other kinds of literature, including novels and short stories, have been published, generating “Yuan Shikai Fever.” The quantity of this new assessment has not been matched by creative or ingenious quality; indeed, many of these writings tend to be repetitive in content – even “plagiaristic” in the Western sense.

The Chinese have since developed a strong interest in Yuan. In contrast to the previous notorious stereotype, he is now praised as a reformer, a modernizer, a national hero, a talented administrator, a wise politician, and an adept poet. His errors, such as his attempt to restore the dynastic system, are still censured, but his attempts to modernize the nation are praised. Many past accusations are quietly being dropped, and some scholars are going further, moving boldly to rehabilitate Yuan’s reputation. Of course, these radical efforts are criticized by those who adhere to the traditional stance. All said,

however, an objective image of Yuan Shikai is slowly emerging, and this constitutes a sharp break from the past condemnations and disdainful denunciations.

Most of today's writers about Yuan Shikai focus on his vital role in training the first new modern army, his significant contributions during the New Administration (xinzheng), his crucial involvement in the "bloodless" 1911 Revolution (Xinhaigeming), his prominent role in the shift from empire to republic, his efforts to concentrate power during his wobbly presidency, and most importantly, his inglorious efforts to create the Hongxian monarchy. The newly published literature tends to be narrative in nature and lacks in-depth analysis. Large gaps are evident regarding Yuan's elite background, his tempestuous childhood, and his eventful Korean years. Fortunately, *Yuan Shikai quanji* (The Complete Works of Yuan Shikai) published in late 2013 by Henan University Press, offers voluminous primary sources that allow us to probe Yuan's family background and personal experiences. These thirty-six volumes were compiled by two Chinese scholars of Guangdong, Luo Baoshan and Liu Lusheng, who devoted three decades to collecting and editing Yuan Shikai's written works. *Yuan Shikai quanji* includes thousands of official documents and personal letters. Some of the documents may have been written by his aides or secretaries but nonetheless were approved by Yuan. With all of this new abundance, we now have no reason to complain about the dearth of primary sources, at least not in the Chinese materials.

By contrast, Western literature on Yuan Shikai is quite scanty. Over the past century, only one biography has been published – by Jerome Chen, a Chinese Canadian scholar, in 1961. In the almost six decades since, there has not been a second one in English. Chen is clearly an expert on modern China, and he skilfully weaves narratives about Yuan's role in Chinese politics. Yet his book has become outdated for modern readers – given the wealth of new materials available, it is a useful but timeworn volume whose narrative would benefit from comprehensive analysis and insightful interpretation, and it lacks materials about Yuan's family background and early years that are now available. Some chapters offer more about national history than about Yuan himself, making the book a concise account of the events during Yuan's lifetime. Also, Chen's use of the old Wade-Giles system for Chinese terms poses a barrier for twenty-first-century readers.

Two important monographs about Yuan Shikai and his political career have been published. One is Stephen R. MacKinnon's volume about Yuan as an important Qing official in Tianjin and Beijing between 1901 and 1908. In that book, MacKinnon challenges some Chinese scholars' arguments about the centrifugal nature of political power during the late Qing Empire and about power devolving from the centre to provincial elites. MacKinnon examines the three expanding nodes of power: the centre, the provinces, and the regions. He argues that Yuan's case did not reflect the centrifugal theory. Instead, he notes that Yuan maintained strong ties with the Imperial Court from which he received his power. MacKinnon points out that Yuan was a talented official who positioned himself at the intersection of those three nodes of power, relying on the Imperial Court but responding to the needs of provincial and local elites. MacKinnon also observes the strong foreign influence on Chinese politics. Another important monograph is Ernest P. Young's discourse on Yuan Shikai's presidency (1912–16), which focuses on the two trends of conservatism and liberalism during the years when Yuan was the national leader. Rejecting the notion that Yuan was a reactionary warlord, Young carefully analyses Yuan's policies as well as his relations with the gentry and the military. Young demonstrates that Yuan was extremely power-hungry and increasingly concentrated power in his own hands. The monographs by MacKinnon and Young were typical of Western scholarship on Yuan. However, they were published in 1977 and 1980 respectively and need to be supplemented with new findings and new sources. More importantly, these two scholars do not deal much with Yuan's personal life, focusing instead on the power structure and political affairs during the years from 1901 to 1916.

There is an urgent need for a twenty-first-century biography of Yuan Shikai that incorporates newly unearthed primary sources, that integrates existing scholarship, and that offers fresh perspectives. Such a book would fill the void left by the long interval since Chen's biography appeared in 1961; it would also help Western readers understand modern Chinese history and politics as well as, more broadly, new trends in Chinese civilization. In many ways, Yuan embodied the enormous changes taking place in modern China, and an understanding of him will help readers understand the country's recent past. Because of the voluminous recent literature and the new availability of primary source materials, it is now possible to write a comprehensive biography of Yuan.

A new assessment of him in the context of his family background and the momentous changes China underwent during his lifetime will do much to inform – and intrigue – readers in this new century

Yuan Shikai was first and foremost a product of history. He was the scion of an elite family, a product of his foreign mission, a crystallization of his military program, an artefact of turbulent political changes, and an outcome of his own personal ambition. Yuan built his power base on the ruins of the declining Qing Empire, yet he never earned a degree in the Civil Service Examination System and thus did not rise through normal channels. He took the side of the imperial system, yet he endeavoured to modernize his country through reforms. He was a new man in the old system, but at the same time he was an old-timer among new modernizers. Yuan represents and perhaps embodies a bundle of contradictions within the declining Qing dynasty and the rising Chinese Republic. He enjoyed speedy promotion but through atypical channels. Unlike most officials rising from the grassroots to the provincial administration and then to the central government, he achieved prominence through a combination of foreign missions, military power, civilian management, and political manoeuvring. He never joined the revolutionary movement, but he easily landed the job as the first president of the post-revolutionary government and the newly established republic.

In retrospect, Yuan Shikai as a historical figure was produced by a number of historical factors, such as personal and social networks, individual gifts, propitious opportunities, domestic supports, foreign encouragement, and – most importantly – the 1911 Revolution. Yuan as a historical figure can be viewed as a political phenomenon, or a cultural happening, or a historical instance during the era of transition from empire to republic. These dramatic historical forces turned Yuan into a unique figure. His rise exemplifies the importance of the local gentry class, represents the rising supremacy of the military in civil politics, betokens soaring Han Chinese nationalism, and signals China's efforts to modernize. Yuan was shaped by his time and by his world, which together transformed him into a national figure.

This book is a study of Yuan Shikai from his birth to his death. It has a dozen chapters, each focusing on a particular time span. Instead of offering a narrative, each chapter provides an analysis that interprets Yuan as a historical figure. Readers will come

to understand that Yuan was strongly impacted by his country's multiple and widely disruptive transformations. Given that he experienced the mass rebellions of the midnineteenth century, the self-strengthening movement, the Sino-foreign conflicts, the reform movement, the 1911 Revolution, and the founding of the republic, this book amounts to a discourse on those turbulent times, one that will enable readers to comprehend modern Chinese history through the lens of Yuan Shikai.

It is not my intention to glorify Yuan, as some readers might expect. Yuan needs no rehabilitation. One hundred years have passed since his death, and any effort at such a rehabilitation – especially in the new century – would be irrelevant. Instead, this book presents a fair appraisal and an objective assessment. It will neither hide his mistakes nor exaggerate his contributions. It treats his life as a totality, examining the factors that led to his rise and scrutinizing his role in modern China's great transformation. Fair assessment does not mean rehabilitating him but rather presenting him objectively as a historical figure. To assess him fairly is not to downplay the heroism of the pioneering revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen, who launched a major revolution to overthrow the Qing dynasty. Rather, Yuan Shikai and Sun Yat-sen represent two distinct paths for modern China: Yuan was a conservative reformer and a modernizer; Sun was a radical revolutionary and also a modernizer. The fact that Sun's followers sacrificed their lives and forsook personal happiness qualifies them as national heroes. Nevertheless, Yuan too aimed at modernization, albeit by a different route. Ultimately, the two forces, along with others, worked together to bring down Qing imperial rule and to offer China a new republic. Through political man oeuvres, Yuan and Sun reached a compromise to build a republican system, for which Yuan seemingly could have become another George Washington, as many of his countrymen at the time eagerly anticipated. Unfortunately, the modernizing former governor general and military leader of the ancien regime committed a fatal mistake by trying to restore monarchism, which discredited him and cast him in a notorious light. Yuan's efforts in this regard were his own error; they were not only his personal tragedy but also the catastrophic misfortune of his nation.

China in First World War

We have examined the 1911 Revolution; the social forces that brought about : the revolution and its major drawbacks. To recapitulate, the 1911 Revolution no doubt:

transformed the political situation in China. Nevertheless, it did not resolve some fundamental problems facing China. Foreign imperial presence was entrenched, there was endemic economic instability, and in the final analysis the revolution did not achieve any political stability either. Almost as soon as the revolution was completed its basic principles were subverted.

Yuan Shi Kai, the imperial general who was made the President of the new republic in 1912, quickly made it clear that his vision of a new China did not include the realization or creation of a republican and democratic society. While Yuan was quick to agree to get rid of the Manchus, he himself harboured monarchical ambitions. The revolutionaries had turned to him with the expectation that they would be able to control him. The European powers gave him tacit support since they viewed him as a symbol of stability. Yuan was a traditional imperialist functioning in a new China, the president of a republic who would rather be a king. This was the reason that Kang Yu-wei castigated Yuan for his monarchical ambitions and wrote to him: "from the point of view of the Manchu Imperial house you are an usurper, and from the point of view of the republic you are a traitor."

In spite of such criticism, Yuan tried to combine imperial customs with modern legal practice. He held imperial audiences, conferred titles to nobility and had the electoral law changed making him president of the Republic for life. Yuan's attempts to arrogate absolute power to himself were supported by engineered expressions of popular support. For example delegates were ordered to come to the capital to deliberate on the form of politics China should have. Quite naturally these tutored delegates respectfully urged the present President Yuan Shi Kai to assume the title of the Emperor of the Chinese Empire". In anticipation of his becoming Emperor, Yuan had ordered the Imperial kilns to manufacture 40,000 porcelain pieces for his palace. Yuan's plans to be declared Emperor were, however, interrupted by Japan presenting an ultimatum in the form of the Twenty One Demands. (We will discuss these a little later.)

Opposition to Yuan's Ambitions

Yuan's ironclad reign was to start on New Year's Day in 1916. When Yuan's intentions became public, opposition to them also came into the open. As it is the makers of the 1911 Revolution were deeply disappointed by Yuan's betrayal in 1913. However,

now what seemed clear was that even those reformers who had supported the idea of a limited monarchy under the Ch'ing were not willing to support the reinstitution of monarchy in China. To this extent then one could say that the 1911 Revolution had a lasting impact.

Radical revolutionaries in Southern China and abroad were alarmed. Even moderate conservatives who had supported Yuan now turned away. The most prominent among them was Liang Chi Chao. He gave up his office as Minister of Justice in Yuan's government and went to Tientsin from where he launched an attack on Yuan's monarchical ambition.

There were others who organized resistance to Yuan in a more direct manner. Tsai Ao, a young general, organized the National Protection Army in the province of Yunnan which under his leadership declared itself independent. Kueichou, Kuanhsia, Chechiang and Sichuan provinces followed suit and declared independence.

Unlike in 1913, Yuan now was not able to control this trend of secession. Even in Northern China his control was on the wane. The army, on which he depended, was also now not willing to support him. In the face of this resistance Yuan was compelled to retire and the Presidency was handed over to the Vice-President, Li Yuan Hung. Yuan's sudden death in 1916 resolved this issue conclusively.

Aftermath of Yuan's Death Yuan's death, however, marked the beginning of a period of political fragmentation i.e. the rule of the 'warlords'. A period of political and military haggling began for the control of a part or whole of China. Even within a province there were often several warlords. The political situation worsened with increased jockeying for power among the warlords and politicians. This political tussle went through a sequence of phases.

'Soon after Yuan's death, attempts were made to reconvene the parliament with Li Yuan Hung as President and Tuan Chi jui as Premier. The problems continued. Though the parliament had been convened, the Peiyang generals continued to exercise their power. The generals of the Northern and Central provinces formed an inter-provincial association under an old Manchu supporter, General Chang Hsun. On the other hand, Premier Tuan Chi jui was forced to resign over the issue of China joining the World War.

To add to the political uncertainty, in 1917 a brief attempt was made to restore the last Ch'ing ruler, the Hsuan Tung Emperor. (It must be recalled that he had abdicated at the instance of Yuan Shi Kai.) General Chang Hsun and Kang Yu wei were actively involved in this attempt. General Chang occupied Peking with the support of Kang and tried once again to restore the last Ch'ing emperor. This restoration lasted about two weeks only as other generals moved quickly to suppress it. They rallied around Tuan who was once again made premier. As a result of this the parliament was brought firmly under the control of the warlords and this alienated the southern provinces further.

In the second phase of the unfolding crisis, the southern provinces defected from the parliament in 1917. The Kuomintang and Sun Yat-Sen tried in 1917 to convene a meeting at Canton with some 250 members of the parliament. Here a military government was formed with Sun as generalissimo. However, in this case too the real wielders of power were the local warlords.

Though the country was rapidly heading towards political disintegration, the group that controlled Peking and its environs continued to maintain the fiction of representing the Chinese Republic. On August 14, 1917, Premier Tuan declared war on Germany. Tuan himself was in the midst of a fight for survival. The Peiyang generals had split into cliques. The Anfu clique (militarists from the provinces of Anhui and Fujian) supporting Tuan and the Chili clique supporting another general Feng Kuo Chang. Tuan tried to bolster his position with loans from Japan. Ostensibly these loans were taken to fight the Germans but in reality they were used to fund his fight against his enemies.

In the south, too, there was a split in Sun's Canton parliament. Sun was forced to retire to Shanghai in May, 1918. A Kuanghsia clique of militarists now dominated the South. The political crisis deepened in China with the dramatic and aggressive moves of Japan during the war period.

The Changing Economic Scene

While the period of World War-I coincided with a deteriorating political situation in China, it provided a boost to Chinese industry. As a result of the war, the pressure of Western competition was reduced. Chinese entrepreneurs seized this opportunity. The industrial spurt was, however, in the foreign administered treaty ports, protected by the treaty system from warlords.

A new merchant class had been in the making for some time. After 1901, they had been fostered by government policies. By 1914 there were over 1000 chambers of commerce with more than 200,000 members. Large scale enterprises continued to be dominated by foreign firms. By 1914, a modern Chinese administrative and entrepreneurial class had begun to emerge.

The World War and China

As already mentioned, the period of war was also a period of cataclysmic political change in China. When war broke out in 1914, China declared her neutrality. China, however, was necessarily drawn into the global conflict because of the presence of foreign powers. Japan which entered the war on the side of the Allies, declared war on Germany. Japanese troops landed in Northern Shantung, thereby flouting Chinese neutrality. In November 1914, the Japanese captured the German held port of Tsingtao and then proceeded to take over the whole of Shantung. This was the first move on the part of Japan to prepare the ground for the presentation in secret of the Twenty One Demands to Yuan Shi Kai. Had these demands been acceded to in toto, Japan would then have realised her larger imperialist goals.

The Twenty One Demands

Japan sought to make permanent her political and economic interests in the East in general and in China in particular at a time when the Western imperial powers were preoccupied with the World War. A fundamental problem in Sino-Japanese relations was Japan's growing dissatisfaction with her role and power in China as compared to that of the Western powers. The monopolistic character of most of the railway and mining concessions held by the American and European financial groups threatened to exclude Japan completely from the development process and thereby deny her potential profits. According to the Four Power Consortium (Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia) Agreement of April 15, 1911, China granted these four nations almost exclusive monopoly to furnish China with funds and capital. Such agreements were perceived by the Japanese as further proof of Chinese and European attempts to curtail Japanese investment prospects in China. The political measures evolved by the Japanese to safeguard and expand their interests in China came in the form of Twenty One Demands.

The exigencies of Japanese politics too played a major role in shaping this aggressive policy. Though we need not go into the details of Japan's wmpulsions here, suffice is to say that the pressures to seek access to resources, markets, an outlet for a growing population and an ambition to be a leader in East Asia all propelled the Twenty One Demands. The World War provided the Japanese with an opportunity to remove all doubts and insecurities of theh potential and capacity to safeguard their interests and acquire new ones. The Japanese Minister in China is reported to have stated somewhat picturesquely and bluntly Japan's intentions: "the present crisis throughout the world virtually forces my government to take far reaching action. When there is a fire in a jeweller's shop, the neighbours cannot be expected to refrain from helping themselves".

As already stated many of the Twenty One Demands sought to give Japan the same kind of rights in China that the European powers had long enjoyed. The immediate catalyst for the demands was Japan's successful defeat of Germany in Shantung. The question now was the disposal of the leasehold and economic rights enjoyed by Germany in Shantung and Japan was eager to acquire them.

Yuan Shi Kai, the Chinese president, was presented with an ultimatum in the form of the Twenty One Demands on May 7th 1915, a day which Chinese students and nationalists commemorated as National Humiliation'

Day.May Fourth Movement

The May 4th Movement twenty years ago marked a new stage in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism. The cultural reform movement which grew out of the May 4th Movement was only one of the manifestations of this revolution. With the growth and development of new social forces in that period, a powerful camp made its appearance in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, a camp consisting of the working class, the student masses and the new national bourgeoisie. Around the time of the May 4th Movement, hundreds of thousands of students courageously took their place in the van. In these respects the May 4th Movement went a step beyond the Revolution of 1911.

If we trace China's bourgeois-democratic revolution back to its formative period, we see that it has passed through a number of stages in its development: the Opium War, the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the Reform

Movement of 1898, the Yi Ho Tuan Movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4th Movement, the Northern Expedition, and the War of the Agrarian Revolution. The present War of Resistance Against Japan is yet another stage, and is the greatest, most vigorous and most dynamic stage of all. The bourgeois-democratic revolution can be considered accomplished only when the forces of foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism have basically been overthrown and an independent democratic state has been established. From the Opium War onwards each stage in the development of the revolution has had its own distinguishing characteristics. But the most important feature differentiating them is whether they came before or after the emergence of the Communist Party. However, taken as a whole, all the stages bear the character of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. The aim of this democratic revolution is to establish a social system hitherto unknown in Chinese history, namely, a democratic social system having a feudal society (during the last hundred years a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society) as its precursor and a socialist society as its successor. If anyone asks why a Communist should strive to bring into being first a bourgeois-democratic society and then a socialist society, our answer is: we are following the inevitable course of history.

China's democratic revolution depends on definite social forces for its accomplishment. These social forces are the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the progressive section of the bourgeoisie, that is, the revolutionary workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen, with the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary forces and the workers as the class which leads the revolution. It is impossible to accomplish the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution without these basic revolutionary forces and without the leadership of the working class. Today, the principal enemies of the revolution are the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors, and the fundamental policy in the revolution is the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, consisting of all workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen who are against Japanese aggression. Final victory in the War of Resistance will be won when this united front is greatly consolidated and developed.

In the Chinese democratic revolutionary movement, it was the intellectuals who were the first to awaken. This was clearly demonstrated both in the Revolution of 1911

and in the May 4th Movement, and in the days of the May 4th Movement the intellectuals were more numerous and more politically conscious than in the days of the Revolution of 1911. But the intellectuals will accomplish nothing if they fail to integrate themselves with the workers and peasants. In the final analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary intellectuals and non-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary intellectuals is whether or not they are willing to integrate themselves with the workers and peasants and actually do so. Ultimately it is this alone, and not professions of faith in the Three People's Principles or in Marxism, that distinguishes one from the other. A true revolutionary must be one who is willing to integrate himself with the workers and peasants and actually does so.

It is now twenty years since the May 4th Movement and almost two years since the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. The young people and the cultural circles of the whole country bear a heavy responsibility in the democratic revolution and the War of Resistance. I hope they will understand the character and the motive forces of the Chinese revolution, make their work serve the workers and peasants, go into their midst and become propagandists and organizers among them. Victory will be ours when the entire people arise against Japan. Young people of the whole country, bestir you!

Self-Assessment Questions

1. When did the Chinese Revolution take place?
2. Who led the Chinese Revolution of 1911?
3. What were the main causes of the 1911 Revolution?
4. What was the Tung Meng Hui?
5. Which party was founded by Dr. Sun Yat Sen?
6. Who became the first President of the Chinese Republic?
7. What was the role of Yuan Shi Kai after the revolution?
8. How was China involved in the First World War?
9. What was the May Fourth Movement?
10. What was the impact of the 1911 Revolution on Chinese society?

Unit – II

Background – Japanese Imperialism – Japan in First World War – Twenty one Demands – Washington Conference.

Objectives

- To the rise of Japanese Imperialism.
- To the Japan's role in the First World War.
- To the Twenty-One Demands imposed on China.
- To the impact of the Washington Conference.

Background – Japanese Imperialism

European imperialist projects in the nineteenth century had many goals – land for colonizing, raw materials, markets for manufactured goods, the civilization of the world, and glory for the mother country, to name just a few. The Japanese, who in the 1850s were the victims of American imperialism, built their own empire in the second half of the century for many of the same reasons. The following reading provides some background about how they did so.

Imperialism and Colonies

The Japanese had rarely been engaged in foreign affairs before the Meiji Restoration. In the 1850s, however, the United States Navy, under Commodore Matthew Perry, forced the Japanese to open their ports to U.S. trade, and this forced a major change in Japanese policy towards the outside world. The Tokugawa Shogunate fell in 1867 with the Meiji Restoration, and Japan began to look at surrounding territories as places to establish colonies and project influence.

The “opening of Japan” began in the years before the Meiji Restoration; it was so controversial that it was a major reason why the Tokugawa Shogunate was toppled. Eventually, however, the Japanese accepted that they would need to modernize so that they would never have to repeat the experience of the Black Ships (as Perry’s fleet was called) again. The Meiji regime sent missions to the Western countries to try to understand their progress and duplicate it.

Soon, the pursuit of progress and the struggle to survive became hallmarks of Japanese imperialism, much as they were in the West with the rise of Social Darwinism

and the doctrine of the survival of the fittest. Many in the Western world believed that only the strongest countries would persevere, and that the strongest were those that were best able to adapt to the situation in international politics. The Japanese accepted this idea and sought to become strong enough and modern enough to ensure their survival. The Japanese improved their armies so that they could meet the Western powers on equal terms in battle. They cultivated a strong sense of nationalism and state Shintoism in the populace, following the Western belief that a coherent society would be strongest. Finally, they overhauled their social institutions so that they would best reflect the goals Japan sought to achieve. This, the Japanese believed, would help them to repel European imperialists and perhaps build an empire of their own.

Japan's first expansion was north, to the nearby island of Hokkaido. The island was populated by the Ainu, a society of hunter-gatherers. The Japanese sought the land for farming, so they assimilated the Ainu and converted them into farmers. Next, in 1879, Japan annexed the Ryukyu Islands to the south.

Tensions between Japan and Korea led the Japanese to acquire influence in the Korean Peninsula. In 1876, the Japanese invaded because the Koreans refused to accept the Meiji Emperor. The Japanese annexed territory in some of Korea's ports and declared that all Korean ports were open for trade with Japan. In the ensuing decades, the Japanese and Chinese battled for influence in Korea. Tensions exploded in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), which the Japanese won. The peace treaty gave the Japanese some trading rights in China and forced the Chinese to pay reparations to Korea. The Japanese would have taken some Chinese territory, too, but the European powers worried that Japan would gain too much influence in China and blocked this part of the treaty.

Japanese influence in China and Korea increased in the early 1900s. The Japanese exacted some control over China's Fujian Province, across from Taiwan, as well as an indemnity for helping to subdue the Boxer Rebellion. Meanwhile, Japan made Korea a protectorate in 1905 and formally annexed it in 1910. Within a short period of time, Japan had grown into a significant empire.

Relations with European Countries

Japanese imperialism resembled European imperialism in many ways. The Japanese used their empire as a means to exploit natural resources for industrialization

and provide a market for finished goods. They also developed colonies where mainland Japanese could live. This followed the pattern of European imperialism closely, but the main difference was that the Japanese did not fit the racial explanation for imperialism that many Europeans believed. The Japanese were not Christian Europeans who had a divine mission to civilize and subdue the planet, but a “lesser” race whose imperial period began after the Europeans and Americans had initially sought to project their influence on Japanese territory.

European countries had mixed reactions to Japan’s more assertive foreign policy. Europeans were generally impressed by Japan’s conquests, though the country was still considered a second-rate power on the basis of race alone. Nonetheless, Britain signed an alliance with Japan in 1902, which signified that Japan should be considered somewhat equal to the Western powers. The alliance was one of mutual convenience – both the Japanese and the British were concerned about Russian influence in Manchuria – but the fact that it was made at all is significant. The British pursued a policy of “splendid isolation” from European affairs in the late nineteenth century, and the alliance with Japan was the first they had made in decades.

The greatest opposition to Japanese imperialism came from Russia. Russia’s opposition came not primarily because they believed the Japanese were racially unfit for empire, however, but because of competing interests. The Russian Empire had expanded greatly in Asia, and near the end of the nineteenth century it took parts of China as well. As Japan was expanding into China as well, the two empires were on a collision course. In the 1890s, Russia built the Trans-Siberian Railway from Moscow to Vladivostok, which was a former Chinese territory Russia had acquired. The railway was one of many ways in which the Russians were increasing their influence in Manchuria, a province in northeastern China close to Japan. The two sides entered into fitful negotiations at the turn of the twentieth century to maintain peace, but these negotiations were unsuccessful.

Vladivostok was in northern Manchuria, and because of the ice it was only open for part of the year. When the Russians leased the warm-weather port of Port Arthur from the Chinese, however, the Japanese believed that the Russians had encroached too far. Late one night in 1904, the Japanese destroyed a great deal of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in an attack similar to the one on Pearl Harbor decades later

The Russians were infuriated, and retaliated. To their amazement, the Japanese proved more adept at modern warfare than expected and forced the Russians into a siege at Port Arthur. Confronted by a devastating defeat on their eastern borders, the Russians decided to deploy nearly their entire fleet from St. Petersburg. It was a huge undertaking – the fleet took a couple of months to sail around the tip of Africa, and its journey was chronicled extensively in the Russian press. It finally sailed around to Tsushima at the mouth of the Sea of Japan after much fanfare, and the Japanese were waiting. They sunk the entire Russian navy in a few hours, and sustained no casualties.

Japan's victory at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 was the defining battle of the war. The Russians had no more means of attacking, and they requested peace. This was the first time that an Asian power had defeated a European one in the modern era, and it shamed the Russians. The Japanese gained some respect in the eyes of the Europeans, although some considered the victory more of an inevitable defeat for the Russians, who had always been considered a hybrid between Europeans and “Asiatics.”

- The shock of the American invasions of Japan in the 1850s pushed the Japanese to decide to open up to the world.
- Japanese empire building consisted of annexations in Korea and China as well as of the islands to the north and south. Japanese ambitions greatly resembled European ambitions in their imperial ventures in the nineteenth century.
- One of the reasons why the Japanese pursued their empire was to gain esteem in the eyes of the West. They were successful to some extent; the British in particular were receptive, and completed an alliance with Japan in 1902.
- Japan also gained some respectability after it soundly defeated Russia in the RussoJapanese War of 1904–1905.

Japan in First World War

Introduction

The outbreak of World War-I created an opportunity for Japan to solve some of its problems in the economic and political spheres. To understand these developments it is necessary to examine the developments from the end of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. This war was a major turning point for Japan and marked its emergence as a

powerful actor on the international scene. Hence this Unit starts with a discussion on the Asian political scene before the World War.

The First World War provides a useful point to examine the manner in which Japan was transforming its international role. From the period of the Russo-Japanese war Japan was faced with the question of which countries to ally with and linked to this was also the problem of its relations with China and other neighbours. These questions were not debated academically but linked with the internal political alignments and factional struggles. The political parties as well as the factions within the army, the navy and the bureaucracy expressed differing strategies. Broadly these fell into groups which advocated a Greater Japan and wanted it to expand northwards - an expansion that would bring it into conflict with Russia. The advocates of a little Japan looked southwards as the natural area of Japanese advance.

In these debates Japan's relations with Russia and China became crucial. During these years Japan advanced steadily in China extending its influence and deepening its control. This brought it closer to Britain and the United States as well, for Japan was on the side of the Allies in the World War.

Internally the expansionist policy meant increased expenditure on the army as well as the navy. This economic burden created tensions, both in the economy as well as between different political groups. The Rice Riots of 1918 were one such expression of the problems created for the people. These are the various aspects dealt with in this Unit.

The end of the War saw the creation of the Versailles System and the Unit also takes into account how Japan reacted to the new order and what it visualized as its role in the world.

Background

In the opening years of the twentieth century European colonialism had extended its hold and dominance over large parts of the world and therefore Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 was seen as a major event. For the first time an Asian power had defeated a European country. Even though the war was criticized within Japan by socialists, pacifists and other groups, in Asia in general it was seen as a creditworthy event and Asian nationalists uniformly praised Japan for this accomplishment.

Japan, on the other hand, even while preserving its territorial independence, building its economy and confronting the West was also at the same time following a policy of expansion within the region. Formosa (now Taiwan), southern Sakhalin, Korea and China and southern Manchuria were areas where Japan had extended its hold or acquired extensive privileges (see Unit 19). So even while emerging as the champion of Asian interests Japan was also beginning to play an imperialist role for which it needed and sought the backing of the Western powers. Japan's alliance with Britain formed the bedrock on which this expansion was built

In Asia Japan's development and strength served to act as a beacon to attract nationalists and republicans of various types to learn from this Asian model. From the late 1880's Chinese students came in droves to learn and study in Japan. Of course it was cheaper to go to Tokyo than London but it was also felt that Japan was part of a shared culture and yet had developed a modern industrial society so that it would have valuable lessons for the future China that the republicans wished to build. Chinese reformers from Liang Chi'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-Sen came to Tokyo.

The influx of this large number of Chinese students represents the first massive flow of students to another Asian country.

The experiences of the Chinese and other Asian students (there were some Indian students as well but little is known about them) coupled with the expansionist policies of Japan created an ambiguity in Japan's image. On the one hand it represented an anti-Western alliance to preserve Asia and its culture and on the other it showed its rapacious side and posed a threat to the integrity and freedom of these countries. Thus Phan Boi Chau, an Indo-Chinese nationalist, said in 1917 that Japan was the most dangerous enemy of Asia. Phan had operated from Tokyo after the Russo-Japanese war. Similarly, Korean nationalists refused to participate in common with Japanese socialists.

The period after the Russo-Japanese war saw Japan faced with three broad choices in its dealings with the outside world:

- i) It could, like the Western powers, seek recognition for its rights and privileges in the East Asian region and work in concert and co-operation with the Western powers. ii) On the other hand Japan could ignore Western interests and argue that its rights in the region were of paramount importance.

- ii) Finally, the third possibility was to assert that Japan had a historical mission to fulfil by demolishing Western dominance and creating a new international order based on Asian principles

The idea of an Asian alliance (rentai) was raised by a number of ideologues with varied interpretations. In its most benign form it called for a Japanese alliance to revive Asia. This was the view of Miyazaki Totten who worked wholeheartedly with Sun Yat-Sen to bring about a republican revolution in China. However, for many it represented a way for Japan to assume the leadership of Asia. This leadership would enable Japan to acquire territories, resources and the population necessary to counter the threat and power of the Western nations.

The first world war

On August 1, 1914 Germany declared war on Russia. Germany was bound in the Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy while Russia was part of the Triple Entente with Britain and France. In quick succession war was declared on France and Britain. This brought in the question of German territories in China. Germany had concessions in Tsingtao and Britain at Weihaiwei both of which were on the Shantung Peninsula. Japan declared on 4 August that it would stay neutral but promised that it would support Britain if there was an attack by Germany on Hong Kong which was a major British base or on Weihaiwei. On August 8 Japan declared war on Germany when it received a request to destroy some German merchant ships in Chinese waters.

Japan's actions were calculated and served its purposes. They had little to do with the war in Europe. Japan saw this as a chance of a lifetime to "establish its rights and interests in Asia."

Japan's colonial possessions had been acquired in the opening years of the Meiji period and since then its aggressive policies, particularly towards Korea, had been supported by ideologues who argued for a greater Japan. In the expansion of its empire the outbreak of World War I allowed Japan to seize the German possession of Tsingtao and the islands of Micronesia: the Marshalls, the Carolines and the Marianas (excluding Guam). Japan launched a series of military actions together with Britain and captured Tsingtao. The Japanese supplied 29,000 troops while there were only 1,000 British

soldiers. In October the Japanese took control of the islands of Micronesia. By the end of the war Japan had suffered 2,000 casualties and captured 5,000 German soldiers.

The Japanese had to buttress this physical expansion of the Empire by carrying out a diplomatic offensive to win support and secure the rights to these new territories. Later under the League of Nations mandate the' Micronesian islands were assigned to Japan as Class C territories with the restriction that they were not allowed to fortify the islands. Tsingtao stayed only for a little while with Japan as its acquisition provoked protests in China and the United States. At the Washington Conference in 1922 Japan had to return Tingtao under pressure.

Japan's colonial possessions were acquired by the beginning of the 1920's and World War-I marked the acceptance, however reluctant, to this power by the Western nations. The civilizing mission which the Japanese formulated had a long history and its, conceptions and assumptions differed from those on which the Western nations had built their empires. Above all because Japan's colonies were in the East Asian region and the people shared affinities of race and culture the Japanese put forward the idea of "assimilation" (doka) much as the French colonialists had, of bringing together and eliminating differences on the basis of an Asian identity. These ideas when applied revealed a variety of problems. Problems arose over such issues as the rights that these colonized people enjoyed.

The government of Hara Takeshi attempted to introduce the legal and administrative structure of Japan into the colonies so that they would be governed by the same rules and regulations. These liberals advocated education, civil liberties, and political representation for colonies as well as eliminating differences. They argued that it was not independence but equality that the colonized wanted. Thus in 1920 Hara Takeshi said "The desire of most Koreans is not for independence but to be treated as equals of the Japanese."

The political situation within Japan was marked by a conflict between various pressure groups. The army and its supporters like Yamagata Aritomo or Katsura Taro favoured an expansionist policy across Korea into Manchuria and then into China proper. This they argued required increase in the strength of the army to twenty five divisions.

Tanaka Giichi, a Yamagata protégé wrote in 1906 that Japan "should break free from its insular position, become a continental state, and confidently extend its nation power."

The second important policy position was in favour of a southern expansion through Taiwan, Southern China and into South-east Asia. This position was advocated by the navy whose ideologues felt that as an island country Japan need not fear invasion but should rather defend its trade routes.

The government was on the whole cautious in pursuing these objectives. It realized and clearly stated that it could only extend its control through the co-operation of the Western powers. The position of the army and Yamagata represented the dominant position and this brought it into conflict with the political parties over the question of increased spending on the military.

In 1907 a new plan had identified Russia, the United States, Germany and France, in that order as possible enemies. To counter their ability to threaten Japan called for building up the army to twenty five divisions and the naval fleet to eight battleships and eight battle cruisers. This represented a 150 per cent increase over the Russo-Japanese war level. However, because of the financial problems facing Japan this was not easily possible.

The situation was further complicated by army and navy rivalry with each group's supporters pushing their cases. The army unable to influence the Saionji cabinet withdrew its war minister and brought down the government in 1912. This is known as the "Taisho Political Crisis"

The political situation in the beginning of the twentieth century was a conflict between the various oligarchic-bureaucratic factions such as the one led by Yamagata and political parties. These two groupings were not monolithic and there were internal divisions amongst them. The major Seiyukai, organized in 1900, and the Doshikai established in 1913 (1916 changed name to Kenseikai and 1927 to Minseito) helped to ensure that governments would be formed with the support of the parties.

In 1911 Saionji had formed his second cabinet and with the support of the Seiyukai was attempting to reduce expenditure and stabilize Japan's precarious financial position. When his government was brought down because of the refusal to toe the army line Katsura Taro accepted the offer to form the government. Katsura, however, occupied

two important posts in the Imperial Household and this was widely criticized as being contrary to the principles of the constitution. The public outburst provoked the first movement to support the constitution. The rallies were also provoked because Katsura used an Imperial Edict to prevent the navy from not providing a minister and this provoked further protests.

In December 1912 The League for the Protection of the Constitution was started. Soon it organized a popular movement which brought down the government and Okuma Sigenobu with the support of the Doshikai came to power and this inaugurated a period of divided parties in the House of Representatives. This situation was favourable to the hanbatsu.

In this political situation Japan sought to create a framework of alliances which would ensure it a stable environment and enable it to carry out its objectives. On January 18, 1915 it presented to Present Yuan Shikai the infamous Twenty-one demands. These demands have been dealt with in Unit 21 but here it may be briefly noted that aside from the extensive rights and privileges demanded, the fifth group of demands would have transformed China into the status of Korea with Japanese advisors running the country. The outburst against the demands by Britain as well as the United States led Japan to withdraw the fifth group. However, these two powers became cautious as to Japan's intentions.

The partition of China was proceeding with Russia having secured freedom of movement in western China and the independence of Outer Mongolia. The Japanese obtained influence in eastern Inner Mongolia through the Russo-Japanese entente of 1913.

The Twenty-one demands were not universally approved within the Japanese government. Thus the Foreign Minister Motono Ichiro recognized that Japan lacked the power to hold on to China for any long-term because of popular resistance.

In 1917 the Russian Revolution broke out and this created a new situation whose effects were far reaching - specifically for Japanese policy in this region. Now Japan too participated with the Allied forces in the Siberian expedition. Under the Terauchi cabinet Japan dispatched seventy thousand troops, the largest contingent. These troops stayed the longest there in spite of the mission having fulfilled. Because of the threat of communism

Japan pressurised China to sign a joint defense treaty and its troops could move freely in China. The United States, which was not favourably inclined to Japan's aims in China and still supported the "open door" policy, gradually came to a grudging acceptance. In November 1917 Ishii Kikujiro and Robert Lansing signed an agreement in which

Both countries recognized China's territorial integrity, equal business opportunities for all, and

The US accepted that Japan had "special interests" in China.

However, Ishii's interpretation that this meant recognition of Japan's exclusive rights over China was denied by the Western nations after the war ended.

Japan also extended its influence over China through financial loans. Between 1917-1918 Japanese loans totaled nearly 200 million yen and in return the rights of the 1915 treaty were guaranteed to Japan as well as additional railway and mining rights.

The Post-War Situation

The end of the war led to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 which laid the basis for an international order which was further developed by the Washington Conference of 1921-22. The subsequent years mark the attempt by Japan to break away from this order which was created to protect the interests of Britain and the United States.

The roots of Japan's dissatisfaction with the Versailles and Washington systems lay in that she had to surrender much of the gains she made in Asia and the Pacific during the war. The United States had not ratified the Paris Peace Treaty which had accepted Japan's acquisition of Shantung. These gains of the war were ultimately nullified by the Washington Conference. The Anglo-Japanese alliance which has been described as the "marrow of imperial diplomacy" was ended and it was not to be replaced. The Japanese had to withdraw from North-east Asia where they had entered during the Siberian Intervention, particularly from the Maritime Provinces, northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. Further the limits imposed on naval capacity left Japan with a lower capacity. The ratio of battleships between the United States, Great Britain and Japan was fixed at 5:5:3. In China, Japan had to return the Shantung concession to China. There was an agreement that no Anglo-American bases would be established east of Singapore or west of Hawaii. In 1922 the Nine Power Pact ended all treaties with China and the other powers and brought in the open door principles. The treaty also laid down the principle of

gradually liquidating the treaty system and called for conferences on Chinese customs tariffs and extra-territoriality. Thus, between the end of the war and the Washington Conference Japan felt that it had been unfairly deprived of her privileges.

These measures were not implemented immediately. Tsingtao was returned and Britain withdrew ultimately from Weihaiwei. The tariff conference was held only in 1925-26 but no agreement was ached at except to postpone tariff autonomy for China to 1929. Aside from the internal problems of China the Exclusion Acts of 1924 passed by the United States was a major problem in Japan-United States relations.

Japan's dissatisfaction with the developments of the post-war period stemmed from the notion that it had been treated unfairly. In 1928 Konoe Fumimaro, an influential statesman, argued that under the Verslles System Japan would always remain a backward country. However, there were other leaders and opinion makers who argued that Japan must accept the current events and work in adjusting itself to the new international order which was being created around the League of Nations.

The Washington System had the possibility of developing a joint and co-operative effort between the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The measures enforced under its policies were not always against the interests of Japan. For instance, the restrictions imposed on Japan did not apply to Manchuria and Mongolia, two areas which Japan considered vital to her interests.

The concessions that Japan committed herself to can be considered as a small price to pay for participating with the other powers in an international system. The limitations on armaments called for by the Washington Treaty provided an opportunity for Japanese politicians to reduce arms expenditure and together with this reduce the role of the army which was emerging as a major political force. There was even a plan by Hara Takeshi and Takahashi Korekiyo, both of whom had been prime ministers. to abolish the office of army chief of staff. However, their plans were unsuccessful. The most representative figure who accepted this new framework was Shidehara Kijuro. a career diplomat who served as foreign minister under five Minseito cabinets. His policy was based on international collaboration, non-intervention in China and the pursuit of economic diplomacy to establish and preserve Japan's strength.

The colonial empire was of course built to serve the needs of the home country and the policy in turn was formed by the dictates of the changing needs of the Japanese economy. From 1900 to 1930's Japan was evolving from a largely agrarian society to an industrial nation. The growing industrial sector required markets and these could be most easily provided by a protected colony. This meant that any competitive industry was not to be allowed in the colonies and the trade of these countries was channeled to Japan.

The growth of the population also required increased food supplies. Taiwan and Korea became major suppliers of sugar and rice respectively but because of the continuing rise in the price of rice Japan imposed measures to intensify rice production in Korea. These steps led to both technical improvements as well as to increases in the cultivated acreage.

The State of Economy

The Japanese economy had been growing but by the time of the First World War Japan was facing serious fiscal problems which slowed the rate of growth. The external debts were increasing and these problems had stemmed from the Russo-Japanese war. The war itself had cost over 2 billion yen and the peace treaty gave no indemnity as the treaty after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 had done. This was the reason that the Portsmouth Treaty provoked violent protests. The war had been financed by borrowing abroad and Japan's foreign indebtedness rose by 1907 to 1.4 billion yen and deficits in current international payments between 1909-13 ranged from 80 to 90 million yen annually.

The World War brought the Japanese economy increased orders from Europe as well as from Asian countries because the Western competitors were occupied elsewhere. The growth of the real gross national product brought about an improvement in the economic situation and increases in private investments. However, income differences increased as those with fixed incomes did not benefit as much as speculators from the boom conditions after the war. The war made private industry and commerce profitable and thus more confident. The leaders of these modern industries established in 1917 the Industrial Club which symbolized their newly emerging power.

Growth of the economy was best represented in the growth of the manufacturing output which rose by 72 per cent between 1914-19 while the labour force increased by

only 42 per cent which meant that labour productivity increased substantially. The highest area of growth within this was in the machinery industry which included shipbuilding, vehicles, machine tools, etc. The figures in table-1 mention the rate of growth in certain fields. Shipbuilding also expanded rapidly. Though the price of materials went up the rate of profit increased and orders multiplied. This growth also generated improvement in construction techniques so that the time taken was reduced by half. After the World War the demand collapsed seriously affecting small companies but the big companies like Mitsubishi were supported by increasing naval demand.

Growth Rate (Per cent per decade)

| Industry | 1906-16 | 1910-20 |
|---------------|---------|---------|
| Chemical | 26.1 | 64.3 |
| Clothing | 36.8 | 39.4 |
| Construction | 36.6 | 22.8 |
| Machinery | 88.8 | 159.1 |
| Manufacturing | 35.4 | 55.6 |
| Metal | 41.2 | 71.9 |

Source: Kazushi Ohkawa and Miyohei Shinohara (ed) Patterns of Japanese Economic Development, London

The war also stimulated the development of general engineering like the building of steam and water turbines for the electric power industry. The reduction of imports, because of the war, allowed a host of small producers to develop and improve their capacity to produce. War time profits were also high (as in steel) where there were severe shortages. Indigenous capacity to produce steel was also limited and the price of pig iron rose from the 1913 average of 49 yen to 541 yen. Yawata, the state run steel company which had been losing 11 million yen before the war made a total of 151 million yen profit during the war years.

The post-war years saw an increase in the gap between big and small industries. The large industries cut back on labour and utilized their capacities more efficiently to meet the post-war recession. The small scale industries continued to employ labour intensive techniques and this led to the emergence of the dual economic structure.

In agriculture growth was largely because of the greater diffusion of technology and increased domestic and foreign demand. However, the rapid increase in food prices led to dissatisfaction amongst many groups - particularly urban consumers but also among tenant farmers both large and small. This discontent burst in the Rice Riots of 1918 which started with a demonstration by housewives and spread over large parts of Japan and brought down the Terauchi cabinet.

The riots were viewed with great seriousness by the growing liberal intelligentsia. In an editorial in the Oriental Economist the riots were seen as showing that: "Unfortunately the political process in our country works effectively only for the property-owning minority, whereas the classes without property are hardly given any security at all. In one sense it is possible to say that those without property have no government at all. Herein lies the true cause of the riots."

The Liberal Opinion

The liberal opinion within Japan saw the triumph of the democracies in the war as confirmation that the world trend was towards democratic government. The Russian Revolution on the other hand inspired socialists and Marxists to work for the actualization of socialist principles. The liberals saw the October Revolution as a sign that class conflict has to be reduced and social solidarity promoted.

The liberal outlook is best represented by the ideas of Yoshino Sakuzo who in 1916 wrote an influential essay on constitutional government. Yoshino was faced with the problem of creating the basis of democracy on the eerie constitution which in turn was based on the principle that sovereignty resided in the Emperor. Yoshino therefore argued that in Western democracy there were two concepts:

That legally sovereignty of the state lay with the people, and
Politically the exercise of sovereignty was with the people.

These two ideas were joined in the Western concept of democracy while in Japan the first was not applicable as sovereignty of the state lies with the Emperor. The second was appropriate for it could be exercised by the people

Yoshino went on to define democracy which he translated as "tinpionshugi". But here it would suffice to note that his and other like minded thinkers' idea of democracy was limited and failed to take into account the actual working of society. It was because

of this failure that the pace of events forced many of these thinkers to take increasingly radical positions.

Yoshino had helped to establish the Reimeikai, an organization which sought to disseminate new political ideas but gradually many of its participants moved to more critical positions. Oyama Ikuo, a well known democrat and liberal thinker began to argue that it was not political opportunity but social and economic equality which was necessary. Hasegawa Nyozekan another influential thinker took a similar stance. The key words were now "reconstruction" (kaizo) and "liberation" (kaiho) symbolizing this quest for a more egalitarian and equitable society where people would have true equality.

The socialists who had, after the execution of the conspirators in the Great Treason Trial in 1911 which had implicated socialists in a plot against the Meiji Emperor, gone into hibernation, began to express themselves after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The spread of socialism and the organization of labour and direct action by workers increased considerably. This was the climate which made it possible to see the Rice Riots as "retaliatory confiscation"

Let Us Sum Up

The First World War provided Japan an occasion to gain both, the advantages of an Allied power as well as that of a neutral country. As an ally of the Triple Alliance she extended her control over the Shantung peninsula and in China as well in the south Pacific islands which had been under German control. The Russian Revolution led to an Allied expedition in which Japan took a major role and which she used to prolong her stay in the region.

Japan's early imperialism stemmed from a variety of motives like the desire to become a great power with ample land and resources; the shortage of domestic capital which led Japan to build protected zones to be able to compete with the Western powers. Also liberal opinion saw Japan as spreading the benefits of modern civilization.

Japan's direct participation in the war was limited to sending a few troops to provide escort for Allied ships. This opportunity was used to expand her trade and improve her economic position. The war shortages led Japan to develop her own capabilities and this can be seen in the growth of the manufacturing sector such as in shipbuilding, machinery and in the development of engineering skills.

The development of industry was accompanied by the growth of labour organizations and industrial action. The nose in prices of rice in particular led to riots which were reflective of a growing inequality in incomes and increasing demand for social and economic equality. Thinkers of various persuasions, nationalist, liberal and socialist were concerned with developing a view of how a more just society could be created. During these years the government of popularly elected parties with a majority in the House of Representatives exercised greater power. This has been referred to as the functioning of "Taisho democracy". Scholars debate the extent of democracy that was established and point to the weaknesses of the parties both in constitutional and ideological terms.

Many of the gains of the war were lost when the war ended but the international order created between the Versailles Peace Treaty and the Washington Conference sought to create co-operation between Great Britain, the United States and Japan. Even though Japan increased her privileges in China, many in Japan were dissatisfied with her position. Japanese leaders debated the pros and cons of expanding northwards or southwards or in both directions and even not expanding at all.

Twenty one Demands

The Twenty-One Demands Analysed - Group I

So much for the procedure in the presentation of the Twenty-one Demands and the oblique methods which the Japanese Government had seen fit to employ for the purpose of keeping them secret. It now remains for us to review seriatim the demands themselves and to follow the tortuous course of diplomatic negotiation.

The demands of the First Group called upon the Chinese Government

- (i) To give "full consent" to all matters which the Japanese Government might arrange with the German Government in regard to the disposition of German rights, interests, and concessions in Shantung;
- (2) To engage not to alienate "to a third Power" any territory within Shantung or any island along its coast;
- (3) To consent to Japan's building a railway from Chef00 or Lungkow to join the Shantung (from Kiao-chow to Tsinan-fu) Railway; and

(4) To open "important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as commercial ports."

In this Group of demands, quite a few interesting points were involved. Imprecise, Japan seemed to have completely ignored Great Britain, her ally, and her partner in the Tsingtao expedition. The capture of the German stronghold in Shantung was not due to one man or one nation's work. It was the accomplishment of the joint forces of the two countries. How, then, could the Japanese Government alone, evidently without the knowledge of the British Government, proceed to negotiate with the Chinese Government for the succession to the German rights and properties in Shantung, which were captured by the joint forces of the two nations? The fact that British soldiers had co-operated with Japanese forces in the reduction of Tsingtao was completely ignored or forgotten. Secondly, it may be noted that, in making these demands relating to Shantung, Japan presumably proceeded on the theory that she succeeded, after the expulsion of Germany from the said province, to all the rights, privileges, and concessions previously enjoyed by Germany. As matter of fact, however, Japan demanded more than what Germany had enjoyed before the war. The request for the right to build a railway by Japan from Chefoo or Log know to connect the trans-Shantung line, for instance, testified to this fact. And in the third place, Japan seemed to have entirely ignored the fact that the most important subject matter of the First Group of demands the disposition of German concessions in Shantung related to the post-bellum settlement, and as such, it should be left over for negotiation by all the interested Powers at the forthcoming Peace Conference. Was Japan at all sure then that the Allies were going to win the war? It seemed that she had taken for granted that Germany was as good as vanquished. And finally, it must be observed, the demand requiring China not to cede or lease to a third Power any territory in the Province of Shantung or any island on its coast was most derogatory of China's sovereignty. It brought us back to the days of inter-national scramble towards the end of the nineteenth century when Japan and the leading European nations vied with one another for territorial concessions from China. The demand was made worse for the reason that "a third Power" meant to exclude Japan, thus leaving herself free to take hold of anything in Shantung or along its coast.

We notice that the demands in the First Group were introduced by a preamble which said as much as that the demands were intended for "maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations." Studying them in their true light, we have failed to see how they could contribute to the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia or to the improvement of the neighborly relations of the two countries. On the very contrary, we perceive that they were destined to disturb the political tranquility in the Far East and the friendly relations between the two governments. It is easy to see how the Japanese Government, with sugar-coated words of peace and friendship, essayed to hide the grim and sinister realities. The Chinese Government was called upon to give full consent to whatever Shantung arrangement that Japan might make with Germany; to pledge not to cede or lease any territory in Shantung to a third Power; to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect the Shantung Railway; and to open important cities and towns in the province for foreign (which means for Japanese) trade and residence.*If the general peace in Eastern Asia and the friendship between China and Japan depended upon the acceptance by the Chinese Government of these demands, it is evident, then, that Japan was to be bought for her willingness to maintain peace and to continue friendly relations with her neighbour."It was palpable that the whole of the demands were intended to extend the rights and interests of Japan without securing a quid pro quo of any kind for China." It was equally palpable that the acceptance of these demands was a necessary part of the price for her to preserve peace in the Far East.

The real significance of the First Group of demands cannot be realised until one takes into consideration the railway situation in Northern China. In the first place, Japan desired to succeed to the German rights and concessions in Shantung, among which was included the trans- Shantung Railway, known as the Kiao-chow-Tsinanfu Railway. Germany had also the right, by virtue of the notes ex- changed, December 31, 1913, of constructing a rail- way from Kaomi, and, passing through I-chow-fu and I- hsien, terminating at Hanchuang, there connecting with the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway; and another line starting from Tsinanfu to connect the Peking Hankow Railway at a place between Shunteh-fu and Hsin hsiang hsien. To both lines Japan claimed to succeed. Now,

these railways together with the other concessions in Shantung, "were the fruits of sixteen years of German aggression." "Their transfer to Japan means that the Teutonic methods, which enabled Germany to dominate and exploit the province, will pass into the hands of the Power with a great military base already standing on Chinese soil at Port Arthur."

But this is not all. Japan also claimed the right of building a railway from Cheroot or Longbow to join the Kiaochow Tsinanfu Railway. The meaning of this demand considered in conjunction with Japan's right to succeed to the Kiaochow Tsinanfu Railway and to the other two lines running into the provinces of Kiangsu and Chili, is that Japan would practically dominate North China through her control of the railways in the region. The situation becomes all the worse when it is remembered that Japan has been in control over the South Manchurian Railway and has been granted the right of constructing a number of railways in Inner Mongolia. The Chinese delegates at the Peace Conference at Versailles described the situation succinctly and accurately.

"Through the trans-Shantung railway, with its western or inland terminus at the provincial capital of Tsinanfu where it flanks the northern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway built by the Germans Japan will at once dominate the whole of Shantung as well as the northern half of this important trunk line. Then, by financing, constructing and supplying the material's for the first of the aforesaid 'two lines of railway i.e., a line from the city of Kaomi, on the trans-Shantung railway, to a point strategically dominating the southern or British constructed section of the same Tientsin Pukow Railway, Japan will practically master the great railroad linking Tientsin (the port of Peking) and North China with the Yangtze Valley and South China.

"Next, by financing, etc., the second of the 'two lines of railway/ i.e., a. line practically extending the- trans-Shantung Railway from Tsinanfu, where it will bisect the Tientsin Pukow trunk line, to a point westward on the Peking-Hankow Railway, Japan will flank the other of the two trunk lines connecting Peking and North China with Central and Southern China.

"And when it is borne in mind that Japan also controls the railway systems in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the extent of Japan's railway domination of China north of the great line of the Yangtze will be realised.

"This fact also must be noted. It means the isolation of Peking which will be cut off from Central and Southern China not only by land but by the sea-route, 'owing to the Gulf of Pechili through which Peking can be reached via its port of Tientsin - being directly dominated by the Japanese at Port Arthur."

The Twenty-One Demands Analysed - Group II

The seven demands in Group II exact in favour of Japan and her nationals a series of preferential rights, interests and privileges in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia calculated at once to increase the existing difficulties which seriously hamper effective Chinese administration in these two areas and to develop a situation facilitating the extension thereto of the territorial system which has transformed Korea into a Japanese province."

This is the language which the Chinese delegates at the Versailles Peace Conference employed in characterizing the demands of the Second Group, which affected, one and all, most vitally the territorial integrity and administrative independence of China in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Furthermore, the demands of this Group were in complete contravention of the Open Door principle, violating a number of treaties existing between Japan and China, and between Japan and other Powers about China. This Group was generally interpreted, and correctly too, as an attempt by Japan to consolidate her interests in South Manchuria, obtained as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, and to extend them into a new region, Eastern Inner Mongolia, which is, in the language of the Chinese Government, "a new expression in Chinese geographical terminology."

A more careful examination of the demands, however, revealed the fact that it was not consolidation, but extension, of Japanese interests in those regions that was really aimed at by the Japanese Government. This was made plain by the desire of the Japanese Government to extend the leases of the Kwantung peninsula and of the Antung-Mukden and the South Manchurian Railways, and to secure for its nationals political and economic rights and privileges never before enjoyed by them.

The demands were introduced by a queer preamble. It alleged that "the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia." This was contrary to the fact, for the Chinese

Government had never acknowledged anything of the kind. The furthest that the Chinese Government went was its agreement in 1905 to the transfer to Japan of the Russian concessions in South Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War.

As has been pointed out, the demands were in- compatible with the principle of the Open Door. And the incompatibility becomes apparent when we come to analyse the gradients of the demands. Japan demanded for her nationals the right to lease or own land in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; to travel and reside freely in those regions; to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever; to open mines, build railways, and to monopolies loans to China for development purpose in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Aside from these privileges and rights which would immediately create for the Japanese sea status unwarranted by the terms of the existing treaties between China and Japan and would thus give them a freedom of action which would be serious restriction of the sovereignty of China and infringement of her administrative rights, the Chinese Government was called upon to hand over to the Japanese Government the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway for a term of 99 years, and to employ none but Japanese for positions of financial and military advisers or in- structures in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. That these demands were outrageous to the extreme could admit of no doubt. They meant to create for the Japanese such a privileged status neither in those regions that it would neither be in consonance with the Open Door policy nor in harmony with Japan's professed desire for the maintenance of the territorial integrity and political independence of the Chinese Republic.

It is a well-known fact that the extension of the term of the leased territory had long been broached among the political circles in Tokio. In fact, the visit of Baron Fukushima, one time Governor-General of Port Arthur and Kwantung, to Peking in January, 1914, was attributed to his desire for the extension of the lease. His mission was a complete failure, for the determination of the Chinese Government not to extend the existing leases could not be moved. "Owing to the bitter experiences which China sustained in the past in connection with the leased portions of her territory, it has become her settled policy neither to grant further leases nor to extend the terms of those now in existence." As the term of the leases would soon expire, something had to be done, and

done quickly. Diplomacy is a tortuous course, which may not be able to arrive at results in the shortest time possible. The only alternative was that Japan tried to force an extension of the leases from the Chinese Government, which she could not secure through diploid persuasion. It was, therefore, no surprise that Japan should have preceded all other demands in the Second Group that of extension of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, and that of the South Manchurian railways. The Chinese Government was forced to abandon its own cherished hopes to regain control of these territories and properties at the expiration of their respective original terms of lease. The 25-year lease of Port Arthur and \ Dalny, the 36-year period of the South Manchurian Railway, and the 15 -year period of the Antung Mukden Railway were, one and all, extended to 99years! "The extension of these leaseholds means the perpetuation of an alien political system in South Manchuria that immediately menaces the territorial integrity and independence of China," observed the Chinese delegates at the Versailles Peace Conference. "Through Port Arthur the most powerful citadel in continental Asia and the commercial base of Dalny which is linked with the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden lines, Japan politically and commercially dominates a region through which lies the 'historic road of invasions' into China. In the past, Asiatic invaders have entered the country from the North ; and it was through the Manchurian 'gate' that the last invaders crossed into the great plains of Northern China. History and a sense of realities seem to suggest a view of the Japanese sys-tem in South Manchuria that cannot be reconciled with the security of the Chinese Republic."

When all is said, it is necessary to point out once more the serious nature of the right which Japan had claimed for her nationals to travel, to reside, to lease or own land, and to engage in the business and manufacture of any kind what sever, in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. In the first place, the Chinese Government, inasmuch as the people of Mongolia were not at all accustomed to foreign trade and residence, could not suffer the foreigners to travel or to do business in that region without feeling great anxiety about their safety. Furthermore, to extend these privileges to the Japanese subjects would entail the extension of the rights of extraterritoriality to a large alien population, which would not only be a source of future trouble, but might also be a contributing cause whereby China was to lose jurisdiction over a large area of her

territory. "Should Japanese subjects be granted the right of owning land, it would mean that all the landed property in the region might fall into their hands thereby endangering China's territorial integrity." Or, as an American writer observes, "it is obvious that if these were agreed to, Japanese statej aided enterprises could be dotted all over South Manchuria, and China would have no jurisdiction/ over the occupiers of the land. To all intents and/ purposes the areas occupied by the Japanese would! be alienated from China, as with the growth of\ the Japanese communities it is certain that there would come a demand for the control of policing and: other municipal functions. The Chinese authorities and police would be powerless to function, as extraterritoriality would bar them. Right of entry to land and premises could not be insisted upon by the Chinese police and other authorities and consequently the Chinese Government would lose jurisdiction over an area only limited by the extent to which the Japanese could appeal to the cupidity of the Chinese landowners. Moreover it would appear that by virtue of the most-favored nation clause other nationalities would acquire whatever rights the Japanese secured. Clearly this would tend further to restrict China's jurisdiction and to increase the chance of complications. "Indeed, if these rights and privileges were granted to the Japanese, but not extended to the nationals of the other Powers, then the Japanese would have a preferred position which would enable them to monopolise all the interests in the above-mentioned regions. If the same and similar rights and privileges were given to all foreigners, as they should be under the rule of the most favoured nation treatment and the principle of equal opportunity, then China's administrative autonomy over the territory would be come a thing of the past. It was a veritable dilemma confronting the Chinese Government when it under took to negotiate the demands of the Second Group.

The Twenty-One Demands Analysed - Group III

The demands of the Third Group, relating to the Japanese interests in the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Works, betrayed at once the desire of the Japanese Government to control the biggest iron works in China and its ambition to monopolise the mineral resources of practically the entire Yangtze Valley.

According to the demands, the Hanyehping Company was to be converted into a Chino-Japanese joint concern, the rights and properties of which were not to be disposed of without the previous consent of the company, or the Japanese Government, which

meant in this case one and the same thing. The Chinese Government, on the other hand, was asked to agree that the mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the company were not to be worked by other persons outside of the company, without the consent of the Japanese Government. The "blanket" character of these demands was apparent. It is easily discernible that what Japan had really wanted was not a Chino-Japanese joint concern. A joint company could serve only as a means to the end which she had in view. She wanted in the first place an absolute control over the largest iron works in China, so as to monopolise the product to the exclusion of all other Powers (including China, perhaps). She wanted then an exclusive right to operate the mines in the Yangtze Valley, conveniently and diplomatically styled as the mines "in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company." It was pointed out at the time that these demands were in direct conflict with the recognised interests of Great Britain in the Yangtze Valley. "To accept joint Japanese control of the Yanyehping Company, the most successful enterprise in the country," said a British diplomat, "would mean establishing Japan at the very heart of the British sphere of interest."

In a highly picturesque language, another British writer put the situation thus: "When we reach (Group III) we touch matters that are not immediately vital but quite new in their type of audacity and which every one can to-day understand since they are politico industrial. Group III, as it stands in the (original text), is simply the plan for the conquest of the mineral wealth of the Yangtze Valley which mainly centres round Hankow because the vast alluvial plains of the lower reaches of this greatest of rivers were once on the floor of the Yellow Sea, the upper provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi being the region of prehistoric forests clothing the coasts, which once looked down upon the slowly receding waste of waters, and which to-day contain all the coal and iron."

The attention of the Japanese Government was re-heatedly called to the fact that the Hanyang Arsenal, the Tayeh Iron Mines, and the Pinghsiang collieries called the Hanyehping Company generally for the sake of convenience were private concerns. According to the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, the private property of the Chinese citizens cannot be interfered with by the Government. In other words, Chinese citizens are guaranteed the right of protection of their property and freedom to engage in any lawful occupation, with which the Chinese Government are precluded

from interfering. It was declared, therefore, that the Chinese Government could not negotiate with Japan to make any disposal of the company without doing violence to the fundamental law of the land, or to convert it into "a joint concern of the two nations." It may be interesting to note that, in the preamble which introduced the demands of this Group, the Japanese Government asserted that "Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company have close relations with each other at present." It also intimated in broad terms that these demands, looking towards the joint control of the Company and a Japanese monopoly of the mineral deposits in the heart of China, were made with no other purpose in view than that of advancing "the common interests of the two nations." Admittedly, the psychology of the Japanese Government is difficult to understand. How could a Japanese control of the Hanyehping Company benefit China? And how could an intended monopoly by Japan of the mineral wealth of central China be made to serve the "common interests" of the two countries? In order to arrive at a fairly reasonable answer to these questions, and in order to understand, in concise language, the way in which the "Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company have come to close relations with each other," we reproduce here in extensor an editorial comment from the Far Eastern Review, April, 1915, apropos of the subject. It reads:

"The career of the Hanyehping Company, which comprises the Hanyehping iron works, the Pinghsiang coal mines, and the Tayeh iron mines, has been somewhat chequered. It has had recurring financial troubles and, influenced by Sheng Kung-pao, who has always been amicably disposed towards the Japanese, it has largely employed Japanese money to assist it over its difficulties. In the first instance a sum of This. 5,000,000 was borrowed from a German firm, but this was repaid later on by the Chinese Government. Japan appears to have first come upon the scene in 1902, when a contract was entered into between the Company and the Japanese Imperial Steel Foundry whereby the latter was to be supplied with iron ore from Tayeh for fifteen years. The Company was at this time suffering from insufficiency of funds, and two years after making the contract with the Steel Foundry a sum of this. 3,000,000 were borrowed from the Yokohama Specie Bank. Other debts to Japanese concerns were contracted, and by 1912 the total amount outstanding was in the neighborhood of this. 9,000,000. The financial condition of the Company showed no sign of improvement and in 1913 the sum of

\$15,000,000 Mexican currency was borrowed from the Japanese, who secured the right to appoint advisers and other officials. This is a brief history of the Company, showing how the Japanese have gradually won their way to a position in which they have some voice in the management. It is said that the Japanese have largely to thank Sheng Kung-pao for the hold they have gained over the concern. The shareholders, or a large section of them, have long been desirous of releasing the Company from its financial shackles, or at all events those riveted by Japan, and it was hoped that a sum sufficient to pay off the indebtedness to the Japanese could be borrowed from America or Great Britain. Influence was brought to bear, however, and this project was defeated. There was also some talk of nationalizing the Company, but this also fell through

"The preamble of the Hanyehping demands recites that the proposed arrangement is for the 'common interests' of China and Japan. It is difficult to conceive what arguments could be advanced to show that China's interests would be served by admitting Japan as a partner in an enterprise of such paramount importance. If it were necessary for China to secure the assistance of another nation in the development of her steel' industry it would be clearly advantageous for her to select a nation that had the benefit of long experience and expert knowledge. Without casting any reflection upon the Japanese it cannot be said that they possess the qualifications that would justify China in admitting them to partnership. Moreover, it is evident that the partnership would consist of the Japanese Government on the one hand and Chinese Company on the other. The control of an industry upon which the greatness of so many countries is based, would assuredly pass into the hands of the Japanese and this is a possibility that no patriotic Chinese would contemplate without alarm. The interests of Japan, which, as is generally known, is badly in need of iron ore owing to the poverty of her own resources in this respect, would undoubtedly be served if she were admitted to partnership—the interests of China would equally as assuredly suffer.

"When attention is directed to the second article of the demand it is seen that not only does Japan want to gain control of the Hanyehping Company, but she wishes to prevent any other country from working mines in the provinces in which the Hanyehping properties are situated. The Tayeh mine is in Hupeh and the Pinghsiang coal mine is in Hunan. The expression that is used, 'mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the

Hanyehping Company* is comprehensive enough to enable Japan to veto any mining operations in either province. It may be re-called that when the question arose as to the meaning of the term 'parallel to the South Manchuria Railway' Japan insisted upon putting her own interpretation upon it, and it may safely be assumed that she would act similarly if any question arose in regard to mines in Hupeh and Hunan. It has to be borne in mind that these provinces, Hunan in particular, are immensely rich in mineral deposits and, with acceptable mining regulations, would present a splendid field for the investment of foreign capital. Japan now proposes to prevent the investment of foreign capital in this part of China. The demand is the more extraordinary in view of Japan's relationship with Great Britain. The alliance between the countries was contracted in order that their interests in the Far East should be protected. Great Britain has admittedly special interests in the Yangtze Valley, yet Japan proposes to render it impossible for British capital to be invested in a most important industry in this region. How can Japan reconcile this demand with her engagements with Great Britain and her often reiterated adherence to the principle of equal opportunity? It must be confessed that all the evidence points to a desire on the part of Japan to secure for herself the sole right to develop the mines of China. She has already secured a monopoly in South Manchuria and Shantung ; she is demanding a monopoly in Hunan and Hupeh and Fukien. Even were this not directly opposed to the pledge that Japan has given to maintain the principle of the open door, such a monopoly would be most disastrous for China. Japan has no surplus capital of her own for investment in mining enterprises, and as she would scarcely be able to borrow money from other countries to work mines in China for her own benefit, the result of the monopoly would be that China's mining resources would remain undeveloped. It seems hardly credible that Japan should seriously have presented demands that conflict so directly with the interests of the other Treaty Powers, but the fact that they have been presented remains. China has hitherto declined to take the Hanyehping demands into serious consideration, and it is to be hoped for her own sake as well as that of the Treaty Powers that she will be able to resist the endeavour being made to induce her to become a party to what can only be called an act of political' bad faith."

The truth of the matter is that Japan, having very little coal or iron of her own, decided that the sooner she could get control of China's almost in- exhaustible resources

the better. Before she made the demand, Japan had, as has been pointed out in the passage reproduced in the above, already acquired considerable influence in the management of the Hanyehping Company, largely through the means of financial assistance. The great Tayehiron mines, which have been considered as one of the richest in the country, had been drawn upon for supplies of iron ore for the Japanese Government Foundry at Wakamatsu (on the island of Kiushiu), and the rich coal mines at Pinghsiang had supplied a good portion of fuel for the said foundry. Japan was, however, not satisfied with tit-bits, and taking advantage of the European War which absorbed the attention of the British Government, she decided that it would be best to seek a monopolistic control of China's natural resources. Viscount Uchida, the present Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared at the opening of the Diet at Tokio, January, 1919: "We have to rely, in a large measure, upon the rich natural resources in China in order to assure our own economic existence." This same point was emphasized by Baron Makino, one of the Japanese delegates at the Versailles Peace Conference, when he declared: "China has the raw material: we have need for raw material and we have the capital to invest with China in its development for use by ourselves as well as by China." Taken together with Japan's demands on China, particularly those relating the Hanyehping Company now under consideration, these two statements by the responsible Japanese tell the unmistakable tale of Japan's economic ambitions in China. The Chinese delegates at the Peace Conference were, however, very emphatic in their reply, when they said: "China does not admit that her natural resources are necessary to assure the economic existence of Japan any more than the 'natural resources' of Alsace-Lorraine were necessary to assure the economic existence of Germany." China is, of course, incomparable with Alsace-Lorraine; but Japan is certainly another Germany.

The Twenty-One Demands Analysed - Group IV

Of all the demands which Japan had pressed upon China for acceptance, none looks at the first glance so innocuous, and yet reveals, upon close examination, so intimately the working of Japan's political mind, as the single demand contained in the fourth Group. The Japanese Government, "with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China," demanded that the Chinese Government should engage

"not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China."

Made under the pretext of preserving China's territorial integrity, the demand appeared, therefore, to have a good deal of plausibility, which might easily be mistaken for Japan's honesty of purpose. The plausible character soon evaporates, however, when the pretext is carefully examined and found to be nothing more than the usual hypocrisy which has distinguished Japanese diplomacy in China in the last score of years. The innermost recess of the political minds of Japanese statesmen and diplomatists is penetrated, when we come to weigh the real meaning of the phrase "a third Power, a phrase as vague as it is definite, though it may seem paradoxical to say. It is vague in the sense that it does not refer to any particular Power; it is very definite, for it cannot mean Japan herself. The phrase refers to any Power except Japan and China. In other words, while pronouncing her solicitude for China's territorial integrity, Japan was at the very same time reserving to herself the right to despoil it. It would be highly interesting to know, therefore, if Japan would consider it a violation of the territorial integrity of China, if she herself should one day force the Chinese Government to cede or to lease some harbour or bay or island along the Chinese coast. Japan's sincerity of purpose could be easily proved 1 if she had frankly declared that no Chinese territory should be ceded or leased to any Power whatsoever, or if she had merely demanded that China should not alienate her coast line to any Power at all. Such a declaration, inasmuch as it would not be consistent with the sovereignty of China, would not, of course, be very agreeable to the Chinese Government. It would nevertheless serve to clear away the general suspicion as to the territorial ambitions which Japan has apparently entertained in China.

This was not the undertaking which Japan was anxious to obtain from China. A declaration such as along the lines suggested above would not only prevent any "third Power" from violating the territorial integrity of China, but would also debar Japan herself from the execution of her ambitious designs in Fukien, in Shantung, and in Manchuria. Japan would not, of course, allow her hands tied in her dealings with China, and nothing would be more opposed to her set purpose and policy than to see herself debarred from opportunities of expansion and aggrandizement at the expense of her big but feeble neighbour. Thus, both the language and the manner in which the single

demand of the fourth Group was made, strongly remind us of the Russian tactics of 1895. The three-Power intervention which Russia had engineered after the Chino Japanese War against the seizure by Japan of the Liaotung peninsula was ostensibly undertaken for the protection of the integrity and independence of China. No one, however, seriously doubted that the real purpose of the intervention was to keep the Pacific door open for Russia herself. The occupation by Japan of the Liaotung peninsula would blight all the roseate hopes that the Muscovite states- men had entertained for an ice- free port in the Far East. Three years later the fruit of the intervention was reaped when Port Arthur and Talien wan were leased to Russia for a term of twenty-five years. Following, perhaps, the same line of diplomacy, now Japan tried to force the declaration from the Chinese Government that it would not lease or cede any territory along the coast to a third Power, only to make the field clear for herself!

From the standpoint of the Chinese Government, the demand of the Fourth Group was a serious limitation of its sovereignty. Mr. Hector C. By water, the brilliant author of "Sea-Power in the Pacific: A Study of American-Japanese Naval Problem," observed that "the presentation of such a demand presumed a Japanese protector ship over Chinese territory, and was therefore open to objection as it stood." In the official statement which the Chinese Government gave out apropos of the negotiation of the Twenty-one Demands, it was pointed out that, "as regards the single article of the Fourth Group and the preamble thereto, the Chinese Government held that they were inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty." The same view was shared by all those IV who have had the opportunity of examining the Twenty-one Demands in their true light

Aside from this ill-concealed attempt on the part of Japan to assume a protector ship over Chinese territory, there was much more behind it. While it was difficult at the first glance to understand why such a demand should be made upon the Chinese Government, especially at the time when the whole world was engaged in war, and when there was no one Power in sight, but Japan herself, who would ever dare ask China to cede or to lease any harbor, bay, or island along her coast, it was comparatively easy to see the real motive behind it. It should here be called that throughout the year 1914 there had been rumors in the Far East that the United States was invited by the Chinese Government to undertake the reorganization of the Foochow Arsenal in the Fukien

Province. The enterprise was, it was alleged, finally entrusted to Bethlehem Steel Company. For the purpose of carrying out the said scheme, it was deemed necessary that the Bethlehem Steel Company should be granted the lease of a harbour adjoining to the arsenal. The story was officially denied, in Peking; Mr. John V. A. Mac Murray, who was then Secretary of the American Legation in Peking, asserted that the story was entirely without foundation. But the Japanese Government was very much alarmed, and the Japanese people were equally excited so much so that they deemed it necessary to extract from the Chinese Government an explicit assurance that such a scheme was not to be undertaken. The demand was the natural result. Although phrased in a general language, that China should not lease or cede any harbor or bay or island along her coast, the demand aimed particularly at the Fukien province.

That this was really the case is borne out by the notes exchanged between China and Japan respecting the Fukien province. "A report has reached me," said Mr. Hioki Eki, Japanese Minister in Peking, "to the effect that the Chinese Government has the intention of permitting foreign nations to establish, on the coast of Fukien province, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments; and also of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the abovementioned establishments." The Japanese Minister asked a categorical assurance from the Chinese Government. In reply, the Chinese Government stated that it had no intention of setting up military / or naval establishment on the coast of Fukien province.

Thus analysed, the pretext that the single demand of the Fourth Group was made for the purpose of maintaining the territorial integrity of China appears in its true colour.

The Twenty-One Demands Analysed - Group V

The most drastic, outrageous, and derogatory of China's sovereignty, in comparison with which the Austrian demands to Serbia of 1914 paled almost into insignificance, was the Fifth Group of the demands, which were not admitted by the Japanese Government when the attention of the Western Powers was first drawn to them, and which were not included in the official communication of the Japanese Government, replying to the inquiries of the great Powers regarding the nature and the terms of the Twenty-one Demands. To say the least, these demands, if granted, would have reduced China to a vassal of Japan, by making the relations between the two countries similar to

the existing relations between Great Britain and Egypt, or between Korea and Japan herself. Although the Chinese Government was forced to give way in the first four groups of demands, it stood absolutely firm on the fifth, and declined to consider them on the ground "that they were not proper subjects for international negotiation, conflicting as they did with the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights of other Powers, and the principle of equal opportunity." History knows of no combination of demands more sinister in motive and more outrageous in character than this Fifth Group, which Japan, a friendly Power, had presented on China, another friendly Power. And it may also be said that the course which the Japanese Government had pursued in concealing the demands of this group from the knowledge of the Western Powers, is admittedly one of mendacity and duplicity, for which history of modern diplomacy has but few parallels, if any. According to the demands in the Fifth Group, the Chinese Government was to employ influential Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military affairs; to permit Japanese hospitals, churches (Is there any Japanese church in China?) and schools to lease and own land; to employ Japanese officers for the administration of the police department of important cities; to purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war, aside from establishing an arsenal in China to be under Japanese control and management; "to grant to Japan the right to construct a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hankow, and another line between Nanchang and Chao-chow;" to pledge not to use any foreign capital other than Japanese to work mines, build railways, and construct harbour works in the Fukien province; and finally to permit Japanese subjects to carry on missionary propaganda . for the dissemination of Buddhism in China.

A formidable set of demands, indeed. To say that they constituted a sufficient *casus belli* is to put the case very mildly. Those who are at all acquainted with the nature of Austrian demands on Serbia, whose refusal to accept them in to led to the outbreak of the European War in August, 1914, will readily agree that the Japanese demand son China, especially those of the Fifth Group, were hundred times more drastic, and that a disastrous war in the Far East was averted only by the extremely conciliatory spirit of the Chinese Government.

A well-known writer on Chinese questions said :

"The real purpose of the Japanese demands becomes unalterably clear, for in this group we have seen seven sketches of things designed to serve as the coup de grace. Not only is a new sphere – Fukien province - indicated; not only is the mid-Yangtze, from the vicinity of Kicking, to serve as the terminus for a system of Japanese railways, radiating from the great river to the coasts of South China; but the gleaming knife of the Japanese surgeon is to aid the Japanese teacher in the great work of propaganda; the Japanese monk and the Japanese policeman are to be dispersed like skirmishers throughout the land; Japanese arsenals are to supply all the necessary arms, or failing that a special Japanese arsenal is to be established; Japanese advisers are to give the necessary advice in finance, in politics, in every department - foreshadowing a complete and all embracing political control. Never was a more sweeping programme of supervision presented, and small wonder if Chinese when they learnt of this climax exclaimed that the fate of Korea was to be their own.

A more vicious assault upon Chinese sovereignty cannot be imagined!

We shall not, in this connection, go into the details of the demands which are in direct conflict with the principle of equal opportunity in China. This aspect of the question is dealt with at some length in "The Chino-Japanese Treaties of 1915" in which an attempt is made to bring out the strongest reasons why the 1915 treaties growing out of the Twenty-one Demands should be null and void. We need only to point out here that the proposal of joint administration by China and Japan of the Chinese police would be clearly an interference with the domestic affairs of the Republic, and consequently an infringement upon China's sovereignty. Besides this, the demand for an engagement by the Chinese Government to purchase a fixed amount of munitions from Japan or to establish a Chino-Japanese joint arsenal was such a clear encroachment of China's sovereignty that it was really difficult to see how one Power could without cause make such a demand upon another. In respect to the appointment of advisers in political, financial, and military affairs, the policy of the Chinese Government, it maybe said, has always been similar to that which has apparently guided the Japanese Government, appointing to positions of great importance the best qualified and most able men irrespective of their nationality. As a sovereign and independent nation, China could not

allow her national policy being dictated to by an alien Power, no matter how desirous that Power might be of "maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing between the two nations." For Japan to insist upon the Chinese Government employing Japanese, and Japanese alone, as political, financial, and military advisers was to disregard the practical side of the question, to say the least. In spite of her advanced » position in the family of nations, Japan has not yet found it possible to dispense with the services of the foreign advisers herself. She has a number of foreign advisers in her government service; and it is, therefore, questionable whether she is at all in a position to advise China.

The demand that Japan should be first consulted, if China were to borrow foreign capital for the purpose of working mines, building railways, and constructing harbour works and dock-yards in the Province of Fukien is easily understandable. It was based on the fear, as has been pointed out in the previous chapter, that the Chinese Government might make use of American capital in setting up military and naval establishments on the coast of the said province. Japan has claimed special interest in the province, on the ground of its geographical proximity to Formosa, a Chinese island ceded to Japan at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese War in 1894-5. "Geographical propinquity" might in certain cases create a special interest, but the position which Japan has hitherto enjoyed in the Fukien province is that of a neighbour, not of a protector. Her demand, however, was nothing short of an absolute right of vetoing any attempt on the part of China to utilize the foreign capital to develop the Fukien province. It would be, therefore, not only a denial of equal opportunity, but also an unwarranted limitation on China's sovereign rights. Regarding the two articles relating to the acquisition of land for Japanese schools, hospitals, and churches, as well as the right of missionary propaganda, we can do no better than to quote the Chinese Official Statement, which defined the position of the Chinese Government in a language at once concise and comprehensive. These demands

Would have presented grave obstacles to the consolidation of the friendly feeling subsisting between the two people. The religions of the two countries are identical and therefore the need for a missionary propaganda to be carried on in China by Japanese does not exist. The natural rivalry between Chinese and Japanese followers of the same faith would tend to create incessant disputes and friction. Whereas Western missionaries

live apart from the Chinese communities among which they labour, Japanese monks would live with the Chinese, and the similarity of their physical characteristics, their religious garb, and their habits of life would render it impossible to distinguish them for purposes of affording the protection which the Japanese Government would require to be extended to them under the system of extraterritoriality now obtaining in China. Moreover, a general apprehension exists among the Chinese people that these peculiar conditions favoring conspiracies for political purposes might be taken advantage of by some unscrupulous Chinese."

The most significant feature of the demands of the Fifth Group remains yet to be considered. This is no other than the desire of the Japanese Government to invade the British sphere of interest by demanding railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley. She demanded "the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou." Unquestionably, this demand for railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley conflicted with the existing agreements between China and Great Britain. It would come into conflict first with the Shanghai Nanking Ningpo Railway Agreement of March 6, 1908, Article XIX of which provided that if foreign capital were required to build the branch lines of the said railway, preference should be given to Great Britain (British and Chinese Corporation Limited). It would then conflict with the Nanking Hunan Railway Loan Agreement of March 31, 1914. Article II of the said agreement stipulated: "The loan is designed secondly for the construction of a Government line of railway from Nanking to Nanchang through Ning-kwo-fu and Hwei-chou-fu, and with connection to Wu-hu and Kuang-te-chow: and from Nanchang to Pinghsiang to connect with the existing Government railway from Pinghsiang to Chuchow." And thirdly, it may be pointed out, the demand conflicted with certain engagement which the Chinese Government had made on August 24, 1914, giving preference to the British and Chinese Corporation, Limited, for the projected line from Nanchang to Chaochowfu. "For this reason," the Chinese Official Statement emphasized, "the Chinese Government found themselves unable to consider the demand, though the Japanese Minister, while informed of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly pressed for its acceptance." Is Japan an ally of Great Britain, and according to the terms of the alliance,

is she not re-quired to defend the common interests of both countries? The Japanese Minister in Peking could not have pressed upon the Chinese Government for acceptance of this demand without instructions from Tokio, and the Tokio Foreign Office could not have been ignorant of the fact that the railway lines demanded had already been conceded to Great Britain. The Chinese Government, faithful in its international engagements, made it very clear that the demand conflicted with its previous engagements with Great Britain, and therefore could not be granted. After all, one is quite justified, with this fact in view, in asking if Japan is really such a loyal ally as she has claimed to be.

In this matter of railway concessions, Japan's conscience was sorely touched. Realizing that she could not after all ignore the engagements which the Chinese Government had already entered into with Great Britain, Japan revised the language of the demand so as to make it inoffensive. Thus, in the list of revised demands, presented to the Chinese Government, April 26, 1915, Japan suggested that the demand for the railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley should be made the subject of an exchange of notes between the two countries. "If it is clearly ascertained that other Powers have no objection, China shall grant the said right to Japan." In the meantime, however, "the Chinese Government shall not grant the said right to any foreign Power, before Japan comes to an understanding with the other Power which is heretofore interested therein." The right referred to here was that of financing the construction of those railways mentioned in the original demand.

In the ultimatum, it was stated that the Fifth Group of demands was detached "from the present negotiation" and that it would be discussed "separately in the future." The ultimatum was delivered to the Chinese Government, at 3 p. m., May 7, and it was accepted the following day. The Japanese Minister in Peking objected to the phraseology of the Chinese note of acceptance and insisted that the demands of the Fifth Group, except the one relating to Fukien, which was to be made into an exchange of notes, should be specifically reserved for future negotiation. The Japanese Minister insisted that, following the words "Group V" there should be inserted the qualifying phrase "postponed for later negotiation." The result is that the Fifth Group of demands remains to-day as "unfinished business, to be taken up at a future date."

It may also be added here that the Japanese Government, in answer to the inquiries from the western Powers, failed to make public the demands of the Fifth Group, and that when they became known, the Japanese Government referred to them merely as "wishes," "requests for friendly consideration" by China. In the statement issued by the Japanese Government, May 7, they were referred to as "propositions relating to the solution of pending questions and others." In answer to this tergiversation, the Chinese Government in its official statement, made it very clear that these demands of the Fifth Group were presented as "demands," not as "wishes," "requests," or "propositions." "The first four Groups were each introduced by a preamble, but there was no preamble or explanation to the Fifth Group. In respect of the character of the demands in this Group, however, no difference was indicated in the document between them and those embodied in the preceding Groups."

The Washington conference

Objects of the conference

The objects of the international conference which sat in Washington from November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922, were set forth in President Harding's formal invitation to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan of August 11, 1921.

"Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat the reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only without economic justification but is a constant menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to expect the halting of these increasing outlays unless the powers most largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to effect their limitation. The time is believed to be opportune for these powers to approach this subject directly and in conference; and while, in the discussion of limitation of armament, the question of naval armament may naturally have first place, it has been thought best not to exclude questions pertaining to other armament

to the end that all practicable measures of relief may have appropriate consideration. It may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by' which in the interest of humanity the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled.

"It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this Government that through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned- importance at this time, that is, such common understanding with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples.

"It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East, but rather to leave this to be' the subject of suggestions, to be exchanged before the meeting of the conference, in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and cordial appreciation of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy, will govern the final decision."

After acceptance of this invitation by the five powers and of an invitation including merely the last two paragraphs by China, (subsequently by Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal also') these objects were rendered more concrete by publication of the following agenda on September 21, 1921.

Limitation of Armament

- i. Limitation of naval armament, under which shall be discussed
 - (a) Basis of limitation.
 - (b) Extent.
 - (c) Fulfillment.
- ii. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.
- iii. Limitation of land armament.
Pacific and Far Eastern Questions
- iv. Questions relating to China.
First: Principles to be applied.

Second: Application. Subjects:

- (a) Territorial integrity.
- (b) Administrative integrity.
- (c) Open door, equality of commercial and industrial opportunity.
- (d) Concessions, monopolies or preferential economic privileges.
- (e) Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railvay.
- (f) Preferential railroad rates.
- (g) Status of existing commitments.

Two. Siberia. (similar headings.)

Mandated Islands. (unless questions earlier settled.) Electrical Communications in the Pacific.

Under the heading of "Status of existing commitments" it is expected that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to reach an understanding with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of rights may hereafter be asserted.

In addition however to the two major problems here indicated, another was in the back of every one's mind, suggested by the platform on which President Harding had been elected.

"The Republican party stands for agreement among the nations to preserve the peace of the world. We believe that such an international association must be based upon international justice, and must provide methods- which shall maintain the rule of public right by the development of law and the decision of impartial courts, and which shall secure instant and general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action, so that the nations pledged to do and insist upon what is just and fair may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of war."

This object came to the surface after the conference had begun through President Harding's announcement to a group of newspaper men on November 25 that the administration would "set on foot a movement to bring out of the armament conference a system of similar but broader annual conferences to deal with the troubles of the world."

Thus the objects of the conference extended to three distinct topics, Limitation of Armament, Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, Association of Nations.

Organization of the Conference

The conference consisted of plenary sessions and committees. The plenary sessions were formal occasions attended by all the delegates, in which announcement was made of programs for discussion or agreements reached. They were not intended for negotiation but for declaration. They were held in Continental Memorial Hall, a handsome marble building on 17th street erected by the Daughters of the American Revolution and were open to members of the Senate and House of Representatives, representatives of the press and such of the public as had cards of admission from the State department.

The delegates sat at a "U" shaped green covered table with Mr. Hughes as chairman at the head of the "U". The remaining American delegates sat at his right, the British at his left and then in regular alternation the French, Italian and Japanese delegations. Thus an alphabetic order was followed as is customary in such gatherings. The powers attending merely the Far Eastern but not the Limitation of Armament Conference sat at the ends of the "U" in a similar order, Belgium, China, Netherlands, Portugal. In the center of the "U" sat the secretary of the conference and the efficient interpreter, M. Camerlynck, ready to repeat instantly every English speech in French and vice versa, for both these languages were official in the conference. Back of the delegates sat their technical experts. Since the auditorium seated only about 1200" persons, subtraction of the space occupied by delegates, experts, senators, representatives and the press left a remainder of forty seats to rotate among those of the public who would like to attend.

The real work of negotiation was conducted by committees. There was a committee of the whole on armaments with five powers represented and a committee of the whole on the Far East and Pacific with nine powers represented. These appointed many subcommittees, some of delegates, some of experts, and some mixed. Committee or subcommittee meetings went on almost continuously in the Pan-American building next door to Continental Memorial Hall and closely guarded by marines with fixed bayonets.

The delegations were assisted by technical experts, of which Japan had the most. The American delegation was also assisted by an "advisory committee" selected by, the

president so as to represent prominent organizations of the country, and designed to form a liaison between the conference and the public.

Publicity was handled in the manner customary with international conferences. Plenary sessions were public, committee and subcommittee meetings were private. The public gained only such information of the latter as was given out in communiqués prepared for the press by the committee itself or in press interviews by plenipotentiary delegates. The latter method gave ground for occasional protest by certain delegations who felt that confidential discussions had been prematurely published. News of committee happenings sometimes came to Washington via London, Paris or Tokyo where it had leaked out through the foreign offices of those countries. Finally the fertile imagination of newspaper correspondents was a source for filling news columns if not always for distributing accurate information. Stories of violent disagreement in committee meetings, one of which occasioned an anti French riot in an Italian town, had to be officially denied by the plenipotentiaries, reputed to have participated. Although this type of rumor was something of an embarrassment, on the whole the progress of the conference endorsed the experience gained at Versailles and in the League of Nations, that negotiations can be most satisfactorily conducted withdrawn from the glare of public opinion but that agreements should be published as soon as reached.

It seems probable that the United States Senate will discuss the Washington treaties in open session as they did the treaty of Versailles. To facilitate this discussion the president in submitting the treaties to the Senate on February 10, 1922, accompanied them with complete minutes of both plenary session and committee meetings and a copy of the official report of the American delegation.

Negotiations

"Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war!" Thus President Harding struck the keynote of the conference at its opening meeting, and in spite of much haggling for national advantage in committee meetings, the pitch was not wholly lost through the seven plenary sessions which marked the progress of negotiations.

On the opening session, November 12, 1921, after President Harding's address of welcome, Secretary of State Hughes was elected chairman and surprised the conference

and the world by laying down a concrete program for the limitation of naval armaments. On November 14 a session was held in which Mr. Balfour for Great Britain, Premier Briand for France, Admiral Baron Kato for Japan and Senator Schanzer for Italy accepted the American proposal "in principle."

Committee negotiations upon the details of this proposal began at once as also upon the Far Eastern problems, but before any conclusions had been reached another plenary session was held, on November 21, to afford Premier Briand the opportunity to say that France was unwilling to discuss an agreement for the limitation of land armament until Germany was "morally" as well as "physically" disarmed. He cited passages from General Ludendorff's recent book to prove that this happy state had not been reached. Delegates of the other powers diplomatically voiced their disappointment, Senator Schanzer of Italy expressing the hope, doomed to disappointment, that the land armament item on the agenda would not be abandoned.

After three session less weeks filled with committee negotiations over the Japanese demand for a 10, 10, 7 naval ratio instead of the 5, 5, 3 ratio proposed in the American plan, the conference again sat in plenary session on December 10. Previous to the meeting, information had reached America from foreign capitals that a Pacific alliance was being negotiated and at this meeting Senator Lodge of the American delegation presented the fourpower Pacific Pact, which he noted covered islands "so diverse that we might describe them in the words of Browning as the

'Sprinkled isles,

Lily on lily that o'erlace the sea--"

Islands ranging in size from "Australia, continental in magnitude to atolls where there are no dwellers but the builders of coral reefs," islands upon which "still shines the glamour of some of the stories of Melville and the writings of Robert Louis Stevenson." Unfortunately he neglected to refer to the home islands of Japan which the committee, had agreed were included, thus misleading President Harding who offered a contrary interpretation in a press statement of December 20. This was, however, withdrawn six hours later with the comment that the president had "no objections to the construction" which the delegates had agreed upon. It appears that the inclusion of the Japanese Home Islands had been originally insisted upon by Great Britain as a sop to the pride of

Australia and New Zealand which were also included. The attitude of the United States Senate, however, seemed to jeopardize the whole agreement and as Japan was not averse, a subsequent resolution expressly excluded her home islands.

The next plenary session was held on February 1, the seven weeks' interim being filled with difficult committee negotiations. The United States, Great Britain and Japan announced substantial agreement upon the American naval limitation program on December 15, the most important modification being the concession to Japan, whereby she was to retain the "Mutsu," which was to have been scrapped. This was a new vessel built by popular subscription and of sentimental importance. Great Britain and the United States were in consequence to complete two new Post-Juiland battleships. Older vessels were to be scrapped thus leaving the total tonnage and the ratios substantially as in the original proposal. More formidable difficulties in the naval treaty were presented by the French demand for the privilege of building ten Post-Jutland battleships of 35,000 tons each, only withdrawn after Mr. Hughes had cabled Premier Briand, who had returned to France, that insistence upon this demand would wreck the treaty. France, however, accepted the 1.75 ratio for capital ships, with the understanding that she be allowed a larger ratio of "defensive ships" in which category she included submarines. In spite of the British demand for total abolition of submarines," and the American desire to limit their number to 60,000 tons for United States and Great Britain with tonnage on the adopted capital ship ratios for the others, France was obdurate. With the failure of submarine limitation, efforts to limit the total tonnage of surface auxiliaries, which certain powers thought necessary to combat them, also failed and the conference had to be content with the Root resolution declaring submarine use against merchantmen piracy and limiting the size of naval fighting auxiliaries except air craft carriers to 10,000 tons. Vessels of larger tonnage were to be regarded as capital ships. Perhaps the warmest debates of the conference occurred on the submarine issue, since Great Britain regarded the French demand as a menace to her safety.

Discussion of the Chinese problem was begun by the presentation on November 16 of ten points by Mr. Sze. These were abandoned and four general principles formulated by Mr. Root and restating the Hay Open Door notes of 1899 and 1900 were adopted. Detailed application of these principles proved difficult and several Chinese

technical experts resigned in disgust. In fact all progress threatened at times to be held up by the failure of China and Japan to agree in their special conversations on Shantung begun at Washington on December 1 through the good offices of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour.

These negotiations finally succeeded, and in the plenary session of February 1, the Shantung treaty was published together with the five power naval limitation treaty, the five power treaty restricting the use of submarines and poison gases, and a number of resolutions on the Far East which had been previously adopted in committee.

A session of February 4 published two nine power treaties on China, one attempting to assure the territorial and administrative integrity of China and the open door, the other providing for Chinese customs administration. At the final meeting February 6, the five treaties were formally signed and President Harding made a concluding address.

Thus the work of the conference is embodied in five treaties explained and amplified by fourteen resolutions and ten unilateral declarations. The treaties -with the resolutions directly pertinent thereto, were presented to the United States Senate by President Harding in person on February 10, with the comment:

"All the treaties submitted for your approval have such important relationship, one to another, that, though not interdependent, they are the covenants of harmony, of assurance, of conviction, of conscience, and of unanimity. I submit to the Senate that if we can not join in making effective these covenants for peace, we shall discredit the influence of the republic, render future efforts futile or unlikely, and write discouragement where today the world is ready to acclaim new hope."

In addition to the work of the conference, three treaties, relating to Shantung, Yap and Pacific cables have been negotiated at Washington concurrently with the conference.

These various treaties, resolutions and declarations embody achievements, more or less complete in the three fields which the conference had before it. We may therefore consider in succession its results as to Limitation of Armament, Far Eastern and Pacific Questions, and an Association of Nations.

Limitation of Armament

Efforts to limit armament by international agreement did not begin in recent years.! A treaty to this effect is said to have been made in the Chinese Age of Confusion (6th Century B. C.). In 1766 Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Chancellor, suggested an army limitation agreement to Frederick the Great and in 1787 France and England actually signed a treaty reducing navies. Army limitation agreements were proposed by Alexander I of Russia (1816), Louis Phillippe of France (1831), the Italian General Garibaldi (1860), Richard Cobden of the British House of Commons (1861), and Napoleon III of France on several occasions (1863, 1867, 1870). More important, however, was the proposal of Czar Nicholas II. The Mouravieff circular of August 12, 1898, calling the First Hague Conference, issued under his authority, suggests President Harding's invitation of August 11, 1921:

"The ever-increasing financial charges strike and paralyze public prosperity at its source; the intellectual and physical strength of the nations, their labor and capital, are for the most part diverted from their natural application and unproductively consumed; hundreds of millions are spent in acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which though today regarded as the last word of science are destined to-morrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. National culture, economic progress, and the production of wealth are either paralyzed or perverted in their development.

Moreover in proportion as the armaments of each. Power increase, so do they less and less attain the object aimed at by the governments. Economic crises, due in great part to the system of amassing armaments to the point of exhaustion, and the continual danger which lies in this accumulation of war material, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if this state of affairs be prolonged, it will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the impending horrors of which are fearful to every human thought.

"In checking these increasing armaments and in seeking the means of averting the calamities which threaten the entire world lies the supreme duty today resting upon all States.

"Imbued with this idea, his majesty has been pleased to command me to propose to all the governments which have accredited representatives at the imperial court the holding of a conference to consider this grave problem."

The First Hague Conference which met in response to this call in the summer of 1899 failed to limit armaments as did its successor in 1907. Germany was the stumbling block, as she was in the numerous overtures for a naval holiday made by England from 1910 to the outbreak of the world war. This obstacle was, however, removed by the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and Sevres which provided for the effective disarmament of the Central Powers, "in order to render possible the institution of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." The members of the League of Nations had, in the covenant, recognized "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." In the two assemblies of the League the armament question had received thorough consideration with the conclusion that effective action toward limitation would be impossible without cooperation of the United States who was taking the lead in naval building.

The United States Congress, however, by the Hensley amendment to the large naval appropriation act of 1916 had declared that "it looks with apprehension and disfavor upon a general increase of armament throughout the world, but it realizes that no single nation can disarm, and that without a common agreement upon the subject every considerable power must maintain a relative standing in military strength." Consequently it had authorized the president to call a conference "not later than the close of the war in Europe" to "formulate a plan for a court of arbitration or 'other tribunal'" and to "consider the question of disarmament," and to suspend the naval program provided in the act, in case the results of such conference should "render unnecessary the maintenance of competitive armaments."

Thus the time was ripe for agreement on the subject. In his speech of July 22, 1920, accepting the republican nomination for president, Mr. Harding said he could "hear in the call of conscience an insistent voice for the largely reduced armaments through the world" and a resolution introduced in the Senate by Mr. Boraa was passed as an amendment to the Naval Appropriation act of July 12, 1921.

This amendment "Authorized and requested" the president "to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs of each of said governments, to wit the United States, Great Britain and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding or agreement is to be reported to the respective governments for approval."

Two days before passage of this amendment, however, President Harding announced that he had already approached the powers informally with reference to a conference of broader scope and more extended membership. These informal approaches lead to the formal invitations of August 11.

The Washington treaties on naval armament limitation are based on four general principles laid down in Mr. Hughes's original proposal:

- a) The elimination of all capital ship building programs, either actual or projected.
- b) Further reduction through scrapping of certain of the older ships.
- c) That regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the conferring powers.
- d) The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of strength of navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed."

In detail they provide for a discontinuance of all capital ship building for ten years, certain replacement being allowed France and Italy after 1927. Capital ships include every "vessel of war, not an air craft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons standard displacement or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches."

Existing capital ships are to be scrapped so as to leave the United States 18 (525,850 tons), Great Britain 20 (558,980 tons), Japan 10, (301,320 tons), France 10, (221,170 tons), Italy 10, (182,800 tons). After 1931 ships over 20 years old may be replaced so as to maintain ratios of 525, 525, 315, 175, 175 among the five powers, no vessel being over 35,000 tons. The treaty is to be effective for fifteen years and to continue after that unless denounced with two years' notice. It may be suspended in time of war with exception of the articles relating to scrapped vessels.

Aircraft carriers are limited with regard both to total tonnage and individual tonnage, but air craft themselves are not limited. Submarines and fighting surface auxiliaries may not exceed 10,000 tons displacement or carry guns of over 8 inches, but there is no limitation in their total tonnage. Merchant vessels may not be prepared for military use in time of peace except to stiffen decks for guns, of not over six inches.

No limitation is placed on land forces or armament. The status quo "with regard to fortifications and naval bases" is to be maintained in the American, British and Japanese insular possessions in the Pacific except Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand, the Japanese home islands, and the islands near the American continent exclusive of the Aleutians.

Rules were adopted declaring the use of submarines against merchant vessels to be piracy and prohibiting the use of noxious and poisonous gases, and a resolution urged the calling of a conference to consider laws of war.

These armament limitation provisions go an enormous step beyond all previous treaties on the subject. They should result in a genuine saving of money through the discontinuance of capital ship programs. "This treaty" said Mr. Hughes in the plenary session of February 1, "ends, absolutely ends, the race in competitive armament." Without minimizing the achievements of -the conference it is well to recall that the problems of land armaments, submarines, naval vessels under 10,000 tons and air craft remain. Competition in these types of armament is still possible without violation of the treaty. The importance of this is emphasized through the opinion of many professional naval men that, even in the absence of international agreement, future navies would have been composed of smaller vessels, because of the increasing difficulty of properly defending super-dreadnaughts from submarines and aircraft.

While the illegitimate use of submarines and the use of poison gases were prohibited it is well to recall that the same prohibitions were recognized under customary international law and the Hague Conventions on August 2, 1914. Too much should not be expected of rules of warfare. Unless framed so that their observance serves the military aims of belligerents better than their violation, they will be of remedial rather than preventive value. They will give the victor a ground of action but will not mitigate the horrors of war.

"We may grant," said Mr. Root in presenting the treaty, "that rules limiting the use of implements of war made between diplomats will be violated in the stress of conflict. We may grant that the most solemn obligation assumed by governments in respect of the use of implements of war will be violated in the stress of conflict, but beyond diplomatists and beyond governments there rests the public opinion of the civilized world, and the public opinion of the world can punish."

Far East and Pacific Questions

International conferences have occasionally been called to consider general principles or methods for conducting international relationships. Of this character were the Geneva Conferences on the Red Cross (1864, 1906), the St. Petersburg and Brussels Conferences on land warfare (1868, 1872), the Hague Peace Conferences, (1899, 1907) and the London Naval Conference (1909).

Of a somewhat different character are international conferences called to settle particular political problems or controversies. These have usually followed wars as did the Congresses of Westphalia (1648,), Utrecht (1715), Vienna (1815), Paris (1856), Berlin (1878), and Versailles (1919). Sometimes, however, they have been called in time of peace to prevent war. Examples may be found in the various African conferences participated in by the European powers and the United States at Berlin (1885), Brussels (1890), and Algeciras (1906). Often, it is true, this type of conference establishes general principles, but its prime object is to settle an immediate political problem.

The Washington Conference combined both types. The five power negotiations on limitation of armament were of the first, the nine power negotiations on Far East and Pacific Questions were of the second type. The latter was concerned primarily with China, but Pacific Islands and Siberia were also on the agenda.

The absence of Russia from the conference precluded action on the latter beyond a resolution taking cognizance of the Japanese declaration of intention eventually to withdraw its troops from Siberia and northern Saghalien. No time was stated.

On Pacific Islands the fortification status quo provision of the naval limitation treaty has been referred to. More important is the four-power pact by which the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan "agree as between themselves, to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the

Pacific Ocean" and "if the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power" to "communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation." A subsequently adopted resolution excludes the Japanese home islands from the treaty. Attached resolutions exclude domestic questions from the controversies which may be a subject of discussion under article 1, and reserve the privilege to the United States to negotiate with reference to mandated islands which are declared within the scope of the treaty. The agreement is to continue for ten years and more unless denounced with a year's notice. Its dual object, from the American standpoint, of superseding the Anglo-Japanese alliance and protecting the Philippines seems to have been achieved, the first expressly. The treaty is between only four powers and is confined to insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific but in other respects it seems to bear a close resemblance to article X of the League of Nations Covenant by which.

"The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

Mr. Lodge, however, in presenting the four power pact to the Conference on December 10 distinguished it from this article, and in offering the treaties to the Senate on February 10, President Harding said:

"There is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no written or moral obligation to join in defense, no expressed or implied commitment to arrive at any agreement except in accordance with our constitutional methods. It is easy to believe, however, that such a conference of the four powers is a moral warning that an aggressive nation, giving affront to the four great powers ready to focus world opinion, on a given controversy, would be embarking on a hazardous enterprise."

This statement, however, leaves some doubt as to the President's interpretation of the pact. If the clauses of the first sentence are separable and the parties are under "no written or moral obligation to join in defense" it is difficult to see why an aggressive

enterprise would be any more "hazardous" with the treaty than without it. If on the other hand, the final qualification applies to all the preceding clauses, the president seems to imply that there is a "commitment to armed force" provided "our constitutional methods" are followed.'

Closely connected with this treaty are the negotiations over the island of Yap, between the United States and Japan, conducted independently of, but concurrently with, the conference. These began in the summer of 1921 and resulted in a treaty signed February 11, 1922. By this treaty the United States recognizes the Japanese mandate in Yap under the League of Nations and Japan agrees to accord the United States full rights in all that relates to cables on the island. The United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands have also practically concluded a negotiation dividing the former German Pacific cables between the United States, Japan and the Netherlands.

Since the first opium war and the treaty of Nanking (1842) Chinese sovereignty has suffered progressive impairments. These impairments extended to customs autonomy and jurisdiction over resident aliens before the Chino-Japanese war- of 1895. Soon after the European acquisitions of leaseholds and spheres of interest jeopardized Chinese territorial and administrative integrity while the privileges of the favored powers in these spheres threatened to deprive other powers, most notably the United States, of all share in the economic development of China. Finally the Japanese policy which began to develop in Manchuria aider the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, seriously menaced the political independence of China. This policy culminated in the 21 demands, the treaty of May, 1915, based thereon, whereby China agreed to recognize any Japanese settlement with Germany, and the treaty of Versailles transferring former German rights to Japan. It should be noted, however, that Japan had declared an intention to return some of these rights to China as soon as the Chinese government, divided and insecure since the revolution of 1911, gave signs of stability. The Hay open door notes of 1899 and 1900, the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908 and the LansingIshi agreement of 1917, though all affirming the territorial integrity, the administrative entity of China and the open door had been of little material assistance to that power, while the last, by recognizing that "territorial propinquity" creates special interests actually strengthened Japan's position.

The Washington treaties with their appended resolutions go immeasurably beyond earlier agreements. The tariff treaty does not restore Chinese tariff autonomy but does provide for periodic revisions to assure China 5 per cent on imports, in exchange for which China agrees to abolish like or domestic sales taxes, and to fulfill existing treaties with respect to taxation.

The more important Chinese treaty begins by reiteration of general principles in respect to China formulated by Mr. Root and resembling the Hay statements. The powers other than China agree:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations through the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantages of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges this would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states."

The powers agree to refrain from making treaties, agreements, arrangements or understandings "either with one another or individually or collectively with any other power or powers which would infringe or impair" these principles. A more substantial guarantee is given to the last two principles through the creation of an international board of reference in China to investigate and report whether future concessions in China are in accord with the open door. The original proposal to give the board authority to consider past as well as future concessions failed of acceptance, though a resolution provided that past concessions be published. China herself agrees not to permit unfair discrimination in economic matters, particularly railways.

Various agreements, resolutions, and declarations connected with the treaty aim to give concrete application to the first two of the Root principles. Some of the resolutions are considered within the scope of executive agreements and so will not be submitted to the Senate for ratification. The Shantung treaty between China and Japan greatly assists

toward restoring the territorial integrity of China. Japan agrees to restore the leased port of Kiau Chau and to sell back the Tsing-Tao-Tsinanfu railway for Chinese Treasury notes redeemable in fifteen years or at Chinese option in five years. Japan is to have a traffic manager and chief accountant under a Chinese managing director until payment is complete. Following announcement of this treaty Mr. Balfour declared the British willingness to restore her leased port of Wei-Hai-Wei to China. France indicated a willingness to negotiate for the restoration of Kvang-chow. If these negotiations are successful the Japanese lease of Port Arthur and part of the Liaotung Peninsula and the British lease of Kow Loon near Hong Kong would alone remain. China declared her intention to make no more leases. Aside from the two leases, the British island of Hong Kong, the Portugese port of Macao and the Japanese island of Formosa and privileges in Manchuria remain as subtractions from the territorial integrity of China as she existed before contact with Europe.

The administrative integrity of China gained through resolutions providing for withdrawal of foreign post offices by January, 1923, and of unauthorized foreign radio stations; for a commission to report on the practicability of removing extritorial jurisdiction, and for a consultation looking toward the removal of foreign troops in China. In the Shantung treaty Japan agreed to withdraw troops from that area and the powers requested China to reduce her military forces. Japan also declared her willingness to abandon group five of the twenty-one demands of 1915 which China had never accepted.

Though China has by no means regained full territorial and administrative integrity, yet substantial steps in this direction have been taken. The United States will have less cause to worry about the Philippines, agreement has been reached on the vexing problems of Yap and the Pacific cables, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance has been superseded. Made in 1902 against Russia, renewed in 1905 and 1911 against Germany it seemed to have no objective unless the United States in 1921. Yet to denounce it after the loyal observance of Japan during the World War would hardly comport with British honor. The addition of France and the United States seemed the easiest way out and this was achieved by the four power pact.

Association of Nations

The problem of an association of nations though not on the agenda, lay in the background of the conference. An international conference is certain to end with its purposes only partly achieved and so seeks to perpetuate itself. Thus in his instructions to the American delegates at the second Hague Conference, Mr. Root, then Secretary of State, wrote:

"After reasonable discussion, if no agreement is reached, it is better to lay the subject aside, or refer it to some future conference in the hope that intermediate consideration may dispose of the objections. . . The immediate results of such a conference must always be limited to a small part of the field which the more sanguine have hoped to see covered, but each successive conference will make the positions reached in the preceding conference its point of departure, and will bring to the consideration of further advances toward international agreement opinions affected by the acceptance and application of the previous agreements. Each conference will inevitably make further progress, and, by successive steps, results may be accomplished which have formerly appeared impossible."

Consequently he suggested further conferences and a recommendation to this effect were adopted.

However, the problem of an association of nations was emphasized in the Washington Conference because of the struggle in the United States over the League of Nations. President Harding and Senator Lodge had voted for the league with reservations while Senator Underwood had voted for it without reservations. Secretary Hughes and Mr. Root had openly favored the league in public speeches and had signed a letter on October 14, 1920, with twenty-nine other prominent republicans urging the election of President Harding as the shortest route to American entry into the league. The republican platform subsequently adopted contained a clause drafted by Mr. Root favoring an association of nations, but without assuming a definite position on the league. In an address before the American Society of International Law on April 27, 1921, Mr. Root had explained this as capable of fulfillment by American entry into the league.

"It is apparent" he said, after quoting the Republican platform article, "that the attitude of the league and the attitude of America toward this subject do not differ in

substance, however much they may differ as to the specific modes of effectuating the common purpose.

"There remain the hindrances of differing forms and methods favored by the nations within and the nations without the existing league. But the idea that by agreeing at this time to a formula the nations can forever after be united in preventing war by making war seems practically to have been abandoned; and the remaining differences are not of substance and ought not to prevent the general desire of the civilized world from giving permanent form to institutions to prevent further war. In the long run, from the 'standpoint of the international lawyer, it does not much matter whether the substance of such institutions is reached by amending an existing agreement or by making a new agreement."

President Harding, however, interpreted the republican platform otherwise and in his message of April 12, 1921, held his election to the presidency to be a rejection of the league by the United States. But in making this statement he referred to "the American aspiration" for "an association of nations based upon the application of justice and right, binding us in conference and cooperation for the prevention of war and pointing the way to a higher civilization and international fraternity in which all the world might share. In the national referendum to which I have adverted, we pledged our efforts towards such an association, and the pledge will be faithfully kept."

All of the powers in the Washington Conference except the United States were members of the league and most of the delegates, including Messrs. Balfour, Viviani, Schanzer, Koo, and Karnebeek had taken a prominent part in its work, notably in the discussions of armament limitation at the second assembly of the league, which ended a few weeks before the Washington Conference met. Nothing, however, was said about the league in the conference deliberations, though the United States recognized that organization through recognition of the Japanese mandates under it in the Yap treaty negotiated at the same time.

On November 25, President Harding suggested to group of newspaper men that the limitation of armament conference might well furnish a precedent for future conferences, thus creating a loose association of nations and in his concluding address on February 6. he said:

"Since this conference of nations has pointed with unanimity to the way of peace today, like conferences in the future, under appropriate conditions and with aims both well conceived and definite, may illumine the highways and byways of human activity. The torches of understanding have been lighted, and they ought to glow and encircle the globe."

Though no association is formally referred to in the treaties, numerous clauses authorize the calling of future conferences or the establishment of commissions. The functions of these bodies vary from political and administrative to quasi-judicial, in character. Thus the United States is to arrange for a conference in eight years to revise the naval limitation agreement. Other powers may call such a conference in emergency and one must be called after a war which has suspended a treaty. A conference to revise the rules of war is authorized, as is one to revise the Chinese customs tariff. A commission is appointed to consider the question of extritoriality in China and by the four-power pact the powers agree to meet in joint conference if a question arises over Pacific possessions. Finally a board of reference to consider questions under the open door agreement is provided for.

These provisions for future conference are not in any sense a substitute for the League of Nations with its permanent secretariat, periodical council and assembly, administrative commissions and permanent court of international justice. The experience of Washington has undoubtedly convinced European statesmen of the utility of the league and of its permanence, whether or not the United States elects to enter it. The league has greeted the efforts at Washington as helpful cooperation in its own work, but sees no association of nations which could possibly become a rival.

"The American people," writes Mr. Frank H. Simonds, "will have to make up their minds to the fact that in spite of the Washington Conference, or on account of it, the European nations which have been represented here and the European nations which were not represented have not been shaken in their adherence to the Geneva organization and that the French, the Dutch, and not impossibly even the English, have seen in the circumstances of the Washington Conference reasons for having increased, rather than diminished, respect and faith in and for the League of Nations."

Thus the Washington Conference has brought both the United States and Europe to an increased understanding of the value and necessity of international organization. It has begun to liquidate the political bankruptcy into which the world was plunged in 1920, through the exigencies of American party politics. In his eulogy of the unknown soldier on armistice day President Harding had a vision of a united world:

"His patriotism was none less if he craved more than triumph of country; rather it was greater if he hoped for a victory for all human kind." The method of achievement he tried to express in his address terminating the conference:

"I once believed in armed preparedness. I advocated it. But I have come now to believe there is better preparedness in a public mind and a world opinion made ready to grant justice precisely as it exacts it. And justice is better served in conferences of people than in conflicts of arms."

Self-Assessment Questions

1. What is meant by Japanese Imperialism?
2. When did Japan join the First World War?
3. Which countries were Japan's allies in World War I?
4. What were the Twenty-One Demands?
5. Which country received the Twenty-One Demands from Japan?
6. What was Japan's aim in making the Twenty-One Demands?
7. When was the Washington Conference held?
8. What was discussed at the Washington Conference?
9. How did the Washington Conference affect Japan's naval power?
10. What was the overall impact of Japanese imperialism on Asia?

Unit – III

Kuo-Min-Tang rule – Chinang – Kai-Shek – Manchurian Crisis – Second Sino- Japanese war – China in Second World War – China under Mao-Tse-Tung – Chinese Communist Party – Reforms – Cultural Revolution.

Objectives

- To the Kuo-Min-Tang rule.
- To the Crisis and the Second Sino-Japanese War.
- To China's role in the Second World War
- To the Chinese Communist Party.

Kuo-Min-Tang rule

The Kuomintang Party (KMT), established in 1912, ruled China from 1927 until 1948 before moving to Taiwan. The origins of the Kuomintang could be traced back to the decline of the Qing Empire. However, the party that held the mantle of the Chinese Revolution and ushered China into an era without Imperial rule had been forced to retreat outside of China. In recent years, the KMT failed to win the presidency in the 2016 and 2020 elections in Taiwan, raising questions over its legitimacy and relevance in a younger world. Due to this history, it becomes important to understand the KMT's evolution, as it is yet another example of an older party fighting for relevance in the young and contemporary world. While the KMT has made significant gains in the recent legislative elections and will have its eyes set on the presidential elections in 2024, this paper will trace the history of the Kuomintang and look at how it sailed through history and made alterations to its styles to adapt to the changing times.

Background

The KMT is the oldest party in East Asia. The emergence of the Kuomintang party is synonymous with the decline of the Qing Dynasty and the emergence of Sun Yat-sen. The Qing dynasty had promoted itself into a conquering force and ruled China for 268 years. Several internal turmoils during the Qing dynasty ended in devastating rebellions that eventually led to the empire's downfall.

The crippled Qing Dynasty was eventually ousted in 1912, ending China's long imperial period. Sun Yat-sen was elected the provisional President of the newly

established Republic of China. During this time, Sun Yat-sen decided to convert his revolutionary society into a political party, forming the Kuomintang.

At this time, the Kuomintang, the National People's Party, was essentially an amalgamation of small political groups. However, the KMT emerged as the dominant political party in China and won the first-ever national elections in 1913. However, shortly after the new republic had been established, a power struggle broke out between the then-President Yuan Shi-kai and the new bicameral National Assembly, which the Kuomintang heavily dominated. As a result, KMT was declared an illegal organisation in November 1913, and the National Assembly was disbanded the following year.

In 1919, Sun re-established the Kuomintang to counter the weak government in Beijing. The KMT, which was rebuilt with Soviet assistance, was a tightly organised Leninist political party in command of an army strong enough to defeat the warlords. Until now, the Leninist organisation of the party still persists.

The principles of the people posited by Sun Yat-sen in his writings could be seen as the guiding principles of the Kuomintang Party since its inception. These principles still continue to guide the ideological base of the party. Sun promoted the three principles of the people throughout the revolution, including the principle of Nationalism, Democracy and livelihood.

Chiang Kai-shek and Military Dictatorship

Following the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek, the Republic of China (ROC) army, and the government fled to Taiwan. Close to two million mainlanders sought refuge on the island. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT were not welcomed with open arms by the island's Indigenous population. Additionally, when the KMT government was still in power on the mainland, it enforced martial law on the island in response to widespread protests demanding government reforms. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT used to pretext of a possible China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) invasion to justify the upholding of martial law.

During the reign of Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang was essentially at the helm of a oneparty authoritarian political system. This was a big deviation from the founding principles of the party outlined by Sun Yat-sen in his writings and the model of government the KMT was attempting to establish in the Republic of China when it was

established in the mainland. Following the loss of the mainland, the KMT also needed to undergo several changes to adapt to its new territory and rule it effectively. In the early 1950s, the KMT was essentially a demoralised and disorganised party. Firstly, Chiang Kai-shek set up a reform committee led by middle-aged loyalists. A process to re-register all members were initiated. Many viewed as disloyal, incompetent, or corrupt were purged from the party. The reforms started showing their effects, and the party emerged with fresh new leaders. Further, Taiwan's economic success also played a key role in the KMT's ability to gain domestic legitimacy.

The KMT also maintained its power during the martial law period through the flawed political system of the country. The system was inherited from when it governed China and is based on the 1947 ROC constitution. The policy structure was maintained due to publicly outlined desires to retake the mainland. To hold new elections just in Taiwan would have undermined the ROC's claim to be the government of China.

Provincial governments and governors were responsible for running the affairs of Taiwan province. As a result, the Provincial Assembly became the highest elected office in Taiwan. However, during this time, Taiwan's democracy was merely a façade and was still a one party state.

Shift from Authoritarianism to Taiwanisation and Democratization

Taiwan was moving away from strict authoritarianism by the 1980s. Changes in the party were noticeable after Chiang Kai-shek's passing away and the accession of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo. Ching-kuo's political strength allowed him to launch the party's Taiwanisation drive. As a result, younger and well-educated Taiwanese and Mainlander technocrats were promoted to higher positions in both the party and the government.

The major steps to democratize Taiwan effectively came after 1987. Martial law was lifted, and public rallies and mass media restrictions were removed. The Democratic People's Party (DPP) was established in 1986 despite the ban on forming political parties, formally removed only in 1989. Lee Teng-hui became the first Taiwanese President who was born in Taiwan. During his time in office, he oversaw widespread constitutional changes, which led Taiwan to a more democratic political layout. In 1996, in the first-ever direct Presidential elections, he was democratically elected for a second term with a landslide victory.

The formation of the DPP also saw the first actual opposition to the KMT in Taiwan. The DPP started off as a relatively moderate party, promoting democracy and Taiwanese self determination rather than outright independence. However, in the subsequent years, it became more radical. It adopted more extreme positions on Taiwan's independence and a new constitution. Even though its vote share was just 21.1 per cent in the 1996 presidential elections, it began to cover grounds in the following years. Since the arrival of the DPP and the democratization of Taiwan, shifts could also be noticed in the ideologies of the KMT. The KMT, which was the pioneer of Chinese nationalism and unification, , 4/5 moved to the centre on national identity to compete with the DPP. Following a defeat in the 2000 elections, the KMT emphasised economic issues more, dropped its attacks on Taiwan's independence, and employed a mixed identity message.

A Young Taiwan and an Aging Kuomintang

The rise of Lee Teng-hui as the steward for Taiwan's democratisation shifted the regime's focus towards Taiwan itself. The party's long-standing aspiration of controlling the mainland was more or less given up and more focus was placed on Taiwan. A gradual increase in Taiwanese identity could also be observed from this point onwards. Election results and the years that followed the expulsion of Lee Teng-hui from the party have proven that he was indeed right in being pro-Taiwan. The Taiwanese youth sees the KMT's primary goal of reunification as the agenda of an older generation as opposed to today's democratic Taiwan. The KMT's last President was Ma Ying-jeou, whose tenure saw the Sunflower Movement, which was a protest against an agreement with the mainland that the people feared would undermine Taiwanese democracy and independence. The population clearly did not prefer closer political and economic ties with China. 2016 saw the emergence of DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen as the President. Tsai has openly rejected the 1992 consensus, and her rise reflects the current political scenario in Taiwan. The KMT needs to initiate fundamental political shifts and promote a message that will resonate with the party's members and attract new voters.

The Kuomintang is the oldest party in East Asia and has seen many twists and turns in history. The party finds in origins in Sun Yat-sen's ideals. Sun Yat-sen's education in the west greatly affected his political thought, and his ideas were revolutionary for a China that failed to modernise and adapt to the changing world. After

the death of Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang moved increasingly towards autocracy under Chiang Kai-shek. When they were forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan, the party established a one-party dictatorship for almost thirty-eight years. After initiating the democratisation process, the KMT did see initial success under Lee Teng-hui; however, they failed to sustain that victory. The DPP has taken over executive leadership on the island and has continued to do so despite the country's economic situation. It could be established that the KMT has failed to remain relevant for the younger Taiwanese population, who are more concerned with Taiwanese independence than reunification with the mainland.

The KMT has always believed its forty years of indoctrination, and economic realities would maintain its influential position within Taiwanese politics. This complacency and misplaced optimism have led to the party refraining from modernising and appealing to new and younger voters who have started voting for the DPP. The KMT needs to modify the message it sends to people, take a more pro-independence stance, or at least tune down its support for the 1992 consensus and maintain the status quo. The KMT must introduce radical changes to ensure that the oldest party in East Asia does not lose relevance in a younger world.

Chiang Kai-shek's Study in Japan

Based on the facts mentioned above, I will examine Chiang Kai-shek's speeches and writings regarding his days in Japan. He recollects his days in Japan in his memories through speeches and writings. The recollections are not the facts themselves, but selective memories of some aspects of the facts. His selection is based on his position, thought and necessity.

Looking at Chiang Kai-shek's memories of his days in Japan throughout his life, we can distinguish three categories of speeches and writings. The first is his direct experience in his days in Japan between 1905 and 1911. The second is not limited to the above mentioned period, but more generalized and indirect expression of his experience in Japan. The third is a comparison of civilization between Japan and China stemming from his perspective as a Chinese leader. What did Chiang Kai-shek try to insist through those memories? In my opinion, his characteristics of political leadership manifested themselves in those categories.

Direct Experiences

Chiang Kai-shek's speeches and writings about his memories of Japan between 1906 and 1911 are already quoted in many writings. Relying on the existing writings, I would like to re-examine this question from my own perspective. The first problem Chiang Kai-shek was concerned with in his memory was a habit of spitting by a Chinese student which he saw on the boat to Japan in 1906.

According to my memory, when I went to Japan for the first time at age 19 (in 1906), I found that a Chinese student unconsciously spit on the forecastle deck. A Chinese sailor discovered it and told him that ordinary Japanese would not spit anywhere. If he did it, he would spit in his handkerchief or in the tissue paper, and then put it in his pocket, bring it back home to wash or to throw away.

This speech is a part of Chiang Kai-shek's long report to the Tenth National Congress of the Kuomintang made at the beginning of the congress in March, 1960. This strong impression remained in Chiang's memory even after over 50 years. Chiang even at that time thought that Chinese people lacked a "common sense of modern life". It was a necessary attitude for a party member and ordinary people in general to master in order to promote ongoing reforms. For Chiang it was indispensable in building state and society for the Chinese people to liberate themselves from traditional bad habits and to become a polite modern person. Here he took out his memories of his days in Japan.

As to his study in Japan, Chiang Kai-shek most often referred to his experiences in the regiment at Takada. Coldness left strong impression on him as southern Chinese.

Takada is a city located in Niigata Prefecture near Hokkaido. The climate of this area is very severe. They have heavy snow every winter. Such heavy snow cannot be found even in the northern frontier of our country.

Coldness was not confined in itself. It had more effect.

I was not physically strong when I was a young boy. I came to Japan to study in the army at twenty years old and entered the regiment at Takada. I tried hard to train myself. It snowed hard there. I sometimes washed my body with snow or cold water. My body became stronger after difficult training of washing my body in this way, and the spirit also became healthier concurrently with strong body.

Coldness contributed to strengthening of the human body and spirit. Washing the face with cold water in the morning was also a Japanese custom to be noted for Chiang Kai-shek. For every Japanese washing his face with cold water became very popular custom all over the country. If someone does not do that, the others certainly consider him to be barbarous and not patriotic. What we know is that always.

Washing the face with cold water can inspire a man's spirit and make his mind clear. That custom also strengthens his skin and makes him immune to colds. More importantly it can save time by doing so. The Chinese lack this custom.

It is clear in Chiang Kai-shek's memory that washing the face with cold water was closely related with awakening spirit, strengthening the body, rationalizing life, resisting against Japan and reviving the nation. In other words, choosing the fact of washing the face with cold water of his memories in his days in Japan, was based on the challenge of the problems he faced. As a part of the question of coldness, Chiang Kai-shek also referred to cold meals taken by the Japanese people in the army and in daily life.

Ordinary Japanese take cold meals every day. He will carry a packed cold meal when he goes out during the daytime. This is, in other words, a basic military training and military activities. They have got into the habit of working hard and enduring difficulty at home from their childhood, because their whole life has been militarized since early years and their soldiers could become strong. The New Life Movement which I am advocating now intends to militarize completely the life of whole nation. Militarization means good order, sanitation, simplicity and naiveté. Only by accepting this value, one can become a member of modern nation who has a sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor, and is fitted to live in the modern world.

Thus the Japanese custom of eating cold meals was introduced into the targets of Chiang's New Life Movement, that is, militarization, good order, sanitation, simplicity and naiveté, sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor, and creation of the new nation. Furthermore, this custom was considered one of the sources of strength of Japanese army. In this sense, eating cold meals by the Japanese people was one of Chiang Kai-shek's choices concerning his memories of Japan.

Chiang Kai-shek's memories of his military life in Japan had broader implications. Looking over his whole life, the attitudes of "self-cultivation" and "self-strengthening" which meant to influence other people were important (Yamada 2009). In this context, he was attracted by the good discipline of Japanese army.

He paid attention to the discipline of "our enemy, Japan" brought about by military education. It was in October, 1940 when this speech was made during the Sino-Japanese War. His experience in the Japanese army still had meaning for Chiang Kai-shek even at this point in time.

As I saw in my days in Japan years ago, when the senior officer of the army examined bedrooms and a hall, at first they would see whether or not every corner of the room being clean and tidy, then examine the dust of backside of the door. They touched the bar of the door with white gloves. If they found dust on the gloves, the room was immediately judged not well in order and they had to clean it again. Then examining the spittoon, they had not only to see whether it was in good sanitary condition, but also to see whether water reached at the regulated level. I saw here the key to successful Japanese military education. The only secret of the success of education of the Japanese army lies in the fact that everything required for their whole daily life from cooking rice to washing all charged by soldiers, and need not to turn to outsiders.

The military education of Japan penetrated even into the daily life of the army, which contributed to maintaining discipline. Chiang Kai-shek found the strength of Japanese army in this aspect. Furthermore, military education and discipline was related to the problems of sanitation, cleanliness and order. These problems constituted in part to the strengthening of the Chinese army, party and nation which were compatible with his New Life Movement.

Other elements Chiang Kai-shek abstracted from his memory of disciplined life in the army were simple meals and monotonous time. As to a simple life of eating, he stated:

After entering the regiment] each person could eat only a medium-sized cup of rice in the Japanese army, and had to eat a boiled mixture of rice and barley several times during the week. Three pieces of pickled radish or salted fish were on the rice on other occasion. It was only on Sunday when we could eat some bean curd, green vegetables

and meat. Regardless of being full or not, the amount of rice and vegetables for each person was limited to this volume.

Even in this condition

The lower officers and soldiers in general were physically very good, and there was no health problem. This practice to limit the food was tried at Yunnan Chiangwutang earlier. According to their investigation, many of the students fell ill before having limited the amount of food, but the number of sick students even decreased three months after the restriction of food.

I spent one year in the regiment as mere soldier. The life was extremely monotonous and severe. At that time I felt it unreasonable because of the restriction of discipline, monotone of life and boringness. However, recollecting the past now, the basis for me to be able to live a simple life every day, to work constantly and to live a life for forty years as usual, was surely established in this one year of training as soldier. I feel that my will and spirit of revolution for my whole life thus became patient and not afraid of anything thanks to one year's experience as soldier.

Enduring a monotonous life also resulted in Chiang Kai-shek's present strength. Another question to be examined about Chiang Kai-shek's memory at Takada regiment was grooming a horse. As pointed out, taking care of horses occupied an important position in the training of the artillery regiment. As to grooming a horse, Chiang stated as follows:

After washing the face, the senior officer takes us to the stable and leads us to rub a horse down. The task of rubbing a horse starts from hoofs and thigh to the back. We would rub from the horse's back to the head and tail. We had to rub every joint and muscle of the horse by bundle of straws with all our might. Then, the whole body of the horse would get warm after rubbing for about an hour, and the pulse would get smooth. We ourselves rubbed a horse down with strength and worked hard. Thus we came to feel not cold in this cold weather, and our body, hands and feet got hot, and sometimes sweated. After finishing rubbing a horse, we again take it to the horse bucket outside of the stable covered with snow and lead it to eat and drink water. After the horse had enough food, we finally went back to our barracks and had breakfast. In the evening

again we went to the stable and rubbed a horse down, and after that could finally eat supper.

This grooming of a horse was for Chiang “the greatest training in my whole life. Nowadays I believe that it was on this occasion that I had the inspiration to consider worry to be happiness, and not to be afraid of difficulty”.

Chiang Kai-shek also referred to grooming a horse on another occasion. “I found the spirit of Japanese army in this aspect at that time. That is the point we especially have to learn”. That is to say, for Chiang grooming a horse was not confined in itself. The experience at that time constituted his spiritual basis. The Japanese army was a model to be followed.

Indirect Experiences

In this chapter I will deal with Chiang Kai-shek’s life in Japan and with what he learned and heard there other than the period when he was a student. We must ask what he tried to extract from that experience, and how that experience was related with his memories in his student days in Japan.

The most distinct contrast between his memories of his days in Japan and his view of Japan during the rest of his life was his feeling of humiliation toward Japan. The aspect of conflict occupied many years of Chiang’s entire life. Needless to say, the conflict was most severe during the time of Sino-Japanese War.

“Wiping out humiliation” (xuechi) toward Japan was related with “saving the nation” (jiuguo). “If we try to save our nation, first we must save the spirit of our nation. If we try to save the nation, first we must save the nationhood. Therefore, in order to revive the spirit of the nation, then we must surely begin by self-governing and self-strengthening” (Chiang 1932a, in Qin 1984, 10, 529). Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude confronting the Japanese invasion resulted in wiping out humiliation, saving the nation, self-governing and self-strengthening. This showed that Chiang for everything started from strengthening one’s own power position.

The next point to be noted is that Chiang Kai-shek tried to selectively extract useful elements for China from his experiences in Japan including his life in the army. He got the Soldier’s Handbook of the Japanese army in 1940 amid the Sino-Japanese War and chose the following items from “the preface” consisting of 20 paragraphs. “Absolute

obedience to the military officer and acting with courtesy" was required. "Courtesy" meant "keeping of discipline". The soldier "must do his best to help and support his war comrades, highly respect mutual courtesy, and further have the spirit to sacrifice himself for others".

A soldier must deal with the affairs of his family well and get rid of worry before going to war. The will to fight beyond life and death was important. Keeping the training, sanitation and health while awaiting orders are included with those items. Furthermore, this handbook required grooming a horse, having a will not to retreat when wounded, to respect the war dead and the wounded, not to be deceived by Japanese army, and to highly regard the importance of propaganda and espionage. These were general matters for the officers and soldiers to keep in mind when engaged in directing the army. However, looking all the items, they have common traits with his memories from his student days in Japan such as discipline of the army, unity and mutual assistance and the spirit for sacrifice. "We must surely pay attention especially to the morals of the army and military law". Within this context, the second volume of this handbook which exclusively dealt with the army morals, was important.

As an extension of this tendency Chiang Kai-shek summarized on other occasions what he learned from the Japanese army into the following three points:

- a. We "must absolutely obey the law of government, keep strictly to the discipline of the army and execute the order of senior officers".
- b. We "must highly regard the importance of political training, establish our core principle, fight for Three People's Principles (sanmin zhuyi), engage in the military service with strong will and complete the great task of revolution and building the nation".
- c. We "must try to learn a sort of necessary skill for our daily life and train the middle cadres to build the nation and to remodel the society".

It is evident that Chiang was trying to directly apply what he learned from Japan to the execution of Chinese revolution.

The third point to be noted about Chiang Kai-shek's indirect experience of Japan is that he was trying to find the source of the strength of Japanese army. From this perspective he paid attention to the importance of education in comparison with China.

“Hereafter if we wish to build our state and revive our nation, there is no other basic way than developing education. Therefore, education is essentially the greatest work for saving and reviving the nation”.

Recollecting his life in the Japanese army at the beginning of the New Life Movement, Chiang Kai-shek stated that the education which was equivalent to “the sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor” was going on in Japanese army. “They (Japanese) nowadays finally built such a rich and strong state after carrying out an education of this sort for more than several decades”. Education was the source of the strength of Japanese army.

I paid attention to three major points Chiang Kai-shek extracted from his indirect experiences in his life in the Japanese army. The common element of those three points was his attitude to try to find the source of strength of Japanese state and army and to apply them to strengthening China. As referred to in the previous chapter, it was also related to the elements he tried to extract from his direct experiences in his student days in Japan. However, it must not be forgotten that war with Japan had been going on for most of the years during which Chiang formed these attitudes.

Interrelations between Japanese and Chinese Cultures

Chiang Kai-shek referred to the characteristics of Chinese culture on various occasions. When he discussed Japanese culture in comparison with its Chinese counterpart, he had his own logic. While he based his analysis on his direct experiences in Japan, it revealed his view of Japan beyond those experiences.

Japan’s “national soul” or “Japanese military soul” makes up “Bushidō” and the “Japanese Spirit”. Its contents consist of “loyalty and patriotism, respect for chivalry and fondness for justice” (Chiang 1934b, in Qin 1984, 12, 362). Japan’s strength, however, originated “not in the influence of Western science but in the philosophy of China”. What then is this Chinese philosophy? It is the “Confucian Way”, which can be traced back to “Zhuxi’s Scholarship” from the Song Dynasty. Chiang highly evaluated “Wang Yangmin’s Scholarship” and emphasized the concepts of “the unity of knowing and doing” and “encouragement of natural knowledge”.

Here I will not deal with the contents of the concepts themselves referred by Chiang Kai-shek. The issue is in his logic. According to Chiang, the Japanese way of

thinking mentioned above was the source of their strength. Supposing that the Japanese thinking and philosophy originated in Chinese thought, it is logically appropriate then to return to Confucianism as China's traditional thought in order to enrich and strengthen China. However, when Chiang referred to Chinese tradition for the sake of nation building, he did not necessarily presuppose the existence of Japan. Chiang Kai-shek's logic concerning the interrelationship between Japanese and Chinese cultures had a complicated nature. On one hand "if both cultures have an intimate relation, we should consider how we can be friendly and should try to live together in mutual prosperity". On the other hand, he stated as follows:

The reason why Japan succeeded nowadays as a conquering nation, is only because she partially put into practice the philosophy of Wang Yangming. Unfortunately Japan did cut off a part of Chinese philosophy, and did not extract its whole essence.

According to Chiang's logic, Japan became strong relying on distorted Chinese philosophy and invaded China by what she stole from China. This logic explained Japan's invasion while he was expecting peace. It also manifested his ambivalent feelings of love and hatred toward Japan.

Chiang Kai-shek's Study in Japan and His Politics

The words, "Chiang Kai-shek's politics" sounds ambiguous. Here I intended to discuss his psychology and attitude as a Chinese politician. Therefore, specific policies, thought and ideology were not the objects of analysis. It will, however, define all frame work within which the individual policies of Chiang and Guomindang can be understood. Furthermore, it contains an element which was universally applied toward the political leaders of modern China.

As is well known, Chiang Kai-shek went to Japan for study twice between 1906 and 1911. This time includes three periods; Seika Gakkō, Shinbu Gakkō and no. 19 Regiment of no. 13 Division Field Artillery at Takada. The 'facts' regarding Chiang's activities in Japan during this period are not necessarily clear enough. Much of the existing research on Chiang during his student days in Japan, is mainly based on his memories from later years. That is to say, 'memories' were treated as 'facts'. However, 'memories' are not 'facts'. 'Facts' are chosen through 'memories'. That is to say, some aspects of a fact are deleted, while others are added. The 'facts' chosen through

‘memories’ are not the fact itself, but manifestations of the imagined scenery by the people who remembered that scene at various times. Thus, I began by confirming the facts about Chiang’s activities in his student days in Japan, and tried to reconstruct his memories about his days in Japan which were expressed in later years. His later memories of Japan are not the facts themselves, but rather showed his psychological attitude toward Japan and his own politics.

What characteristics can we extract from his memories of Japan?

Firstly, he tried to show a strength and superiority obtained through his experiences in Japan. Chiang Kai-shek as a leader wanted to show himself to be superior to the ordinary masses intellectually and physically and had to prove his own strength. It was the logic of “self-strengthening” (ziqiang) which prioritized his own strength over others. Within this context, he felt his experiences in Japan strengthened him and chose those experiences from his memories.

It is very hot during the summer in Takada, and the humidity was high. But, Chiang Kai-shek chose coldness, suggesting that he became physically and spiritually strong and healthy by the life-style experienced in this coldness. He noticed the frugal meals instead of luxurious food which he failed to get. He felt that this experience contributed to preserving himself in good health. Furthermore, he became patient by enduring the monotonous daily life in the army.

Secondly, Chiang Kai-shek presented himself as a model for military men and the ordinary masses by his spirit of “self-strengthening”. He suggested that they behave in the same way. The process of “self-cultivation” leading to “self-strengthening” was important for Chiang. Within this context, his memories of his student days in Japan were useful.

Chiang noted that in Japan the senior officer went into the bedrooms of soldiers and the halls and directed the arrangement of the rooms, in order to keep the discipline of army life. Thus keeping discipline was connected with cleanliness and sanitation. For example, his attitude manifested itself in his criticism of spitting.

Indirectly Chiang’s observations and experiences in Japan influenced his New Life Movement beginning in 1934. The aims of the Movement such as militarization, order, sanitation, simplicity and naiveté, sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor,

were adopted in order to create a new and strong modern nation. The various elements indicated in his style of life had an important meaning in the process from Chiang's self-cultivation to self-strengthening which were related to his experiences in Japan

Thirdly, Chiang Kai-shek tried to find the origin of the strength of Japanese army in his memories from his days in Japan. This effort came from his desire to understand his own weaknesses and to strengthen the nation. His ultimate goal was to create a strong nation and army. This attitude was ultimately related to his logic of self-strengthening. He wanted to build a nation and an army surpassing Japan during Sino-Japanese War while being aware of the experiences of Japan as an enemy. His formula included wiping out humiliation, saving the nation, self-governing and self-strengthening. As discussed above, this attitude appeared in Chiang's experiences and memories.

According to Chiang, the Japanese customs of washing the face with cold water and eating cold meals, and their attitude of saving and simplicity were sources of the strength of Japanese army. Ideological education and complete penetration of discipline, and diffusion of education throughout Japan also contributed to strengthening Japan and Japanese people. The fourth point is the question of the horse. As referred to earlier, training and grooming a horse were among the most important duties for field artillery. He established his spiritual basis through his experience of grooming a horse. He considered that experience to be a valuable model to learn from the Japanese army.

The fifth point is Chiang's comparison of Japanese and Chinese cultures. Chiang considered that the spiritual basis of Japanese and Japanese army was in the "Japanese Spirit", "Bushidō" and loyalty and patriotism. This ideological system was the foundation on Japanese strength. However, according to Chiang, the spiritual basis of Japanese was formed under the influence of a part of China's traditional thoughts consisting of Confucianism, Zhuxi's scholarship and Wang Yangming's scholarship. This fact had two implications. On one hand, it implied that Chinese thought and philosophy still had superiority over the Japanese people. On the other hand, Japan became strong by a philosophy imported from China. China however, experienced humiliation being invaded by Japan. This logic was an manifestation of Chiang's ambivalent feelings of love and hate toward Japan. Chiang Kai-shek articulated his political position through positive

experiences in Japan. However, his humiliation experienced during the Sino-Japanese War also must not be forgotten.

The sixth point is that Chiang Kai-shek acquired broad knowledge and insight about China and the world through his study in Japan. At the same time it gave him an opportunity to participate in Chinese politics leading to the 1911 Revolution through acquaintances with Chinese revolutionaries there. In this context, participation in the revolutionary movement was a by-product of his study in Japan, and was also the aim itself.

Lastly, let me consider Chiang Kai-shek's politics within the whole structure of modern Chinese politics. In the past I proposed to adopt a concept of "Daikōshugi" (substitutionism) as an element of continuity of Chinese politics in the twentieth century. It is defined as "a system and style of political leadership, in which a group of elite sets up the target of reform in place of the people, puts political consciousness into them, mobilizes the people for the realization of their targets, but lacks the institutional guarantee for the people to participate in politics voluntarily" (Yamada 2007). This definition involves some questions. The first question is what political target the political leaders set up for the people. That is the leadership of political leaders over the people. The second is how the leaders put political consciousness into the people. In this case, the conditions of politics are to be determined by how the political leaders judge the degree of political consciousness of the people. The third point is the degree of institutionalization of raising objection by the people against the state and the party. The question to be asked is to what extent the government and party allow the voluntary political participation of the people. The system lacks institutional framework to solve the political conflicts. The fourth point concerning substitutionism is that maintaining the power of the leadership required absolute priority over the people, and therefore the apparatus, means and resources for that purpose must be taken into consideration. However, all of these questions were not necessarily connected directly with Chiang's student days in Japan; for it was before he came into power, and in this context he did not confront the question of institutionalizing the people's political participation. Rather, the question of what the political leaders should be in substitutions, was his major interest in terms of his experiences in Japan.

In terms of Chiang Kai-shek's memories centering around his student days in Japan referred to earlier, these do not conclude all aspects of his life in Japan. These memories were selected from various aspects of his life in Japan. His attitude toward "self-strengthening", his consciousness of intellectual and physical superiority over the people, his desire to create a strong China, and his feeling of humiliation constituted a part of leadership of substitutions. In this sense, Chiang Kai-shek's attitudes discussed in this paper are to be located in the broader context of Chinese politics in the twentieth century.

The Manchurian Crisis: 1931

On the 18 September 1931 Japanese forces launched an unauthorised assault on North-Eastern China (Manchuria). The effects of the Depression in Japan and the resurgence of nationalism in China had combined to break the rotting tether which bound the army on the Kwantung peninsula to the restraining hand of Shidehara diplomacy. 1 Moscow was directly interested in the crisis because the pretext for aggression was the explosion of a bomb at Mukden on the South Manchurian Railway. Further up the line lay the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), which the Soviet Government had inherited from its predecessors and defended from forcible seizure by the Nationalists (Kuomintang) and their allies in 1929. Sustained possession of the railway testified to continued preoccupations about the balance of power in the region, 2 originally aroused by Japanese military intervention in the Soviet Far East from 1918 to 1922, bolstered by Britain's bombardment of Nanking in 1927 and consolidated by the consequent conversion of the Kuomintang into a partner of the West. The Russians were not merely passive observers, however. They actively sought the unification of an anti-imperialist China and this, despite the debilitated condition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), played its part in turning Tokyo against Moscow, at a time when the Depression accentuated Japanese dependence on Manchuria as a secure and vital source of raw materials, as a focus for trade and investment, as well as a place of settlement for "excess" population; likewise the sight of Eastern Siberia's vast expanse also whetted the appetites of the land hungry in huddled Japan. For the Russians, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria took place against a background of protracted difficulties in the Soviet Far East. Soviet agriculture generally was in crisis, and the harvest of 1931 was poor. As

Alec Nove has observed: "The peasants were demoralized. Collective farms were inefficient, the horses slaughtered or starving, tractors as yet too few and poorly maintained, transport facilities inadequate, the retail distribution system (especially in rural areas) utterly disorganized by an over-precipitate abolition of private trade".³ Famine was on its way. The disruption caused by collectivisation, which had been renewed with vigour in the winter of 1930/1, engendered unrest in the Soviet Far East, as in Russia proper, except that it appears to have become more intractable there than elsewhere. Commanding the Special Far Eastern Army, set up on the 6 August 1929 to meet the threat to the CER from the Kuomintang, was General Blyukher. His overriding aim was to develop the region into a self-sufficient economic unit which could support its own defence.⁴ It was evidently this that brought him into conflict with Moscow and led, by late November 1930, to talk of his arrest on charges of conspiring against the Party leadership.⁵ Denied by the Soviet Government, the rumours proved difficult to dispel,⁶ and re-emerged in May and June of 1931.⁷ Arrested or no, the General had clearly fallen from favour, but only temporarily, for he had become a figure with an international reputation as well as considerable domestic popularity as a result of his defence of the CER in 1929. The Politburo evidently decided to take his grievances seriously. On the 11 March 1931 Sovnarkom granted privileges to military personnel discharged from the Far Eastern Army settling in the region.⁸ More was to follow.

In late July Voroshilov began an extensive tour of garrisons, factories and collective farms in Siberia and the Soviet Far East, a tour which lasted nearly two months, including what appears to have been a public reconciliation with Blyukher, when he awarded the General the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Star on the 6 August. Although most of the Soviet press had little concrete to say of Voroshilov's visit, Izvestiya's comment nearly a week later is worthy of quotation, for behind the customary cliches lurked the unanswered question: why did the Far East merit so much of the Commissar's time and attention?

Voroshilov's trip to the Far East has activated to an even greater extent the creative efforts of the worker and collective farm masses on the battle-front of socialist construction.

Causes:

- Medium term: The Wall Street Crash and the onset of Depression led America to adopt protectionist policies. The Smoot Hawley Tariff was the result. This weighed heavily against Japan which relied upon exports to America to generate enough money to import food for its population. Signatories to Kellogg-Briand, Japan sought to extend its interests into China, beyond the Korean peninsula that was already part of its empire.
- Immediate causes: The Mukden incident on the Manchurian railway line which straddled the China-Korea border, of September 18th was entirely engineered by the Japanese military which let off an explosion on the railway line in order to attract Chinese troops whom it would later blame for causing the incident. The explosion was not strong enough to attract attention so on the 19th September, the Japanese Kwantung army opened fire on a nearby Chinese Garrison, in 'retaliation' for the explosion.

The crisis unfolds:

- Japan claimed it was acting in self-defence against Chinese attempts to take control of the territory it leased from the Chinese Government, and used this as a pretext for invasion which Japan conducted in the following weeks and months.
- On October 24th, 1931 the League of Nations issued a resolution to the Japanese to withdraw. The latter refused and instead proceeded with negotiations with the Chinese government.
- On January 14th 1932 the Lytton Commission began its enquiry and its results were published on October 2nd 1932. Whilst recognising that the Japanese had legitimate economic interests in Manchuria, the League rejected the argument that Japan was acting in self-defence, condemned Japanese action and ordered Japan to withdraw.
- The League failed to apply sanctions, in part because the US were not on board: the Washington Naval Conference (1921) guaranteed a certain degree of Japanese hegemony in the Far East.
- Britain was worried that if Japan failed to get its way in Manchuria it might look to British colonies and dominions instead.

- Furthermore, Britain was in crisis, having been recently forced off the gold standard. Although a power in the Far East, Britain was incapable of decisive action.
- The only response from these powers was “moral condemnation”
- Japan resigned from the League in March 1933.

Consequences:

- Manchuria damaged the League because one of its permanent Council Members had flagrantly violated the principles on which the League was established and then resigned when the League showed itself to be ineffective.
- J. P. Taylor wrote that “In the face of its first serious challenge”, the League buckled and capitulated.
- Japan and Manchuria provided a role model for Mussolini in Abyssinia and for Hitler in Austria and Czechoslovakia

Development of Manchuria

Manchuria, the homeland of the Manchus, consists of the “Three Eastern Provinces” of China, Fengtien (Liaoning), Kirin, and Heilungkiang. It has an area approximately the same as the combined areas of Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri, and a population about one-third greater than the total population of those states. Climatically it is somewhat similar to the northern states mentioned. It is traversed by two principal mountain ranges which are rich in mineral and timber resources. Between these ranges, particularly in the southern portion, lies the great Manchurian plain, ideally suited for agriculture, and it is this plain that has caused the area to be called “the granary of Asia.” Until very recently its natural resources have been undeveloped, and its population, formerly approximately stationary, has been increasing rapidly since the beginning of the present century.

Historically, Manchuria has been a part of the fringe of the Chinese Empire which has always been more or less involved in imperial destinies. It was included in the area which was excluded from China proper by the Great Wall, built in the third century, B.C. It has been peopled by hardy nomadic tribes or races, the principal of which, in recent history at least, was the Manchu. In the past its geographical limits have been vague, and no attempt was made to define them until the seventeenth century when the Russians,

moving eastward, gradually began to acquire the territory that is now Siberia. Its history, like that of its neighbors in the remainder of the fringe, contains many records of conflict with the empire and it has been, on more than one occasion, the origin of invasions of China. The most important of these invasions took place about the middle of the seventeenth century and resulted in the conquest of China by the Manchus. This conquest established an alien Manchu dynasty upon the throne of China which remained in power until 1911. While Chinese civilization had penetrated into Manchuria to some degree prior to the establishment of the Manchu dynasty, it was through this conquest of China by the Manchus that Manchuria came to be considered a part of China. The attitude of the conquerors with respect to their homeland illustrates this. During the greater part of the reign of the dynasty, Manchuria was reserved exclusively for Manchus. This restriction served both to exclude the Chinese from the land and to retard its development.

China's time-honored means of conquering conquerors has been to assimilate them, and this explains to a large degree the decay and collapse of the Manchu dynasty. Near its end, in 1907, one of the reforms initiated in an effort to save the dynasty was the opening of Manchuria to Chinese immigration. This opportunity, coupled with the almost constant state of civil war which has existed in China since 1911, has served to encourage a migration of Chinese from China into Manchuria. So effective has this migration been that from an estimated population of from 16 to 20 millions in 1912, the population is now estimated to be about 30 millions, almost all of which is Chinese. Until very recently it was increasing at a rate varying from one half to one million per year. The Manchu race, as such, is now almost non-existent and its numbers total less than a million.

In the earlier contacts between western countries and China, Manchuria, isolated and undeveloped as it was, did not play a prominent part. Due to its geographical position, however, Russia was an exception to this condition. In the sixteenth century the Russians began crossing the Urals in search of furs, and as this movement spread to the eastward clashes with the natives of Manchuria occurred. Resulting from this movement, and the intermittent warfare which ensued, was the first treaty signed between China and any western nation. This treaty, signed in 1689, fixed the boundary of Russian territory to be along the Amur River. The area thus transferred to Russia had never been settled by the Manchus and was comparatively unknown, although it had had some value as a

source for furs. The Russian migration continued to the eastward, and in 1860 another treaty was signed which fixed the present boundary of Russian territory and extended the Russian Empire to the Sea of Japan where was founded the port of Vladivostok. Russia obtained title to this wide expanse of territory in return for her efforts in mediation which led to the settlement of the war between China and England and France. Another result of this war, which had a bearing on the development of Manchuria, was the opening of the port of Nanchang to foreign trade.

Manchuria's early contacts with Japan extend back through several centuries. Japan's line of communication with the mainland naturally passed through Korea and it was by this route that many elements of Chinese civilization, such as the written language, were introduced into Japan. At one time Japan was considered to be a tributary state of China. Kublai Khan, while ruling over China, attempted a conquest of Japan over this route. Japan, at another time, launched a strong invasion of China by way of Korea, which failed after several years of effort. The earlier contacts had little effect on the present course of events, for in the seventeenth century Japan closed itself to foreign intercourse and remained closed for more than 200 years. Not until after 1854 did she renew her interest in the mainland. There followed a long series of troubles which brought the relations between Korea and China on the one hand and Japan on the other to a critical stage.

The principal cause for the Sino-Japanese War, which broke out in 1894, was this deep-rooted controversy which had developed about the independence of Korea. In a single battle the effectiveness of the Chinese navy was destroyed. With the naval threat to communications removed, Japanese armies moved through Korea and quickly occupied the southern part of Fengtien (Liaoning) Province from the mouth of the Yalu River to Newchang. After the capture of Wei-hai-wei and what is now Port Arthur, the Japanese prepared for an advance on Peking. With their capital thus threatened the Chinese sued for peace. Among the provisions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which terminated the war, was the cession of a part of Manchuria which had been occupied by Japanese troops, and known as the Kwangtung peninsula, to Japan. Russia, alarmed at this turn of events, enlisted the aid of France and Germany and succeeded in preventing this cession of territory.

Russia was not slow to take advantage of the events of the Sino-Japanese War to further her own interests in Manchuria. The trans-Siberian railway was in process of construction and the idea of running this line directly across Manchuria to Vladivostok was conceived by the Russians. To traverse Manchuria instead of building around it meant a saving of about 600 miles of trackage. Her intervention, which had prevented the cession of Kwangtung to Japan, provided the basis for negotiations which resulted in a secret treaty of alliance between Russia and China, signed in 1896, specifically directed against Japan.

In exchange for assurances of help in the event of another war with Japan, Russia obtained from China formal consent to the building of the trans-Manchurian railway. While Chinese territorial rights were guaranteed in the alliance, the railway concession was clearly indicated as being primarily for military purposes. By the terms of the treaty the Russo-Chinese Bank, known since 1910 as the Russo- Asiatic Bank, was to be given the contract for the construction of the railway. This bank, organized in 1895, appears to have been an agency of the Russian Ministry of Finance and the Foreign Office for the primary purposes of financing the railway and disguising its official character. While French capital was obtained and used for the construction of the line, the French loans were made to the Russian government and were secured by government bonds. The Russian government, in turn, used this money for financing the railway through the bank. The agreement between the Chinese government and the Russo-Chinese Bank providing for the formation of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and for the construction of the railway, is of the greatest importance, for it is the basic agreement upon which the later structure and operation of the railway concessions in Manchuria are based. One reason for the many controversies which have followed this original concession is the fact that the agreement contains many ambiguities and conflicting statements. It was written in the French and Chinese languages and the French text contains one provision which was omitted from the Chinese text. While many controversial points have arisen concerning the operation of the railway under the terms of the remainder of the contract, they have been of minor importance when compared with those which have arisen from the particular provision appearing only in the French text. Because of its extreme importance it should be emphasized that its existence as a binding part of the contract,

although appearing in but one text, has been fully recognized by the Chinese government. The provision is: "The company will have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands."

This provision was interpreted by the Russians as giving the company civil jurisdiction over the railway lands, an interpretation to which the Chinese objected. Subsequent agreements have recognized the Russian interpretation, in principle, at least. Inasmuch as the "company" was a semi-official agency of the Russian government, the provision had the effect of a limited transfer of sovereignty. There can be little doubt that the Chinese negotiators realized that this condition would result when they signed the agreement, and its inclusion can be interpreted as the price that the Chinese were willing to pay for the assurances of help contained in the secret alliance.

Aside from this one provision the agreement is more or less conventional and general in its terms, although favorable to the operating company. In addition to the right of way for the railway itself it was granted lands for the supply of necessary sand, gravel, etc. A later agreement permitted the company to develop and operate mines and it gradually expanded its operations and assumed added powers, in many cases beyond the limits permitted by the agreement. While these practices were objected to at the time by the Chinese government, subsequent agreements have, in general, confirmed the increased activities.

Having been completely successful in her first entry into Manchuria, Russia soon made further advances. Among her desires was an ice-free port, a condition which Vladivostok did not satisfy. When Germany obtained the Kiaochow lease in 1898, Russia joined in the "scramble for concessions" which followed and obtained from China a lease of the Kwangtung peninsula, containing Port Arthur and Dairen, for a period of twenty-five years. Work was commenced at once in building extensive fortifications at Port Arthur and in developing the port of Dairen (called Dalny under the Russian regime). This was the same area which she had, with the help of France and Germany, succeeded in preventing Japan from obtaining but three years before. Also included in the lease convention was authority for the Chinese Eastern Railway to construct a branch line from Harbin to Dairen and Port Arthur under the same conditions as were provided for in the original agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank.

The Boxer troubles in China indicated more clearly the objects of Russia in the Manchurian area. Upon the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, Russia rushed troops into Manchuria and, among other things, established "railway guards," consisting of troops distributed along the railway, to cope with the bandit situation. Points many miles from the railway were occupied and at one time upwards of 100,000 troops were in Manchuria. Work on the railways was rushed in spite of troubled conditions, and the lines were actually completed ahead of the scheduled time. Russia was slow to remove her troops after the Boxer troubles had been settled, although she had given assurances to several foreign countries, including Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, that she would remove them promptly. In 1903 her troops were still in force in the section and her general attitude was such as to indicate that the annexation of Manchuria was her real objective.

Shortly after the close of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan and Russia reached agreements regarding their respective relations in and with Korea, which had become independent as a result of that war. It is significant that Russia entered into these agreements soon after she had negotiated her secret treaty of alliance with China. Both Russian and Japanese troops were stationed in Korea for several years and both countries struggled for permanent footholds. The history of the ten-year period from 1895 to 1905, so far as Korea is concerned, is largely one of intrigue centering about the efforts of each country to obtain a dominant position. In many ways the Russian became somewhat stronger than the Japanese. The effects of this struggle were felt in other parts of the world and one of the principal reasons for the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the Russian expansion in the Orient as evidenced by her efforts to dominate Manchuria and Korea.

Russia showed little inclination to cooperate with Japan and repeatedly disregarded her agreements regarding Korea. After the failure of prolonged efforts on the part of Japan to reach a satisfactory understanding regarding both Manchuria and Korea, the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904. This war was unique in that the land operations were conducted entirely on neutral soil, although by the provisions of her secret treaty of alliance of 1896 China should have entered the war on the side of Russia.

In prosecuting the war Japanese forces advanced into Manchuria through Korea and captured Liao-Yang on the south Manchurian branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In making this advance a light military railway was constructed across Fengtien which was later to become the Antung-Mukden Railway. After the capture of Liao-Yang, which gave the Japanese a foothold on the railway, operations were directed against Port Arthur. The capture of this fortified stronghold required a long siege which included extremely severe fighting and heavy casualties. Following the reduction of Port Arthur, a general advance was made in the direction of Mukden and, after its capture, the Russians were completely expelled from southern Manchuria. The Japanese were successful in every major operation of this war and their success destroyed the Russian domination of Manchuria, although the war ended before they had advanced beyond Changchun.

The Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, transferred to Japan both the Kwangtung lease and the south Manchurian branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur. Transferred with the actual property were all rights and privileges pertaining to the areas concerned and the coal mines in the region which were owned by or operated for the railway. The transfers were to be made subject to the approval of China. China gave her consent in a treaty with Japan signed in Peking in December, 1905. In an additional agreement to this treaty, China formally recognized and sanctioned the presence of railway guards for the protection of the railway property. Following the Russo-Japanese War, Russian influence in Manchuria gradually diminished in importance even in the northern section which was largely unaffected by the war. The settlement made no important changes in the administration of that part of the Chinese Eastern Railway which was retained by Russia.

The operation of the original contract in connection with the administration of lands was formally brought to the attention of other powers by the establishment of a municipality at Harbin in 1907. It was planned that this municipality, when established, should be administered according to Russian law, and the administration would include such functions as the levying of taxes payable to the railway and the operation of courts of law. Objections by China to this proposal caused prolonged discussion and resulted in agreements which apparently met the Chinese objection, but which actually strengthened the Russian position. The question was made into an international one when the

American consul refused to apply to the railway authorities for permission to establish his consulate, basing his refusal on the ground that he was accredited to the Chinese government and that Harbin was Chinese territory. The United States and Germany objected and claimed that the rights of foreigners were being interfered with. Japan was favorable to the Russian position, and other powers were inclined to accept the situation. The United States has refused to recognize that the original contract granted the railway political and civil administrative rights in the railway areas. In practice, however, the American government has permitted its nationals to pay taxes on the ground that they enjoy the benefits provided by the municipalities and should, therefore, contribute a fair share of the cost of these benefits.

One result of the Russo-Japanese War was the conversion of the Chinese Eastern Railway from a primarily military venture into one commercial in nature. This was specifically provided for in the Treaty of Portsmouth. However, instead of doubletracking the Chinese Eastern, the Russians have since built an additional line around Manchuria entirely in Russian territory.

From 1907 to 1915 Russia entered into several agreements with Japan which were concerned chiefly with the "spheres of influence" of the two countries in Manchuria and in the delineation of these spheres. Until the time of the Russian Revolution both usually have stood together and acted in unison whenever questions involving Manchuria have been raised. Examples of this co-operation will be noted when the activities of Japan in Manchuria are considered.

In 1924 the Soviet government denounced the "unequal" treaties to which China was a party and renounced all of the privileges, such as extra-territoriality, which Russia had previously enjoyed. In a treaty with China, signed at this time, it agreed to a co-operative administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This joint administration has not been free from controversy, and one dispute in 1929 resulted in open hostilities. The incident was brought about by the forcible ousting of certain Soviet officials in Manchuria by the Chinese. The officials concerned had, according to Chinese claims, abused their administrative positions and utilized the various agencies of the railway for the dissemination of Soviet doctrines. Diplomatic relations were completely broken off

by the two parties and they have not yet been resumed.¹ The particular incident was settled by a protocol which re-established the status quo.

Following the acquisition of her new properties after the war with Russia, Japan launched an energetic program of development. The record of her activities from the first indicates that she has been hopeful of reserving the benefits to be derived from the development of Manchuria largely to herself. It is in the prosecution of this policy that questions involving Manchuria, or rather the Japanese activities in that area, frequently have had the attention of world powers. She has resisted the entry of foreign finance into the area and in this she has been practically, if not theoretically, successful. An examination of some of the foreign efforts to obtain a financial interest in railway development, in particular, will serve to indicate the extent of her success.

Immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Mr. E. H. Harriman, the American railroad builder, made an effort to buy and operate the newly acquired Japanese railway. The negotiations reached an advanced stage, but were broken off when the Japanese decided to retain the line.

In 1907 a British company agreed with China to build a railway from Hsinmintun to Fakumen, both in Manchuria. Japan objected to the project, citing a protocol to the Treaty of Peking, of 1905, in which China had agreed to the transfer of the Russian properties. This protocol provided that no railway paralleling the South Manchurian, and competing with it, should be built without previously consulting Japan. There has long been doubt as to the validity of this protocol, but the Lytton commission, which made a special point of investigating it, found that an understanding, substantially as claimed by Japan, was reached and is binding upon China although it does not have the force of a formal treaty. The principal difficulty in interpretation has been in defining what is meant by "parallel" and "competing." The British government, then bound by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was inclined to be favorable to the Japanese position and did not give its nationals support in this venture.

In 1909 an Anglo-American syndicate agreed with China to construct a railway from Chinchow, on the Peking-Mukden Railway, to Aigun, in northern Manchuria, crossing the Chinese Eastern at Tsitsihar. The execution of this project was delayed by the death of Mr. Harriman who had been one of the leading figures in the syndicate.

Shortly afterwards the American State Department put forth a plan for the "neutralization" of the Manchurian railways. This scheme became known as the Knox plan and it grew out of the negotiations in connection with the Chinchor- Aigun project. The British government was lukewarm to the proposal and Russia and Japan, with neither of whom had any preliminary discussions been conducted, flatly rejected it. The Chinchor-Aigun Railway project was abandoned after the failure of the Knox plan to materialize.

In 1910 European and American banking interests combined into a "four-power banking group" for the purpose of jointly financing various projects in China. In this same year the group entered into an agreement with the Chinese government for a loan to be used for currency reform and for industrial development in Manchuria. The objections of Japan and Russia to certain features of this agreement led to lengthy discussions which resulted in the inclusion of these two powers into what then became a six-power consortium. Practically nothing was accomplished by this group and one of the first acts of President Wilson's administration was the withdrawal of the official support of the United States from the consortium.

The World War transferred the interests of world capital to the European field and matters in China were left largely to Japan. In 1918 the American State Department again became interested in Chinese financial matters and at its suggestion a new consortium was formed consisting of American, Japanese, British, and French banking groups. While this international banking consortium was fully organized, and the negotiations attendant upon its formation contributed materially to removal of certain objectionable elements in the way of joint international financial activities in China, it has been and remains largely a paper syndicate. One principal reason for the failure of this group to underwrite loans of any importance has been the inability of the Chinese to form a stable and responsible government.

While these two banking groups were organized for the joint financing of Chinese undertakings, including railway construction in Manchuria, no foreign capital, other than Japanese, is invested in railways in southern Manchuria, although several new lines have been constructed in that area since 1906. The sole exception is in the case of the Peking-

Mukden Railway in which British capital is invested by an agreement entered into prior to 1900.

Included in the agreements incident to the approval by China of the transfer of the Russian rights to Japan, was the right to retain and convert into a standard-gauge commercial line the narrow-gauge military railroad which had been constructed by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War from Antung, on the Korean border, to the south Manchurian branch of the Chinese Eastern. Owing to the inability to reach agreement over such matters as the inclusion of this line under the terms of the south Manchurian, the right of Japan to maintain railway guards on the line, and the variations in route from the original line, the actual conversion was delayed for several years. Originally it was to have been completed within three years but it was not until 1909 that a final agreement was reached and then only after Japan had sent an ultimatum to China demanding settlement. Although China finally agreed to the conversion, many questions such as the railway guard issue were left unsettled.

From the time of her initial acquisition of the railway, Japan has been engaged in almost continuous controversy with China over various problems arising from the rights involved. These have been complicated by the lack of precise phraseology, not only in the original Russian agreements, but also in the Treaty of Portsmouth and the agreements which have been entered into subsequently. For example, while the Treaty of Portsmouth transferred certain Russian properties to Japan no exact description of the property transferred was made. In many cases land was involved in which the Russian title either was not clearly defined or was involved in litigation. Thus, at the outset, there was a lack of definiteness concerning just what Japan had acquired. In their own enterprises the Russians had instituted practices which were not definitely permitted by the agreements and which had been the subject of controversy with China. In assuming the administration of these properties the Japanese followed the existing Russian practices and thereby inherited the points of difference and controversy along with the physical property.

Because of her alliance with Great Britain, the World War promptly included Japan among the Allies. Her geographical position naturally gave her, as her principal objective in the war, the capture of the fortified German leasehold at Tsingtao. In

accomplishing this capture she suffered heavy losses and was forced to conduct extensive military operations on Chinese soil outside the limits of the leased area. The disposition of the captured German holdings, coupled with her many troubles in Manchuria, led her, in January, 1915, to submit a series of proposals to China in the form of a demand.

These proposals have since been known as the "twenty-one demands." They were submitted in an unusual manner, being presented direct to the president of China and without previous intimation that their submission was contemplated. An examination of them indicates that they were probably much more severe than the actual conditions warranted. With one exception they were concerned chiefly with the settlement of outstanding differences. The proposals contained in Section V provided, in effect, that Japan would have an active part in the internal administrative affairs of China. The provisions of Section V were not insisted upon and they were completely abandoned after the Washington conference.

After prolonged discussions and in reply to a Japanese ultimatum, a series of treaties and agreements were signed and reached in May, 1915. Many current differences concerned with China proper, including the disposition of the ex-German leased territory, were settled. Several changes in the then existing conditions in Manchuria were made. The periods of the leases of the Kwangtung leased territory, the South Manchuria Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway, were extended to ninety-nine years. Originally these were: for the Kwangtung lease twenty-five years; and for the railways, eighty years for the South Manchurian with a provision for repurchase by China after thirty-six years, under specified conditions, and fifteen years for the Antung-Mukden. There were several provisions concerning the free movement of Japanese subjects in Manchuria and the granting of certain trade facilities. Others provided for the transfer of control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to Japan for ninety-nine years, for exclusive financial activities, for the extension of mining rights, and for the employment of Japanese advisers when required.

Perhaps more than any one incident, the 1915 agreements have been responsible for the continued strained relations between China and Japan. Many Chinese have maintained that, since the agreements were obtained under duress, they are not binding. Such an attitude cannot be given serious consideration, however, because its acceptance

would cause the same claim to be made for countless other treaties, such as the Versailles Treaty. The Chinese government has accepted their validity, but has taken the position that they were unjustified and, being obtained under duress, should be abrogated. There is evidence to the effect that the ultimatum, which was responsible for the conclusion of the agreements, was privately requested by Chinese officials for the purpose of preserving their prestige. If this be true, the Chinese position is weakened for the duress claimed was the threat contained in the ultimatum. There are many elements concerned with these agreements which have not yet been explained satisfactorily.

The 1915 agreements represent the last important grant of concessions which has been made by China. In fact this time may be taken as marking a turning point in China's position, for since then she has regained some features of autonomy which had been withheld from her complete control, and also some of the concessions which she had previously granted.

That the agreements concluded, and more particularly the provisions of the original proposals, were the source of considerable concern to other powers was evident by the attention which they received. Chief among the foreign interests in the negotiations was the question of the maintenance of the open-door policy, one to which all of the powers concerned were committed. Where exclusive rights were granted to Japanese subjects, these rights were apparently in conflict with the principle. The subject of the 1915 agreements was prominent at the Washington conference in 1922, and the Nine Power Treaty, which was signed at this conference, nullified the provisions of the agreements which were most in conflict with the views of other powers.

During the war years, when the attention of the rest of the world was focused in Europe, a series of questionable agreements were concluded between Japanese interests and the Chinese government in Peking. In 1917-18 a series of loans to the Chinese government were arranged through Japanese banks. These have become known as the Nishihara loans and were named for the representative of the Japanese prime minister who negotiated them. The funds were advanced to the military rulers then controlling the government in north China. Two of the loans were for the stated purpose of railway construction in Manchuria, \$5,000,000 in one case and \$10,000,000 in the other. While ostensibly for railway development, the agreements did not contain any details governing

the method of expenditure of the funds, such as might be expected, and they were written in the most general terms. The loans amounted to an unconditional delivery of the funds to the Peking regime and the enemies of that regime have claimed that the money was used to finance military operations against southern factions. Outwardly it appears that these unconditional advances were hardly more than disguised bribes which Japanese interests were willing to pay for the privileges and concessions which they received in return.

One other loan agreement made during this period is illustrative of the attitude of certain Chinese military leaders towards such matters. A loan of fifteen million dollars was made with the gold mines and national forests of Heilungkiang and Kirin Provinces, together with the government's revenue from these sources, as security. No definite purpose for the loan was stated other than an implied development of the resources listed as security. So far as is known the loan has never been repaid and the control of these resources is now largely in Japanese hands. It may be presumed that the funds were used by the Chinese officials for their own personal purposes.

During this same period an agreement was made between the United States and Japan which is now of little importance but of which much was made at the time. Upon the American entry into the World War, Japan sent a delegation, headed by Viscount Ishii, to congratulate the United States upon its decision and to arrange for co-operation between the two countries. When the appointment of this mission was reported to the State Department it was closely followed by a suggestion that the United States recognize Japan's position in Manchuria by "appropriate means." After the arrival of the mission and as a result of a series of conferences between Viscount Ishii and Secretary of State Lansing the views of the two countries were exchanged. In a formal note addressed to Viscount Ishii was the following statement:

The governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous.

This was considered to be a notable diplomatic victory in Japan, for it gave formal recognition to a position which Japan had sought to have recognized and it paved the way

for claim to the formulation of an "Asia Monroe Doctrine." While the wording of the statement seems quite clear there has been from the first a difference of opinion as to its actual meaning. The record of the conversations, both preliminary to and subsequent to the writing of the note, indicates differences concerning the intended meaning. Viscount Ishii stated that what he had had in mind was a statement recognizing that Japan's position with respect to China was similar to that of the United States with respect to Mexico. The American interpretation, on the other hand, was that the term "special interests" had reference only to economic matters attributable to geographical conditions. The essence of the difference was that Japan considered that political matters were also included in the meaning of the term. Following the signature of the nine power pact at the Washington conference whatever significance the exchange of views had had was superseded by that treaty and the Lansing-Ishii agreement was terminated by mutual denunciation in 1923.

At the peace conference of Versailles the Chinese attempted to have the 1915 agreements with Japan abrogated, but in this they were not successful. At the Washington conference, China renewed the attempt and while she was unsuccessful again, she did succeed in having a considerable part of that conference devoted to a study of the Chinese situation with particular reference to Sino-Japanese relations. Several agreements were reached which, on the whole, indicated a more liberal attitude toward China on the part of the powers. One of the most important of any of the agreements was the nine power pact. In this treaty all of the signatories agreed to a rigid adherence to the principle of the open-door policy of equal opportunities for trade to all. This was definitely extended to include Manchuria by virtue of the fact that the treaty also recognized that Manchuria was an integral part of China. By signing and ratifying this treaty Japan renounced any claim which she may have had to any special or preferential position in Manchuria.

Whenever Japan has been involved in international discussions with powers other than China concerning conditions of her activities in Manchuria, the substance of such discussions may be said to revolve about the principle of the open door and the treaty rights of other foreigners. She has been able, however, to secure and retain for herself practically if not theoretically a dominant position in south Manchuria. There is an

abundance of reports, some from partisan sources and some of an official character, which indicate that Japanese officials in the railway areas have followed practices which have tended to delay and obstruct the trade activities of non-Japanese foreigners. This condition existed far more noticeably prior to 1922 than since that time.

In indicating some of the steps which Japan has taken to secure her dominant position no mention has been made of the machinery which she has set up in Manchuria to derive for herself the benefits of this position. It is only through an examination of this machine that the character and scope of her position can be understood.

Soon after it had obtained the railway rights from Russia in 1905, the Japanese government chartered the South Manchuria Railway Company to operate the newly acquired property. Since it has been through this organization that the Japanese development of Manchuria has been carried out the articles of incorporation of the company are of particular importance. Of those articles which pertain to purely operational functions little notice need be taken, for they follow accepted practice and have been the source of little trouble. The significant parts are those which determine the official character of the company.

One-half of the capital stock was reserved for the Japanese government and was represented by the physical properties and rights acquired from Russia. It was provided that the president and vice- president were to be appointed by the government and that the board of directors was also to be appointed by the government from the ranks of stockholders having fifty or more shares of stock. These two factors, the ownership of one-half of the capital stock and the power of appointment of the principal officers, gave the government definite control of the company's policies. For many years the presidency of the South Manchuria Railway Company was a purely political appointment and was considered in Japan to be of importance second only to a cabinet portfolio. Only the Japanese and Chinese governments and nationals of the two countries were permitted to be stockholders. While a small amount of stock is held by individual Chinese, the company is almost entirely Japanese. Certain decisions involving matters of policy were required to be referred to the government for approval.

The field of operations embraced all of the acquired rights concerned with the railway and mines and the company was authorized to administer the areas owned by the

railway outside the Kwangtung leased territory. Thus, while it was incorporated as, and in many respects has been, a private corporation, it was actually a semi-official organization of the Japanese government. Aside from the civil administrative functions which it exercises in the railway areas, the actual company is well described in its Second Report of Progress in Manchuria to 1930, published in 1931.

The South Manchuria Railway is more than a railway company. In addition to its railway undertakings in South Manchuria which constitute the main business, the company conducts, as accessory enterprises, coal mines, iron works, wharves, warehousing, and other activities. The company is also engaged in educational, hygienic, and other public works within the railway zone; controls a number of joint-stock companies, hotel undertakings, etc., chiefly in South Manchuria, and acts as a holding company for these concerns. The functions of the corporation and the volume of its business are possibly the largest of their kind in the Orient, and in some respects, are unsurpassed by any other concern in the Pacific area. The story of the company's development is also, to a great extent, the story of the progress of Manchuria in the last quarter-century, for both are inseparably related.

One of the administrative features continued from the Russian practice was the grouping of the properties into a "railway zone," over which the right of administration was granted to the railway company. The railway zone is hardly capable of exact description because of its irregular features, the questionable status of some of the properties, and the fact that it is constantly expanding. It embraces the holdings outside the Kwangtung leased territory and roughly consists of about 108 square miles of area which includes the right of way of the railway itself, varying in width from 50 to about 300 feet on either side of the tracks; the enlarged areas in the principal towns along the railway, commonly known as the "Japanese settlements" and "railway areas"; lands acquired by the railway through purchase or lease and used for such activities as mining; and lands owned or leased by individual Japanese in the region. Except in the towns and industrial centers the zone is roughly the railway right of way, aptly described, as one writer has done, by a rule to "follow the white stakes."

Another operating condition continued from the Russian practice was the maintenance of railway guards along the railway. The Treaty of Peking, sanctioning the

transfer of property, contains a provision granting to Japan the right to maintain railway guards to a number not exceeding 10 per kilometer of railway line. The present mileage is such that the total number allowed is about 13,000. Although designated by a special name and in many respects a separate organization, the railway guards have been, in practice, regular Japanese troops under the command of the garrison commander of the Kwangtung leased territory. Normally they are stationed in detachments at various places along the right of way and until recently totalled about 10,000. Japan agreed to remove her railway guards simultaneously with Russia, but the break-up of the Russian Empire and the renunciation of all special rights by the Soviets, coupled with the ever increasing bandit activities, has given Japan justification for retaining them beyond the time that the Russian guards were actually removed.

Prior to 1919 the control of the Kwangtung leased territory, the railway zone, and the affairs of the railway company were in the hands of the governor-general of the Kwangtung leased territory, a military officer directly appointed by the emperor. In that year a reorganization replaced the governor-general with a civil official, the governor of Kwangtung. Since then there have existed four distinct forms of military and police activity in the area under Japanese control. The Kwangtung garrison and the railway guards are under the command of the garrison commander and are independent of the civil administration. The municipal police in the various railway towns are under the control of the governor of Kwangtung. The consular police, having duties restricted to consular activities, are attached to the various consulates. It is a condition difficult to describe, but it is neither as complicated nor as unwieldy as might be supposed, owing to the interlocking organization by which the several officials are involved in administrative affairs. In practice there is one organization, the railway company, which conducts all of its operations, including civil administration, under the general supervision of the governor of Kwangtung. The military in Manchuria, which has the protection of the railway for one of its duties, is entirely independent of the remainder of the organization and is responsible directly to the throne through the ministry of war and the chief of the general staff.

The operation of the railway guards has been one of the most fruitful sources of irritation between the Japanese and the Chinese in Manchuria. Particularly in the earlier

stages of Japanese development there were numerous clashes between the railway guards and Chinese troops and civilians. The execution of their duties necessarily led the guards outside the strict limits of the railway zone and such operations on purely Chinese soil provided fertile grounds for the clashes that have occurred.

Aside from their activities of protection to the railway the presence of the guards has enabled Japan to exert strong pressure upon the internal affairs of Manchuria. Manchuria has been relatively free from the almost constant civil warfare existent in the rest of China for the past twenty years. Manchurian leaders have participated in these wars but their military activities have been confined largely to the area south of the Great Wall. When the armies of the present Nanking government were pushing northward, and obtained control of the Peking area in 1928, the Japanese government sent a warning that should the situation become such as to threaten the peace and security of Manchuria the Japanese would interfere. Whether or not this threatened interference was warranted, it had the effect desired.

The Japanese have been careful to avoid incidents within the railway zone which would lead to formal complaint by other powers. The foreigner living in the zone is in a peculiar position because the general extra-territorial treaties give him their protection. At the same time he enjoys the protection and improvements provided by the railway and he can be reasonably expected to contribute his share towards the support of these advantages. Taxes are levied on Japanese subjects as a matter of right. The scale of taxes applied to the Japanese is also applied to the other foreign and Chinese residents of the zone. If such levies should be met by refusal to pay the matter is usually adjusted privately in a manner satisfactory to both parties. By such compromises the Japanese authorities have succeeded in keeping the question of the right to tax all residents of the zone out of diplomatic channels, with the result that taxation of these residents is actually exercised without its legality having been formally challenged.

Most of the problems concerning Manchuria have been, in general, restricted to discussions between China and Japan. Japan has respected the treaty rights of other foreigners in the zone and has, thereby, avoided many other problems which might have arisen. In the long series of quarrels, discussions, and negotiations with China the points at issue have been clouded by misunderstandings and conflicting opinions. These can be

traced to the careless manner in which almost all of the pertinent agreements, beginning with the original Russian contract, have been drawn. They contain generalities and statements so phrased that differing and conflicting interpretations can be placed upon them. Added to this are several agreements between the Japanese and local Chinese officials who often have acted independently and without the sanction of the recognized government in China.

This is one of the basic causes of the impasse which exists. Japan has adhered to a rigid exercise of the rights and privileges which she has gained by formal contracts and agreements with China, whether with the central or principal government or with local officials. She has insisted upon her own interpretation of these agreements and has shown little inclination to compromise. China's objections to Japanese action have been based upon differing interpretations of the agreements and she has frequently attempted to enlist outside support for her contentions. Japan has been largely successful in resisting these efforts.

In less than one hundred years Japan, has transposed herself from a comparatively unknown feudal state, completely cut off from the outside world, to one of the world powers. Immigration barriers in various parts of the world have effectively cut off the disposal of her surplus population. Attempts to use the relatively unsettled Manchuria for this purpose failed. Consequently she has been forced to turn to industrialization for a solution to this problem. Outside her own territory her largest industrial activity is centered in Manchuria. Her investment in this area, including that in the leased territory of Kwangtung, exceeds \$1,000,000,000, an amount which is about one-fiftieth of her national wealth. The South Manchuria Railway Company is one of her largest corporations in which over one-half billion dollars is invested. In view of this huge investment it is not difficult to understand why she considers her Manchurian enterprises to be vital to her economic security. Aside from purely financial considerations her dependence upon Manchuria can be illustrated vividly by one example.

Prior to the World War she imported a industrial steel from England and Belgium. When these two countries entered the war this supply was stopped and iron and steel were imported from the United States. Upon its entry into the war, the United States

placed an embargo upon the export of iron and steel. This action cut off Japan's remaining source of supply. Owing to unobtainable raw materials, work on hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping, then on the building ways in Japan, was suspended and much of the partially completed work became a total loss. She was forced to develop the iron mines of Manchuria and, while these are not sufficient for all of her needs, they form her only dependable source of supply. Similarly, the coal mines provide an industrial necessity, as the deposits in Fengtien Province are the only extensive deposits of coking coal in the Asiatic area. These, together with forests and other mineral resources, provide an abundant supply of raw materials which are vital economically to Japan.

That Japan is primarily responsible for the development of Manchuria from what was a largely unknown area into a highly prosperous section of the world is hardly open to question. In recent years the balance of trade, unlike that of the rest of China, has been favorable to Manchuria. In 1929, for which statistics are available and which may be considered as a typical year, the ratio of export to import was approximately 4:3. For the whole of China (including Manchuria), in the same year, the ratio of export to import was about 2:3. Although unquestionably predominant, Japan has by no means had a monopoly on this trade. In 1908 her share was about 30 per cent of the total (including that with China proper) and in 1929 it was about 35 per cent. For the same years the trade of the United States amounted to approximately 7 and 5 per cent, respectively. In 1929 the American imports from Manchuria amounted to about \$6,000,000 and the exports to Manchuria amounted to about \$14,000,000, which does not include goods reshipped through China and estimated at about \$3,000,000.

Starting with the original Russian railway from Changchun to Dairen the Japanese have either built up, or have been instrumental in building up, a railway network which has opened southern Manchuria to rapid communication. In addition to the Japanese-owned main line and feeders there is a network of joint-owned Sino-Japanese lines and purely Chinese-owned lines. Of the approximately 3,700 miles of railways in Manchuria, the Japanese-owned consist of about 700 miles, the joint Sino-Japanese about 140 miles, and Chinese lines built with Japanese capital 614 miles, making a total of about 1,450 miles in which Japanese capital is invested. The joint Sino-Russian mileage is 1,096, the British financed Peking- Mukden Railway mileage in Manchuria is 388, and the purely

Chinese owned is about 765 miles. Although the Japanese railway interests form considerably less than half of the total they predominate because they feed the principal port of Manchuria, Dairen. The lines operated by the Japanese are well equipped and efficiently managed and the service compares favorably with that of any railway in the world.

It is not only in a railway system that Japan has developed the country economically. Through the railway company she has built and operated agricultural experiment stations and through them she has improved both the quality and quantity of agricultural products. Principal among these products is the soy bean, useful as a food and for fertilizer, and exported to various parts of the world. Modern and well-equipped hospitals and schools have been built, and these agencies have contributed to the improvement of general living conditions. Her mining enterprises have been among the most extensive of her operations. These have been the source of much trouble with China, because of the expansion of control over mineral deposits, but through them and forestry operations she has contributed to the economic welfare of the country.

To secure a balanced idea of the Manchurian development and troubles it is necessary to consider the situation from the standpoint of Chinese activities and attitudes.

By the time of the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the Japanese had become firmly established in Manchuria and their presence had a tendency to dampen extensive revolutionary activity which might have occurred otherwise, although Manchuria was slow to join the revolt. In fact, loyal authorities succeeded in checking the revolution by appointing Chang Tso Lin to command imperial troops in resisting the revolutionaries. After the overthrow of the dynasty had been accomplished, the authorities accepted the situation and announced loyalty to the revolutionary government. As in the rest of China the military commanders soon assumed full control and supplanted the nominal civil authority. By 1916 Chang Tso Lin had gained control of most of Manchuria for himself and began a series of operations in China proper. At various times he declared his area independent of China and at one time he conducted all of his foreign affairs independently. At other times he joined with other war lords in controlling the north of China. By 1925 he had gained for himself the control of north China and by 1928 his influence extended as far south as the Yangtze Valley. At this time

he was attacked by the Cantonese under Chiang Kai Shek, together with a combination of northern military leaders, and was forced to retire outside the Great Wall. It was at this time that Japan intervened to preserve peace in Manchuria. Chang's death occurred during his retirement from Peking and he was succeeded in power by his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, the young marshal. For a time the young marshal apparently made some effort to improve conditions in his domain. Like his father, however, he became involved in the affairs of China proper through a successful attempt to act as peacemaker in a civil war being fought in 1930.

These military operations and interests inside the wall brought the governmental affairs of Manchuria to a low state. The country was forced to support the huge military machine which was built up by Chang Tso Lin and maintained by his son. The military expenditures are estimated to have amounted to about 80 per cent of the whole. This organization was maintained by the levying of excessive taxes and a general bleeding of the country, a practice common throughout China. At Mukden a huge arsenal was built for turning out war munitions in quantity. The currency was inflated with irredeemable paper money and the fiscal system all but collapsed. Maladministration and all of the evils of military rule to be found in other parts of China were present here also. Under this system of misrule, or lack of rule, banditry, always present in some degree, grew to alarming proportions. It was natural that much of the bandit activity should be directed against the one prosperous enterprise in Manchuria, the South Manchuria Railway.

Japan was forced to operate her enterprises in the face of this type of local rule and, lacking other provocations, the situation could not have been satisfactory. Conditions required her to maintain a relatively large force of railway guards to protect her properties. Coupled with the many disputes over interpretation of the agreements, the character of the Chinese administration added to her troubles and the situation became progressively more acute. It became critical during the summer of 1931 when a series of racial disturbances occurred in the Korean-Manchurian borderland. These disturbances were outgrowths of local conditions, but their effect was felt throughout the country. The murder of a Japanese army officer in the interior during the summer added to the tenseness. Finally, on the night of September 18, an explosion along the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway just outside of Mukden precipitated hostilities.

The rapid increase of population in Manchuria can be traced to the civil warfare in China since 1911. To the Chinese farmer, Manchuria has represented a land of relative peace and freedom from molestation in spite of the gradual increase in maladministration. Consequently a steady migration has taken place. This migration has developed political significance for it has established an overwhelming Chinese population. Coincident with the steadily increasing Chinese population the Chinese government has witnessed the Japanese development of the region with a corresponding increase in influence. To counteract this spread of Japanese influence it has employed every means at its command except open warfare. In addition to its efforts to limit or restrict the expansion by means of treaties and agreements, it has launched, from time to time, railway and industrial enterprises.

One project, in particular, has been undertaken with a view to undermining the Japanese influence economically. This is the construction of the port of Hulutao, in process of construction for more than a decade, but only recently showing evidence of nearing completion. Should this port be completed and operated it would absorb a large amount of the trade of Dairen.

In such enterprises, however, as in the preservation of peace and order, the lack of a strong and stable government has served to make Chinese effectiveness more visionary than real. If any one consistent policy has been evident throughout the course of events it has been that China has been desirous of reserving to herself the full benefits of trade in Manchuria. The origin of the existing trade is immaterial for it does exist, and speculation as to whether Manchuria would have been developed to its present state under different conditions is futile.

After the outbreak of hostilities on September 18, 1931, China appealed the case to the League of Nations. After considerable discussion by that body a neutral commission was appointed to investigate the situation and report to the League. This commission, named for its chairman, Lord Lytton of England, made a thorough investigation and has submitted its report. The matter is still an open international question from which comment should be withheld until the League has completed its deliberations, reached its final decision, and the controversy is finally settled.

Whatever may be the final outcome of the controversy the report of the special commission is of permanent value because it contains a formal record of the conditions which have existed in Manchuria for the past quarter century.

The essence of the whole controversy may be summarized by two quotations from this report:

This long-standing Sino-Japanese controversy over the right of Japanese to lease land arose, like the other issues already mentioned, out of the fundamental conflict between rival state policies, the allegations and counter-statements concerning violation of international agreements being less consequential in themselves than the underlying objectives of each policy.

Second Sino- Japanese war

Introduction

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident is usually considered to have been the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. It is no mistake that this incident served as the trigger for the Sino-Japanese conflict, but the incident itself was only a small conflict and it should not be called the start of a full-blown war. What must officially be considered to have been the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War was the concerted full-scale attack that was the general mobilization on Aug. 13, 1937, of 30,000 regulars under the Chiang Kai-shek government in Shanghai in opposition to the Japanese navy landing force stationed there for the protection of Japanese residents.

Who, then, caused the actual war between China and Japan?

In an Aug. 31, 1937, article in The New York Times by Shanghai correspondent Hallett Abend, we find the following:

Foreigners Support Japan

Official foreign observers and officials of various foreign governments who participated in various conferences here in seeking to avoid the outbreak of local hostilities, agree that the Japanese exhibited the utmost restraint under provocation, even for several days keeping all of the Japanese landed force off the streets and strictly within their own barracks, although the move somewhat endangered Japanese lives and properties.

Opinions may differ regarding the responsibility for the opening of hostilities in the vicinity of Peiping early in July,|| said one foreign official who was a participant in the conferences held here before Aug. 13, —but concerning the Shanghai hostilities the records will justify only one decision. The Japanese did not want a repetition of the fighting here and exhibited forbearance and patience and did everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation. But they were literally pushed into the clash by the Chinese, who seemed intent on involving the foreign area and foreign interests in this clash.

The tenor of the article in The New York Times followed the general trend of the time to be critical of Japan and sympathetic toward China. The article still states that the start of the fighting in Shanghai was due to a one-sided strike by the Chinese army.

Some 30,000 Japanese were living in the Shanghai concession and working in manufacturing or trade. Stationed to protect the residents was a 2,200-man landing force from the navy. The Chinese army violated a cease-fire agreement¹ in sneaking a large number of soldiers into the demilitarized zone outside the concession, so reinforcements numbering 2,000 were hurriedly gathered. The —all of the Japanese landed force mentioned in the Shanghai article are those some 2,000 landing-force troops.

On Aug. 9, the Chinese army murdered Sublieutenant Ôyama Isao and Seaman First Class Saitô Yozô, who were in their automobile and carrying out an inspection. The Chinese obstinately insisted that they had been attacked and returned fire, bringing out the body of a Chinese Peace Preservation Corps soldier as evidence, but the bullet damage indicated clearly their deaths had not been because of the Japanese. The book *Mao* (by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Anchor Books, 2005) explains that the incident was orchestrated by Gen. Zhang Zhizhong, the defensive commander of Nanking and Shanghai and a Communist Party member who had infiltrated Chiang's high command, to force Chiang Kai-shek to decide to attack the Japanese forces.

The Chinese regulars surrounding the concession numbered more than 30,000, the core of which was the elite 88th Division. On the 13th the offensive began, and on the 14th the Chinese began simultaneous aerial bombardment as well. I will show how these attacks led to the outbreak of full-scale war later.

In any case, it was clearly the Chinese who were the ones who set the course for war. It is distinct truth that Japan was dragged into a war she did not want. The launching

of a concentrated attack by regular army troops against civilians and soldiers stationed in accordance to treaty is, speaking in terms of international law, committing —acts of aggression|| — regardless of whether they are inside their own country.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident was also orchestrated by China

The article in The New York Times said, —Opinions may differ regarding the responsibility for the opening of hostilities in the vicinity of Peiping early In July.|| It was a conflict that became the impetus for what followed, but in point of truth, this, too, was clearly a conflict that had been orchestrated by the Chinese.

This is clearly written in the local cease-fire agreement³ that was concluded on July 11, four days after the actual shooting incident. The first item on the three-item cease-fire agreement says: —The representative of the 29th Route Army expresses his regrets to the Japanese forces, and declares that those formerly responsible will be punished, and those who will in future be responsible will take precautions to never again provoke such an incident.|| China clearly assumed the responsibility. The 29th Route Army was a force of approximately 150,000 controlling northern China under the command of Gen. Song Zheyuan. The opposing Japanese forces stationed there⁴ were no more than 5,600, so is impossible to say they were an overwhelming force in position to press for an unreasonable cease-fire deal. Afterward, China made out as if to say it did not exist, but that is preposterous. First of all, the document exists. The third item on the agreement says, —In light of the incident resulting from guidance from the so-called Blue Shirts Society, the Communist Party, and all manner of other anti-Japanese organizations, we will in future undertake counter-measures against them and supervise them thoroughly.|| The work of putting the particulars of the agreement into operation went forward, and later, on July 19, the pact was concluded. It is true that, for her part, Japan labored to that point to observe the terms of the agreement even while acts in violation of it frequently took place. Nothing could be done about China's repudiation of the existence of the agreement. In other words, not only did the Japanese military not set the course, the responsibility rests entirely on the shoulders of the Chinese.

There was a need for a Chinese attack

In the first place, there was absolutely no reason for Japan to make an attack. It goes without saying that it would be insane if the only 5,600 troops stationed there were

to plan an attack on the 150,000-man 29th Route Army. Moreover, if one were to speak of the full might of the Japanese army — in Japan, in Manchuria, in Korea, and in China — it would have been roughly 250,000 men. Compared to this, China had 2.1 million. Of that number, 500,000 had received training in modern tactics and equipment from leadership under German military advisors. In addition, Japan's greatest potential enemy was the Soviet Union, and the Soviets had a large military force of 1.6 million, 400,000 of which had been dispatched to the Soviet Far East. Given all these conditions, it would have been foolish for Japan to open hostilities in northern China, and there were no plans for any such thing.

In China at that time, however, there was an overwhelming predominance of those advocating war against Japan. Excluding the peasantry, the urban residents of China had a burning desire for war and were confident of victory. One could look at all of the newspapers published in China at the time, and the situation would be obvious. The book *Nitchū Sensō: Sensō o nozonda Chūgoku, sensō o nozomanakatta Nihon* (—The Second Sino-Japanese War: The China that wanted war, and the Japan that did not want war⁵) provides a detailed account of this. Those advocating war at the time can be broadly broken down into three groups. First were the radical intellectuals, students, and urban citizens; second were members of the Chinese Communist Party; third were the provincial military cliques. As supporters of the radical public opinions of the leaders of the intellectuals and others, the Communist Party and the military cliques used their opposition to the stance of the government of Chiang Kai-shek and advocated war as a more profitable goal.

The Communist Party in particular used the anti-Japanese stance as their most powerful political weapon. The Chinese Soviet Republic, established in November, 1931, in Ruijin in Jiangxi province, issued a proclamation of war against Japan in the name of the Central Government on Apr. 26, 1932. (On Sept. 18, they also issued an —official proclamation of war by telegram.) In addition, in August of 1935, in accordance with the Comintern's —Anti-Fascist United Front⁶ directive, they issued a declaration of anti-Japanese patriotism. Then, in December of 1936, the Xian Incident took place. Chiang Kai-shek, setting out to urge his soldiers to fight more vigorously in the subjugation of the Communist Party, was kidnapped by Marshal Zhang Xueliang, who was the north-

eastern commander in charge of those activities. Chiang was pressured into working with the Communist Party to put anti-Japanese conflict into practice. The Nationalist Party's confrontational line toward the Communist Party was diverted, and the anti-Japanese sentiment swelled all the more.

And then, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred

Given the circumstances, it was only a matter of when and where that a not unexpected strike on the Japanese would happen. On July 7, 1937 the Marco Polo Bridge Incident took place.

The 135 men of the Japanese army's 8th Company, having given prior notice to the 29th Route Army, conducted maneuvers on the dry riverbed near the Marco Polo Bridge. As the map (attachment 1) shows, the maneuvers began in front of the bridge at a position about 400 meters distant from the Marco Polo Bridge wall (the Wanping Fortress wall) and the embankments that were the Chinese army bunkers, and at about 10:40 PM, just before the maneuvers were to end after a 400-meter advance, several shots were fired into the Japanese positions. After that, ten-odd shots were fired from the direction of the embankments. A few hours later at 3:25 AM, there were three more shots; and at 5:30, after taking fire a fourth time, the Japanese forces finally responded with their own fire. This was seven hours after the first shots had been fired.

It was therefore only natural that the 29th Route Army would admit total culpability in the cease-fire agreement signed on the 11th.

As I have already shown, it said, —In light of the Incident resulting from guidance from the so-called Blue Shirts Society, the Communist Party, and all manner of other anti-Japanese organizations, we will in future undertake counter-measures against them and supervise them thoroughly.|| The commanders of the 29th Route Army, too, weren't completely certain who it had been that had fired the shots, but they certainly inferred that their suspicions were that it had been members of the Communist Party.

It was natural that the Chinese Communist Party, who continued to cry for total anti-Japanese action, would try to continue causing clashes, but the truth was that at the time the Communist Party found itself facing a serious predicament. To be sure, with the Xian Incident, Chiang Kai-shek had ceased attacking the Communists and he promised to forge cooperation and connections with the Communist Party; but he thrust strict

conditions one after another at the Communist Party, and half a year later, around June of 1937, relations between the Nationalist and Communist parties were on the verge of a breakdown. Edgar Snow wrote,

But by June 1937. Chiang Kai-shek had scattered and demoralized the once-powerful Tungpei Army, moved his own forces into Shensi, and again was blockading the Reds---Once more they now seemed to face the choice of total surrender or encirclement and disaster, or retreat to the northern desert.

The Communist Party was launching itself upon an enormous gamble to break the predicament. A large number of Communist Party members had slipped into the ranks of the 29th Route Army⁷ and fanned anti-Japanese sentiment, and those caught up in that fervor caused the shooting incident of 10:40 PM on July 7.

Immovable proof that the Communist

It is now 100 percent clear that it was the Communist Party who had caused these incidents. On the 8th, the day after the shooting incident, the Communist Party sent a long telegram from Yan'an in the name of the Central Committee to all the powerful people in China (starting with Chiang Kai-shek), the newspapers, those affiliated with the Nationalist government, the army, and other organizations and associations. In official Communist Party histories, it is given special mention as —the 7-8 circular telegram.⁸ Moreover, on the same day, the same kind of telegram was sent under the names of Mao Zedong and six other military leaders to Chiang Kai-shek, Gen. Song Zheyuan, and others.

As I mentioned before, the Japanese army first began to return fire at 5:30 on the morning of the 8th. It follows from circumstances of transmission at the time that though the counter-offensive began on the 8th, for this intelligence to be in-hand on the 8th to comprise what had transpired and to create the long text, and to gain the approval of the Central Committee, then draw it up as an official telegram and to send it all over the country, etc., is totally impossible. The only possibility is that it had been prepared in advance.

In point of fact, it had been prepared in advance. Evidence to that exists today. The chief of the China Expeditionary Force Intelligence Department Beiping (Beijing) Office, Col. Akitomi Jûjirô, said: —Late at night immediately following the incident, the

Tianjin Special Intelligence Section radio operator intercepted an urgent wireless transmission from a transmitter we believe to be on the grounds of Beijing University to the Communist military headquarters in Yan'an. It repeated Chenggong-le [success!] three times. (Sankei Shinbun, Sept. 8, 1994, evening edition.) He said that at the time they had no idea what it meant. It is clear now. They were relaying to Yan'an that their stratagem at the Marco Polo Bridge had succeeded. The creation of that telegram was carried out immediately in Yan'an. Then, on the morning of the 8th, after having confirmed that Japan had begun firing back, they sent the long telegram in great numbers all over the place. The criminals who started the war were the Chinese Communist Party.

Edgar Snow wrote about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as if the Japanese Army had caused it, which rescued the Communist Party from their great predicament of June. He wrote:

Now a second stroke of luck opened up the broadest and most fertile opportunities for them. For it was in the following month that they were extricated from their precarious position only by Japan's —providential major invasion of China, which gave Chiang no choice but to shelve any and all plans for another annihilation drive.

While they planned it themselves, they repeatedly said that the Japanese attack had been a Godsend. As I have already presented, it was the Chinese who caused the incident. Above all, there is no way a Japanese force numbering merely 5,600 would have launched an attack, and that is not what happened. There was the cease-fire agreement on the 11th, but there were repeated violations of that agreement on the Chinese side — whether by the army itself, or by persons unknown. There were also large-scale cease-fire violations by the Chinese army such as the Lang fang Incident and the Guang'anmen Incident. On July 27, the Japanese government, which had consistently followed a policy of non-expansion of the conflicts since the incidents occurred, finally determined to dispatch three army divisions into the Chinese interior, and on the 28th sent notice to the 29th Route Army that it was war.

The Communist Party that planned on escalating the Marco Polo Bridge Incident

While it is untrue that there was a concerted attack by the Japanese military, Snow, in his writings, let slip that the Chinese had desired exactly that. They were delighted that Chiang Kai-shek had had no choice but to abandon his operations to wipe

out the Communists, but their true goal was going on and forcing him to fight the Japanese. Two of the items on a Comintern order issued after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident said:

1) You must stubbornly avoid localized resolutions and instead lead the way to full-scale conflict between China and Japan.

2) You must use every possible measure to accomplish the above goal and you must obliterate important people who betray the liberation of China with their localized resolutions and compromises toward the Japanese.

We can clearly understand that in addition to aiming directly at breaking the deadlock of the Communist Party's predicament, the true goal of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was to create a full-scale outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China. The Communists called for opposition against Japan, but rather than directly engaging the Japanese military themselves, their true goal was to cause a full-scale war between the Japanese army and the army of Chiang Kai-shek. With this, they could achieve their objective of guaranteeing the security of the Soviet Union; and bringing about the exhaustion and mutual destruction of both China and Japan was their long-term strategy for realizing a Communist Party victory. It goes without saying that 1949 was the realization of the ultimate goal of the Chinese Communist Party, which had implemented this global strategy.

The North China Incident and the Tongzhou Massacre

The conflict expanded in keeping with the Communist Party's goal, and the Nanking government of Chiang Kai-shek also went forward with plans to send the army north. As I have already said, Japan was forced to change her policy of non-expansion and localizing the conflict, and decided to dispatch three divisions on July 27 and notified the 29th Route Army on the 28th that a state of war existed. It was an outnumbered military force, but with support from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the troops stationed in Korea, the Japanese army quickly gained total control of the Pingjin area (i.e., the Beijing and Tianjin areas).

Chinese Peace Preservation troops, taking advantage of an opening left by the movement of the outnumbered Japanese army, carried out a massacre of Japanese residents of the city. There were about 420 Japanese living in the town of Tongzhou,

some 12 km east of Beijing. On July 29, the Japanese defensive garrison numbered merely 110 as their forces had made for an offensive in nearby Nanyuan. Peace Preservation Troops of the autonomous government of pro-Japanese Yin Jukeng were stationed in the town, but seeing the situation, they suddenly swooped down and attacked the small remaining garrison and the ordinary townsfolk. A barbarous act of mass slaughter unfolded. It was later established that First Unit commander Zhang Qingyu and Second Unit commander Zhang Yantian had been in contact with the Nationalist Party beforehand.

All manner of brutalities such as looting, acts of violence, indignities, and slaughter were directed toward a great number of innocent people, including the old, the young, and women. The number of the slain totaled 250.

In Asahiken (a Japanese restaurant) were seven or eight women, all of whom had been raped. They were shot dead, naked, with their privates exposed. Four or five had been stabbed in their privates with bayonets. Most of the Japanese men's bodies showed signs of having been strangled with ropes. Blood spattered the walls. It beggars description. (Testimony given at the Tokyo Trials by the witness Kayajima Takashi, commander of the 2nd Regiment, who rushed to the site on the 30th to rescue the town.)

At the entrance to Kinsuiro (an inn), I saw the body of a woman who looked to have been the proprietress. Her legs were facing the entrance, and she was covered only on her face by a newspaper. I remember that it seemed as if she had resisted considerably; the upper and lower parts of her body were exposed, and there were signs of four or five bayonet thrusts. It looked like her privates had been gouged out with an edged weapon, and there was blood everywhere. ... In the house of a Japanese family behind, two people — a parent and child — had been slaughtered. All the fingers of the child had been cut off. At the store of a Japanese citizen near the South Gate, the body of what seemed to have been the proprietor had been left in the street, his ribs exposed and his organs scattered. (Testimony given at the Tokyo Trials by acting 2nd Regiment Infantry Commander Katsura Shizuo.)

The cruel atrocities went on and on, and there are no words to describe them.

The Nanking Massacre and the Tongzhou Massacre

These witness statements do not speak of the Nanking Massacre, but it is possible that there are those who misapprehend that they do. To be sure, in the tale told by Chinese afterward purporting a Nanking Massacre, stories exactly like these, the manner in which things were done, examples of brutality and so forth, were common. I will write about the Nanking Incident later, but although no Nanking Massacre ever existed, it is an undeniable truth that there was a massacre in Tongzhou. An incident of brutality the like of which had never happened in Japan happened in China. In investigating the history of China, however, we find that such brutal incidents were not uncommon.

In reading the book *Chûgoku daigiyakusatsu shi: Naze Chûgokujin wa hitogoroshi ga suki na no ka?* (A history of massacres in China: Why do the Chinese like killing?) 10 by Shi Ping, a graduate of Beijing University, we learn that in China excessive by far massacres were repeated occurrences in ancient, medieval, and modern times, and even in the present day under the Communist Party rule. Particularly interesting is the fact that there was a Nanking Massacre. It was not in 1937, however, but in 1864 during the Taiping Rebellion, when Nanking, then the capital of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, was attacked and entered by an army commanded by Zeng Guofan. After Zeng Guofan's death, one of his staff officers, Zhao Liewen, wrote *Neng jin ju shi riji* (Diary of a capable, quiet gentleman):

Children, too, were the object of the slaughter, and many of the rank and file soldiery quite nearly made a game of the killing of the children and appeared to delight in it. As far as women were concerned, those under 40 were made instruments to slake the lust of the soldiers, while those over 40 or those with unattractive faces were cut down indiscriminately with whatever came to hand.

Notorious mass killings — a million slaughtered at the massacres in Sichuan, the massacre at Yangzhou, the massacres at Jiading, and on and on — fill the pages. Shi Ping's book is a must-read.

To repeat, no such incident ever took place in the entire history of Japan. Something with which the Japanese were totally unacquainted, and which the Chinese were vehemently saying had been the work of the Japanese, was the —Nanking Massacre. In other words, the —Nanking Massacre was fabricated to indict the Japanese

army; it was a tale made-up in imitation of the accounts of the mass killings that had occurred time and again in China as well in imitation of the recent massacre in Tongzhou which they had perpetrated. That is why it was a story that so closely resembled the conditions of the Tongzhou Incident.

I will later present evidence to show why there was no — Nanking Massacre,¹¹ and why there could not have been one.

The Funatsu peace initiative and the murder of Lt. Ôyama

The Japanese army had gained total control of the Beijing-Tianjin district and its northern environs, but the general staff headquarters issued an order that the limit for their forces' advance should be retained at about 100 km south of Beijing. That was a point some 1,000 km away from Shanghai. The Japanese government's objective was to end the —North China Incident¹¹ and keep the conflict from spreading.

The Japanese people were enraged at the news of the Tongzhou Massacre. All the newspaper headlines were full of demands to —chastise the violent Chinese.¹¹ Public opinion seethed against the unforgivable Chinese atrocity and voices grew louder demanding the government take resolute measures. There is one note that must be added here. Namely, the murder of Chinese workers, merchants, and businessmen by angry, rioting Koreans at the time of the Wanpaoshan Incident.¹² In contrast, there were Chinese workers, merchants, and businessmen in Kobe and Yokohama, but there were no incidences of attacks on the those in Japan. There was fury, but there was nothing resembling any retributive attacks.

The government, however, sticking with its non-expansion policy despite such atrocities and such an outraged public opinion, went along with the emperor's suggestions and drew up a peace plan¹³ on Aug. 1, and receiving the assent of the foreign and army and navy ministers five days later, made the proposal to the Chinese. This peace proposal was a momentous, conciliatory document wherein most of the pending issues between China and Japan to that point (and in particular vested rights in north China) were renounced.

Funatsu Tatsuichirô, formerly Japan's consul general in Shanghai and at that time the chairman of the board of the Spinning Association in China, was named to be the

person responsible for the negotiations, so it came to be called the —Funatsu peace initiative॥

Aug. 9, the day of the first meeting between Ambassador Kawagoe Shigeru and Gao Songwu, head of the Asia Office, was the day that Lt. Ôyama was killed. As I mentioned already, this was an act perpetrated by the Nanking and Shanghai Defensive Forces under the command of the crypto-Communist Zhang Zhizong to get Chiang Kai-shek's to fight the Japanese. It was also meant to be an obstruction to the peace process. As intended, then, peace negotiations collapsed.

China in Second World War (1937-1945)

In Europe, World War II started in 1939. Hitler, the leader of the Nazi Party in Germany, invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, and Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939. The United States of America did not declare war against Japan until 8 December 1941, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Britain also declared war against Japan at that time, having learned that its territories in the Far East had been attacked by the Japanese. But in China, the war against Japan started earlier. In a sense, it began with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, which ended with the cession of Taiwan, and other territories, to the Japanese. After the fall of the Qing dynasty, China's disarray made her very vulnerable to further Japanese aggression. The Mukden Incident occurred in 1931, to be followed by subsequent incursions by Japan into China's northeastern territories (see the chapter 'The Decade of Nationalist Rule in Nanjing (1927(8) – 1937(8))' in this volume). The leader of the Guomindang (Nationalist) government in Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek, was more interested in eliminating the Communist challenge to his rule, than in defending the country against Japan. Eventually he was kidnapped at Xian in 1936 and forced to agree to cease hostilities against the Communists, led by Mao Zedong, and form a united front with them to fight the Japanese.

China alone against Japan (1937-1941)

The Marco Polo Bridge (Lugou Bridge) incident

The warring Chinese united to resist Japan by the end of 1936, but neither Chiang Kai-shek nor the Japanese government in Tokyo wanted war. However, Tokyo had difficulty controlling their imperialistic Kuantung and North China armies. Sometimes,

even members of the cabinet were not informed of the intentions or plans of their highly independent military authorities. Fiercely anti-Communist, the Japanese considered the Soviet Union, which had amassed 240,000 troops in its Far Eastern provinces by 1935 - compared with Japan's 160,000 in Manchuria - as their only serious enemy in East Asia. Since the Japanese withdrew their forces from the Soviet territories after the Washington Conference in the early 1920s, there was little risk of the Japanese and the Soviet armies clashing with one another accidentally. Although war with the Soviet Union was a possibility, in 1937 Japan was not ready for such a conflict. On the other hand, the presence of bellicose Japanese troops in north China, poised to fulfill their country's destiny to carve out an empire from their militarily weaker neighbor, presented a volatile situation that could easily lead to an outbreak of violence, should the Japanese move closer to the tense and watchful Chinese forces, who were ready to repel any new Japanese advances into Chinese territory.

On 7 July 1937 a company of Japanese soldiers stationed in Beijing – a privilege granted by the Boxer Protocol in 1901 - decided to conduct a night manoeuvre in the vicinity of the scenic Marco Polo Bridge (Lugou Bridge), located about 10 miles from Beijing. Near this bridge, there were Chinese troops that had been strengthening the defences on the banks of the Yongding River. This area was strategically important because a railway bridge next to the Marco Polo Bridge linked railway lines from the south to the town of Wanping, a key railway junction. The control of Wanping was equivalent to taking Beijing, as railway lines ran through it to Zhangjiakou (historically known to Europeans as Kalgan) in the northwest, Mukden to the northeast, the port of Tianjin to the southeast, and to the south through Shijiazhuang to major southern cities. As the Japanese were acting out mock battles, at around 10:30 pm the Chinese fired some shells into the Japanese position without causing any casualties. The absence of a Japanese soldier at a roll call led the trigger-happy Japanese commander to order an attack on Wanping, which was repulsed by the Chinese. Negotiations at various levels between the military and government officials of the two countries soon followed, but peace was elusive.

The Chinese looked upon the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as yet another Mukden-type occurrence that would lead to another round of Japanese territorial expansion into

China. This time, however, Chiang Kaishek decided to resist. It was clear that if the government of China were to defy an increasingly militaristic Japan primed for conquest, war between the two countries would be inevitable. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937 therefore marked the beginning of the, thus far undeclared, World War II in China, though some might argue that World War II in China had already begun with the Mukden Incident of 1931.

Without a mature industrial base for armaments and other aspects of modernization, China was no match for Japan in a military show-down. While reinforcements were streaming into northern and central China from Japan, by the end of July the local Japanese forces had captured not only the Marco Polo Bridge, but also the entire region between Beijing and Tianjin. During the next four months, Japanese forces advanced down the railway lines to the south, taking Baoding by late September, Shijiazhuang in October, and Taiyuan in November.

The battle of Shanghai

Having his best German-trained troops stationed around Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek decided to focus his efforts on driving the less prepared Japanese forces away from Shanghai, to render his capital in Nanjing more secure. Unfortunately, the attempts of the Italian-trained Chinese to bomb the Japanese fleet anchored off the Shanghai docks during the middle of August missed their targets and hit Shanghai civilians instead. When the Japanese were ready to counter-attack later in September, the Chinese were soon put on the defensive. In addition to the assault from the well-equipped Japanese army corps and marines, the Chinese soldiers had to endure continuous shelling from the heavy guns of the Japanese navy, and also bombing by the Japanese ship-borne and land-based planes, and even some from Japanese-occupied Taiwan. Following Chiang's order to make a firm stand in Shanghai, the Chinese fought heroically, despite an alarming number of casualties. Unable to make much headway for three months, the Japanese sent an amphibious force to Hangzhou to attack the Chinese positions from the rear. Assaulted from both the front and the back, the Chinese positions in Shanghai became unsustainable by 9 November. On 12 November 1937, Shanghai fell to the Japanese. Instead of retreating to the defensive blockhouses in Wuxi, which had been erected in anticipation of just such a contingency, the Chinese soldiers fell back to Nanjing in chaos. It was an

unequal contest, pitting Chinese flesh and blood against the overwhelming force of modern firearms. The Battle of Shanghai cost 250,000 Chinese casualties – almost 60% of Chiang's best troops – against some 40,000 on the Japanese side.

The Japanese advance to Nanjing, and Chiang's response

At this point, some Japanese army generals favoured a decisive strike against Nanjing to force the Nationalist government to surrender, but others preferred a more cautious approach, such as consolidating the Japanese positions in a wider area around Shanghai. Through German diplomatic mediation, a brief negotiation took place between Tokyo and Nanjing to settle the Battle of Shanghai in this full-scale, but as yet undeclared, war. The terms were too severe for Chiang, and insufficiently so for the Japanese military. Chiang was aware that, in the long run, Japanese expansion in China would militate against the interests of the great Western trading nations in China, particularly America and Britain, and he hoped that these nations would intervene on China's behalf. However, in the short term, the Sino-Japanese conflict benefited these nations' exports. China needed to purchase military equipment, arms, and ammunition from the industrialized nations. America was a vital source of aviation fuel and scrap metal for Japan. At that point, these Western nations did not want to be involved in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Chiang was disappointed, but his resolve to lead China against Japanese aggression did not waver.

By late November, 50,000 soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army in three parallel lines of advance were racing towards Nanjing. At the same time, aerial bombing of Nanjing, which had started in August, intensified, hastening the exodus of people from the city to safer spots. Infuriated that the Chinese had had the audacity to engage them in battle in Shanghai, where they had sustained a significant number of casualties in an intensive three-months-long combat, the Japanese invaders were ready to avenge themselves, and to terrorize the Chinese population into submission, once they were out of sight of the large Shanghai Western communities, who might have borne witness to their atrocities.

Was Chiang Kai-shek going to defend his capital, or move his government elsewhere? Chiang held several high-level military conferences on this matter during November. When one of his senior advisers, Tang Shengzhi, made a case for defending

Nanjing, Chiang appointed Tang as the Commander-in-Chief for the defence of Nanjing, while he himself retreated westward on 8 December. Shortly before this date, he had moved his government as well as the treasures of the National Palace (Forbidden City) and other museums to cities up the Yangtze River, such as Hangzhou, and Chongqing. When Chiang left, he took with him the small Chinese air force of 300 planes, and sophisticated communications equipment. This put Tang at a grave disadvantage because the different parts of his army could not communicate with each other to coordinate their actions, and he was also thereby denied the ability to gather vital information on the Japanese troop movements from the air. Even though the Chinese air force with 300 planes was very small against their enemies' almost 3,000, having even a tiny number of planes would have been better than none. Notwithstanding these and other handicaps, the weary Chinese soldiers prepared to defend Nanjing.

All along the way to Nanjing, the Japanese troops went on a rampage of plundering, setting fire to houses, and killing indiscriminately. From tiny hamlets to villages, towns, and large cities, little was spared. Consider for example the desolate scene at the city of Songjiang as witnessed by the Australian journalist Harold John Timperley of the Manchester Guardian, nine days after the Japanese passed through it. Here is what he wrote:

‘There is hardly a building standing which has not been gutted by fire. Shouldering ruins and deserted streets present an eerie spectacle, the only living creatures being dogs unnaturally fattened by feasting on corpses. In the whole of Sungchiang (Songjiang), which should contain a densely packed population of approximately 100,000, I saw only five Chinese, who were old men, hiding in a French mission compound in tears. Not far away, the lovely old city of Suzhou, which once astounded Marco Polo with the rich abundance of its produce and the multitude of its elegant canals and bridges, suffered a similar fate. After the Japanese army lingered there long enough to pillage and murder on a massive scale, its population was reduced from 350,000 to 500.

On 9 December Japanese airplanes were dropping leaflets from the air, demanding the Chinese to surrender within 24 hours, or suffer the consequences. Although general Tang vowed to fight to the last man in public, privately he agreed to

arrange a truce with the Japanese through the help of about a dozen Americans and Europeans, who had chosen to remain in Nanjing, at the risk of their own lives, in order to set up an International Committee for the establishment of the Nanjing Safety Zone (to be discussed shortly). The plan was to have a three-day cease fire for the Japanese to march into Nanjing peacefully, while the Chinese army withdrew. However, Chiang Kai-shek refused to sanction such a plan. By noon on 10 December, seeing that the Chinese had not surrendered, the Japanese began a ferocious assault on the city. They dropped bombs, pounded the city walls with their heavy artillery, and attacked the Chinese positions fiercely. The Chinese had plenty of ammunition and more soldiers, albeit poorly trained, than the Japanese, but instead of digging in and fighting as determinedly as the Chinese had done for most of their campaign in Shanghai, Chiang ordered Tang to retreat immediately by the afternoon of 11 December. Tang protested that, after the Japanese had already penetrated the Chinese frontlines, retreat in such a situation would lead to a rout. However, under pressure from Chiang, early in the morning on 12 December, Tang gave the order to retreat to those of his subordinates who were able to attend his emergency meetings, and left Nanjing himself as Chiang had directed him to do.

With the Japanese surrounding the city and forcing their way through some of the gates, the only escape route for the panicky retreating army was through the northwest water gate to the harbour, to board the junks waiting there for crossing the Yangtze River. As Tang's black chauffeur-driven car threaded its way along this route to the docks, he witnessed a scene of utter chaos: a mad scramble of thousands of soldiers trying desperately at the eleventh hour to leave the soon to be abandoned city, jettisoning their arms and ammunition along the way. While some made it over to the opposite bank of the river by boat, others died in fighting each other to board the rapidly diminishing number of available boats, or in trying to swim across. Inside the city, large numbers of Chinese soldiers, who had not managed to retreat, and the police, were hurriedly taking off their uniforms and putting on civilian clothes, as the city came under Japanese occupation on 13 December 1937. Battalions of Chinese soldiers, still in their uniform, simply held up white flags and surrendered to the Japanese.

The Rape of Nanjing: the 1937 Nanjing Massacre

The Chinese soldiers who surrendered did not know that an order to kill all prisoners of war (POWs) had already been given by the Japanese high command. Since the number of Chinese soldiers who remained in Nanjing - ninety thousand, according to an estimate - outnumbered the 50,000 plus Japanese troops, their captors made sure that they would not make trouble before their execution. The Japanese promised to treat them well and divided them into small groups to render them docile, and then starved them, before marching them with their hands tied behind them to a convenient spot for mass execution by machine gun fire. The Japanese soldiers then thrust their bayonets in the fallen bodies to make sure that no one survived. Some were lined up and beheaded with swords. In one case, about 15,000 Chinese POWs were butchered along a riverbank at dusk. The largest single case of mass execution of Chinese soldiers, former soldiers, and civilians, occurred at Mufu Mountain north of Nanjing, where an estimated 57,000 were massacred.

When the Japanese army roared into Nanjing on 13 December with their tanks, trucks, heavy artillery, and columns of marching soldiers, it was a defenceless city of half of a million people. All those who had the strength and the means to leave this doomed city had already left. For a period of six weeks after the Japanese entered Nanjing, its soldiers were let loose to vent their blood lust on these helpless and defenceless people. They went about in groups and shot anyone in sight. The streets were littered with corpses, and many were shot in the back, when they ran from the trigger-happy Japanese. The Japanese searched for and rounded up any men and murdered them with the excuse that they were former soldiers, but old men or even babies were killed without any such excuse. They shot shopkeepers, looting and setting fire to their shops at will.

While these horrors were being perpetrated on men, women suffered an even worse fate. The Japanese soldiers raped girls and women of any age, from preteens to eighty-year-old grandmothers, from any class or professions, even nuns, often by gangs of soldiers, at all hours of the day, in any locations, in their homes, churches, Bible training schools, on dirt roads, or in the middle of a street in front of crowds. Women in advanced stages of pregnancy were not spared. Many women died from abusive and

prolonged gang rapes. After the soldiers were sated with sex, they would kill the victims immediately, so as to silence them forever. Mutilation of the victims was not uncommon.

The death toll of the wholesale rape and murder of the Chinese civilians, during just a six-week period after the Japanese entered Nanjing, was estimated by many researchers to be in the range from 260,000 to 340,000. Although the figure was shocking enough, the extreme cruelty and sadism exhibited by the perpetrators of these acts towards their victims was simply beyond human comprehension. Those who died quickly from shooting or beheading were fortunate to have been spared the excruciatingly painful, slow, and gruesome deaths suffered by many others. In many parts of the city, people were being disembowelled, dismembered, nailed to wooden boards to be crushed by tanks, and crucified on trees and used for bayonet practice. Large groups of victims were burned or buried alive. Another diabolical practice was to bury people up to their waists or chests and let them be torn apart by German shepherd dogs, cut to pieces by swords, or run over by horses. The soldiers appeared to kill without compunction or sense of remorse; some even turned killing into a sport. One form of amusement was to douse people - men, women, and children - with fuel and then shoot them, to see them explode into flame. On one occasion teams of Japanese soldiers competed to see which team could behead their captives the fastest.

History has recorded many incidences of large-scale war atrocities committed by conquering armies under the orders of cruel tyrants: does the tragedy in Nanjing contain new lessons for us? It occurred in the context of an evil imperialist war of conquest, rendered more vicious by a racist and militaristic ideology, directed by a government which was controlled by ultranationalists and sanctioned by an emperor, who was worshipped like a god. The Japanese soldiers were the tools used to fulfil their national destiny of becoming a great colonial power. To be moulded into a soldier, young teenage boys were systematically brutalized through beatings, combined with other kinds of humiliating and degrading treatment, to render them into compliant instruments of their superior officers, whose authority, being derived from a god-like emperor, required their absolute loyalty and obedience.

In addition to this type of conditioning, they were indoctrinated with racist propaganda that instilled in them a sense of Japanese racial superiority over other

peoples, such as the Chinese, whom their government intended to subjugate. They absorbed the idea that the Chinese were inferior subhuman beings, whose murder deserved no more moral consideration than killing pigs or squashing insects. In their training, they were hardened by being made to slaughter and torture POWs or civilians, often en masse. After undergoing such training, ordinary young persons were rapidly transformed into psychopathic mass murderers, monsters devoid of any natural human feelings of either sympathy to their victims, or revulsion at cruel and inhuman acts.

The Nanjing Massacre occurred because thousands of young Japanese soldiers, indoctrinated and trained in the manner described, were permitted to exercise unbridled power to prey upon the defenceless people of the city. History has repeatedly shown the danger of giving any man absolute power. Many emperors, kings, and heads of states committed enormous crimes against humanity, when the political institutions of their countries conferred upon them, or let them seize, absolute power. Japan in World War II was a country dominated by a military and imperial elite, who ruled in the name of their absolutist and God-like Emperor Hirohito, from whom the officers and soldiers of the Japanese army derived their power. The Nanjing Massacre, the Holocaust in Europe, and other tragic episodes of genocide and mass rape should teach us to be vigilant about unbridled personal and governmental power. Humanity needs to build and defend institutions that prevent any individual, groups of people, or governments from having absolute and unchecked power.

Another lesson to be distilled from this and other tragic genocidal instances of mass murder in other parts of the world was the evil of cultivating racism, or large-scale propaganda against other groups of human beings, branding them as subhuman beings, or people with irreconcilable differences from one's own group, and then consigning them to maltreatment or even death. The Chinese and Japanese, after all, were not that different as regards racial characteristics, but racism in this case was more a matter of culture, a mental construction based on perceived differences, rather than simple biological differences. After World War II, although the Japanese society no longer corrupted the minds of their young people with racist propaganda against the Chinese, the government has been, and is still, in denial of the Nanjing Massacre. Such a position sidestepped all questions of apologizing and compensating its victims. In Japan of the twenty-first

century, racial discrimination against Koreans still exists. Although a number of advanced societies have enacted legislation to protect their members against racism, many people in these societies are still suffering from its subtle and prevailing influences. In Japan and in many Western countries, including those in South America, more efforts need to be made to eradicate legacies of racism that have become embedded in the cultures and value systems of these societies.

The only ray of light emanating from the dark days of the Nanjing Massacre came from the Nanjing Safety Zone, created by a small band of Westerners. In 1937, Japan was not yet at war with any Western country, and Westerners were regarded by the Japanese as neutrals (apart from the Germans, whose country had become an ally of Japan), and their international concessions at the treaty ports were treated as neutral territories, and so were left alone. However, before the Japanese army reached Nanjing, most foreigners evacuated from the city, to avoid being caught in the crossfire, except for a couple of dozen Europeans and Americans. They were Christian missionaries, YMCA and Red Cross workers, university professors, medical doctors, and business executives, two of whom were Germans who happened to be Nazis. These extremely brave and kind-hearted individuals could not bear to abandon the endangered Chinese to their fate. They chose to stay, risking their own lives, and set up an International Committee for a Nanjing Safety Zone, a neutral territorial zone and safe haven as a shelter for Chinese non-combatants. The members of this committee cordoned off an area of about two and half square miles near the city centre, with its borders lined with white flags and sheets marked with the red cross symbol ringed by a red circle

By the time the city fell, 250,000 refugees had found their way into the Nanjing Safety Zone, where the members of the International Committee worked indefatigably day and night to provide food and shelter, to ferry the sick and injured to the hospital where their colleagues worked, and to defend their charges = the men from being taken away and killed, and the women from being raped. Thanks to the heroic efforts of these Americans and Europeans, the safety zone saved the lives of up to 300,000 people, which included most of the Chinese who did not perish from rape and massacre during the six to eight weeks of the frenzied Japanese reign of terror. The men and the lone woman - Wilhelmina Vautrin, known as the Goddess of Nanjing - of the International Committee

of the Nanjing Safety Zone provided a heart-warming example of human decency, kindness, and courage that transcended ethnic and racial boundaries.

China Fragmented

After the fall of Nanjing, some Japanese military leaders had expected Chiang Kai-shek to capitulate, or the Chinese resistance to collapse. Such was not the case. The Japanese hopes for an easy victory in their conquest of China were dashed. Their aim of reducing the whole of China to a supplier of raw materials, and a market for their goods, would have been a big step towards building an even larger empire, which the ultranationalist Japanese had named as 'the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere'. Contrary to their expectation, however, their army was soon bogged down in a long-drawn-out war with China.

Having abandoned his capital, Chiang withdrew his army up the Yangtze River to Wuhan, the triple-city that had sparked the Revolution of 1911, and tried to consolidate his position there in the spring of 1938. While amassing the forces and materials to assault this city, the Japanese continued to advance into central China unchecked, except briefly at the important railway junction around Xuzhou, where General Li Zongren scored a major victory against them in April. Li was a former Guangxi warlord, who sometimes collaborated with Chiang and sometimes joined others to challenge Chiang's monopoly of power. But Li could not block the Japanese advance for long. After taking Xuzhou in May, the Japanese were threatening the ancient city of Kaifeng, from where a railway line would take them south to Wuhan.

To make it difficult for the Japanese to attack Wuhan from the north, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the dikes of the Yellow River to be blown up. This drastic act, though it delayed the Japanese advance for three months, caused immense floods in over 4000 north China villages, and the loss of countless lives among the rural population. It also changed the course of the Yellow River to run through northern Jiangsu to the sea, instead of through the north of the Shandong Peninsula, a route which was itself a consequence of an earlier change of course of this river around 1851.

By late summer of 1938, the Japanese were ready to carry out a two-pronged advance on Wuhan, one from the north by land, and the other coming up from the south through the Yangtze, after sweeping the mines laid by Chinese nationalists in Poyang

Lake. At this point Stalin, aroused by the Anti-Comintern Pact between Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan in 1936, came to the aid of China, which shared a long border with Russia. The Russian air force, based in Lanzhou in Gansu, and supplied through the Silk Road by trucks and camels, fought aerial battles against the Japanese in the air, and inflicted serious damage on the Japanese air force. As a result of the Russian aid, the Japanese failed to take Wuhan until 25 October 1938, by which date the Japanese had lost 100 planes and suffered 200,000 casualties, according to a Chinese estimate.

However, preoccupation with events in Europe soon led the Russians to withdraw their 'volunteer pilots' from China. And shortly before the fall of Wuhan, the Japanese navy landed marines and seized the important southern city of Guangzhou, near Hong Kong.

Before Wuhan fell, Chiang Kai-shek had retreated further westward beyond the Yangtze gorges, with his government and the remnants of his army, to make Chongqing (Chungking) in Sichuan province his wartime capital. During the year and a half of war against Japan, from July 1937 to November 1938, Chiang had lost vast stretches of Chinese territory to Japan, along the eastern seaboard, including Guangzhou, and in northern and central China. The battle casualties of Chinese soldiers reached more than a quarter of a million. Beside the huge financial cost of the war to the Nationalist government, the personal and economic loss of the Chinese people caught up in the war was beyond measure. Despite the heavy losses, Chiang was determined to resist Japan and fight a protracted war from a less accessible region of China, where mountains and rapids afforded natural barriers against the enemy's advance.

Notwithstanding the continuation of Chinese resistance by the Nationalists from Chongqing and the Communists from Yan'an, by November 1938 the Japanese army had occupied the most fertile and developed regions of China. The Japanese government declared that the Chinese Nationalist government in Sichuan represented only a local authority, while China, as a part of the Japanese-led 'New Order in East Asia', was to be divided into several puppet regimes, administered by different governments led by Han Chinese, Manchu, or Mongol officials, that were in turn controlled by the separate Japanese army commands. The war therefore resulted in a renewed fragmentation of China.

The Kwantung Army was one such command. It had already taken over China's Dongbei region in 1931, ruling it through the Manchukuo regime that was formed in 1932. After invading north China with the help of troops drawn from Manchukuo and Mongolia between 1936 and 1937, the Kwantung Army founded an Inner Mongolian puppet state. Stirring up Mongolian nationalism, the Japanese secured the cooperation of a Mongol prince to lead the 'Federated Autonomous Government', which they created to rule a mineralrich region that was 95% Chinese. After the full-scale Japanese invasion in 1937, Japan's North China Army set up its own puppet regime, under the 'Provisional Government of the Republic of China' in Beijing, to rule central China in 1938, while her Central China Army organized the 'Reformed Government' in Nanjing, ruling the region occupied by this army. Having abandoned their hope that Chiang Kai-shek might see the futility of resisting Japan and agree to lead a government of 'united' China under Japanese tutelage, in 1940 the Japanese succeeded in recruiting Wang Jingwei, a pro-Japanese Guomindang leader tired of playing second-fiddle to Chiang, to lead their government in Nanjing. Japanese development companies and banks were founded under these Japanese-controlled colonial regimes, to direct the economic development and resources of these Chinese regions to serve Japan's needs.

To the above Japanese-ruled Chinese territory, one should add Taiwan, a Chinese province taken from Qing China by Japan, after China lost the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. By the 1930s, Taiwan served as a mature example of how Japan organized and developed the economy of this island as her supply base.

Further Japanese assaults on China from 1939 onwards did not lead to such spectacular territorial gains as compared with the periods between 1937 to 1938, and before. Although Japan had succeeded in acquiring the vast natural resource base administered by her puppet regimes in China, she did not reckon on having more than a quarter of a million of her armed forces tied down in China for a protracted war. It was not possible for the Japanese, as they had once hoped, to keep China securely in their orbit by relying on the forces of the puppet regimes alone. While the territory ruled by the Japanese armies and puppet regimes appeared large, outside the major cities and away from the railway lines both the Chinese Nationalist and Communist guerrilla forces did not have too much difficulty infiltrating enemy-occupied countryside.

Outside the territory controlled by the Japanese armies and their puppet regimes, the Guomindang government in Chongqing retained a measure of control of areas that included most of Hunan, large parts of western Hubei and Henan, southern Jiangxi, most of Zhejiang and Fujian, and southern Shaanxi. It also controlled Guangxi, apart from the area between the city of Nanning and the coast, and Guangdong, except for the Pearl Delta around Guangzhou. Obstacles in communication during wartime prevented Chongqing from exercising its authority fully over all the above-mentioned areas. The Guomindang's move to Sichuan made its neighbouring province, Yunnan, a part of its heartland rather than a distant border region. Chiang Kai-shek managed to develop a working relationship with Long Yun, the ethnic Lolo warlord, who had ruled this province as a personal fiefdom since 1927.

As regards Xinjiang and Tibet, the former had existed as a province and the latter as a dependency under the Qing dynasty. Since then, local political or religious authorities ruled these areas autonomously, because there had not been a sufficiently strong Chinese central authority to reclaim its dominance over them.

The Chinese Communist Party with its headquarters in Yan'an constituted a separate Chinese authority in northwest China. As we have seen, Zhang Xueliang's coup in Xi'an, and the threat of full-scale war from Japan, led to the formation of the second united front between the Guomindang and the CCP in 1937, this time for the purpose of waging a national war of resistance against Japan. Had it not been for Japan's aggression that began in 1931, the Guomindang which nominally united China in 1928 under Chiang Kaishek might well have been able to destroy the CCP regime in Yan'an, and dominate the richest part of China, while eliminating the warlords or keeping the surviving ones in check. The development of the war meant that the Chinese Communists were no longer the target of Chiang's annihilation campaign, and the CCP was given legitimacy by the Nationalist government in Chongqing. Greatly reduced in number and exhausted from the Long March, freedom from Guomindang attacks at this critical point enabled the CCP to recover and gain a new lease of life in northwest China.

The call for national resistance from both the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists led to hundreds of thousands of Chinese from all walks of life - students, teachers, factory workers, and landlords among others - making the arduous and perilous

journey to the base areas controlled by these two Chinese regimes. Tsinghua University in Beijing, and Nankai University in Tianjing, moved with their staff and students to Kunming in Yunnan, to unite as the South-West Associated University during the war. However, most Chinese had little choice other than to remain in Japanese occupied areas.

Chongqing at war

In comparison with Nanjing's favourable situation in the fertile Yangtze Valley, near coasts and the major treaty ports, Chongqing was located in China's less developed interior, far from the major railway networks. After the Japanese closed the Yangtze River to non-Japanese shipping and pressed the French to stop the transport of military supplies by rail from Hanoi in French Indochina (now Vietnam) to Kunming in Yunnan, Chongqing was cut off from the outside world. Yunnan took on a new prominence as, starting in December 1938, Chiang Kai-shek pushed through the arduous undertaking of constructing the Burma Road, a 715-mile earthen track over mountainous terrain (600 miles in China, and 115 in Burma), which enabled the vitally needed gasoline and military supplies to be carried from the British-controlled Rangoon (Yangon) in Burma to Kunming. This road was closed after the Japanese occupied the key Burmese city of Lashio in April 1942. After that time, these supplies had to be airlifted from British India to China, across a dangerous air route known as the 'Hump' over the Himalayas.

Having transferred the machinery and personnel of the Nationalist government from Nanjing via Hangzhou to Chongqing, Chiang Kai-shek enacted a number of measures to consolidate his power and win wider support in this new base. To meet the demands of representative government and to apply the principle of the united front, a People's Political Council was established in 1938. Its 200 members were chosen from a broadly representative spectrum of public figures. The seats on the council were distributed with 80 allotted to the Guomindang members, 70 to independents, and 50 to the Communists and other small parties. However, this council was not a legislative body; it could only offer advice. When some of its independent members criticized the government, Chiang changed the rules in 1942 so that most of its members were from the Guomindang.

In 1939, the Three Principles of the People Youth Corps was set up, to build support for Chiang's leadership among the young. His government founded a Central

Training Corps for indoctrinating officers, administrators, professors, and others in responsible positions with the Guomindang ideology, as put forward by Chiang in his book, *China's Destiny*. Attributing China's woes to foreign aggression, Chiang stressed the need for patriotic anti-imperialism. To counter the imported foreign Communist ideology of class struggle, Chiang sought to revive Confucianism, and to reassert the age-old virtues valued by the Chinese society. Like his fellow dictator, Mao Zedong, he believed in the subordination of the individual to the state. He regarded democracy as unsuitable for China's stage of development. Chiang's drive to root out opium poppy cultivation and smoking in Sichuan was reminiscent of Yuan Shikai, an autocrat of an earlier generation, who had also tried to revive Confucianism and to eliminate opium from the Chinese scene.

The activities of these political institutions were something of a sideshow for a regime preoccupied by the grim exigencies of the war. Chiang dominated the Nationalist party and government through his control of the military. The expanding Military Affairs Commission with Chiang at the top took over increasingly many of the functions of the civil government. There were five million men under arms at times, with half a million officers. The support for this large military establishment, in addition to war expenditures, and a large bureaucracy, together posed a severe strain on the meagre financial resources available to the Nationalist government.

The maritime customs on foreign trade, which had constituted more than 50% of the Nanjing government's revenue, was no longer available to Chongqing, because most of the ports were in Japanese occupied territory. The neutral status of the self-governing foreign concessions of the treaty ports could not prevent the Japanese from doing some arm-twisting of those who managed these conclaves. The foreign customs house officers could not resist the Japanese pressure to deposit the customs collected in their ports in Japanese banks. The Central Bank of China in Chongqing continued to issue notes and raise loans, both foreign and domestic, though it could not raise money as readily as its predecessor in Shanghai. From 1937 to 1939, China's main source of foreign aid was the Soviet Union, which provided \$250 million of credit to China. This sum almost equalled the \$263.5 million of Western credits to China during the four years from 1937 to December 1941, when China and America became allies after the Japanese bombed Pearl

Harbour. After the Nationalist government gave up China's traditional silver-based currency in 1933, the United States had been purchasing silver from China. By 1941, China raised \$250.2 million from the export of silver to America.

The Nanjing government had left the land tax to the provincial authorities for their own use. Chongqing had to take back this tax in order to feed its army. The government collected the land tax in kind, and it controlled the price of grain to counter the effect of inflation. To pay the equivalent of their tax assessments in grain, the peasants had the onerous duty of transporting the grain to certain collection points. Fortunately, Sichuan was agriculturally fertile and self-sufficient in grain, except when famine struck. The armies garrisoning or fighting in other provinces were allowed grain as tax themselves, obtained directly from local peasants. Unfortunately, the income from this tax and all other available sources was far from sufficient to cover the growing expenses of the government.

Between 1939 and 1942, the government made an intensive effort to develop industries and transport, with notable results. During this period, the output of coal doubled, the production of electricity increased sevenfold, and 1000 miles of rail tracks were built. However, the circumstances that prevailed in China's backward and isolated wartime base did not allow such developments to be sustained. There was not much taxable income available from the small modern sector to help the government's budgetary deficit.

To cover the shortfall, the government in desperation resorted to printing money. Inflation was the inevitable result. As the gap between income and expenditure widened during the war years, more and more money needed to be printed, and inflation went higher and higher. For example, in 1938 the Nationalist government's income of 1.31 billion yuan was 66% short of its expenditure of 2.18 billion yuan. By 1942, though its income had increased to 6.25 billion yuan, its expenditure reached 26.03 billion yuan, more than 4 times the income. During the same two years, in 1938 the outstanding bank-note issues were 2.7 billion yuan, while in 1942 the figure was a staggering 35.10 billion yuan. The rise in the retail price index was also striking: if January 1937 was taken as 1, the December 1938 figure was 1.76, and in 1942, this index reached 66.2. Between these

two years, the value of the Chinese yuan against the U.S. dollar dropped by almost a factor of 10.

Life was a daily struggle in Free China's wartime base. The peasants, already overburdened by taxes and land rents, were pressed into offering their labour for free, in building roads, airports, and other construction projects. Furthermore, many were forcefully conscripted into the army. As inflation cut into the salary of the government officials, many fell either into poverty, or the temptation of corruption. Shortages of gasoline and luxury goods led to a thriving black market. Despite the uncontrollable inflation, those who had the means or connections to tap into state capitalism, such as owning high interest bonds and hoarding certain goods, still managed to do well. The widening gulf between the rich and the poor led to greater social tension.

Tough laws limited democratic freedoms. Strict censorship meant that the Chinese intellectuals with liberal, progressive, or left-wing tendencies had to tread carefully in China's wartime capital, or face harassment, imprisonment or worse, at the hands of Chiang's secret service. As the war dragged on, the situation became more demoralizing. From 1939, the Japanese made life even more miserable for the residents of Chongqing by systematic air raids that killed the defenceless people, until a network of underground shelters was dug into the rocks underneath the city. Partisans behind the Japanese lines were also recruited to use radios to warn the city of impending bombing raids.

To remedy the weakness of lacking air power - in 1940 Chiang's air force had 37 fighters and 31 old Russian bombers - Chiang sent T. V. Soong, assisted by Hu Shih, the Republic of China's ambassador to the United States, to purchase planes from America. Because of the enormous British need, the Roosevelt administration was only able to ship 100 P-40 fighter planes to China. Although the number of planes was small by comparison with Japan's capacity to deploy over 1,000 planes against the Chinese (968 in China and another 120 in Indochina), the American 'volunteer' pilots, recruited by Claire Lee Chennault, a former U.S. military officer and adviser to Chiang, managed to inflict serious damage on the Japanese in 1941. This corps of flyers in Chiang's informal air force organized by Chennault soon became known as the 'Flying Tigers'.

Yan'an at war

In comparison with Chongqing in Sichuan, Yan'an in Shaanxi was even more poor and backward and isolated from the outside world. The aid to China from the Soviet Union was given before 1939 to the Nationalists only. After that time, the Russians were too preoccupied with the developments in Europe to be involved in China, until 1945. The Communist regime had therefore to be entirely self-sufficient and self-reliant. It had also become more independent of the Comintern.

In late 1937, the united front agreement between the Nationalists and the Communists obliged the CCP to give up armed rebellion, abandon the soviet form of autonomous government in Shaanxi, stop confiscating the land of the landlords, and put the Red Army under the Guomindang's nominal command. With the Guomindang's approval, instead of the Shaanxi Soviet, the CCP set up two border region governments: the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia (abbreviated as Shaan-Gan-Ning), and the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (abbreviated as Jin-Cha-Ji, the archaic names for these provinces). Yan'an was the capital of the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region. The united front agreement also limited the positions of the Communists in the Yan'an government to one third, while another third was to go to the non-Communist left progressives, and the rest to the nonaligned or even Guomindang members. Mao Zedong believed that, even as a minority block, the cohesion and discipline of the Communists would enable them to dominate the government. To adhere to the united front policy, the leaders of the CCP had to curb the revolutionary zeal of some of their members, preventing them from expropriating landlords' land and redistributing it to the poor and landless peasants. Instead, a more gradualist approach of rent and interest reduction was adopted to help the poor peasants.

Like the Guomindang, the CCP tried to tighten its own organization, as well as the government and the army it led, to survive, fight the Japanese, and expand their base area. It set up party branches in the border regions, and recruited new members among the locals, as well as among the refugees who migrated from Japanese occupied areas. CCP membership increased from about 40,000 in 1937 to an estimated 800,000 in 1940. To render the selected party members into a disciplined force of party functionaries (cadres), who were embedded in the government administrative organizations, the army, and the productive enterprises, and who were to carry out the policies and goals of the

centre, the CCP put them through an intense programme of training and indoctrination. They were required to study subjects such as Marxism, guerrilla warfare, Mao's thoughts, and the policies of the CCP, and to participate in discussions of these. To win the support of the masses of ordinary people, Mao propagated the idea of following the 'mass line'. In Mao's words, the Party was to be like 'fish' in the people's 'water', so as to get to know the people's needs, and to work out what actions to take to satisfy those needs. The CCP was to aim at total solidarity with the people, to promote their interests, and to achieve their goals. This was Mao's answer to Western democracy, or 'bourgeois democracy' as the Communists called it. The Communist cadres were schooled in the mass line idea. The popularity of the Chinese Communist movement would be understandable, if and when this idea was put into practice.

The CCP's regular armed forces consisted of the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies, led by Zhu De as Commander-in-Chief and Peng Dehuai as his Deputy. In 1937 these two armies had 92,000 men; by 1940 the total reached 500,000. In addition, there were local forces, which were aided by part-time militia of men and women, aged from 16 to 45, who generally had other occupations. The poorly armed militia performed useful services in intelligence gathering, and in providing logistic support and shelter to the regular troops. The CCP made sure that the officers and soldiers of its armies did not exploit or mistreat the people, for example by not paying for goods, or molesting the women. These well-disciplined troops enabled the Red Army to maintain a good reputation among the people, which would later stand the Party in good stead in the civil war.

Though the Communists tried to develop industry with primitive technology and surplus labour, the taxable income to support their regime had to be derived from agricultural production. Taxes were high and burdensome to the peasants, and the CCP policy of reducing rent and interest to 37.5% benefited most of them, at the expense of the landlords. The CCP's efforts to educate, indoctrinate, mobilize, and organize them for social revolution and patriotic war against Japan must have helped to win their understanding and support. The fact that the leaders dressed, ate, and lived in the same simple style as the common people, probably helped to promote a sense of solidarity and the need to sacrifice for national salvation. While morale was low in Nationalist

Chongqing, the opposite was the case in Communist Yan'an, despite the general hardship and shortage of material things. These were the impressions given by Americans who had dealings with both these regimes during World War II.

Ever since the top-level meeting of the CCP in Zunyi during the Long March, Mao Zedong's star in the Chinese Communist movement had been rising, and he clearly dominated the CCP in Yan'an. Mao arrived at this position through having convinced the CCP leaders of the correctness of his strategic vision and his policies, which together saved the CCP from destruction and enabled it to flourish. He produced a large body of writing to establish his ideological leadership. His ideas became the party orthodoxy no one dared to challenge. He was not just a theoretician, whose 'head was in the clouds'; he also distinguished himself as a military leader, an organizer of party cells and peasant movements. While others were pushing for the doomed urban putsches as directed by the Comintern, he took the unorthodox line of a peasant-based revolution, which bore fruit not only immediately, but also in the long run. The use of guerrilla tactics, favoured by him, had led to the defeat of the better armed and more numerous Nationalist forces which had tried to encircle and destroy their peasant soviet in the early 1930s. But as we have seen, when Mao's colleagues forsook this tactic in 1934, and resorted instead to conventional positional warfare against the Guomindang during its fifth encirclement campaign against the CCP's centre in Jiangxi, the Communists suffered such a severe rout that they were forced to abandon their painstakingly developed base in central China, and embark on the Long March.

Furthermore, Mao claimed credit for insisting on continuing the Long March to their present base, rather than following Zhang Guotao's policy of building another centre in a border area between Sichuan and Xikang in 1935, when the two men and the armies they led met briefly. Zhang failed to establish another viable CCP central organization in competition with Mao. Military setbacks against the Nationalist forces greatly reduced the strength of the army he led by 1936, when he also retreated to Shaanxi. Although Zhang had posed a serious challenge to Mao's leadership of the CCP in the mid-1930s, he could not match Mao's entrenched position in Yan'an. In 1938, Zhang defected to Chiang Kai-shek's side.

Mao's other possible rival for power was Wang Ming, the most powerful of the 'Returned Bolsheviks'. Since 1931, he had represented the CCP in the Comintern in Moscow and had been elected to its governing body. With the Comintern's support, he effectively became the leader of the CCP between 1931 and 1935, when Mao was one among many leading figures of the Jiangxi Soviet. During this period, he and his supporters had enforced the Comintern's line of using the Red Army to seize major urban centres, with disastrous results. From 1935 onwards, he espoused the policy of the united front, which was also the line taken by the Comintern. During the war, he argued that the Red Army should be truly, rather than just nominally, integrated into the Nationalist forces, and be commanded by the Nationalists to fight the Japanese together. For this he was branded as a 'right capitulationism', while his early espousal of urban revolution was criticized as 'left adventurism'. In Yan'an during the 1940s, his colleagues pressed him to admit these errors. Targeted for criticism and humiliation, Wang Ming was in no position to challenge Mao's leadership.

In the war against Japan, from 1937 to 1939, the Communists confined themselves to guerrilla tactics, since the Red Army had a regular armed force of fewer than 100,000 at the start of the war. Faced with an elusive enemy, Japanese used a 'cage policy', which entailed building blockhouses and digging trenches to seal off the Communist-held areas. In 1940, with the Eighth Route Army reaching 400,000 strong, the Yan'an regime changed to conventional warfare. Under Peng Dehuai's leadership, the Red Army launched a fierce '100 Regiments' offensive against the Japanese that broke the cage and inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. However, when the much better armed and more numerous Japanese counterattacked, the Eighth Route Army lost about 100,000 men. Harsh Japanese reprisals against the people of the region of northern China under Communist rule devastated enormous areas, wiping out villages and reducing the population there from 44 to 25 million.

Thereafter the Communists reverted to guerrilla tactics, which often required the collaboration of the local Chinese communities in the countryside. To warn the Chinese civilians against helping their Communist compatriots, the Japanese carried out a ruthless policy known as 'Three Alls' which stood for 'kill all, burn all, destroy all'. These atrocities served to drive the peasants into the arms of the Communists, making it easier

for the CCP to mobilize them for production and fighting. Significant though the Communists' contribution was, earning them some reputation for leading the nation's patriotic war against Japan, the burden of World War II in China in fact fell largely on the shoulders of the Nationalists.

In the protracted war against Japan, clashes were difficult to avoid as the scattered armies of the Nationalists and Communists in the field competed with one another for favourable niches to expand into, so as to build bases and collect taxes. Some of the Guomindang generals in the rich Yangtze Delta area resented the presence of the Communists' New Fourth Army, which grew out of the Red Army remnants that had been left behind at the start of the Long March, either to protect their base in Jiangxi province, or to carry out guerrilla war. Skirmishes broke out between the two forces, when the Nationalist generals tried to enforce their orders that required the Communist forces to move north. Early in December 1940 Chiang Kai-shek issued an ultimatum, commanding the Communist troops to move to the northern bank of the Yangtze River by the end of January 1941. As the main body of the New Fourth Army delayed their northward journey, some of its units actually veered south. These were trapped in a Nationalist ambush in the mountains, where some 3,000 perished and many more were taken to prison camps. The New Fourth Army did move to the northern bank of the Yangtze and establish itself there in six separate groups. Soon afterwards, it set up a new guerrilla base in roughly the same area it had been previously asked to vacate.

Even though the 'New Fourth Army Incident (South Anhui Incident)' did not lead to the breakup of the united front, the tension between the two parties ran high. After this incident, Chiang Kai-shek enforced an economic blockade on the Shan-Gan-Ning and other border regions, which increased the already serious shortages in the Communist-held area, leading to severe inflation. The people were rewarded with money when they handed in weapons after combing the battlefields. The economic difficulties moved the leaders to introduce peasant cooperatives and other means to improve agricultural production. Even Zhu De, the Commander-in-Chief, led soldiers into the countryside to reclaim wastelands.

Since Japan's full-scale invasion of China, the ultra-nationalistic militarists had gained ascendancy in the Japanese government, and the whole country was put on a war

footing, aiming at conquests. This group's expansionist vision did not stop at China, though by the early 1940s, the Sino-Japanese war appeared to have reached a stalemate. While the Japanese had difficulty 'getting off the back of the China tiger they have mounted' (in the words of the Chinese saying *qi hu nan xia2*), they were looking enviously at the rich natural resources of South Asia. The incorporation of this area into their empire would enable the Japanese to achieve the goal of autonomy. However, the territories Japan wanted to annex were all under Western colonial rule: the British had Burma, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaya; the French had Indochina (Vietnam); the Dutch had the East Indies (Indonesia), and the Americans had the Philippines. World War II in Europe, which began in the summer of 1939, changed the situation. Soon France and Holland were under Germany occupation, and Great Britain herself was fighting for survival. While Japan was not ready to go to war at this point with the Western democracies, their collective weakness and American isolationism enabled the Japanese to put pressure on the foreign-managed MCS, and the authorities that ran the international community's at the treaty ports in Japanese occupied areas in China, to comply with Japanese demands.

Japan joins the Axis Powers

In September 1940, Japan joined the Axis powers by signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. The Japanese militarists admired the Nazis, with whom they had a lot in common. By signing this treaty, the Japanese were betting on Germany winning the war. If that were the case, they wanted to be assured that the ex-colonies of the Western democracies in the eastern part of the world would become a part of Japan's New Order. Although the Chinese would not surrender, the Japanese, looking at the shortages and spiralling inflation in wartime Sichuan, expected Chiang Kai-shek's government to collapse after a prolonged period without outside help.

At this time Japan was also interested in German assistance to repair her relationship with the Soviet Union, which in 1939 had despatched its air force to China, to fight Japan in support of Chiang Kai-shek, as already mentioned. In addition, from May to September 1939, the Soviet Union and Japan fought a large-scale war, known as the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, in the vicinity of Nomonhan, near the border between Manchuria and Mongolia. The Japanese were afraid that the non-aggression pact

concluded in August 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union would free the Communist country to strengthen its military forces in northeast Asia against themselves. In order not to have to fight on the Manchurian and Mongolian fronts with the Communist giant across the border, before they had expanded into Southeast Asia, the Japanese strongly desired peace with the Soviet Union. Since the threat of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union was not entirely removed by their non-aggression pact, the Russians also desired peace with Japan, so that they did not have to fight on both fronts. In April 1941, the two countries signed a non-aggression pact.

Another reason for Japan joining the Rome-Berlin Axis was to isolate America. In fact, during the pre-war years, a strong sentiment of isolationism already prevailed in America. That was why the United States, with a small army, and a naval force divided between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, did not prepare for war. Before the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, America kept itself aloof from military involvement, in both Europe and Asia. As regards China, the United States continued to stand for the Open Door Policy, for territorial and administrative integrity of that country, and for non-aggression as the Washington Treaties had stipulated in the early 1920s. Although Japan's aggression towards China, which began with the Mukden Incident in 1931, violated all the principles America stood for, the United States was not willing to go to war to defend these principles, or to aid China militarily. Apart from expressing disapproval of Japan's aggression towards China, the United States maintained a policy of neutrality in the conflict between those two countries, selling equipment and materials essential to the war efforts of both. As American public opinion grew increasingly hostile towards the Axis powers, Japan's close association with this group made her also a target of American animosity.

America joins the war against Japan

The path to Pearl Harbour

With Germany as an ally, Russia neutralized, and the European colonial powers either under German occupation or struggling for survival, the Japanese saw 1940 as an opportune time for them to expand into Southeast Asia virtually unopposed, if the United States, the only power that was free to impede them, continued with its isolationism. For many decades, the Japanese navy had looked upon the American Pacific Fleet with

hostility. It posed a potential threat to their expansion into Southeast Asia. The Japanese were keenly aware of the fact that their dependence on American aviation fuel, and scrap iron and steel for making bombs was their Achilles heel. To be free of this dependence on America, Japan needed to acquire the raw material resources of Southeast Asia, such as oil from the Dutch East Indies, as quickly as possible. Was America willing to go to war with Japan to prevent the latter from fulfilling her colonial ambition? The Japanese militarists were not to be thwarted by this possibility. In September 1940, the Japanese army moved to northern French Indochina, ignoring an American warning. In response, the United States placed an embargo on aviation gasoline, and iron and steel scrap metal. Since the Japanese could process other grades of gasoline to make aviation fuel, the American move was hurtful, but not crippling. Before the end of 1940, the Japanese consolidated their position in northern Indochina, and proceeded to dominate Thailand.

The partial embargo aroused Japanese fear of a total American oil embargo, but it did not stop the Japanese troops from moving further into southern Indochina in July 1941. This time the United States, Britain, and the Dutch East Indies together imposed a total embargo on exports to Japan. The move reduced Japan's oil import to 10% of its previous volume. Alarmed that their limited stockpile of oil might be depleted within a foreseeable time scale, the Japanese militarists felt compelled to take the big step of embarking on the conquest of Southeast Asia, in order to realize their goal of building a self-sufficient empire. Invading the colonial possessions of the Western powers would risk war with Great Britain and the United States.

Although the Japanese believed they could take military action against the British colonies in their stride, war with America, whose involvement in World War II had so far been limited to keeping Britain supplied with shiploads of necessities through the Lend Lease Act, would pose a far more serious challenge to their military-industrial capacity. This did not deter the militant naval staff officers and junior planners of the Japanese navy from preparing for war with the United States. While war remained an option, the Japanese government led by Fumimaro Konoe wanted to explore the possibility of persuading the United States to revoke the oil embargo, in exchange for some concessions from Japan. Since America had no extensive colonial interests to defend in Southeast Asia apart from the Philippines, the 'peace party' hoped that if Japan were to

agree to keep to the status quo in its expansion, or even to carry out some minor withdrawal, America might be willing to make a peace deal with Japan. Furthermore, Konoe was willing to promise not to go to war on the side of the Axis powers, should the United States' support for the British involve it in war with Germany. If war with the United States could be avoided through diplomacy, Japan might wait until the end of the war in Europe for a settlement on the division of Southeast Asia. In July 1941, the Japanese government led by Konoe started intense negotiations with the Roosevelt administration, to strike a deal for peace. The Japanese leaders also set themselves a deadline of war against America by October, if the negotiations failed to achieve the desired result.

Konoe's proposals, and even the offer of a meeting between him and Roosevelt, attracted the U.S. President but he allowed himself to be persuaded by his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who dominated the formation of American policy towards the Far East, not to meet with Konoe. Hull distrusted the Japanese peace initiative. He saw the Japanese as aggressors, and striking deals with them would amount to condoning aggression, which in his view was morally wrong. He was also concerned that a drastic change in American policy towards Japan might jeopardize the network of the established relationships between the United States and Britain, China, Holland, and Australia. In November 1941, Japan made her most sacrificial offer, which was that she would return to the position of June 1941 by withdrawing her troops from southern Indochina, in exchange for an American agreement to stop the oil embargo, and to stay out of China. Hull was far from ready to reach a compromise with Japan. Confident that Japan would not dare to attack the United States, he demanded the Japanese to withdraw their troops from Indochina and China, including Manchuria. His uncompromising stance meant turning the clock back to 1931, before Japan invaded Manchuria.

While Konoe's limited concessions might not have been acceptable to the Japanese military, who were eager to seize the moment to realize their vision of empire, further negotiations on the basis of the American demands were clearly out of the question. By this time, the October deadline of going to war with America set by the Japanese leaders for themselves had already passed, so for Japan war was the only option left on the table. Having prepared themselves in advance for war in the Pacific, the

Japanese had already conducted mock attacks on Pearl Harbour for months in Kagoshima Bay in Southern Kyushu, prior to the actual event. On the morning of Sunday 7 December 1941, to the shock of the United States, the Japanese carried out a well-executed bombing attack by aircraft from a carrier, which destroyed or seriously damaged seven battleships, many lesser vessels, and over half of the aircraft on the American naval base at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. It was a crippling blow to America's Pacific Fleet, though three aircraft carriers that were at sea had the good fortune to be spared a similar fate. Although the U.S. ambassador's warning from Japan, together with other tell-tale signs shortly before the attack, should have alerted America to an impending Japanese strike, these were ignored. The Japanese pre-emptive attack on Pearl Harbour shocked the Americans into abandoning their isolationism, and it united them behind their country's decision to enter World War II

By the end of 1941, without the restraining presence of America's Pacific Fleet, Japan was ready to extend its 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', which had been envisaged for China and Manchuria in 1938, to include almost all the continental and island territories in Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, many Pacific islands, and possibly India. The Japanese conquest proceeded at break-neck speed. Having established a dominant position in Indochina and Thailand earlier in 1941, the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, Malaya, the Philippines, and Hawaii on 8 December 1941. From 13 to 25 December, Guam, the Wake Islands, and Hong Kong fell. In January 1942, both Manila and Singapore fell, the latter after a day's fighting and the surrender of the 130,000 British troops garrisoned there. During the same month, Japanese forces landed in the Dutch East Indies. In the first half of 1942, the Japanese proceeded to take over Burma and Malaya by defeating the British stationed in these countries, the Philippines by forcing the U.S. Army under General Douglas MacArthur to retreat from that country, the East Indies by overpowering the Dutch garrisons, and the Aleutian Islands by landing marines there.

China and America as allies after Pearl Harbour

Chiang Kai-shek's hope of Allied intervention in the Sino-Japanese war finally became a reality after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour. China and America became allies, and there was the possibility of using China as a base to attack Japan. American

support helped China to join the Anti-Axis Alliance as one of the 'Big Four' Allied powers: the other three being the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. \$500 million worth of loans, and \$650 million worth of lend-lease materials were granted to Chiang's government in 1941. President Roosevelt sent General Joseph Stilwell to China as his liaison with Chiang Kai-shek, to supervise the lend-lease supplies, and to have overall command of the American forces in the 'China-Burma-India' war theatre. With America as an ally, substantial air power became available to fight the Japanese from China. The previously mentioned 'Flying Tigers' joined the Fourteenth U. S. Air Force commanded by Claire Lee Chennault, who was given the rank of general. This air squadron protected Free China's cities from Japanese bombing raids.

Although in 1941 the Nationalist troops blocked a massive Japanese assault on Changsha in Hunan province, both the Chinese and British forces, fighting separately, failed to stop the Japanese advance into Burma from Indochina and Thailand in the spring of 1942. This campaign in Burma was extremely costly to Chiang: he lost many of his irreplaceable German-trained troops, and heavy equipment amounting to one third of his strategic reserves. Japanese occupation of Lashio in Burma once more prevented Free China's war supplies from coming via the Burma Road.

How was this situation to be remedied? And how was Japan to be defeated? Stilwell and Chennault had different answers to these questions. Chennault's answer was to use the air force to airlift supplies over the 'Hump' from India. This plan was immediately feasible, but it had the disadvantage of high cost and low capacity. Furthermore, constructing new airfields and enlarging the air force bases was also costly. Stilwell argued for the development of an effective Chinese ground force. He pointed out that air forces needed troops on the ground to defend them. While he had a high opinion of the Chinese common soldiers, he despised Chiang's commanding officers, and Chiang himself. Chiang's armies struck him as being over officered, underequipped, and undertrained. Stilwell's answer was to train a limited number of Chinese soldiers to make them into an elite corps. He believed that they would fight well, given proper leadership and equipment. He would use these troops to reconquer northern Burma and reopen the Burma Road to bring back large-scale supplies to Chongqing. Even though Chiang did not warm to his proposal, he patiently pursued this plan and slowly it achieved the

expected results. The retrained Chinese soldiers under his command fought the Japanese with distinction in Burma, and by early 1945 the land route to China was reopened.

Chiang favoured Chenault's proposal, and he put a lot of his resources into building airfields in Hunan and Guizhou provinces, at the periphery of the area he controlled. From early June 1944, American B-29 bombers flew out of these new airfields, dropping tons of bombs on enemy targets, ranging from railway yards in Bangkok in Thailand to the Yawata steel plant and other industrial sites on the island of Kyushu in Japan, and oil refineries in Sumatra, Indonesia. Stilwell had the foresight to see that the Japanese were not going to let this continue. They struck back hard in an operation called 'Ichigo', or 'Number One' in Japanese, in the summer of 1944. Japanese troops in central China first moved to reinforce their control of the Beijing to Wuhan railway line, and then south along the Xiang River to attack Changsha and Hengyang, where an airfield was located. After capturing these cities, they moved to Guangxi to seize the air bases around Guilin and Liuzhou in that province. From there a couple of columns swerved towards the northwest, threatening the cities of Guiyang and even Chongqing. The Ichigo operation was a disaster for Chiang: besides the serious damage to his military forces and the large territorial loss, it lowered the morale of his regime, and the confidence of his American allies in his leadership.

To make more headway against the Japanese forces in China, Roosevelt conveyed to Chiang his wish to make General Stilwell the commander in chief of all Chinese troops, as he particularly pondered the striking contrast in performance between the Chinese troops involved in the Ichigo operation and those retained and commanded by Stilwell. This suggestion was totally unacceptable to Chiang, apart from the fact that he and Stilwell had not been on good terms. In October 1944, Stilwell was recalled to the United States and replaced by General Albert Wedemeyer.

Horrified by the brutality of the Nationalist armies' forcible conscription of the peasants, swayed by the propaganda coming out of Yan'an, and impressed with the Red Armies' combat capabilities, high American officials in China even briefly toyed with the idea working with the Chinese Communist regime in Yan'an, in the fight against the Japanese. In December 1944, General Wedemeyer submitted to Chiang a proposal for reorganizing 5,000 regular Communist troops, arming them with American weapons and

placing them under an American commander for operations against the Japanese in Guomindang mandated areas. Chiang rejected this plan on the ground that the local Chinese would be too hostile to the Communist soldiers for them to operate effectively. Other proposals involved training and equipping Communist guerrilla forces to carry out sabotage against Japanese installations. By this time, the Guominang and the CCP were already in a confrontational rather than cooperative mode towards each other, and Chiang would not give his consent to any American scheme that might help his Chinese Communist enemies. In January 1945, to Yan'an's disappointment, the Americans shelved these plans.

Ideological differences aside, the one-sided U.S. aid to the Chinese Nationalists could be justified by the fact that their regime had been at the forefront of the war of resistance against the Japanese and had borne the greatest losses. The Chinese Communist propaganda nevertheless succeeded in creating a widespread impression that they were more patriotic and effective fighters against the Japanese. Outside the Japanese occupied areas and behind the frontlines, the CCP strove to consolidate its rule and enlarge the area and the population it controlled, in addition to waging guerrilla war against the Japanese. By 1945, the CCP was active over an area of 250,000 square miles, with radio links for quick communication. The Red Army soldiers were trained to befriend the people of the countryside, whose support was vital for guerrilla warfare. The CCP cadres lived and worked among the ninety-five million people of the liberated area, registering their landownership, staffing local administrations, and spreading liberation ideology illustrated by art (typically woodcut prints), literature, and drama adapted to the culture of the masses. By the time of its seventh national party congress in Yan'an in April 1945 (the sixth was at Moscow in 1928), the CCP had 1.2 million party members, and its Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies numbered 900,000.

Mao took on the new post of Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP. The new constitution buttressed centralized party power and acknowledged the authority of 'Mao Zedong Thought' (Maoism) in guiding the party. Since Mao's ideologies were principles derived from the practical experience, he had gained from working in the countryside, he insisted that Marxist-Leninist theories must be applied with reference to the concrete reality of China's rural society. Mao's idea of testing theory by action was

an approach no scientists would object to. His political rivals, the doctrinaire Soviet-trained CCP leaders, and the intellectuals, who had expressed ‘unorthodox’ ideas, or, in Mao’s opinion, had not used their art to serve the masses, were discredited or disgraced through public self-criticism, or other forms of punishments.

The isolation of the Chinese Communists in Yan’an enabled the CCP to develop according to its own lights, and pursue its own policies under Mao’s leadership, without Comintern interference. The new party constitution omitted any reference to the Soviet Union or the world Communist revolution. As the united front became less united during the years of the protracted war against the Japanese, the CCP shifted from their liberal policy of modest reform in the countryside, moving increasingly to one of revolutionary land reform, and redistribution of the land of the landlords. The Communist cadres penetrated deeply into the rural society of north China, in areas nominally controlled by the Japanese and China puppet regimes, to register, classify, and analyse the rural households, and to indoctrinate and mobilize the peasants for increasing production of crops, for the war against Japan, and for social revolution. The Yan’an years turned out to have been a period of growth for the Chinese Communists, allowing the movement to become independent politically and self-reliant economically.

After the United States entered the war against Japan following Pearl Harbour, it became the principal ally of the Chinese Nationalists, whose government represented China. However, during the initial phase of the war American efforts were focused at first on defeating Germany before Japan. While Roosevelt and Churchill cooperated closely, ‘Vinegar Joe’ Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek were at loggerheads with one another. Even with the aid from America, Chiang’s forces failed to turn the tide of war in China against Japan. Nevertheless, the stubborn Chinese resistance tied down two-fifths of all the forces available to Japan, and this remained the major Chinese contribution to the Allied war effort, and its importance should not be underestimated. The altered situation in the Far East and in the world during World War II finally helped the Chinese Nationalist government to secure, in 1943, agreements from the other Allied powers to abolish extraterritoriality. Since China had already gained tariff autonomy and put the foreign-managed MCS under nominal Chinese control from the late 1920s, the abrogation of extraterritoriality ended the unequal treaty system that had exploited and humiliated

China for almost 100 years. In December 1943, Chiang Kai-shek joined Roosevelt and Churchill at the Cairo Conference, where a decision was made by the leaders to return Manchuria and Taiwan to China after the war.

The fate of the foreigners after Pearl Harbour

The Japanese ended the special privileges of the foreigners in the foreign concessions of the treaty ports in their occupied territories, although they allowed foreigners who remained there to continue carrying on with their businesses. However, in March 1943, the Japanese gathered the 1500 Westerners, adults and children, in Beijing and transferred them to the Weixian Internment Camp, run by the American Presbyterian Medical Mission in Shandong, where they had to survive on meagre allowances of food, and without medical supplies or amenities of any other kind. The Europeans and Americans in Shanghai were interned under similar condition in central China. The 16,000 Jewish refugees who had escaped to Shanghai from Nazi persecution from Europe were rounded up and put into a ghetto in a poor section of the city, where they endured a regime of hardship and deprivation, and the erratic maltreatment of their Japanese guards.

The war in the Pacific

As the war between the United States and Japan developed, the principal battles between the two countries were fought on islands in the Pacific, bypassing China. Probably for this reason, by 1946 America had provided China lend-lease grants of only \$1.5 billion, which was about 3% of the total of lend-lease aid of \$50 billion given to all countries in World War II. In May 1942, after Japan had acquired the previously mentioned far-flung empire in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the United States achieved a crucial victory in Midway, an island at the westernmost end of the Hawaiian chain. At the battle of Midway, U.S. planes destroyed a Japanese armada of four aircraft carriers, which was their principal striking force that kept the sea lanes safe for her merchant marines. The loss of these carriers put the Japanese on the defensive.

To isolate Japan from her empire was an important American strategy, which the United States performed successfully through destroying her naval air power, navy, and merchant marines, by using ship-borne artillery and fighters and bombers from the air, and most effectively by using submarines. The U.S. attack sank over eight million tons of the Japanese merchant ships, leaving only 1.8 million tons of small wooden coastal craft

by the end of the war. The isolation weakened Japan's economy and made it easier for the forces that opposed her inside and outside her empire to overwhelm her defences, and to roll back her empire.

The capture of the Marianas (Saipan) in June 1944 brought Japan within the range of Allied bombing. In October 1944, General Douglas MacArthur returned to the Philippines, which fell to the Allied forces after fierce fighting by June 1945. The Allied assault on the Japanese island of Okinawa started in April 1945, and it was captured in June 1945, after bloody Japanese resistance that took 85% of the defenders' lives. Japanese suicide planes called Kamikaze ('Divine Winds', referring to the typhoons that destroyed the Mongol invading ships during the thirteenth century) caused one fifth of the 49,100 Allied casualties, through the sinking of 34 ships and damaging 368 others.

From the middle of 1944 onwards, when the war in the Pacific and the Allied campaign in Burma were both making great strides, the Chinese Nationalists suffered a severe blow from the previously mentioned Japanese Ichigo operation. Disappointed by the Guomindang defeat, and the inability of the Chinese Nationalists and Communists to work together to make a greater impact on the war against Japan, Roosevelt and Churchill secured Stalin's agreement, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, for Russia to enter the war against Japan within three months of Germany's surrender. As an incentive, Russia would recover all territory lost to Japan, including Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Other rewards to Russia would involve giving back her privileges from the unequal treaties made between Qing China and Czarist Russia. One of these would give Russia once more the majority interest in the former Sino-Russian railway in Manchuria.

The other two concerned the great port cities of Lushun and Dalian in Liaoning province: while Lushun would be 'leased' again to Russia, Dalian would become an 'internationalized' city that would also benefit Russia. These future gifts to Russia were at China's expense, without consultation with the Nationalist government which represented China.

The major Allied strategy for the next phase of the war, which started during the second half of 1944, was to conduct massive firebomb raids on the Japanese homeland, aiming at the major cities with their industrial sites and civilian housing. As time went on, a raid could involve over 100 B-29 bombers, flying in parallel and saturating a

densely settled city, such as Tokyo, with incendiary bombing that would almost instantly burn down the Japanese houses built with wood and paper, and cause over 100,000 civilian casualties in one day. These raids killed a total of 668,000 civilians and destroyed 2.3 million homes, in addition to laying waste countless infrastructure and production facilities, leading to economic breakdown and shortages of supplies, even many daily necessities, including food.

The terrifying bombing raids did not move the Japanese to accept the ultimatum put forward by a declaration of the three powers (the United States, Great Britain, and China) at their Potsdam Conference in July, which threatened the ‘utter devastation of the Japanese homeland’ if Allied terms on Japan’s unconditional surrender were not met. By the middle of 1945, the United States had successfully developed, through the secret Manhattan Project, the ultimate weapon of the era: atomic bombs, using radioactive materials, uranium-235 and plutonium-239. To avoid the estimated one million American casualties that would result in an invasion of the Japanese home islands, and also to bring the war to a quick end, President Harry S. Truman chose to use these unprecedentedly destructive weapons against Japan. On 6 August 1945, an American B-29 bomber dropped the first atomic device in human history on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The more than 4-ton bomb, packed with uranium-235, exploded 2,000 feet above the city of 350,000 in a blast that was equivalent to 12-15,000 tons of TNT, destroying 90% of the city, and killing about 80,000 people immediately; tens of thousands more died later from exposure to the high levels of radiation.

Responding to the terms of the Yalta Agreement, on 8 August 1945, three months after Germany’s surrender on 7 May, the Soviet Union moved massive forces into Manchuria to attack the Japanese. On 9 August, the United States dropped a second atom bomb, an even more powerful plutonium device, on the smaller Japanese city of Nagasaki, killing between 60,000 and 80,000 people. On 15 August, Japan’s unconditional surrender, announced by Emperor Hirohito in a radio address, brought World War II to an end.

With no knowledge of the Yalta Agreement or the secret atomic bomb programme, Chiang and Wedemeyer were working first on improving the quality of thirty-nine specially selected divisions of the Nationalists’ troops, and then on a plan to

recover Chinese territory from the Japanese little by little, first from the southeast to recapture Guangzhou, then moving northwards to recover Shanghai. The second leg was reminiscent of the Northern Expedition against Chinese warlords in the late 1920s. Early in August, Chiang's forces captured Guilin shortly before the news of Japan's surrender reached China. As they had expected the war to stretch into an indefinite future, they were not prepared for the sudden coming of peace, and so no plans were made for the challenge of rehabilitating the country, politically, economically, and socially. But before any such rebuilding could occur, the country would descend into civil war.

China under Mao-Tse-Tung

1. When the armies of Mao Tse Tung and of General Chu Teh crossed the Yangtse river in April 1949, the seal of defeat was almost set on the forces of Chiang Kai Shek. His power had collapsed and before the autumn the Kuo Min Tang was to be driven from the mainland. The world started talking of a 'victory for communism' in China. The Kung Tsiang Tang (the KTT or the Chinese Communist Party) was however to characterise its military victory over the Kuo Min Tang as the 'victory of the national bourgeois democratic revolution' which had begun 38 years earlier. What the KTT proposed and what Mao Tse Tung considered his first task-was the 'stimulation of the revolutionary process'. The bourgeois revolution, according to their beliefs, would be followed by the proletarian socialist revolution. At a later stage the 'transition to communism' would be on the agenda. There is a striking resemblance between the ideas of Mao and the KTT on the development of the Chinese revolution, and those of Lenin and the Bolsheviks on the development of the Russian revolution.

2. This similarity is not coincidental. In both countries the revolutions resulted from similar factors and conditions. Both countries were backward at the beginning of this century. Their relations of production and their patterns of exploitation were semi-feudal(or related to feudalism) and were predominantly based on agriculture. Their populations were largely peasant. Religious beliefs permeated both societies, reflecting the social conditions: in China Confucianism, and in Russia Greek Orthodoxy. The social reality In each country formed the basis of similarly oppressive regimes: the Tsars in Russia and the Manchu Emperors in China.

3. In both Russia and China the revolutions had to solve the same political and economic tasks. They had to destroy feudalism and to free the productive forces in agriculture from the fetters in which existing relations bound them. They also had to prepare a basis for industrial development. They had to destroy absolutism and replace it by a form of government and by a state machine that would allow solutions to the existing economic problems. The economic and political problems were those of a bourgeois revolution; that is, of a revolution that was to make capitalism the dominant mode of production.

4. The Development Plan issued by the KTT in the autumn of 1949 confirmed all this. It challenged Chinese social traditions, based on family ties and on local and regional government. It advocated agrarian reform through the introduction of more modern methods of production and by the extension of the area under cultivation. The KTT wanted to harness China's Immense resources of human labour power and by extending and improving the educational system, to prepare the population for the role assigned to them in a society undergoing industrialization. China's new rulers wanted a modern road network to bring the areas producing materials into closer contact with the urban industrial centres. According to the KTT the primary task was the creation of modern industry. Mao's programme for the period to follow the 'taking of power' was essentially the programme of triumphant capitalism . Class Relations in the Chinese Revolution

5. The economic and political problems of the bourgeois revolution were, generally speaking, ready to be tackled in France in 1789. There were, however, enormous differences between the bourgeois revolutions in China and Russia, on the one hand, and that in France on the other. And it is precisely in those areas where the Russian and Chinese revolutions of this century differ from the French revolution that they resemble one another. In France, the bourgeois revolution of 1789 took a classical form--the form of a struggle of the bourgeoisie against the ruling classes of a pre-bourgeois period. But neither in China nor in Russia was there a bourgeoisie capable of understanding or conducting such a struggle. The characteristic feature of the revolutions in both countries is that they were bourgeois revolutions in which classes other than the bourgeoisie occupied the role played, in the eighteenth century, by the bourgeoisie in

France. These fairly unusual class relationships were to form the basis of Bolshevism in both Russia and China. Bolshevism did not occur in China because Mao Tse Tung and his co-thinkers were Bolsheviks but because conditions in China were similar to those in Russia which originally created Bolshevism. In neither Russia nor China could capitalism triumph except in its Bolshevik form.

6. In both China and Russia feudalism (or its equivalent) had persisted until fairly recent times as a result of the stagnation of agrarian development. In both countries capitalism arose out of what might be called external needs. With it an embryonic bourgeoisie and an embryonic proletariat developed. In Russia capitalism arose as a result of the economic needs of Tsarist militarism. Industrialisation began in Petrograd, in Moscow, in the coal-bearing Donetz basin and around the oilfields of Baku. In China the same process occurred in the major ports of Shanghai, Canton and Nanking. In China, however, the proletariat formed an even smaller percentage of the population than in Russia. Despite the many similarities, this fact was to result in great differences between the revolutions in the two countries.

7. The 'bourgeoisie' which, in (China and Russia developed alongside the process of industrialisation, in no way resembled the 'Third Estate' which, at the onset of the French bourgeois revolution, had proudly proclaimed its right to power. The bourgeoisie in China and Russia arose as a class without any firm economic base of its own. It was supported by foreign capitalism and developed in the shadow of an absolutism which had itself made concessions to foreign capitalism.

The Development of the Revolutions in China and Russia

In Russia, although the working class was small, the conditions of Tsarism ensured that it was very militant. Such militancy, combined with its concentration in certain areas, allowed the Russian proletariat significantly to influence events. It played an important role in both 1905 and 1917 just as the peasants did as a result of their sheer numerical force. Russia also had an intelligentsia for whom history had reserved a special role. From the ranks of the intellectuals came the cadres of professional revolutionaries of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin once said of such professional revolutionaries (and it was far truer than he realised) that they were 'Jacobins bound to the masses', i.e. revolutionaries

of a distinctly bourgeois type, advocating a typically bourgeois method (or form) of organisation.

These Jacobin Bolsheviks left their imprint on the Russian revolution just as conversely--they were themselves to be influenced by the Russian events. They used the word 'smytschka' to describe the needs of the revolution. The 'smytschka' was class alliance between workers and peasants, classes with completely different interests but who, each by itself, could not achieve their own aims in any permanent way. In practice (and as a historical result), this came to mean that the Party occupied a position of authority above the two classes. This situation continued until, as a result of social development, a new class appeared, a class engendered by the post-revolutionary mode of production.

In China history repeated itself but in a somewhat different form. Although the Chinese revolution in general resembled the Russian, it differed from it utterly in some respects. There was, firstly, an enormous difference in tempo. Although the Chinese revolution began in 1911, in the beginning (apart from some important events in 1913, 1915 and 1916) it only marked time. At its onset, in contrast to what happened in Russia in 1917, the mass of the population did not enter the scene. The fall--or rather the abdication--of the Manchus was a belated echo of mass movements of bygone years such as the Tai Ping revolt and the Boxer Rebellion. The abdication was not the sequel to an uprising. The 'Imperial Son of Heaven' offered China the republic on a tray. Imperial authority was not destroyed as French royalty or Russian Tsarism had been but was bequeathed by imperial decree to Yuan Shih Kai. Yuan has been nicknamed the 'Chinese Napoleon' for his unsuccessful attempt at replacing the Empire by a military dictatorship. But this is an inaccurate designation. Napoleon was the executor of the will of the bourgeois revolution whereas Yuan Shih Kai was only the executor of the will of a bankrupt imperial household. As such Yuan Shih Kai proved an obstacle to the development of the revolution.

Yuan cannot be compared to Bonaparte but is perhaps more like Kornilov, the Russian general who at the end of the summer of 1917 prepared a counter-revolutionary coup. When faced with this danger the Bolsheviks called for resistance and the Petrograd workers intervened on the side of the revolution. Nothing similar could have occurred in

China where the working class, small as it was, was too weak even to contemplate such action. The progress of the Chinese bourgeois revolution was therefore slowed down.

In China historical necessity had thrown up no Jacobins to oppose Yuan Shih Kai; what did exist was a petty bourgeois intelligentsia-radical and republican. Their radicalism was, however, relative in the extreme and only discernible in relation to the reactionary Chinese bourgeoisie who flirted with both Yuan Shih Kai and the empire. This petty bourgeoisie was represented by Sun Yat Sen, who followed in the footsteps of Confucius in advocating class reconciliation. Sun Yat Sen sought a compromise between ancient China and a modern (i.e. bourgeois) republic.

Such illusions certainly could not stimulate revolutionary attitudes. They explain why Sun Yat Sen capitulated without resistance to Yuan Shih Kai when for a short time after 1911 he found himself in the foreground of events. Yuan Shih Kai's lack of success was due primarily to the forces of separatism and decentralisation which had rendered impossible the continued existence of the Manchu monarchy and had seriously impeded the maintenance of the former power structures even under a modified form.

China in 1911 did not become a national bourgeois state as France, Germany or Italy had become after their respective bourgeois revolutions. Consequently China fell prey to a handful of generals such as Sun Chuan Fang and Feng Yu Hsiang who fought each other for over a decade, whereas in Russia generals such as Denikin, Kolchak and Wrangel only entered the scene after the revolution of 1917. In Russia the generals fought the peasants, the workers and the Bolsheviks; in China the generals fought to prevent events like those that had taken place in Russia in 1917 before there was any chance of their occurrence. They attempted not to erase events but to preclude them by extending their power over the greater part of China. But all of them failed. It was not until the late twenties that Chiang Kai Shek succeeded; at a time when the revolution had entered a new phase.

Chiang Kai Shek was unlike the other generals; he was not a feudal war-lord nor did he represent the well-to-do peasants. He was the general of the Chinese 'Girondins', the general of the Kuo Min Tang. His party had been forced into revolutionary activity for a short period by the pressure of the masses, now beginning to play an active part in events. After marking time for a quarter of a century, the Chinese revolution had reached

the stage which the Russian revolution had reached in February 1917, despite the still very different social conditions in the two countries.

The Parties in the Chinese Revolution

The Kuo Min Tang (the National Party of China) is the oldest party to have played a role in the Chinese revolution. It was the heir of the Tung Min Wuo ('United Front of Revolutionaries') which itself continued the traditions of the 'China Awakes' secret society. This was formed outside China by Sun Yat Sen in 1894 with the support of émigré petty traders. The petty bourgeois base of this group remained tradesmen and intellectuals but it also comprised many soldiers and officials with careerist notions. It also gained support from the ranks of the Chinese bourgeoisie, still in its infancy.

The outlook of the KMT was as vague as its heterogeneous composition might lead one to expect. It failed to realise that, as in all bourgeois revolutions, the development of China's economy depended on an agrarian reform and on the freeing of the peasantry from feudal forms of ownership. The confusion was inevitable for this freeing of the peasantry was inseparably connected with the breakdown of traditional Chinese family relationships. These relationships were an integral part of the future China envisaged by Sun Yat Sen and the KMT. The KMT were republican nationalists and the logical consequence of nationalism was a struggle against imperialism. But this was impossible for a party whose bourgeois supporters were so strongly linked to that very imperialism. So confused were Sun Yat Sen's ideas that he seriously believed that China could be unified and strong under a central power supported by foreign capital. He failed to realise that such foreign capital benefited most from China's weakness. The main feature of the ideas of Sun Yat Sen and the KMT was, however, their notion of a general reconciliation between classes. This unrealistic ideal incontestably corresponded to the fact that the KMT was the political expression of basically antagonistic interests.

It was only in the early twenties, when the Chinese people took action to defend themselves against an oppressive imperialism, that the KMT moved to the left. The party was reorganised and Sun Yat Sen drew up a programme for it which for the first time recognised the agrarian problem as basic to the development of Chinese society. The programme was however so obscured by Confucian terms that hampered its revolutionary interpretation that the left and right wings of the party could interpret it as

they chose. Despite this, the KMT was driven by events for a while to fight imperialism and the forces of reaction which had remained as strong as they had been in 1911. For a time it seemed as if a form of 'Jacobin democracy' would appear within the nationalist party. The revolution gained momentum but this only exacerbated the contradictions between the various social groups which composed the KMT. As the revolution moved forward, all that was reactionary within China arose against it.

Kung Tsiang Tang (the Chinese Bolshevik party) emerged in the years 1920-21 for much the same reasons as the Russian Bolshevik Party had been formed twenty years before. As the Chinese bourgeoisie was failing in its own mission, the workers and the peasants became the fighting force of the revolution. Because it was a bourgeois revolution and not a proletarian revolution that was the order of the day, the organisation formed in the struggle-in the wake of the shortcomings of the KMT proved to be of bourgeois type: a party. The party was created on Leninist lines because conditions were similar to those which had given rise to the Bolshevik Party in Russia. Its internal structure and its social and political ideas corresponded to these material circumstances.

The Chinese scholar Chen Tu Hsiu who founded the KTT made of it a faithful copy of the Russian Bolshevik Party. This was confirmed by Mao Tung himself when, in a speech on the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the KTT in June 1949, he said: 'It was through the practices of the Russians that the Chinese discovered Marxism. Before the October Revolution the Chinese were not only ignorant of Lenin but also of Marx and Engels. The salvoes of the guns of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-leninism.' The Chinese concluded from this that 'it was necessary for us to follow the way of the Russians.' This conclusion was correct, but only because 'Marxism-Leninism' has nothing in common with Marxism other than terminology. Marxism was the theoretical expression of class relationships within capitalism. Leninism is a transformation of social-democratic ideas to fit particular Russian conditions. And these conditions were to shape Bolshevism more than did the social-democratic ideas. If Leninism had been Marxism, the Chinese would have had nothing to do with it, and what Mao said of other western theories could have been applied to Leninism itself, namely: 'the Chinese have learned much from the West but nothing of any practical use.'

Although the KTT could borrow its structure from the Russian Bolshevik Party as a result of the similarity between conditions in the two countries, these conditions were not identical. It was therefore necessary to modify Leninism to fit Chinese conditions just as Lenin had previously changed western ideas to fit the Russian situation. As the situation in China resembled that in Russia more closely than Russian conditions resembled those of western Europe, the alterations made were less drastic.

Undoubted changes were made, however, and Chinese Bolshevism while remaining Bolshevism was to reflect a much stronger peasant influence than did the Russian variety. This adaption to more primitive conditions was not consciously undertaken but occurred under the pressure of reality. The visible influence of this pressure was the total renewal of the party around 1927. As long as it had remained a faithful copy of the Russian model, the KTT had been completely impotent in the maelstrom of the Chinese revolution, but once it identified more closely with the peasant masses, it became an important factor. This explains why Chen Tu Hsiu was expelled in 1927 at the time of the 'renewal of the cadres'. The 'rebels in the countryside' were joining in large numbers. Chen Tu Hsiu, the Marxist scholar, was replaced by Mao The Tung, the peasant's son from Honan.

A third party to appear in the Chinese revolution was the Democratic League. Founded in 1941, the League sought from the beginning to act as a buffer between the KMT and the KTT. In the newspaper *Ta Kun Puo* (January 21 1947), close contacts of the League defined its activities as conducting propaganda for democracy and acting as intermediaries between the KMT and the Bolsheviks with a view to achieving national unity'. Elsewhere the League defines itself as being directed towards the end of civil war and towards peace. The League sought to reconcile the irreconcilable. The compromise put forward (the League themselves used the word 'compromise') was an attempt similar to the one made by Sun Yat Sen in 1912 when he gave way to Yuan Shih Ksi 'to avert a civil war'. But in 1912 the revolution once begun, civil war was inevitable. All attempts to compromise at that stage or later in history only had one result: an intensification of the civil war.

It has been said of the Democratic League. Founded by the coalition of various groups and small parties, that most of its supporters were academics or students and that

they used the word 'democracy' much as it is used in the West, namely to mean the rule of the bourgeoisie. What is true in this characterisation is that these scholars were the heirs to the Mandarins who had ruled China for over 3,000 years but what they had learnt from western bourgeois democrats was but a thin veneer over their basic Confucian philosophy. The basic feature of this philosophy is its concern for 'peace' and the avoidance of class struggle. The Mandarins of the League maintained close economic and family ties with the uppermost stratum of Chinese society. This social layer had one foot in bourgeois society but also maintained feudal interests. This social background was eloquently expressed in the politics of the League; despite its outwardly severe critique of the KMT, its practical actions were confined to attempts at reforming the KMT. Such attempts were fruitless. The 'faults' of the KMT could not have been eliminated without eliminating the social circumstances which had given rise to both the KMT and the Democratic League.

The end of the civil war in China could not have been achieved by the compromises suggested by the League but only by pursuing the civil war to its conclusion. The League never abandoned its pacific policies but reality forced it eventually to modify them. Hesitatingly, reluctantly and too late in the day, even on their own admission, the League declared war on Chiang Kai-shek, whom they (politically short sighted as they were) had always taken for a moderate man. At that very moment Chang Kai-shek returned to his policy of destroying the advocates of policies of compromise and moderation, which he had temporarily interrupted during the war with Japan. The Democratic League, caught between the left and the right, was crushed by the unfurling of events and disappeared. That was in the autumn of 1947.

The Chinese Kerensky and the Peasants

In the years 1927 to 1947 the Chinese revolution underwent a second period of stagnation. During this period the KMT was in power, having separated itself from its youth and its own Jacobin wing. This was the Girondin period which had begun with the defeat of Sun Yat Sen and of the left. In the spring of 1927 social antagonisms brought about a political crisis and a subsequent split in the party. In the April of that year there were two KMT governments; a left wing one at Wu Han and a right wing one at Nanking. The differences between them were not great for the Wu Han regime itself was

to keep its distance from the peasantry, now becoming active. The Nanking regime reacted in the same way. There was no difference between the agrarian policies of the two regimes.

When the peasant movement in Honan took on the appearance of a mass revolt, Tan Ping San, the Minister of Agriculture at Wu Han, travelled to the province to 'prevent excesses'... (in other words to suppress the revolt). Tan Ping San was a Bolshevik and a member of the KTT (then working in close collaboration with the KMT). Chen Tu Hsiu, then still Party Leader, reasoned as follows: 'An agrarian policy which is too radical would create a contradiction between the army and the government in which the KTT is participating. The majority of army officers come from-a background of small landowners who would be the first people to suffer in an agrarian reform.'

This is yet another example of why it proved necessary to renew the ranks of the Bolshevik Party with peasants. It was clear, moreover, that the Wu Han administration stood between the peasant revolts and the Nanking government and that, because of its petit-bourgeois base, it did not take its flirtation with radical Jacobinism too seriously. As a result it was forced to surrender to Nanking at the beginning of 1928, leaving Chiang Kai-shek master of the situation.

The Nanking government of Chiang proved victorious in the critical year of 1927, great working class uprisings had to be put down in Shanghai and Canton. It is claimed by some that these uprisings were attempts by the Chinese proletariat to influence events in a revolutionary direction. This could not have been the case. Twenty-two years after the massacres in these two towns the Chinese Ministry of Social Affairs announced that in China there were fourteen industrial towns and just over a million industrial workers in a population of between four and five hundred millions-i.e. industrial workers comprised less than 0.25% of the population. In 1927 this figure must have been still lower. With the proletariat insignificant as a class in 1949, it seems unlikely that they could have engaged in revolutionary class activity twenty-two years earlier. The Shanghai uprising of March 1927 was a popular uprising whose aim was to support Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition. The workers only played a significant role in it because Shanghai was China's most industrialised town, where one-third of the Chinese proletariat happened to live. The uprising was 'radical- democratic' rather than proletarian in nature

and was bloodily quelled by Chiang Kai-shek because he scorned Jacobinism, not because he feared the proletariat. The so-called 'Canton Commune' was no more than an adventure provoked by the Chinese Bolsheviks in an attempt to bring off what they had already failed to achieve in Wu Han.

The Canton uprising of December 1927 had no political perspective and expressed proletarian resistance no more than the KTT expressed proletarian aspirations. Borodin, the Government's Russian adviser, said that he had come to China to fight for an idea; it was for similar political ideas that the KTT sacrificed the workers of Canton. These workers never seriously challenged Chiang Kai-shek and the right-wing of the KMT; the only serious, systematic and sustained challenge came from the peasantry.

After his victory Chiang Kai-shek found himself master of a country in which the insoluble contradictions of the traditional social system had produced social chaos. The Nanking government saw before it the task of re-organising China, but it was impossible to turn the clock back.

Chiang Kai-shek was obliged to embark on new roads and was ready to do so. He dreamt of being, if not the Jacobin, at least the Girondin reformer of China, just as Kerensky had dreamt of being the great reformer in the Russian revolution. Kerensky, like a comic opera hero, had strutted across the Russian political scene between February and October 1917, believing he could dominate events, whereas in fact it was events that were carrying him forward. Chiang Kai-shek can be compared to Kerensky in several ways: neither had much criticism to make of imperialism: both were faced with agrarian problems which resulted in the basic instability of their regimes; both became puppets of reaction as a result of their own ideals. Kerensky's 'socialist' beliefs (the word can be interpreted in many ways!) led him to become the ally and friend of many of the most reactionary elements in Russia. Chiang Kai-shek who, as a cadet in the military academy, had dreamt of 'renewing China with his sword' in his own lifetime, eventually became a member of a clique of whom T.V. Soong was the most typical member. But the wealth of Soong* (in fact, Chang's father-in-law) and other large financiers presupposes both a form of commercial imperialism and the mass poverty of the Chinese peasantry. Kerensky's policies were similarly dictated by the social position of his friends, such as Nekressov, a position based on the poverty of the Russian peasantry. While Kerensky's

government in Russia lasted only a few months, the Chinese 'Kerensky' period of the KMT lasted until World War II.

Although the accession to power of Chiang Kai-shek impeded the progress of the bourgeois revolution, the revolution had already begun and the main revolutionary force, the mass of the peasantry, continued to press forward. In the early thirties, scarcely three years after the country had been 'pacified', there was a series of peasant insurrections. Thus the KMT armies were fighting against the revolutionaries-the peasantry -who had been continually oppressed and cheated and were now being driven to extremes of desperation. Wherever the masses took action they undertook a general partition of the land. This partition was so radical in the province of Kiangsi that the KMT were forced to legitimate it when they 'pacified' the rebellious area in 1934, although such land reform was scarcely in accord with their general policy. Chiang Kai-shek had declared, it is true, that he intended to regulate land ownership so that each could have his share, but outside Kiangsi where the partition was imposed by peasants themselves no such reforms took place. The KMT claimed that co- operatives would improve the living standards of their participants and, although the number of such co-operatives rose from 5,000 to 15,000 between 1933 and 1936, they only in fact served the interests of the land-owners. The Swedish anthropologist Jan Myrdal, who lived for a time in a country village in Shansi, recorded that the peasants themselves had told him that the credit system brought them further into poverty. Their debts to the landlords increased and the troops of the KMT enforced payment. Such conditions, as recorded by Myrdal, lend weight to the assertion that the revolution which shouldered throughout the thirties to explode in the forties was overwhelmingly a peasant revolution.

The Nanking government under Chaing Kai-shek failed to resolve China's most urgent problem, that was the agrarian problem. Their incapacity in this field stemmed from the close links between the KMT and those sections of Chinese society whose interests most favoured the maintenance of the traditional system. The overt and direct oppression of the peasantry under this system was of a distinctly pre-bourgeois nature and showed that remnants of feudalism were still in existence.

Here can be found the source of the increasing corruption within the KMT: such corruption was not the result of personal characteristics of the KMT leaders but of the

social system itself. The KMT was not corrupted because it sought support from the propertied classes but by the fact that it was based on such classes. This corruption greatly exacerbated the social problems of China. The Nanking government and the parasitical classes which it represented held back development and tended to destroy China's economy. But once this economy was challenged the government itself was doomed. After twenty years of tentative attempts, the peasant masses at last discovered how to unite in a revolutionary force. It was not the working class, still very weak, which brought about the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek but the peasant masses, organised under primitive democracy into guerilla armies. This demonstrates another fundamental difference between the Chinese and Russian revolutions. In the latter the workers were at the head of events at Petrograd, Moscow and Kronstadt, and the revolution progressed outward from the towns into the countryside. In China the opposite was the case. The revolution moved from rural to urban areas. When Kerensky called upon the army to help him against revolutionary Petrograd, his soldiers fraternised with the Bolsheviks. But when the armies of Mao Tse Tung and Lin Piao approached the Yangtse river, the peasant soldiers of the KMT deserted en masse. There was no question of a defence of Nanking or of the China of Chiang Kaishek. The specter of feudalism was driven out of China and capitalism was bloodily born there, the result of a social caesarean section carried out with the bayonets of peasant armies.

Land Partition and the Agrarian Revolution

As a peasant revolution, the Chinese revolution showed its bourgeois character as clearly as did the Russian revolution. When the peasants began to move, Lenin and his colleagues were forced by events to abandon their ideas on the 'agrarian question'. They adopted the Narodnik policy based on the so- called 'black partition' under the slogan of 'the land to the peasants'. In China the KTT used a similar slogan, also borrowed from others (notably from Sun Yat Sen) and which, as in Russia, had been similarly forced upon them by reality itself.

In 1926 the two childhood friends from the province of Honan, Mao Tse Tung and Liu Shao Chi, both strictly followed the Party doctrine. The former wrote in a study of the old class structure in China that 'the industrial proletariat is the motive force of our

revolution'. The latter wrote in a pamphlet that 'the social and democratic revolution can only succeed under the leadership of the workers' unions'.

The ink was scarcely dry, however, when the peasants of Honan challenged such opinions with an irresistible force. Deeply impressed by what he had seen during a short visit to his native province, Mao Tse Tung came to believe that it was not the workers but the peasants who would be at the forefront of the revolution. He wrote in a report that, 'without the poor peasants there can be no question of a revolution'. Whoever acted against the peasants attacked the revolution; their revolutionary tactics were beyond reproach.

Mao Tse Tung depicted in great detail the revolutionary tactics of the peasants of Honan in a report on the revolutionary movement in that province. These tactics were used throughout China as much during the long' Kerensky period' as in 1949 and in 1953. The houses of village tyrants were invaded by crowds, their corn confiscated and their pigs slaughtered. Landowners were dressed up as clowns and paraded through the villages as prisoners; meetings were held at which the poor expressed their grievances against the rich, and tribunals were set up to try exploiters. These were the methods of struggle spontaneously developed by the Chinese peasants. In China, just as in Russia, it was not the party which showed the way to the peasants-the peasants showed the way to the party.

The social changes which occurred in the Chinese countryside between 1949 and 1953 were characterised by partition of the land, the dispossession of the landowners, the breaking up of the social groups connected with them and, finally, by the destruction of the patriarchal family which was the basic production unit of traditional Chinese society. The social significance of this process was that it put an end to the old system which was in decline and seriously hindered the development towards private ownership of land (the most important means of production in China). The result was the same in China as it had been in Russia. Those who had been landless peasants became small land-owners. After four years of agrarian revolution, there were between 120 and 130 million independent peasants in China.

Of the development of Russia after 1917, Karl Radek had written, 'the Russian peasants have made the feudal land on which they worked until now their own property'.

This remains the basic fact although it can be partly concealed by various juridical fictions. The Bolshevik economist, Vargas, wrote in 1921, 'the land is worked by peasants who produce almost as private owners'. Radek and Vargas were absolutely correct.

The first phase of the Russian revolution produced capitalist private ownership in the countryside, which naturally led to new social differentiations. A new class of agricultural labourers developed alongside a class of well-to-do peasants. Of similar developments in China, Mao Tse Tung was to write in 1955: 'in recent years the spontaneous forces of capitalism * have expanded day by day in the countryside; new rich peasants" have appeared everywhere and a large number of well-to-do peasants are trying desperately to become rich. On the other hand, a large number of poor peasants still live in misery and poverty because the means of production are insufficient. Some of these poor peasants are in debt while others are selling or letting their land.' Later, in the same article, Mao writes of 'a group of well-to-do peasants who are developing towards capitalism'

Partition of the land created, both in Russia and China, the conditions under which agriculture could enter the sphere of modern commodity production. Such a system of commodity production arose in Western Europe under the form of classical capitalism. In such a system there no longer exist the closed units in which needs are fulfilled by local labour alone and in which production is geared to local consumption. A peasant no longer consumed all his own production nor produced for the satisfaction of all his own needs. Specialisation developed and the peasant began to work for the market just as industry did. The peasant supplied industry with primary products and the non-agrarian industrial workers with food. In return, industry supplied the peasant with the machinery to improve and increase production. This specialisation led to an increasing inter-dependence between agriculture and industry. In Russia and China this type of development also took place, but not along classical lines. Both these countries lacked a modern bourgeoisie which is the historical agent of this type of social change. Its historical role had been taken over by the party and the state. The development towards capitalism in these two countries was also the development towards state capitalism. At first it might appear as if this development was the product of a supposedly 'socialist' ideology. On closer inspection, however, it appears that state capitalism was not the result

of such an ideology but rather that this 'socialist' ideology was the consequence of the new inevitability of state capitalism.

Because state capitalism implies a restriction of 'free' market mechanisms and of the traditional 'freedoms' of the producer, it encountered both in China and in Russia the resistance of peasants who had just established themselves as free producers. The historical need to overcome this resistance inevitably resulted in a Party dictatorship.

The climate of resistance among the Chinese peasantry is clearly demonstrated in an episode described in the Party's theoretical journal in 1951 as follows: 'The young Liu Shao-chi had worked as a farm labourer for more than ten years. During this time he had suffered from bitter poverty. It was not until the victory of the revolution that he was able to marry and start a family. During the campaign for agricultural reform he was very active and was elected secretary of his village youth league. Once he had received land however he refused to continue working for the Party. When reproached, he replied: "All my life I've been poor. I owned no land. Now I own land, I'm content. There is no need for further revolution".' The Party replied that the revolution had not yet ended. The revolution could not be ended until a modern, stable economy had been established without which, despite the land partition, agriculture would once again stagnate.

The peasants against State Capitalism

In 1953, when the agrarian revolution was under way that is to say, after the partition of land had taken place, China saw the onset of a violent struggle between the peasants and the KTT. The object of this was the building of a state capitalist economy. Alongside this development there arose also increasing tensions between the workers and the government.

In these two respects, events in China in the fifties resembled events in Russia in the twenties. But events in the two countries were by no means identical. China witnessed nothing like the development of workers' councils or the growth of these tendencies of self-management in the Russian factories which had forced Lenin to adopt the slogan of 'All Power to the Soviets', despite this being in its essence, in opposition to Bolshevik ideology. Nevertheless, similarities can be seen underlying, on the one hand, the decision of the First All-Russian Congress of Councils of National Economy (in May 1918) to the effect that eventual nationalisation of the factories could only be undertaken with the

consent of the Supreme Council of National Economy (See "The Bolsheviks and Workers Control p. 43), or the decree of the 10th Party Congress of March 1921 which forbade the further confiscation of enterprises, and, on the other hand, the Chinese measures introduced in September 1949 forbidding even workers in the private sector from striking.

While the Russian proletariat was developing new methods of struggle, the Chinese proletariat was resorting to the classical strike weapon. But in both countries legislation was directed at the self activity of the workers. Behind the thin façade of the so-called 'dictatorship of the proletariat' could be found, in both countries, the features of capitalism.

In both China and Russia there was a contradiction between the claims of the Bolshevik Party and social reality. In relation to the trade unions, this led to a 'discussion' in which the truth was meticulously avoided even when the facts were fairly clear.

In 1952 the Chinese unions were purged of officials who, it was stated, 'allowed themselves to be led too much by the workers', i.e. who 'showed too much concern over the workers living standards', or who 'proved overzealous in ensuring workers' rights'. Meetings were called at which attacks were made on those who 'failed to understand that, while strikes are necessary in a capitalist country, they are superfluous in a socialist state'. A campaign was launched against 'laxity in labour discipline', in much the same tone as Trotsky had used in Russia. General Hou Chi Chen, who had elaborated the new trade union laws, declared: 'It is no longer necessary, as it once was, to struggle for the downfall of capitalism.'

In 1953, at the 7th Congress of Chinese Trade Unions, it was stated that 'the direct and selfish interests of the working class must be subordinated to those of the state'.

Although in China too debate clouded reality, at the 1953 Congress of Trade Unions the truth was stated far more bluntly than it had ever been in Russia.

That the Chinese Party could express itself more openly than its Russian counterpart was a direct result of the different situations existing in the two countries. In Russia the realities of Bolshevik ideology had to be more carefully hidden as a result of the more important role played by the working class in that country. After all, the

Bolshevik regime in Russia had known a 'Workers' Opposition' based on the trade union of metalworkers and an armed proletarian insurrection at Kronstadt.

No such pressures had been put upon the Chinese Bolshevik Party. As a result it had less compunction in dealing with the working class and could consequently allow itself a freer hand in coping with the peasantry. Until the early thirties the Russian Party vacillated between the workers and the peasants, at times acting against one section while giving way to the other. From the beginning of the revolution the Chinese Party could follow a straight line. As a result, it could develop a stronger state capitalist policy in relation to agriculture, and moreover do so at an earlier date.

From the moment of the Bolshevik victory in China the working class was weaker than that in Russia. Agriculture was more primitive and therefore more dependent on industry. As a result the Party had more elbow room and met with more success in its agrarian policy. In October 1953 the Party began to fight against the private capitalist tendencies which had resulted from the partition of the land. Three and a half years later, in 1957, ninety per cent of Chinese agriculture had been organised into co-operatives. This first period of collectivisation was followed, in August 1959, by a second phase: the introduction of the Peoples' Communes. This second phase of collectivisation had only been going a few months when it encountered a massive and menacing resistance from the peasantry. In Russia the Bolsheviks had met this resistance earlier.

In China, the struggle between the peasantry and the state party reached its peak later than its corresponding struggle in Russia. As a result of China's larger number of peasants, the struggle proved more deeply rooted and more dangerous to the new state. In Russia the ideological repercussions of this conflict did not occur until long after the peasant uprisings had been suppressed: it was not until 1925 that Bukharin issued his famous appeal to the peasants, 'Enrich yourselves!' In China the order of events proved quite different. The peasant uprisings occurred in December 1958 in Honan, Hopeh, Kansu, Kiangsi and Kuangtung provinces but the ideological struggle had taken place two and a half years before in the period between the two periods of agrarian collectivisation known as the 'Hundred Flowers' period.

It is quite wrong to see the resistance against the Mao regime during the 'Hundred Flowers' period as a preliminary to the events of the Red Guards period of the Cultural

Revolution. During the 'Hundred Flowers' period it was the Party which found itself the accused, denounced for suppressing individual liberty and creating a division between itself and the people; in short of 'behaving like a new dynasty', as a spokesman of the opposition put it. The Party was being accused by people who, consciously or not, reflected the aspirations of the small agricultural producers. During the Cultural Revolution, instead of being the accused, the Party was then the prosecutor and the accusations it levelled were not the suppression of individual liberties but an overindulgence in personal liberty. While the 'Hundred Flowers' period was a struggle against the party's state capitalist attitudes, the Cultural Revolution-as will be shown-was a conflict between the Party and the 'new class'.

In China this 'new class' developed more quickly than in Russia. One of the main reasons for this was the ability of the KTT to move more quickly and more strongly towards state capitalism in the first years that followed its victory. In China many of the most profound social changes occurred sooner after the revolution than in Russia. As is often the case in history, what was initially a brake became a stimulus to further development.

The Period of the Hundred Flowers' and the policy of 'Three Red Flags'

In the middle of January 1956 the Chinese Bolshevik Party held a conference during which it decided to change its policy with regard to scientists and writers. Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister, promised the intellectuals better treatment, admitted that a gap had developed between the Party and the intellectuals, and conceded that this could partly be blamed on Party officials. On 21 March 1956 the 'People's Daily' wrote that the Party should make greater attempts than ever to rally the intellectuals back to its ranks. By 'intellectuals' they were referring to the new intellectuals rather than to the old political idealists who formed the Party cadre and who belonged to the intelligentsia. At the same time open attempts were made to persuade Chinese intellectuals abroad to return home. On 2 May 1956 Mao Tse Tung made his famous speech in which he said 'Let a Hundred Flowers bloom and a Hundred Schools of Thought contend'. Thus began the 'Hundred Flowers' period. It was pure coincidence that it began at the same time as the 'thaw' in Russia or as the Polish' spring in autumn'. This coincidence was to lead to a misconception that these were similar phenomena.

Misunderstandings were heightened by the fact that in China too people used the word 'spring'. If however a comparison with this Chinese 'spring' is to be sought, it will not be found in the European developments of the fifties but rather in the Russian events of early 1918. In March of that year Lenin pro- claimed the need to attract people from the professions. In 1921 and in the following years of the NEP relations between the Bolsheviks and the scientists and specialists steadily imp- roved until they once more came under attack from Stalin.

In 1928 the first famous trial took place in Russia against certain engineers. The event in some ways resembled the purges of the thirties but was in essence different. Trials also took place in China, for example that against the author Hou Fu, widely read in this period. Those cases such as this occurred before even the beginning of the 'Hundred Flowers' period only demonstrates how complex reality is and how, beyond all the analogies, there remain profound differences between the Chinese events and those of Russia.

Despite the differences, the 'Hundred Flowers' period in China can be compared to the NEP in Russia. Changes in economic policy took place in China during this period-namely, a pause between the two periods of collectivisation. In Russia this period lasted ten years if dated from Lenin's change of policy towards the intellectuals, or seven years if dated from the formal adoption of the NEP on 21 March 1921. As a result of her backwardness, China's corresponding phase was to prove much shorter, but did not occur until six and a half years after the Bolshevik victory. The systematic building of state capitalism, for which both countries needed intellectuals, began later in China, which was a more backward country; but, once begun, the process continued at a faster tempo as the Chinese did not need to make the detours that were forced on Lenin.

The period of the 'Hundred Flowers' lasted only a year. While the hundred flowers were flowering and the hundred schools of thought were contending, comments of the following kind could be read in China: 'When the Communists entered the town in 1949 they were welcomed by the people with food and drink and they were regarded as liberators; now the people keep clear of the Communist Party as if its members were gods or devils. Party members behave as police agents in civilian clothing and spy on the

people.' Or: 'The unions have lost the support of the masses because they side with the Government at decisive moments.'

To dissatisfaction such as this must be added that caused by a low standard of living and by widespread hunger. One cannot help recalling that Kollontai had said in Russia in the early twenties that the bars of the prison cells were the sole remaining symbols of soviet power-or how the Workers' Opposition had criticised the economic situation. But in China the working class was still weak. No workers' opposition had appeared. The reality of the situation, namely the defence of the liberty of peasant entrepreneurs against the state capitalist tendencies of the Party, was better expressed in the literary critiques of the 'Hundred Flowers' period than it had been by pamphleteers during the NEP. In Russia this had been mixed up with a primitive proletarian critique-something which did not occur in China.

The 'Hundred Flowers' period was in no way related to the events in Russia or Poland after the death of Stalin. Nor was it related to the critique which began in China in the early sixties despite the fact that in a number of instances the Party was the common object of these criticisms. In the 'Hundred Flowers' period the Party was criticised because it was state capitalist; in the sixties it was criticised despite its state capitalist position. Whereas in the 'Hundred Flowers' period the critics were against both state capitalism and the Party, in the sixties the critics were against Mao Tse Tung but not in the least against state capitalism. Behind these apparent subtleties there lay important differences.

In 1957 while the seed of the 'Hundred Flowers' was germinating in the fertile soil of the existing social relations, the Party replied to criticism by a sharp campaign against 'right-wing deviationists' which lasted until April 1958. Then in the summer of that year, the Party announced its policy of the 'Three Red Flags' which it had been preparing for some months. -The first 'red flag' was the 'general policy of socialist construction: the joint development of industry and agriculture by the simultaneous utilisation of modern and traditional productive methods. -The second 'red flag' was the 'great leap forward': the attempt vastly to increase the production of steel and power. -The third 'red flag' was the formation of 'peoples' communes' throughout the countryside as the second phase of agrarian collectivisation.

From this it can be seen that after the short 'Hundred Flowers' period the Party continues on its state capitalist course more decisively than ever. China was now at the stage that Stalin's Russia had reached in 1928, eleven years after the Bolshevik revolution. China had taken nine years to reach this stage. Her development had been more rapid and the methods used more radical. Such 'progress' however was not achieved without trouble. When towards the end of 1958 the 'weapon of critique' of the 'Hundred Flowers' period was discarded and the peasants took the road of a 'critique by weapons', the Party had to back-pedal. In December 1958, April 1959, and on several subsequent occasions, the Party had to modify its 'Communes' programme before eventually abandoning it in 1962. A similar fate met the other two 'red flags'. In the spring of 1962 the policy of the 'Three Red Flags' was completely abandoned.

History repeats itself, but in ever new forms. In Russia there was a fairly strong peasant resistance at the beginning of 1921. The Party took a step back and announced the NEP, only to renew its fight against this resistance in 1928. In China phenomena similar to the NEP were witnessed in 1956-70, after which the Party began a struggle against the peasants which resulted in uprisings similar to those seen in Russia in 1921. The Chinese Party then back-pedalled as Lenin had in 1921. What resembled the NEP in China therefore took place in two distinct periods, the 'Hundred Flowers' period and the period between 1962 and 1964 when a new 'radical' course was again set. But the Chinese events of 1964 no longer resembled what happened in Russia at the end of the NEP. At best they resembled the second phase of a delayed NEP. A new conflict was then beginning, not between the Party and the peasantry but between the Party and a 'new class'.

The 'New Class' in China against the KTT

In the mid-sixties China entered a new phase which the Party called the 'Great Socialist Cultural Revolution'. In a three-volume work published in the autumn of 1966 it was stated that, 'The victory of the socialist revolution does not mean the end to a class society or to the class struggle'. The authors went on to say that after the proletariat had established its power through a political victory, there were other struggles to be fought in the fields of culture, literature, art, philosophy, life-style and everyday conduct. It was

because of this that China had been involved in inter-class struggle on the cultural front since 1949.

This is a typical example of Bolshevik mystification: there had not been a socialist revolution and power was not in the hands of the proletariat. Instead there had been a bourgeois revolution which, as a result of specific historical circumstances, had been carried out by the peasantry. It had taken the form of state capitalism and had subsequently evolved a very unusual ideology. This ideology required a presentation of the facts in such a manner as to imply that, from the outset, the capitalist nature of the revolution had rapidly become socialist. This sleight of hand boils down to the fact in China, as in Russia, state capitalism is presented as 'socialism' and the power of the Party as 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'.

The new ideology also develops the false idea that, after its allegedly political victory, the working class has yet other victories to win. But the real power of the working class, as of any other class, does not lie in political institutions but is of a social nature. It implies above all a revolution in the relations of production, associated with a revolution in all other relationships. In China the relations of production changed. Feudalism was replaced by capitalism. As earlier in Europe, one system of exploitation was replaced by another. As long as revolutions in relations of production only result in one form of exploitation replacing another, they will result in the emergence of institutionalised political power. When a change in the relations of production does away with exploitation, political power will cease to exist. One cannot speak of political domination by the proletariat where the proletariat is still exploited. Once the proletariat frees itself, all forms of exploitation and of class domination will cease.

The concept according to which the 'political power of the proletariat must be used to win victory in the cultural field' is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the link between relations of production on the one hand and political and cultural relations on the other. These wrong ideas arose from the fact that the respective roles of the social and economic infrastructure of society and of its political and cultural superstructure were reversed. Cultural and economic changes are not brought about by the instrument of politics but come about when the economic foundations of society are being transformed. The opposite is learnt if-as is the case of Russia and China-reality too

is violated and wage-slavery is presented as the opposite of what it really is. The 'Great Socialist Cultural Revolution', we would stress, had nothing to do with socialism. Nor was it in any real sense a revolution.

What the KTT labelled as a 'cultural revolution' led, in late 1966 and in early 1967, to violence on such a wide scale that the world spoke of a 'civil war'. It should not be thought however that these are mutually contradictory categories. Cultural developments, historically, have often been violent. In our opinion there is a direct link between the conflicts expressed in art and literature in the early sixties and the violence which broke out in later years. The Chinese scholars and literary critics fought for essentially the same things as were later to be fought for physically. As so often in history, and as has previously been seen in Chinese history itself (see Thesis 44), an ideological struggle preceded an armed struggle.

It was no coincidence that the work already mentioned on the 'cultural revolution' dealt only with literature. The KTT were not wrong in emphasising the relationship between the struggle of the Red Guards and the earlier literary struggle. They were wrong, however, in their distorted view of that relationship. The struggle of the Red Guards did not have a cultural objective. The opposite was the case. The cultural struggle expressed conflicting social interests. The Chinese Bolsheviks failed to appreciate the opposing social interests precisely because they were Bolsheviks and limited by Bolshevik ideology. They described the conflicts of 1966-67 as 'cultural' instead of explaining these conflicts in the field of culture as stemming from antagonistic social interests.

The French journal *Le Contrat Social* (edited by the Institute of Social History in Paris), called the 'Great Socialist Cultural Revolution' a 'pseudo-cultural pseudo-revolution'. This might appear to coincide with our viewpoint. We have said it was wrong to explain social conflicts through cultural mechanisms. We have said that there was no 'revolution' at this period. This is true, but the writer in the French journal meant something else. By 'pseudo-cultural', the French journal meant anti-cultural, and by 'pseudo-revolution' it meant counter-revolution. But in China during the sixties there was neither a revolution nor a counter-revolution, neither physical nor literary. What happened was a conflict between the 'new class' as occurred in Russia after Stalin's death.

But there is an important and specific difference between the parallel developments in China and in Russia. In Russia there was the same upheaval but the defenders of the traditional type of Party were labelled 'anti-party', and the 'new class' won its victory easily and almost without violence. In China, where the Party was much stronger for historical reasons (see Theses 35 and 41), the 'new class' experienced more resistance and violence erupted. If in the fifties Molotov and those around him had succeeded in mobilising the Army against the Mikoyan faction, developments in Russia might have shown more resemblance to those in China.

The agitation of the Red Guards was no more than a reaction against an earlier action by the 'new class'. To grasp this one need only study the literary conflict that took place in the early sixties. Despite the fact that it was couched in literary terms, the true social nature of this conflict became clearly visible in January 1961 after the author Wu Han had published his novel *Hai Jui Dismissed from Office* (Peking Arts and Literature edition). Although this dramatic story was to be severely criticised by the Party's official press several years later, the same author in 1961 published *Three Family Village* in collaboration with Teng To and Liao Mo Sha. Between January and August Teng To began a regular column entitled *Evening Tales from Jenchang* in a Chinese paper. These were short contemplations in the classical Chinese style and apparently dealt with former periods of Chinese cultural prosperity. The allegorical nature of these articles is, however, transparently obvious and within the framework of depicting the Ming dynasty or old time's Chinese culture he was referring to the contemporary People's Republic of Mao Tse Tung and the KTT and aiming his blows against the Party dictatorship.

Teng To was undoubtedly the most brilliant of Mao's critics (and his works contain constant attacks on political fanaticism and persecution because of the disastrous effects they have/ on harmonious social and economic development. In his column *Evening Tales of Jenchang* dated 30 April 1961 Teng To further clarify his position. The article is on 'the theory of the precious nature of labour power' and Teng To makes it clear that he considers the wasteful use of so 'precious' a commodity to be harmful to production. By such criticism Teng To distinguishes himself from the critics of the 'Hundred Flowers' period. He appears as something which previous critics were not, namely as the spokesman for a group with an undoubted interest in production.

When in his Evening Tale of 22 April 1962 Teng To asks if one can base oneself on theory alone and tells the Party bureaucrats that 'people can't do things all alone', one must see it in the light of the 'new class' staking a claim to being heard and listened to.

The Party's tame critics claimed that writers such as Wu Han, Liao Mo Sha, and Teng To 'wanted to restore capitalism' in China. Such an accusation slots into the jargon of Bolshevik ideology but is patently absurd. Capitalism being the existing economic system, there was no need to 'restore' it. What was at most possible was that some Chinese preferred traditional liberal capitalism to the state capitalism variant which existed in China. Who then were the critics? Classical capitalism had made little headway in China and the embryonic classical bourgeoisie had been destroyed or exiled in the late forties. Its residual representatives are today to be found in Formosa or elsewhere. In the unlikely event that there are people in China who favour a return to the social relations of classical private capitalism, Teng To, Liao Mo Sha and Wu Han are not amongst them. While their enemies within the Party constantly publish long attacks on the works of these writers to prove their hostility to the current regime, nowhere in the quotes does any hostility appear towards the system of state capitalism. It is true that Three Family Village (the joint work of these three pilloried authors) contains a semi-overt attack on the 'people's communes', but these criticisms are neither of state capitalism nor of the Party, which was in fact itself now abandoning the 'communes' policy.

In Three Family Village Teng To criticizes Mao's famous phrase, 'the east wind is stronger than the west wind' and Mao's characterisation of imperialism as a 'paper tiger'. Teng To's criticisms spring from his standpoint as a realist. When, in his Evening Tales, he attacks the KTT's general policy as being based on illusions, he is echoing his criticisms of the people's communes. In both instances he is expressing his preference for efficiency. Teng To does not treat history daintily and he attacks political idealists like Mao who try to channel the process of social development according to their own political wishes. in other words, Teng To and his fellow writers are not opposed to state capitalism, they are only opposed to the Party .

The story of Wu Han's novel *Hai Jui Dismissed from Office* concerns a party official who, despite his honesty, is sacked from his post because of divergent ideas. It is probable, as suggested by the author's critics within the Party, that the novel alludes to

those who were expelled from, and persecuted by, the Party after the Lushan conference in 1959. The conclusion drawn by the critics was however that Wu Han was defending 'right-wing opportunists'. This relapse into the traditional jargon tells us nothing either about Hai Jui or about those expelled from the Party. The Party pen pushers could only monotonously reiterate that the writers wanted to 'restore capitalism'.

If, however, nothing can be learned about Hai Jul, or about his creator Wu Han, from the criticisms of his detractors, much can be learned from the author's articles and letters which appeared after the publication of his book. Wu Han therein declares that he himself was among those who did practical work and kept in close touch with reality. Teng To expressed a similar preference for reality when he wrote in his Evening Tales column that 'those who believed that they could learn without a teacher would learn nothing'. The 'teacher' referred to by Teng To throughout his work is historical reality, the actual development of the productive process. It is precisely this type of criticism that identifies Wu Han and Teng To as spokesmen of the 'new class'.

In China the 'Great Socialist Cultural Revolution' was nothing more than an attempted selfdefence by the Party against the increasing pressure of the 'new class'. Against the literary attacks of Teng To, Liao Mo Sha, Wu Han and others, the Party at first used purely literary weapons. The 'Thoughts of Chairman Mao' were published in the famous 'little red book' in which are contained Mao's pronouncements on art and literature uttered at Yenan in May 1942. When Mao said, in the forties, that 'writers must place themselves on the Party platform and must conform to Party policies', he meant something rather different than the use that was to be made of this phrase some twenty years later. When the 'new class' changed its weapons the Party followed suit. The literary conflict between the 'new class' and the Party developed into a physical struggle. The stake in this struggle was just as obvious as in the previous literary phase. But there was a difference. Reality could be ignored on paper; in real life it could not. The 'new class' in China was a product of social development, just as it had been in Russia, and as such the Party felt obliged to defend it. This explains why, at a certain stage, Lin Piao had to hold back the Red Guards and why Mao Tse Tung himself had to call a halt to the 'Cultural Revolution'. What were at stake then was neither literature nor cultural affairs but production and the Chinese economy.

The KTT against the 'New Class'

Information, both official and semi-official, on recent events in China is vague, contradictory, politically distorted and incomplete. Any attempt to build a social image of Mao's opponents, against whom the violence of the 'Cultural Revolution' was directed, confronts great difficulty. It is rather like the task the police undertake when it seeks to build up an 'identikit' picture from a mass of partial or incomplete testimonies. Doubtful and uncertain details must be discarded in favour of the features common to the many partial or inadequate reports. From these features can be built up a composite mental image which, while lacking specificity, nevertheless demonstrates all the general, i.e. essential features. Such features provide a distinct and immediately recognisable framework. Applying this method, Mao's adversaries are found: -to be living in large and middle sized industrial towns (Chou En-lai said at a dinner in Peking on 14 January 1967, that it was in such towns that the Party first felt obliged to move against its opponents); -

to comprise, within their ranks, high Party officials and well-known men (speech by Chou En-lai and articles in the Peking People's Daily) and people in official positions (leader in the theoretical review Red Flag);

To have fortified themselves in powerful positions (leader in People's Daily and Red Flag);

To have some of their number in the management of the railways (articles in People's Paper and Red Flag);

To be attempting to gain the workers' support by wage increases and the bestowing of social benefits and through the distribution of food and other goods (the People's Daily and the Red Flag),

To have interests closely tied to production (statement of a pro-Maoist group in Shanghai);

To distinguish themselves from the masses through their dress and life-style, neither proletarian nor peasant (numerous street witnesses);

Expressing opinions characterised by the Maoists as 'economistic'; these opinions reflect the atmosphere of industrial life and come into head-on collision with the Maoist conception that 'political work forms the basis of economic work' (the People's Daily and the Red Flag);

To favour a policy which would, according to the Maoists, drive a wedge between the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (i.e. the dictatorship of the Party) and the 'socialist system' (i.e. state capitalism) (the People's Daily and the Red Flag).

From all that proceeds, Mao's opponents give the impression of being a group with roots in industrial life and including many Party officials. They have financial influence and are in a position to allocate the products of industry (both food and other commodities). They have the power to grant wage increases and other social advantages. They can therefore be characterised as managers.

The clearer the picture of Mao's opponents becomes, the more readily are they identifiable as the 'new class'. The real social differences between them and the Party correspond exactly to the theoretical differences between Wu Han and Teng To on the one hand and the Party on the other. It is no coincidence that in the early sixties Wu Han was not only an author but also assistant mayor of the large industrial town of Shanghai. Neither is it a coincidence that in the mid-sixties the mayor of Shanghai was one of those fighting the Party with more than a pen. Their so-called 'economism' was the atmosphere they encountered every day in the industrial climate of Shanghai.

The intervention of the Chinese 'new class' (or managers) does as much to clarify the attitudes of their literary predecessors as a study of the latters' writing does to clarify the practical activities of the Chinese managers. The charge that the managers wanted to sever the links between the Party and the economic system shows that the managers-just like the writers-were not directing their blows against state capitalism as such but against the power of the Party. They did not consider the two as inseparable. They wished to destroy the stifling influence of the Party, not to abolish state capitalism. In fact, they believed that state capitalism could only prosper once freed of the political fetters of the doctrines of Mao Tse Tung and of the KTT.

When the 'new class' is proposing in China is a different conception of the Party, in other words an entirely different kind of Party from that conceived of by Mao Tse Tung.

During his visit to London, Kosygin, the Russian Premier, said that the Russian government sympathised with Mao's adversaries in China. This declaration fits in perfectly with our analysis of Chinese events. It was not the 'ideological conflict' with

which the Russian leaders sympathised. What they identified with was the struggle of the managers of the 'new class' against the traditional Party. Their sympathy for the 'new class' stemmed from the fact that such a class had already proved victorious in Russia, personified by such manager-administrator types as Kosygin and Mikoyan.

In Russia the old style Bolshevik Party had been replaced by a Party of a new type. This gives us an insight into the objectives of the anti-Maoists in China. However, despite similarities, one must constantly stress that events had developed differently and at different tempos in the two countries.

In Russia the traditional, old style Party and the 'new class' were natural enemies. This was not the case in China where, because the proletariat had always been weak, the Party had not been forced to pay as much heed to the workers as had its Russian counterpart. As a result the Chinese Party had a freer hand. Its policies were more drastic and direct (see Thesis 35). It moved faster and more confidently towards state capitalism. This is why the Chinese Party differed from its Russian counterpart and why in China the borderlines between the Party and the 'new class' are less easy to discern. Mao's opponents are so strong, even within the Party itself that at an Executive Conference held early in 1967 only six of the eleven present supported Mao. In Russia the 'new class' came to power imperceptibly, the traditional Party having proved an anachronism. In China the rise of the 'new class' has been associated with struggle for control of the Party.

This struggle for the Party in China makes the situation more complex. Definitions such as 'oldstyle Party' and 'new- style Party' mean different things in the Chinese and in the Russian contexts. While the 'new class' in China is seeking to escape from the stranglehold of the Party, the Party is seeking to reform itself to ensure its continued domination over the managers. This gives rise to the totally erroneous impression that the 'Cultural Revolution' was directed against the Party, whereas in reality it was directed against the 'new class'. Such misunderstanding is heightened by the fact that it was Mao himself who first used the term 'new-style Party'.

What Mao meant by this phrase is the very opposite of what is represented by the 'new-style Party' in Russia, correctly seen by Mao as the instrument of the 'new class'. Mao sought to make the 'new style Party' a barrier to the advance of the 'new class'. In Russia the 'new class' rebelled against the power of the traditional Party; in China the

Maoists rose up against a Party structure in which they found their own power too circumscribed. Whereas in Russia the development of the 'new class' was compared to the 'thaw', in China Mao wanted to prevent the occurrence of such a 'thaw'. To this end he used the Red Guards, who threw China into turmoil. Yet despite this result of their intervention, its real purpose was to 'freeze' the social relations.

We have sought to analyse the social characteristics of Mao's opponents, but we hope it will be realised that every detail cannot be fitted into this analytical framework. Information leaking out of China concerning battles between Red Guards and workers for the control of several factories in Manchuria confirms no doubt that the 'Proletarian Cultural Revolution' was neither proletarian nor a revolution. But no one will assert, we hope, that the workers who fought Mao's Red Guards were managers or members of the 'new class'. One does not think of the managers either when one looks at the 1967 uprising against Mao Tse Tung in the capital city of Kiangsi province. The movement took the name 'The First of August Movement' in reference to the time, forty years earlier, when organisations were briefly formed in that part of China on the model of workers' councils, these had played a part in the conflict between the left and right wings of the Kuo Min Tang. Still more difficult to place is the Chinese head of state, Liu Shao Chi who, even within the Party, had always held an independent position. The Maoists of the 'cultural revolution' call him their enemy, but Liu himself takes care to distinguish himself from all other opponents of Mao. It is obvious that many different developments are occurring simultaneously in China. But although reality is more complex than any abstract schema, the exceptions do not contradict the rule. Whatever the forces may have been against which the Red Guards and the 'cultural revolution' were unleashed, the situation can only be understood by the appearance on the scene of the 'new class', with its own indisputable claims.

The 'new class' in China did not appear from nowhere. It was the product of the development of specific social relationships in that country, just as previously it had developed in Russia from similar social relations. This explains two facts: firstly the endurance and obstinacy of the struggle against Mao which is continually breaking out in new places; secondly the repeated calls to order made to the Red Guards for moderate action without too much violence. These phenomena are related to one another and are

both connected with the economy. Millions of Red Guards cannot be withdrawn from industry and education (i.e. from the preparation for future industrial knowledge, and therefore the preparation of the industry of the future) and be mobilised against the 'new class' without severely disorganising industrial development. As soon as the Red Guards are directed anew into production, industrial development is stimulated. Likewise the 'new class' is also stimulated.

From the preceding Theses one can conclude that the so-called 'cultural revolution' is not another step towards state capitalism as has been claimed. On the contrary: the struggle of the KTT is directed against the very requirements of state capitalism in full development. The Chinese 'cultural revolution' was a struggle by the Party to defend itself, a struggle against the 'new class' produced by state capitalism, a struggle against attempts to adapt the political apparatus to the reality of social conditions. It cannot be predicted what forces either the Party or the 'new class' will be able to mobilise. Even in China no one can prognosticate on this matter. But in the final analysis, this is not the issue. How many times the Party can still win is not fundamental. What is important is whether it will be the managers or the political bureaucrats who will wield power in the conditions of state capitalism. This can be predicted without the pressures and balances of the moment. In the social, historical and economic framework of state capitalism, the ultimate victory of the 'new class' is the only logical perspective .

Chinese Communist Party

Introduction

Political parties are an important component of modern-day politics. The existence of political party or parties is common to all forms of modern states—democratic, socialist, totalitarian etc. The nature of political parties and party system in a given country is determined by the historical, political, economic, social, and cultural conditions or experience of that country. In democratic states, we generally find two-party system (as in the USA or Britain) or multiparty party systems (as in India, Switzerland etc.), whereas, in socialist or totalitarian states (like the former Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Cuba etc.), the one-party system operates in which a single ruling party dominates the whole political spectrum.

In this context, China, officially the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a socialist state ruled by the Communist Party of China (CPC), also called the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Founded in 1921 with just fifty-nine members, the CPC today has nearly ninety million members and governs the most populous country in the world. Ever since the party seized power and established the PRC in 1949, it remains the sole ruling party that controls the country's government. The party is the ultimate source of political power in China which commands and controls the entire apparatus of the state, which includes the government, the media, the army and other leading political institutions in the country. In other words, the CPC has been the most influential political force leading the Chinese people and shaping its politics, economy and society. Therefore, to understand politics in China, we must first understand the CPC. This unit is designed to provide you with an overview of the communist party's role in the Chinese political system. The unit will explore the organizational structure, power, functions, and activities of the CPC in China's political system.

Understanding the Chinese Political System

China's political system has several distinctive features which are rarely known and often puzzled many outsiders. While dealing with China there has often been a gap between rhetoric and reality—between what we know or perceive and what is real; between what is officially claimed and what is actual; between how the story is told and things that occurred. Therefore, we should not merely look into what is perceived or appears to be, but carefully observe the actual structures, functions, processes and institutional mechanisms of the Chinese political system.

Article 1 of the Constitution of the PRC defines the country as a "socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants". This Article also stipulates that the socialist system is "the basic system of China and any disruption to the system by any group or individual is prohibited. Such provisions can be traced to the Leninist principle of the state which proclaims „the dictatorship of the proletariat" as the most appropriate form of state power in which people are the masters of the state and the society. In this regard, CPC claims that it alone can represent the best interest of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation as a whole. The party is endorsed by the country's constitution itself. The preamble of the

PRC constitution states that the country is under the “leadership of the Communist Party of China”

While China shares several features in common with other socialist states, it is distinct from traditional socialist states like the USSR. Unlike the established Soviet model of the single-party system, China adopted a unique party system permitting eight „minor“ parties, sometimes referred to as „democratic parties“, to operate in the system along with the CPC. These minor parties came into being and had existed before the formation of the PRC in 1949, and each of these represents a particular section of the Chinese society, such as academics, scientists, artists, writers, professionals, minority groups etc. They are permitted to exist on the condition that they swear their allegiance to the „leadership role“ of the CPC. The constitution of the PRC described this arrangement as „multiparty cooperation and political consultation“ led by the CPC. However, China’s party system cannot be called as a multiparty system because the CPC has an absolute monopoly of power over the system. The eight minor parties can neither question nor challenge the leadership of the CPC through election or any other means. Their role is practically meaningless, restricted to submitting motions, queries, proffering ideas or giving suggestions to the CPC mostly on nonpolitical matters through a consultative institution called Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). But it does not oblige the CPC to act upon it. Moreover, the CPC neither allows the formation of new parties nor is willing to broaden the power and functions of the existing eight democratic parties. When a political party called the Democracy Party of China (DPC) was formed by former activists of the Tiananmen movement in 1998, the CPC quickly suppressed it and arrested or exiled most of its leaders. The CPC is also very cautious in preventing the CPPCC from becoming a forum for dissent or a platform for political mobilization against the CPC. Thus, if we compare China’s political system with other political systems it is a fairly centralized system dominated by the CPC.

In China’s politics, although the party (CPC) and the state (PRC) are organizationally and functionally separate entities, the two are intertwined under the communist system of „party-state“ in which party always exercises its monopoly of political power and control over the government (the state). To maintain the party’s supremacy, its top-ranking leaderships simultaneously hold executive and decision-

making positions of the state (government) machinery and institutions. For instance, though, the president of the PRC (who is the head of the state) is formally elected by the National People's Congress (NPC), in reality, its choice is limited to only one candidate who is usually the head of the party, i.e., the General Secretary of the CPC. Similarly, the Premier (informally referred to as Prime Minister), his vice-premiers and other members of the State Council are formally approved by the NPC (See box item), in practice, their candidacy is chosen and approved within the communist party and most of them have always been members of the Party's powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Therefore, since the key officials of the government are chosen by the CPC, it is the CPC that decides policies while the government acts as an administrative agency, which executes and implements those policies.

As a party which holds the leading position, CPC seeks to establish „socialist democracy“ or „consultative democracy“ in China. It should however be noted that 'the CPC's understanding of the term 'democracy' is quite different from its widely accepted definition. The CPC claims that China's socialist democracy is the superior form of democracy as it is based on the unchallengeable role of the CPC, chosen by the Chinese people and born out of China's culture and tradition. Moreover, it proclaims that the socialist system is the system which suits China's reality and effective in guiding the country in building China into a strong and modern society

Historical Background: the Birth of the CPC

The emergence of the communist party has had a profound impact on the development of modern Chinese society. In the early 19th century, the last imperial dynasty of China, the Qing dynasty (also known as Manchu dynasty) faced several challenges to its rule, including foreign incursions in its territories. After the Opium War of 1840, China was compelled to open its ports to foreign powers for trade. It had to sign a series of 'unequal treaties' with almost all western imperial powers. Britain, U.S., France, Russia, Japan, etc. secured economic and territorial privileges and establish their spheres of influence in different parts of China. Economically, China was plundered by foreign powers and reduced into a 'semi-colonial' and 'semi-feudal' society.

The failure of the Qing dynasty to protect China from foreign incursions and the national humiliation meted out of it persuaded a group of revolutionary intellectuals to

unite a political force against the monarch (Qing) and external enemies. In 1905, the intellectual movement brought into existence the „Chinese Revolutionary Alliance“ (Tongmenghui), a revolutionary group led by Sun YatSen. This group led several uprisings against the autocratic Qing rule and finally in 1911, it succeeded in overthrowing the two-thousand years old dynasty and established the Republic of China (ROC). The Revolutionary Alliance was transformed into a political party called the Kuomintang (KMT, sometimes spelt as Guomindang) often translated as the Nationalist Party of China. China was set to evolve into a liberal democracy on the pattern of western democracies. However, the new republican government was unable to consolidate its power, resulting in the rise of feudal warlords of various kinds

In these circumstances, in May 1919 a mass uprising known as May Fourth Movement broke out in Beijing against the republican government's weak response to foreign interventions. It was an unprecedented movement in which people from all walks of life took part. Around that time, a small group of intellectuals, inspired by the success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, set up communist groups across the country to propagate revolutionary ideas and organize worker's movement among the masses. In July 1921, these communist groups came together at the First National Congress held in Shanghai and announced the formation of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Communist Party of China, as we shall see, soon emerged as a significant political force

In 1923, under the instruction of the Communist International (Comintern), CPC allied with the KMT and formed the „United Front“ in which CPC members joined the KMT as individuals while retaining their CPC membership. The alliance was held together by their common enemy: imperialism and feudal warlordism. The United Front, however, did not last long. Following the death of Sun Yat-Sen in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek, a staunch anti-communist, assumed the leadership of KMT. Soon after, KMT turned hostile towards communism. In 1927, Chiang launched large-scale military campaigns to expand KMT's influence and suppress communist strongholds. During this civil war between KMT and the communists, the latter were forced to abandon their revolutionary activities among China's urban proletariat and relocate their bases in the countryside. Here the communists established close links with the peasants. It was during this time that Mao Zedong propounded the idea of the peasantry as the leading social

force for revolution in China. By recruiting peasants in the party, Mao soon emerged as the leading political figure among the communists. In May 1928, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, better known as the „Red Army“ was formed to combat the advancing KMT forces. But in October 1934, KMT's „extermination“ offensive against the Red Army's main base in Jiangxi, forced some ninety thousand soldiers of the Red Army to retreat towards the north. After marching a little over a year, covering nearly ten-thousand kilometres across some of the most remote parts of China, the Red Army founded a new base at Yan'an in Shaanxi province in Northern China. This escape from Jiangxi and founding of a new base in Yan'an is one of the most significant episodes in the history of the CPC and is celebrated as the „Long March“.

In 1937, to resist the territorial expansion of the Japanese (that had begun with the capture of Manchuria in 1931) CPC made an uneasy alliance with the nationalist KMT. This resistance to Japanese expansion extended into World War II. During the war-time period, the communists led by Mao regained their strength by successfully mobilizing the peasants, whereas, the Nationalist became unpopular and isolated because of widespread corruption and mismanagement in KMT. After the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II in 1945, a full-scale civil war ensued between the two hostile forces— CPC and the KMT. The communists led by Mao Zedong defeated the nationalist KMT and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. Since then, the CPC has remained the sole party ruling the PRC.

Nature and Characteristics of the CPC

The fundamental task of every communist party in the world is to make sure that the party retains its firm hold on power because they believe that political monopoly is the essence of the socialist system. As the sole governing party in China, CPC exercises its power by consolidating its control through a variety of coercive means such as censoring the press, jailing dissidents, suppressing the civil societies, imposing regressive laws, and at times, using brute force to silence the opponents. As a party formed on the basis of Leninist principle of „vanguard“ party, CPC also controls the military, the judiciary and other administrative apparatus of the state by appointing party leaders in key positions of governance. For example, Party leaders also simultaneously hold leading positions as premier, ministers, state presidents, generals and officers in the military,

police, etc. The CPC believes that it alone can „represent“ and „lead“ the interest of the Chinese people and the nation as a whole.

The Communist Party of China's basic organizational principle is also based on the Leninist principle of „democratic centralism“. Democratic centralism as defined in the Party constitution is a „combination of centralism built on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance“. The core idea of democratic centralism is that the Party should encourage „open“ and „democratic“ debate and discussion among its members and party organs while taking a decision; but once a decision is taken by the party leadership, all members of the Party and party organisations have to abide by the decision. Under this principle, individual members are subordinate to the organisations, the lower organisations are subordinate to the higher organisations and all the constituent organisations and members of the party must follow the command and leadership of the party authority. The interests of the Party stand above the interests of the individuals or citizens. The people are often told that obedience to the authority is a moral, sacred, or patriotic duty of the citizens, whereas, repression is justified in the name of the system's stability.

Guiding Ideologies and Principles of the CPC

One of the defining characteristics of communist parties around the world is their allegiance to Marxism-Leninism as the guiding ideology. The CPC is no exception; the party officially proclaims Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology and also affirms its commitment towards establishing a society based on socialism. Since the formation of the party in 1921, Marxism-Leninism has been the primary inspiration and guiding force. While Marxism provided the broad theoretical framework of the 1949 revolution, Leninism offered the practical techniques of revolution to seize state power. However, there have been remarkable changes in Chinese thinking and approach towards Marxism-Leninism. Over time, many significant ideas and thoughts have been incorporated to the Party's guiding ideology, to adapt to the changing situation and also help in retaining its rule in China. This ideological adaptation produced a unique variant of socialism, known as „socialism with Chinese characteristics“.

Another significant ideological foundation of CPC is the 'Mao Zedong Thought'. Mao's thought was described by the CPC as a „doctrine created by the integration of

Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution". It is essentially the 'signification' or adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the prevailing agrarian conditions of Chinese society. Besides, during the revolutionary movement, Mao adapted party-building concepts developed by Lenin. These include concepts like „vanguard party of the working class“, „democratic centralism“ or the „party-state“. Acknowledging Mao's contributions, his ideas known as „Mao Zedong Thought“ along with Marxism-Leninism were formally proclaimed as CPC's guiding ideology when the party adopted its first constitution at the 7 th Party Congress in 1945. Although Mao made significant contributions to the party, two of his utopian initiatives, namely the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) ended in terrible catastrophes. Although these developments have sharply reduced Mao's stature as a national leader, his ideas continue to guide the party and the nation. The CPC has recently described 'Mao Zedong Thought' as the 'spiritual assets of the party'.

Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) rose to power and became the de facto leader of China. Although Deng never held a position as head of the state/government or the CPC, he exercised supreme authority in China in the post-Mao era. In 1978, he initiated the historic „Reform and Opening-up“ policy which brought a far-reaching transformation in China.

Deng started the „Four Modernization“ programme in areas of agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology with the goal of „rejuvenating“ the Chinese economy. He also initiated a parallel set of principles for political reform called the „Four Cardinal Principles“ that became the ideological and political guide for both the party and the state. The four principles called for upholding (i) the road to socialism (ii) the people's democratic dictatorship (iii) the leadership of the CPC (iv) Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Deng's initiatives and programmes became a turning point resulting in a far-reaching transformation in China's political, economic and social development which earned him the reputation as the „Architect of Modern China“. Under him, often called the era of „reform and opening-up“, China's centrally planned economy was shifted to socialist market economy, resulting in unprecedented economic growth. His policies also brought greater integration of the Chinese economy with the global economy. Thus, Deng Xiaoping's era brought a new brand of socialist thinking

formed by forging the orthodox Marxism-Leninism doctrine with China's pragmatic condition, which is known as „socialism with Chinese characteristics“. After he died in 1997, his ideas collectively known as 'Deng Xiaoping Theory' were added into the CPC's Constitution, along with Marxism Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, as the Party's guiding ideology.

In February 2000, the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin (1993-2003), introduced another ideological innovation called „Three Represents“. It stipulates that CPC must always represent; (i) China's advanced productive forces, (ii) China's advanced culture, and (iii) interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. Jiang's ideological contribution of the 'Three Represents' was enshrined in the PRC's constitution in 2003. In 2012, the Eighteenth CPC Congress incorporated yet another guiding ideology called the 'Scientific Outlook on Development' (also known as Scientific Development Concept) conceived by Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao advocated that the CPC's role as the core leadership is critical for building a 'harmonious socialist society', a society free from social and economic inequality.

In its latest adaption of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese context, CPC at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 adopted President Xi Jiping's thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristic for a New Era" as the Party's guide to its action. Xi also conceived another vision called the „China Dream“ to „rejuvenate the Chinese nation“ and make China a great power. To realize the Chinese dream, Xi Jinxing called the Party as well as the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to uphold the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, have a firm conviction in its path, theory, system, and culture, and implement the Party's basic line, basic theory and basic policy. Thus, a strong element of nationalism was injected into the ideology of China's party-state.

Though communist ideology is much less significant in China today than it was earlier, it continues to provide the basic framework for the party. The party constitution proclaims that the „highest ideal and ultimate goal“ of the party is the „realization of communism“. However, it should be noted that to maintain its relevance and legitimacy, CPC not only restructured the orthodox Marxism Leninism but also developed new doctrines. CPC shows no signs of abandoning Marxism-Leninism but rather committed to using it more pragmatically.

Organisational Structure of the Communist Party of China

The CPC is a highly integrated party characterised by centralized power, hierarchy and subordination. In line with this, CPC has several organs spread across three broad levels—central, local, and primary organisations. The role and functions of these organs are all distinct yet mutually interconnected following the principle of „collective leadership“ and „individual responsibility“

The Party Congress

According to the CPC Constitution, the "highest leading bodies" of the party are the National Party Congress and the Central Committee. The National Party Congress, also called the National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC) is the most important political convention in the Chinese political calendar, held once-every-five-years (It is not to be confused with the National People's Congress (NPC) which is an annual legislative congress of the PRC). During this gathering, approximately 2300 delegates representing all levels of Party hierarchy across China review the activities of the Party since the previous Congress and also lay down guidelines and policies for the coming five years. The first session of the Party Congress elects a new Central Committee which then elects members of other Party organs.

Central Committee

The Central Committee of the CPC primarily consists of 370 members who are elected for a five-year term by the NCCPC from across the country. It meets annually for about two weeks and is charged with carrying out the business of the NCCPC when it is not in session. The Central Committee conducts its sessions, usually known as „plenums“ or „plenary sessions“ which acts as a forum for discussion and ratification of major policies of the party. It is vested with the power to elect the members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Central Military Commission, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as well as endorses the composition of the Secretariat.

The Political Bureau

The Political Bureau of the CPC, in short, the Politburo, is a group of 25 seniormost leaders of the Party. It exercises the powers and functions of the Central Committee when a plenum is not in session. Though nominally elected by members of the Central Committee, in practice, Politburo members are selected through backroom

negotiations by its seven-member Standing Committee. Most Politburo members occupy leadership positions in the government and other state machineries in various levels.

The Politburo Standing Committee

In the Politburo, power is centralized in a sub-group called 'the Politburo Standing Committee' (PSC), currently comprised of seven members who are the most powerful personalities in the echelon of leadership in the CPC. The seven PSC members are elected by the plenary session of the Central Committee and each member of the PSC has a rank, responsible for a specific portfolio. Hence, PSC is the most authoritative policy and decision-making body in the CPC and in the country as a whole.

General Secretary

The General Secretary is the formal title of the head of the CPC. Since the abolition of the post of Chairman of CPC in 1982, the General Secretary is the highest-ranking official of both the party and the state. According to the party constitution, the General Secretary is elected from members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) by the Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee. Besides presiding over the functioning of the Secretariat, the General Secretary also heads other party organs such as the Central Committee, Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. Therefore, the General Secretary of the CPC is the paramount leader in the Chinese political hierarchy.

Secretariat

The Secretariat which consists of seven members is an important organ of the Party which is responsible for coordinating the routine business and administrative affairs of the Party. Secretariat members meet daily and supervise the functioning of other organs of the Party. Members of the Secretariat are nominated by the PBSC and are subject to approval by the Central Committee in the plenary session. The Secretariat is also responsible for executing the decisions made by the Politburo and its Standing Committee.

The Central Military Commission

The Central Military Commission (CMC) is the key organisation in charge of the armed forces of the PRC. Technically, there are two parallel military commissions, one within the Party apparatus (CMC of the CPC), and another controlled by the state (CMC of the PPC). The Party CMC is supervised by the Central Committee of the CPC,

whereas, the State CMC is directed by the National People's Congress (NPC). These two commissions exercise the command and control of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) which is the combined armed forces of both the Party and the state. Although, the State CMC is nominally considered the supreme military decision-making body, the actual command and control resides with the Party CMC. Currently, it consists of twelve members, headed by the party General Secretary, who acts as the commander-in-chief of the PLA.

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), comprises of 130 members is an internal control body of the CPC, originally designed to enforce rules and regulations and safeguard morale and discipline of the Party. It also acts an anti-corruption watchdog of the party responsible for monitoring and punishing party cadres who committed abuses of power, corruption and other wrongdoings. At the lower-level party organs in the hierarchy, including provincial, municipal, county levels, there are identical discipline inspection commissions that report directly to the commission one level above them.

Local Level Party Organisations

Apart from the central organs mentioned above, CPC also has several local organisations comprising local Party congresses and local Party committees at the level of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the control of the central government; cities divided into districts, autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous county; and cities not divided into districts and municipal districts. The local committees also conduct local party congresses at their level once every five years or earlier. They are convened by their corresponding level committee. The functions and power of local party congresses are in many ways similar to the National Congress at the central level. They examine the reports of the local Party committee at the corresponding level; examine the reports of the local CCDI; discuss and adopt resolutions on major local issues; and elect the members of the local party committees and local CCDI. The local Party committees conduct at least two plenary sessions a year and carry out the directives of the higher-level Party organisations and the resolutions of their Party congresses at the corresponding levels.

Primary Organisations of the Party

At the base of the Party structure are the primary party organisations which are formed in villages, factories, enterprises, schools, colleges, research institutes, communities, social organisations, military units, or any other basic units where there are at least three full Party members. These primary organisations are essential components of CPC's party building, the foundation of all its work, activities and exercise of power at the grass-root level. Primary organisations disseminate the Party's ideologies, policies and principles and carry out the resolutions and directions of the higher party organisations, and maintain constant and close ties with the masses. Thus, Primary organisations are the foundation of the Party which functions at the grass-root level to expand the party's influence throughout the country.

The Chinese Communist Party: Issues and Challenges

At present, CPC is confronting a variety of issues and challenges from both within and outside the party. This is quite natural given the highly centralized and complex nature of the party. The often-encountered criticism facing the party largely arises from the lack of transparency in governance and decision-making process. Perhaps no party is more secretive as to its inner processes than the CPC. China's politics remain far more secretive, decided by a handful of top party leaders with no public scrutiny and accountability. For instance, the succession and or selection of party leaders such as members of the Central Committee, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the CMC, the CCDI etc. are decided by the top leadership in the party hierarchy. Very little information is available in the public domain how selections are made. On the other hand, the absence of independent press and the organised opposition party in the political system lends credence to the perception that the party is not supportive of freedom of expression and political reform. When confronted with choices between greater control and more openness, CPC always opted for the former. In such a politically restricted environment, CPC has been under intense criticisms from both within and outside the country.

Another hotly debated topic among the observers of contemporary China is related to the prospects of the CPC. Many China observers in the West have questioned the viability of China's political system. Some of them have even predicted the imminent

collapse of China. China scholars like David Shambaugh, Gordon Chang, etc. argue that CPC's rule in China is „historically anachronistic“ and suffers from a deepening governance and legitimacy crisis. On the other hand, forceful suppressive measures taken by CPC such as in the Tiananmen massacre where hundreds of pro-democracy citizens were killed also undermined the Communist Party's legitimacy and severely eroded its global reputation. Coinciding with this, the growing awareness of civil and political rights among the Chinese citizens and their growing expectations for wider political reforms has brought profound challenge to the party. There is a growing demand for political democratization, including multi-party election, internal democracy, ensuring transparency, protection of civil rights and liberties and so on thereby making the party more accountable. At the same time, development in new technologies, especially the internet, has empowered the Chinese citizens in tremendous ways, making it increasingly difficult for the CPC to control the public opinion. Considering this, CPC has taken certain reform initiatives in the economic sphere since the Deng Xiaoping era. However, the party has been reluctant in introducing political reforms. Top leadership in the CPC, from the time of Mao, has constantly rejected the multi-party system of election unsuitable to China's society and tradition.

Tiananmen movement was one of the most significant protest movements in the history of the PRC. It started in April 1989 with university students gathering in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to commemorate the death of former party leader and political reformer Hu Yaobang. The gathering soon transformed into a protest camp against the communist regime, demanding for democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of press etc. But, on 4 th June, the communist party sent in PLA troops and crushed the movement killing hundreds of civilian protestors. The event is known as the „Tiananmen Massacre“ incident.

Corruption is perhaps the biggest challenge facing the party in recent times. Corruption is today so blatant and widespread in China that it affects the lives of most people in the society. It not only eroded the reputation of the party but also decreases its governing capacity. Acknowledging this, Jiang Zemin has said, the fight against misconduct and corruption is a „grave political struggle vital for the existence of the party and the state“. Most scholars in the West argued that China's problem of corruption has

its structural causes, i.e., the autocratic nature of the political system is responsible for it. Meanwhile, the rapid economic growth in China since the 1980s also brought serious problems such as unemployment, income disparity etc. The widening gap between the rich and the poor, the drift between urban and rural, and other frustrations breed social unrest in many parts of China. As a result, a growing number of popular resistance and protest has become visible across China, sometimes violently in recent years. All these conditions in Chinese society illustrate a larger challenge facing the CPC today. Though CPC used several methods to forestall any major violence out of these uprising, how long the party would be able to maintain its stability and legitimacy is a question many ask.

Reforms

The history of post-liberation China has been a history of oscillations between two extreme policies. Throughout its existence since 1949 the two major goals of the Chinese Communists have remained egalitarianism and economic modernization. These goals have remained opposed to each other. As a result, when emphasis was given to one, the realisation of the other suffered. The priority of the Chinese Communist Party has constantly shifted from the social revolution to economic development. The goal of achieving the two at the same time has so far been elusive. Post-Mao reforms came after a period of revolutionary politics of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution when class struggle; egalitarianism and political commitment were given priority. From this period of revolutionary politics, the pendulum again swung to emphasis on gradual social change on the basis of fast economic development. The reforms in the political and economic field have been introduced with this end in view.

Historical Review 1949-78

To understand the post-Mao reforms in correct perspective it is necessary to understand the direction in which economic and political changes have taken place in China since 1949. The period from 1949 to 1992 can thus be divided into the following broad phases: 1) 1949-1952; 2) 1953-1957; 3) 1958-1960; 4) 1961-1965; 5) 1966-1976; 6) 1976- to the present.

- 1) 1949-1952: is the period just after liberation when China was economically backward. Almost 90% of the population lived in rural areas. Inflation was astronomical. Small scale agriculture, obsolete production techniques and

methods were the rule in rural areas. Modern manufacturing industry was extremely limited.

In this period the Chinese Communist Party applied the theory of New Democratic politics. It did not yet attempt to build socialism, but rather a society of transitional nature in which common aspirations of the four revolutionary classes--industrial proletariat, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, could be realised. Economic reconstruction was given great importance during this time. The main aim was to get the basic machinery of economy and administration running, and initiating certain socially progressive measures like the agrarian reform whereby rural lands and goods of landlords were taken up without indemnity and forced labour and feudal services were abolished.

- 2) 1953-57 was the period when China clearly modelled itself on Soviet Union both economically as well as politically. In principle the first Five Year Plan favoured heavy industry, emphasis was placed on technical specialization, institutional structures and making education available for a large number of people. The political system was based on hierarchies of party and state. The country was run by the party in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism. China's economy made spectacular but uneven progress during this period. The agricultural sector suffered as against industry. In 1955 agricultural cooperatives were established, replacing the powerful rule of the centre. This was the beginning of the radical change that prepared the way for the Great Leap Forward in 1958.
- 3) Great Leap Forward (1958-60) was an alternative to the development strategy imported from the Soviet Union, based on the premise that China possessed a large population which was politically and socially conscious and hardworking. With their concerted efforts the problem of limited capital would be overcome and it would be able to bring about a transformation of the whole country in a short period of time. This had to be done by "walking on two legs", i.e., industry was to retain priority but agriculture had to become the basis for, progress. Theoretically it was not unreasonable but it attempted to transform China at a very fast pace. The movement lasted for two years after which its catastrophic results seemed evident.

Along with the Great Leap in the economy the Commune system was extended all over China in 1958. Power was decentralised making local units important. The people's commune was made the basic unit of the socialist social structure.

- 4) 1961-1965: The aggravation of the economic situation in early 1961 made it clear that the economic policy pursued in the years of Great Leap should be readjusted. Along with the revision of economic goals the system of people's communes was also reorganised and a period of consolidation followed. However, during the period between 1961-1965 there was constant political struggle over the kind of policies that ought to be followed.
- 5) 1966-1976: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which began in May 1966 aimed at changing the ideas, values and habits of mind that were a part of China's tradition and creating a new socialist culture. In the political field, the Red Guards (revolutionary youth) and revolutionary rebels under the guidance of the new Cultural Revolutionary Group destroyed the party and government apparatus. Revolutionary Committees were set up instead. These Revolutionary Committees were small groups consisting of representatives from new revolutionary mass organisations, the PLA and revolutionary cadres. Political consciousness was given more importance than any kind of expertise in a particular field. However, the extreme leftists policies of putting politics in command and humiliating and abusing people in senior positions, particularly intellectuals led to total chaos. In economic terms, although agriculture suffered only marginally, production in several industries fell significantly. There was similar significant decline in foreign trade. This was mainly due to political disruption and the policy of isolation practiced by China. The increase in the productivity was further undermined by the security of job and livelihood available to all workers. On the other hand, there was no scope for encouraging entrepreneurship, as one had to produce as prescribed by the state. Thus during the Cultural Revolution while communication had provided for certain basic necessities for most of the people, the centralised command economy led to accumulation of heavy machinery and capital, consumption was kept to a bare minimum and living standards remained stagnant or even declined. This kind of ossified economy did not serve the requirements of the new and developing forces

of production. The need was now felt for the growth of consumer industry and accelerated economic growth. The situation was therefore, ripe for Deng Xiaoping to swing the pendulum in favour of reformed politics and economic liberation.

- 6) Looking back at the period between 1949-1976, one is struck by the fact that the Communist Party has repeatedly been experimenting with establishing a more egalitarian society on the one hand and economic modernisation on the other hand. The aim has always been to achieve both the goals together, but emphasis has always alternated from the one, to the other. Great strides had been made in both the directions but in general in the periods in which radical social policies have been emphasized, there has been chaos in the country. Undoubtedly people have attained a high degree of social consciousness and there has been institutionalization of collective action and interest in different forms.

Economic Reforms

The new leadership made economic development and the Four Modernisation as its chief goals. In 1978, a new ten-year plan, was announced. It was designed to hasten the development of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology. Emphasis was laid on pragmatism, harmony and order, in contrast to conflict and ideology in the previous ten years. From 1980 on, this new leadership repudiated both the Maoist model that emphasized collectivism and egalitarianism and the Soviet model that considered centralised state planning and state administration of economy for providing the framework for a socialist economic infrastructure.

As the new leadership's declared target was to make China a "modem" socialist state by the year 2000 by quadrupling her 1980 gross industrial and agricultural output value, a number of wide ranging steps were taken to correct the old policies that were considered a handicap to the achievement of this goal. The new economic policy was to be guided by a four word directive. These were "readjustment, reformation, consolidation, improvement". This meant adjustment of the basic national economy that had been upset in the wake of the "extreme leftist" policies pursued during the Cultural Revolution "reformation" of the existing over-centralised, rigid, bureaucratic system of economic management; "consolidation" of enterprise management and "improvement" of production standards, technology, economy, and management of existing enterprises.

These principles were formulated at the working conference of the Central Committee of the CCP in April 1979.

It was according to the principles laid therein that reform of the Chinese economic system began to take shape in both rural as well as urban areas.

Rural Reforms

One of the major changes in the agricultural sector was in management of rural production. It was realised that though working together for common benefit solved the problems of limited investment, it did not have much incentive for those with greater entrepreneurial ability and were hard workers. Material incentives. Were therefore restored to the peasantry.

Production responsibility system: The first step in this direction was a gradual return to family farming through the contractual production responsibility system or the household contract system. The concrete measures the Fourth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party passed were the "Decisions on a Number of Questions Relating to the Speeding up of Agricultural Development". Under the system, the state planners first advised each production team on planning the production of an area in general. The production team then entered into a contract with the state'on the amount to be supplied by it as its quota. It would then enter into contract with various households or groups. These contracts stipulated exactly what commitments under what conditions the contracting parties took upon themselves and in what proportion they shared in the output or income. The team then allotted land, drought animals and small and medium sized farm implements to the households. Beyond the commitments laid down in the contract, the peasants were free to take decisions regarding time spent on production and the order in which work was performed. The greatest incentive that was offered was that they were free to dispose of the total volume of output above the quantity to be sold to the team under the contract. They could consume it, feed it to their animals or sell it in the free market. They could even sell it to the state procurement agencies, in which case they received a premium much exceeding the official procurement prices.

This system was at first introduced in certain problem regions where it was difficult to do fanning, but the concessions offered in this system produced an almost

irresistible demand from the farmers for the general extension of such contracts throughout the country. Though there was a lot of opposition from the ranks of cadres to this system, it seems to have delivered the goods as the production from rural areas registered substantial increase.

Break up of communes: As a result of this system, the responsibility of the production team increased and the role of the commune declined. By 1983-84, the rural communes were completely dismantled. First, they were divested of their administrative functions which were taken over by the revived township government. Its economic responsibilities took names like the industrial agricultural metrical. Though the post - Mao leadership severely criticized the communes, yet the communes had undoubtedly made a great contribution to the development of Chinese socialism. They had helped construct large scale water conservancy projects, transform land and develop rural industries.

Diversification of agricultural production: Along with reforms in the system of management of agriculture, reforms were also carried out in the agricultural structure by changing the grain cultivation monoculture to diversified agriculture-cultivation of vegetables and other crops, forestry, animal husbandry, fishing and other side line occupation. These products could be sold to free markets locally. This greatly helped farmers to raise their incomes.

Rise in production: Under the impact of these reform measures the development of rural economy considerably accelerated in 1983 and 1984, so much so that the output of agriculture and the rural sideline activities achieved record results in almost every field. The total value of agricultural output increased by 9.6% in 1983 and by 17.6% in 1984. In 1984, crop production increased by 9.9% animal husbandry by 13.4%, the value of sideline activities by 47.9% in a single year. In 1984, for the first time in the history of China, the annual output of grain exceeded 400 million tons, that of cotton 6 million tons, i.e. the grain production was higher by more than 100 million tons, cotton by more than 4 million tons, than 6 years earlier in 1978. The average per capita rural income increased tremendously.

Rural towns and township enterprises: With increased purchasing power many peasants built better homes and bought themselves luxury articles such as cassette

recorders, television sets and refrigerators. This in turn led to the growth of rural towns which absorbed surplus rural labour and led to the growth of light and service industries in the countryside. Now these township enterprises are hailed as important pillar of Chinese economy and a major source of farmer prosperity. Since 1978, China's township enterprises have recruited some 6.7 million 'rural labourers annually and in 1990 these enterprises had a staff of 92 million employees, greatly easing the pressure created by surplus labour force.

Technological reforms: Agricultural production reached a climax in 1984 and suffered a setback in the years that followed. However, it has again reached an all-time peak. This has largely been due to improvement in agricultural technology. Unlike the Cultural Revolution period, mechanisation of agriculture is no longer ! considered a negative point in this overpopulated country, though the leadership has not disregarded the need for labour-intensive production, mechanisation of agriculture is being promoted and it is believed that greater production would benefit all. Agricultural research is encouraged and attempts made to popularise modern means of production, better quality of seeds and fertilisers.

Urban and Other Economic Reforms

I Compared with the success in the country side, reforms in the urban industrial and commercial sectors were slow to take hold.

Breaking up of the iron rice bowl: The most important step was giving up of extreme socialistic egalitarian thinking, popularly expressed in the phrases "everybody, eating out of one big pot" and the "iron rice bowl". Under the old system the state guaranteed the salaries of an economic unit regardless of the quality of its I produce or the fact that it was running at a loss. The workers and management therefore, did not feel any sense of responsibility, all were assured a part of the "big pot" and the workers could neither be fired for poor work or their salaries reduced for low performance, therefore their Lice' bowls" (jobs) were said to be made of "iron". This system has been gradually reformed to encourage the workers producing more. They are given incentives. Wage laws have been reformed now to the extent that workers not producing results can also be thrown out. The pay package has also increased to a great extent.

Management Inpomibility system: To raise industrial production, first of all attempts were made at improving management conditions of state enterprises, by increasing enterprise autonomy and making the economic units responsible for their profits and losses. The state withdrew from direct involvement with the affairs of economic units. The units had to manage their own finances, no loans were to be underwritten by the state, they had to deal with the banks directly and suffer .the consequences of bad management. At the same time, state gave up its claim over the profits of any economic unit, it only laid claim to the taxes. This left the units with the profits which they could use to increase the galaries of efficient workers and management and upgrade their machinery and technology.

State planning combined with market regulation: Along with greater autonomy to enterprises, market mech. anises or market forces were allowed to regulate the quality of goods, their prices and distribution to a greater extent. State planning has not been given up totally but it coexists with the market economy.

It was clearly stated by the government that the "socialist planned economy is a planned economy based on public ownership, in which the law of value must be consciously followed and applied. The full development of a commodity economy is an indispensable stage in the economic growth of society and a prerequisite for our economic modernization."

Price reforms: The necessity of price reforms was also evident to the reformers and so an effort was made to rationalize the price system. From 1954 to 1984 prices had been kept stable through government economic control agencies. Market regulation of prices was negligible. From 1979 the procurement prices of agricultural products were raised. At the same time, with the spread of contractual responsibility system, the free market trade of agricultural produce also expanded, therefore prices were affected by the demand and supply of goods. In 1985 therefore, dual pricing was introduced to help in the process of transition from the old economic system to the new one. This dual pricing was- to cushion the shock of such a great change in the pricing system, and also to avoid an even greater inflation. State subsidies for grains and essential goods are now gradually being removed, giving greater weight age to market regulation.

Emphasis on light industry: The imbalance in the economy with its stress on heavy industry was also sought to be removed. A conscious attempt was made to slow down the expansion of heavy industry, 'an emphasis laid on the development ' of agriculture and light industry. The overall growth rate was quite impressive. In the five years from 1979-1984 light industry grew at a progressive annual rate of over 11% and heavy industry over 5%.

Private enterprises: Reforms were also introduced in the service industries sector-individually owned private enterprises were encouraged in this field. These enterprises were initially only on a small scale, dealing with repair work, restaurants, tailoring, small retail outlets, transport and the like. These brought new life to the local economic scene. These private enterprises are now growing in scale. This freedom for private enterprises has helped to increase the incomes of urban households. Urban salaries were also improved. All this has led to growth in consumption. Greater emphasis on development of light industry has also led to a sharp increase in the quantity and quality of consumer goods available.

Foreign trade: The most spectacular reform in the economic field was the "opening of the door" to foreign trade, technology and investment. This was in sharp contrast to the earlier policy of self sufficiency, which lasted until 1970 when a cautious move to rejoin the world began. However, before 1979, all Chinese foreign trade was centrally controlled. and planned. Imports were allowed only to the level of exports. Foreign trade was therefore, very limited. After 1979 foreign policy laws have been liberalized.

Foreign investment: Foreign investment has also grown tremendously especially so in joint ventures. In order to provide the best of conditions to the foreign enterprises, certain areas were earmarked for joint ventures. These were the four special economic zones-Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen (later also Hainan). Fourteen other cities were also marked out for special economic development. In these zones advantageous conditions were created for investment of foreign capital. At the same time, income-tax law of the PRC concerning joint ventures between Chinese and foreign firms were also laid down. The main aim of the joint ventures is to help import of technology which would help in faster rate of modernization of Chinese economy, strengthen the weak

points of Chinese economy, i.e. metallurgy, telecommunications, 'mining, transportation, oil exploration, and nuclear power stations. Recently, the Yangpu development zone of Hainan Island has been earmarked for leasing for upto 70 years to foreign countries.

Public face: Stock exchanges have been set up in Shanghai and Shenzhen and securities issued to the public to finance certain enterprises. The Economy has thus been reformed beyond recognition since 1978. Free markets have grown, foreign trade increased. Production in both agricultural and industrial field has grown. It is a growing, developing economy in which fruits of development are distributed unequally. Entrepreneurship is being encouraged and foreigners are repeatedly invited to invest more and more in high technology so that China becomes a modernised developed country.

Political Reforms Introduction:

The new leadership that came to control political power with Deng Xiaoping consisted mostly of people who had suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution. They wanted to not only overthrow those who had committed atrocities in the name of Cultural Revolution but also create an institutional framework wherein the political excesses of the kind experienced during the Cultural Revolution would not recur. At the same time, it was also realised that economic reform and modernisation were not possible without reforms of political nature. Reform of the existing ideology, 'party system and the administrative set up were to provide the basis on which economic reform would be carried on. It was in this situation that political reforms were affected.

Problems: Deng Xiaoping himself listed the main drawbacks of the established political system in his speech entitled "on the reform of the system of party and state leadership". The main problem that he saw as hindering the development of the great advantages of socialism were: "bureaucracy, over-concentration of power, patriarchal methods, life tenure, in leading posts and privileges of various kinds". The main forms in which these problems were manifested were "standing high above the masses, abusing power; divorcing oneself from reality and the masses sticking to a rigid way of thinking suppressing democracy, receiving superiors and subordinates, being arbitrary and despotic and so on."

Party reforms: As the Chinese Communist Party (is at the centre of the Chinese political system, any reform of the system was impossible without bringing about changes in the Party, in its leadership, its structure, its scope of authority and work style. The first major task was to re-establish the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party. This was done by making a reassessment of the work done by Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four. The Gang of Four was blamed for all the excesses during the Cultural Revolution. The assessment of the role of Mao Zedong was very difficult task, not only because of his following but also because it was difficult to denounce him without denouncing the Party and the Communist revolution in China. This problem was overcome by dividing Mao's life into his good early phase and a bad later phase. His outstanding role and service in the victory of Chinese revolution and in establishing foundations of socialism was acknowledged while his grave mistakes were condemned. Mao's life and contributions were assessed as 70% good and 30% bad. Mao Zedong Thought was also separated from Mao Zedong's deeds, indicating that while there were mistakes in what he did, his thought was still relevant and constituted the most important aspect of party ideology. Thus it was said "Mao Zedong thought is Marxism-Leninism applied and developed in China, it constitutes a correct theory, a body of correct principles and a summary of the experiences that have been confirmed in the practice of the Chinese revolution and is a crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party".

Resolution of differences with the party: The next step was to emphasise that differences within the Party which were to be resolved peacefully and not by humiliating and publicly parading those who held different opinions. Thus differences were to be resolved through discussions. The CCP Central Committee acknowledged that it has been partly responsible for the breakdown of collective leadership during the Cultural Revolution. As a result, changes were made in the party Leadership. As it was felt that Hua Guofeng also had close connections with Mao and the Gang of Four and secondly as he was not in favour of long ranging reforms, he was removed from his position as the Chairman of the Central Committee and of the Military Committee. Hu Yaobang was elected party Chairman and Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Military Committee. The composition of the standing committee of the Political Bureau and of the Presidium of the Central Committee also changed as a result of distribution of functions. As a result of

these events and personnel changes, a relatively unified ideological and political platform was created for the evolution of a policy of reform.

Party membership: To regain the confidence of the public, eligibility for party membership was redefined. More educated, competent and younger cadres were sought to be recruited. The system of life long tenure of party leaders and cadres was put to an end. In order to pacify those affected by this policy Deng Xiaoping proposed the induction of old cadres into advisory committees. Deng himself gave up the post of Vice-Premier and became the Chairman of the Military Commission (though in reality Deng continued to have complete control over everything). However, a number of senior members of the party were not willing to give up their posts. There was opposition to this policy at lower levels as well, where a . , compromise solution was found in retaining the older cadres but at the same time recruiting new ones for the same posts.

Party Discipline: Another remedial measure taken to ensure party discipline was the setting up of a Discipline Inspection Commission headed by Chen Yun. Under its supervision disciplinary Inspection Committees were set up at provincial and country levels to remove the errant members. Despite opposition to these measures as a result of efforts made during the five years from 1981-1985 more than a million senior CCP cadres were pensioned off. In September, 1985, 131 high ranking veterans resigned, though many of them retained their perquisites as members of a new Central Advisory Commission of the CCP.

Separation of functions of party and government: The over-concentration of power in the hands of party officials was sought to be contained by separation of the functions between the party and the Government. It was emphasized that the Party should guide and not interfere in carrying on the day-to-day administration.

Legal system: As the new leadership wanted institutionalization of reform policies, it called for the re-establishment of a formal legal system. This was not only to provide safety for the individual but was also necessary for dealing with foreigner's and for the independent handling of management functions. The Ministry of Justice which had been abolished in 1959 was reinstated in 1979. In the 1980s there was an enormous expansion of the legal system, to cover not only criminal matters, but also a wide variety of civil matters, such as commercial law, contract law and family law, especially divorce.

Peoples courts: were set up at 'different levels. At the same time People's Procuracies. were established. Professional lawyers were permitted at all the levels.

As all vestiges of legal independence had been withdrawn during the Cultural Revolution, this was a major change. It had led to the training of a large number of people as lawyers. A number of universities started law departments as a consequence. During the 1980s the general trend was that of recognising the principle that law should be independent of party or state and individual leaders have continued to use the legal system to promote the party's, the state's or their own political power. However, during the period following the Beijiag massacre at Tiananmen Square this trend seems to have been overtaken.

Revision of the constitution: In 1982, the constitution was revised, The major changes brought about by the introduction of the new constitution were the following:

- 1) The office of the President of the People's Republic of China was reintroduced in order to represent the country in domestic and foreign affairs.
- 2) A central Military Commission was set up to head the military of the country, thus technically bringing it out of the purview of the party.
- 3) Powers of the standing committee of the National People's Congress were enhanced making it the chief legislative body.
- 4) It was stipulated that all citizens were equal before the law and guaranteed freedom of person, personal dignity and privacy of correspondence.

Electoral law: Individual rights were thus given respect within the socialist framework. A greater degree of opening up within the political field was displayed by the introduction of electoral reforms. A new electoral law passed in May 1979 provided for a seemingly representative government. At the lowest level were Congresses in every commune (later every administrative township). Above these were 2756 country congresses elected directly for three years. Above these were congresses with five year terms in China's 29 provinces, autonomous regions and 3 municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin. At the top was the National People's Congress. Above the country level the deputies were elected indirectly from the people's congresses immediately below it. The party called this as democracy under the leadership of centralism. It was made clear that this did not mean setting up bourgeois parliamentary democracy. It has

been repeatedly emphasised that this socialist' democratic system in which election expenses are borne by the state is much better than the capitalist democracy where money plays a major role in the elections.

In the political field, an attempt has been made to decentralise power and set limits to the interference of the Communist Party in the day-to-day functioning of the government. The legal system and electoral laws have been democratised to some extent. However, it has been made clear that no reforms can disregard the four cardinal principles, namely, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, CCP leadership, people's democratic dictatorship and socialism.

Cultural Revolution

Aims of the Cultural Revolution

The primary goal of the Cultural Revolution was to remove what Mao identified as bourgeois influences and counter-revolutionary tendencies within the Chinese Communist Party and society as a whole. Mao aimed to ensure his supremacy within the party and revive revolutionary fervour to confront established power structures and dismantle the 'Four Olds'²: 'old ideas', 'old culture', 'old customs', and 'old habits'.

Mao mobilised young people, primarily students, to form Red Guard groups. These groups targeted intellectuals, party officials, and individuals associated with the pre-Communist era. They engaged in widespread purges, public humiliation, and destruction of cultural artifacts and symbols.

The movement soon descended into chaos, with different factions emerging and vying for power. Conflicts between Red Guard factions, the army, and other political groups became increasingly violent. As the situation spiralled out of control, Mao called upon the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to restore order.

This intervention led to the suppression of the Red Guards and the Lin Biao, a key military figure and Mao's designated successor, rose to prominence during this period. However, his ambitions clashed with Mao's, leading to his downfall in 1971. Mao's death in 1976 marked the end of the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution had a deep impact on Chinese society and politics.

Many high-ranking officials, intellectuals, and individuals associated with the pre-Communist era were purged. There was disruption of governance and significant loss of

life. The Cultural Revolution also resulted in economic turmoil and stagnation as the focus shifted from economic development to political struggle. Social structures were disrupted, families were torn apart, and traditional values were suppressed. Numerous historical and cultural artifacts, including ancient temples, books, and artworks, were destroyed. The Cultural Revolution remains a sensitive and controversial topic in China. Its legacy continues to shape Chinese politics and society, and its memory is subject to state control and historical reinterpretation.

Self-Assessment Questions

1. Who was the leader of the Kuo-Min-Tang (KMT) party?
2. What was the main aim of Chiang Kai-Shek's rule?
3. What caused the Manchurian Crisis?
4. When did the Second Sino-Japanese War begin?
5. How was China involved in the Second World War?
6. Who led China after the Communist victory in 1949?
7. What were the major reforms introduced by Mao Tse-Tung?
8. What was the purpose of the Cultural Revolution?
9. Which party ruled China under Mao Tse-Tung?
10. How did the Communist rule change China's society and economy?

Unit – IV

Japan in second World War – Pearl Harbour Incident – Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere – impact.

Objectives

- To study Japan's role in the Second World War.
- To understand the causes and effects of the Pearl Harbour incident.
- To examine the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
- To analyze the overall impact of Japan's participation in the war.

In World War II, the principle of unconditional surrender declared in January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference made the termination of the war far more difficult. Indeed, Germany kept on fighting until Berlin fell and truly had to surrender unconditionally. In contrast, Japan laid down its arms by accepting the Potsdam Declaration before the “Decisive Battle for the Home Islands” began.

As epitomized by the title of a Japanese TV program, “The End of War: Why Couldn't It Have Been Decided Earlier” (NHK special, aired on August 15, 2012), previous studies in Japan have mainly focused on the analysis of the causes that delayed its surrender, even after Japan was clearly militarily defeated. Analysts have attributed the delay to political leaders' belief that a more favorable peace could be attained if the enemy could be dealt one final blow, or to political leaders' expectations of Soviet mediation, as well as to problems with Japan's political system. There is heated debate to this day on whether the primary cause that led to the termination of the war was the dropping of the atomic bombs, the Soviet Union's entry into the war, or both.

In order to address the question of why Japan followed a course quite different from Germany's towards the termination of its war, this paper shall examine the background and factors that brought about Japan's political surrender, while taking into consideration recent studies. It analyzes: 1) Japan's war objectives; 2) Japan-U.S. relations; and 3) the military factor, specifically, the gap between Japanese and American perceptions on an American invasion of the Japanese Home Islands.

Japan's War Objectives

The Imperial Conference that was convened on June 8, 1945 approved the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” The Japanese Army’s original draft reflected its hardliner theory of resisting to the very end, stating that, “The Japanese Empire will prosecute the war to the end in order to preserve the national polity and protect the imperial land, and thereby secure the foundations for the further development of the race.

The Basic Policy that was adopted read as follows: “With the belief in giving seven lives for the country as its inspiration and based on the strength of its advantageous geographical position and the unity of its people, the Japanese Empire will prosecute the war to the end in order to preserve the national polity and defend the imperial land, and thereby, accomplish the objective of the military expedition.”³ The first half took into account domestic considerations for the upcoming convocation of the Imperial Diet session, while bearing in mind the wishes of the Army. Nevertheless, the Basic Policy was undeniably a major disappointment for peace advocates.

As a compromise measure, the Cabinet inserted the following clause into the Basic Policy: “preserve the national polity and defend the imperial land, and thereby, accomplish the objective of the military expedition.” As a result, Japan’s war objectives, which until then were “self-sufficiency and self-defense” and “building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” were limited to the “preservation of the national polity” and “defense of the imperial land.” This had two important meanings for Japan’s course towards the termination of the war

This had two important meanings for Japan’s course towards the termination of the war. First, it came to be understood within the Cabinet that Japan would attain its war objectives if the “national polity” and the “imperial land” were preserved, especially the former, and that the war would have been fought to its completion. Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki later stated, “This had considerable implications. I believed that the policy enabled the first steps to be made in our efforts towards the termination of the war.

This understanding was echoed by Hisatsune Sakomizu, Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, who was behind the drafting of the Basic Policy. He later wrote, “The Cabinet interpreted it to mean ‘if the national polity is preserved and the imperial land is

defended, then the objective of the military expedition would be achieved.⁵ The Cabinet understood the Basic Policy as providing an orientation towards the end of the war.

While agreeing to limit Japan's war objectives, the Army had a different notion from that of the Cabinet. For example, an Army officer and aide to Army Minister Korechika Anami wrote that attaining "One Blow, Certain Victory" in a battle for the Home Islands was the optimum means for actively achieving the major objective of the "preservation of the national polity," which was at the heart of concluding the war. He went onto say that "the key to achieving peace lies in whether or not the national polity is preserved."⁶ Whereas Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo and others intended to ensure the "preservation of the national polity" through diplomatic negotiations before the Home Islands were invaded, the Army felt that the "preservation of the national polity" could be ensured only by dealing one major blow and attaining certain victory in a battle for the Home Islands.

There is a classic work dealing with the termination of war authored by Paul Kecskemeti of the RAND Corporation in 1958 entitled *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat*. This book undertakes theoretical analyses of the forms of war termination, comparing the experiences of Japan, Germany, and Italy. In the book, Kecskemeti notes, "The loser may decide to quit because he feels that his core values will not suffer, even if the winner has his way completely and permanently."⁷ Because the Japanese leaders arrived at a shared understanding that Japan's core value, i.e., the preservation of the "national polity," was a war objective, the guidelines for realizing the termination of the war became clearer. The question was how to achieve this objective, i.e., through military force or negotiations.

Secondly, the principle of "building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" that had been underscored at the Greater East Asia Conference in 1943 was eliminated from the list of Japan's war objectives, and this served to further facilitate the termination of the war. In other words, as long as a principle such as the building of a co-prosperity sphere was a war objective, compromise between the two sides was difficult, and therefore, there was a likelihood for the war to be fought to the bitter end.

A basic policy with such landmark significance was approved in the following circumstances. First, Germany surrendered on May 8. This absolved Japan from the

issues of trust that had been used as an argument against Japan making a separate peace with the Allies. Second, as it became increasingly apparent that Japan was losing the battle in Okinawa, for which there had been high expectations, the momentum for pursuing immediate peace quickly grew, as opposed to making peace after striking the enemy a severe blow.

For example, according to the recently declassified “Showa Tenno Jitsuroku” [Annals of Emperor Showa], Foreign Minister Togo reported on April 30 on measures that Japan would take following Germany’s collapse, and in response, the Emperor expressed his “hopes for an early end to the war.

The German war was of a different nature from Japan’s. It was a “war of annihilation” (Vernichtungs Krieg) in which the survival of the race and ideology was at stake. The war was founded on a powerful principle or ideology. Accordingly, it was a war of victory or destruction, and peace through compromise was out of the question.

This kind of ideology surfaced in an extreme way in the last stage of the war. In March 1945, with defeat imminent, Adolf Hitler issued his famous Nero Decree and adopted a scorched earth policy involving the destruction of all assets in German territory. At this time, Hitler stated, “If the war is lost then the nation will be lost also...because this nation has shown itself the weaker. The future belongs exclusively to the stronger nation from the East.” In other words, Hitler felt that the weaker race did not deserve to exist any longer and should suffer the same fate as the defeated nation itself. Hitler’s desire for death and destruction was ultimately directed at Germany itself, i.e., at the annihilation of Germany.

Incidentally, in his second “Imperial Decision,” which he made during the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on August 14, the Emperor stated: “Continuing the war will result in the whole nation being reduced to ashes. I cannot endure the thought of letting my people suffer any longer...Compared to the result of losing Japan completely, we can at least hope for reconstruction as long as some seeds remain.”¹¹ This decision is symbolic of the differences that existed between the Japanese and German political situation and political leaders at the time.

Japan-U.S. Relations

Second, I focus on the underlying factors behind Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, namely, the so-called "moderates" in Japan and the United States, as well as the "relationship of trust" that existed between Japan and the United States even when they were adversaries.

In Japan, certain groups sought to realize peace between Japan and the United States from early in the war. For example, on the very day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, former Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye said to his aide, "We will lose this war. I order you to study how Japan shall lose. It is the job of politicians to conduct this study."¹² In January of the following year, 1942, Konoye stressed to Interior Minister Koichi Kido that the timing of the termination of the war should be considered as quickly as possible. Following this, on February 5, Kido advised the Emperor as follows: "The Great East Asia War will not be terminated easily. Ultimately, the quickest way to peace will be to fight the war to the end, including constructive efforts. Meanwhile, it will be necessary to grasp any opportunity to achieve peace as quickly as possible." Additionally, on the 12th, the Emperor stated to Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, "While I realize that adequate considerations are being paid not to lose the opportunity of terminating the war, for the sake of humanity and peace we should not prolong the war and needlessly increase the heavy damage inflicted."

The tide of the war subsequently turned against Japan. Thus, from around summer 1943, key figures came together to promote efforts to bring the war to an end, under the leadership of a number of former prime ministers, including Konoye and Keisuke Okada. Other persons involved included Navy officers, such as Mitsumasa Yonai and Sokichi Takagi, Army officers from the "Imperial Way" faction; and Shigeru Yoshida, a diplomat. This movement first evolved as a campaign to overthrow the Tojo Cabinet and resulted in its entire resignation

In addition, recent research indicates that there were even groups among mainstream Army officers, who had been considered a monolithic group, that aimed for the quick realization of peace. Many of these officers were assigned to the War Direction Section of the General Staff.

In Germany, resistance movements occurred sporadically, including the July 20 assassination plot against Hitler. However, partially due to the exile of many anti-Nazi Germans, such as Willy Brandt, who later became Prime Minister, Germany lacked a wide range of groups or movements which were in the political mainstream and which explored ways of achieving peace to avoid a catastrophe, as was observed in Japan. Neither was there a movement within the German Army which attempted to forestall the ultimate defeat. At the same time, the United States continued to refuse all German requests for a partial or localized surrender, and repeatedly demanded a complete and immediate unconditional surrender.

As for the Americans, so-called “pro-Japanese” persons played a significant role. An example is Joseph C. Grew of the State Department, who formerly served as Under Secretary of State. In the speeches he delivered across the United States, Grew explained that “moderates” or “liberals” existed in Japan, and that if the militarist clique were overthrown and the “moderates” or “liberals” placed in charge of leading the government, Japan could be rebuilt into a country that collaborates with the international community. Grew argued that the Emperor was on the side of moderates and liberals, and defended the Emperor system. Furthermore, Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, lauded Kijuro Shidehara, Reijiyo Wakatsuki, and others as progressive politicians who had stood up to the militarist clique and had promoted the sound development of Japan.

promoted the sound development of Japan.¹⁶ During the war, these persons had an enormous impact on policymaking, leading to the adoption of more moderate U.S. policies regarding Japan. An example is a memo titled “Conditions for Japanese Surrender” adopted by the Post-War Programs Committee of the State Department in November 1944. The memo essentially stated that the surrender terms would say that support would be provided to democratic and moderate persons who remain in Japan, and that the occupation forces would stand ready to assist with the democratization of Japan. The purport of this opinion varied significantly from the hardline stance prevailing in the United States that sought severe measures, including the eradication of the emperor system. These “pro-Japanese” persons judged that it would be more preferable to occupy Japan while collaborating with and making use of the “moderates” who continued to

remain in Japan, and that occupying Japan would be more in line with American national interests.

Further still, these persons were heavily involved in the drafting of the Potsdam Declaration, and, as a result, Paragraph 10 states, “The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.” The clause “the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies” reflected the perception of the “pro-Japanese” persons.

Diplomatic historian Makoto Iokibe has referred to the extensive efforts made by these “pro-Japanese” persons as “good fortune in the midst of defeat” that was bestowed on Japan unexpectedly.¹⁸ Kecskemeti notes, “There were well-informed and intelligent people in policymaking positions whose knowledge of Japanese conditions enabled them to hit upon the right approach. Thus American surrender policy avoided what would have been the worst of the disasters towards which the cult of ‘unconditional surrender’ was pressing.”

While no direct channels of negotiation existed between Japan and the United States, information on the activities of the “moderates” and others in the United States reached Japan. For example, in his famous statement to the Emperor in February 1945, Konoye states, “To date public opinion in Great Britain and United States has not gone so far as to favor a change of the national polity. (Of course, a part of public opinion is radical, and it is difficult to predict how opinion will change in the future.)” Asked what he thought about the Chief of the Army General Staff’s view that the United States would demand the elimination of the Imperial Family, Konoye responded that the Americans’ goal was to overthrow the militarist clique of Japan, and that “it seems the United States would not go that far, based on the views of Grew and the American leadership.” It was intelligence collected by the Public Affairs Bureau and other branches of the Foreign Ministry that formed the basis of such a view.

This sort of Japanese intelligence significantly influenced Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. In response to the Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26, which was followed by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet

Union's entry into the war, the Suzuki Cabinet issued an emergency telegram regarding the acceptance of the Declaration on August 10. It read that the Cabinet accepts the Declaration "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.

The United States then issued the following reply by Secretary of State James Byrnes: "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers." Japan received Byrnes' reply on the 10th. Following this, opinion within the government became divided over how to interpret the reply and how Japan should respond, i.e., accept the terms, re-inquire, or continue with the war.

A recent study has revealed that at this critical time, the intelligence of neutral countries, including Sweden and Switzerland, especially played an important role in the communications between senior Japanese and U.S. officials regarding the "preservation of the national polity."

For example, the study notes that the report "'Potsdamu' Sangoku Sengen ni kansuru Kansatsu" [Observations Concerning the Trilateral "Potsdam" Declaration] that was prepared based on European intelligence and submitted to Foreign Minister Togo recognized that the Declaration affirmed Japanese sovereignty, used the phrase "unconditional surrender" in relation to the Japanese military, and did not refer to the Imperial Family and the national polity. On this basis, the report contended that the Declaration had taken the maintaining of Japan's honor into consideration and adopted a stance that was considerably different from that taken towards Germany.

Furthermore, the study refers to the telegram from the Minister to Sweden, Suemasa Okamoto, that arrived in Japan on August 13. The telegram described local news reports claiming that the United States had won an "American diplomatic victory" by successfully overriding opposition from the Soviet Union and other countries and forcing them to accept the continuation of the Emperor system. Based on his analysis of these news reports, Okamoto concluded that the essence of Japan's terms had been accepted. The study notes that this was communicated also to the Emperor and Prime Minister Suzuki and affected subsequent developments.

Shunichi Matsumoto, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, had the following notion: “As we had imagined, the United States took our request, and, despite considerable opposition, considered and indirectly approved it by wording it differently.” The Vice Minister handed the telegram to Suzuki and requested its immediate acceptance.²³ At a time when opinion was divided over the response to Byrnes’ reply and Suzuki himself was wavering, the effect of such information was not negligible.

In any event, as a result of these developments, the Emperor commented in his second decision to the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War that, “While it is natural that we have some concerns about our counterpart’s attitude, I do not want to doubt it.”

Before and after making this comment, the Emperor twice dissuaded the strong concerns expressed by Army Minister Anami towards the American reply, saying: “Do not worry, Anami, I have conclusive proof” (August 12), and “Anami, I fully understand your feelings, but I am confident that I can preserve the national polity” (August 14). These remarks suggest that the Emperor had obtained a certain amount of evidence through intelligence and other sources.

Moreover, it cannot be ignored that the Emperor and Suzuki had a certain degree of trust in the United States, and therefore, positively interpreted the information they had acquired. At the Cabinet meeting on the 13th, Suzuki stated as follows in regard to Byrnes’ reply: “From re-reading it over and over, I sense that the United States did not write it with evil intent. We have different national situations. We also have different views. I believe that it will not essentially change the Emperor system. We should not object to the wording.”²⁷ Suzuki’s stance “in effect signified his trust in the ‘good intentions’ of the American leaders in regard to the preservation of the national polity.”

In his second decision to the Supreme Council, the Emperor stated, “I understand that there are various doubts regarding the issue of national polity. However, based on the meaning of the text of this reply, I take it that our counterpart has good intentions.”²⁹ A historian has noted that indeed, “The judgments of Suzuki and the Emperor were strongly supported by a simple trust in the United States and Americans.”

A well-known example of Japan’s trust in the United States is Japan’s reaction to the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Suzuki expressed his condolences, saying,

“I must admit that Roosevelt’s leadership has been very effective and has been responsible for the Americans’ advantageous position today.” The Prime Minister went on to say, “For that reason I can easily understand the great loss his passing means to the American people and my profound sympathy goes to them.” In contrast, Suzuki did not send a congratulatory telegram five days later on the 56th birthday of Hitler, the leader of Germany, Japan’s ally.

On the other hand, on hearing the news of Roosevelt’s death, the Nazi leadership was delighted that this would bring a turning point in the war. Hitler is said to have issued a statement which stated, “Fate has taken from us Roosevelt, the greatest war criminal in history.” Thomas Mann, a German writer who was in exile in the United States at the time, wrote, “Japan is now at war with the United States with life and death at stake...In that oriental country, there still exists a spirit of chivalry and a sensitivity to human dignity. It still reveres a person who has died and reveres a person of great character. These are the differences between Germany and Japan.”

This episode illuminates the differences between the Japan-U.S. and U.S.-German relationships at the time. A relationship of trust like that between Japan and the United States did not exist at all between the United States and the Nazi regime.

As was described, even during the war, a certain “relationship of trust” existed between Japan and the United States. On this point, diplomatic historian Akira Iriye wrote as follows in the conclusion of *Nichibei Senso* (The Japan-U.S. War, translated as Power and Culture), his book that discusses the Pacific War. “Since the 19th century, Japan and the United States had similar fundamental postures and roles. For that very reason, notwithstanding the fact that the two countries were in an extreme adversarial wartime relationship, the transition to the postwar Japan-U.S. relationship was made relatively smooth by returning to the previous form.

Military Factor: The Gap Between Japanese and U.S. Perception on the Decisive Battle for the Home Islands

Third, I consider the contrasting perceptions of the military significance between Japan and the United States on the “Decisive Battle for the Japanese Home Islands,” which was codenamed Operation “Ketsu” by the Japanese and “Operation Downfall” by the Americans. From around spring 1945, around the time Germany was defeated, the

Emperor began to have much interest in a battle for the Home Islands.³⁴ For example, the “Showa Tenno Jitsuroku” records that on May 9, after listening to a report from Chief of the Army General Staff Yoshijiro Umezu for more than one hour, the Emperor “communicated the Imperial General Headquarters Army Order (to the relevant commanders) to the effect that they shall facilitate the execution of the Battle for the Home Islands.”

Despite inquiring about the actual state of preparations for defending the Home Islands, the Emperor failed to receive a clear-cut explanation from the Army. He thus actively attempted to grasp the situation by a number of means, including the sending of the Emperor’s aides-decamp to inspect Togane and Katakai, the beaches in the vicinity of Kujukurihama, on June 3 and 4.

On June 9, Umezu returned from an inspection of Manchuria and reported to the Emperor. The content was pessimistic: Japan’s troop strength in Manchuria was only equivalent to eight U.S. divisions, and Japan only had enough ammunition for a single battle. On hearing this report, the Emperor began to believe that “as the forces in the homeland are far more insufficiently equipped than the forces in Manchuria and China, there is no way they could fight.” The report therefore became one of the factors that heightened the Emperor’s anxieties regarding the end of the war.

Navy Admiral Kiyoshi Hasegawa, who had been sent to strategic areas in Japan as a special inspector general of assets of fighting power, briefed the Emperor on June 12. Hasegawa reported that due to the lack of weapons, shortage of equipment, and inadequate training of personnel, the forces at the projected fronts could not possibly fight a battle for the Home Islands. As an example, Hasegawa explained that small boats, which were hastily built, installed with used car engines, and operated by inadequately trained personnel, were to be utilized as suicide attack weapons. The Emperor was astonished and commented, “I can fully imagine.”

At around the same time, Prince Morihiro Higashikuni informed the Emperor that not only the coastal defense forces but also the combat divisions were insufficiently supplied with weapons, and that shovels were being made with the iron that had been salvaged from bombs dropped by the enemy. Based on this information, the Emperor “confirmed that war was impossible.”

Then on June 13, the Emperor was notified of the “honorable death” of the Navy’s garrison in Okinawa, and on June 14 and the following day, fell ill and did not make any public appearances.

According to the “Showa Tenno Jitsuroku,” on June 20, the Emperor “stated that he desired an early termination of the war” to Foreign Minister Togo. On this occasion, the Emperor allegedly stated, “Based on the recent reports of the Chief of the Army General Staff, Chief of the Naval General Staff, and Admiral Hasegawa, it has become clear that our operational readiness in China and on the Japanese homeland are inadequate for a war...Please proceed to terminate the war as quickly as possible.”

On June 22, at the meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War that was convoked by the Emperor, the Emperor once again requested the swift realization of peace, stating, “A decision regarding the directing of the war was examined by the Imperial Conference that was held earlier. I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts be made to implement them.”

In effect, the series of reports regarding a battle for the Home Islands had a significant influence on the Emperor’s perception. Many historians note that these reports led the Emperor to abandon the idea of making peace after dealing the enemy a severe blow, and shift instead to the pursuit of the swift realization of peace.

Meanwhile, the Army continued to call for the “Honorable Death by 100 Million,” and with continued confidence, insisted that a “Battle of the Japanese Home Islands” be carried out. At the meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War held on August 9, shortly after the atomic bombings and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, Togo asked, “Are you confident that you can prevent the enemy from landing on Japanese homeland?” Umezu responded, “If it goes extremely well, we can even repel the enemy. Because it is a war, however, it is hard to conceive that it will definitely go well. While we will concede some landings, I am confident that we can inflict severe casualties on the enemy during their invasion.”⁴² The Army, while recognizing that ultimate victory was impossible, continued to hang on to a thread of hope

Nevertheless, in his first decision to the Supreme Council on the same day, the Emperor stated, “You keep talking about decisive fighting for the Home Islands, but the defenses at the most important area, Kujukurihama, have yet to be completed. In addition, the divisions that will be involved in this battle are inadequately equipped, and it is said that their equipment will not be complete until after mid-September...Your plans are never executed. Given that, how can we win the war?” The Emperor thus referred to the incomplete preparations for the battle for the Home Islands, and not to the atomic bombings and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war as reasons for accepting the Potsdam Declaration. The Emperor added, “What would happen if we were to plunge into the Battle for the Home Islands in this condition? I am very worried. I think to myself, will this mean that all the Japanese people will have to die? If so, how can we leave this nation Japan to posterity?” Incidentally, the “Showa Tenno Jitsuroku,” records as follows. “I often hear that the Army is confident of securing victory. But plans are not matched by their execution, and with the insufficient state of defenses and weapons, there is no prospect that we will win against the U.S. and British forces that boast mechanical strength.”

In response to this comment by the Emperor, Army Major General Tatsuhiko Takashima, then Chief of Staff of the 12th Area Army and the Eastern Command Headquarters who was entrusted with the defense of the Kanto area, felt responsible for the reference to the “biggest shortcoming” of the 12th Area Army, and responded, “the Battle for the Home Islands is just a ‘house of cards’ as is symbolized by the defensive positions at Kujukurihama.” Conversely, the Army General Staff frequently inspected the defenses in various areas in preparation for the Battle for the Home Islands. Its reports described that not only were the fortifications, supplies, training, and logistics supplies all inadequate, but even the spirit of decisive fighting was lacking. As such, in reality the General Staff also recognized the difficult situation.

It is noteworthy that in this decision to the Supreme Council, as noted above, the Emperor expressed his distrust of the military, stating that the actions of the Army and Navy commands were not in line with their plans, giving as an example the preparations for defending the Home Islands. Additionally, the Emperor noted that the conduct of the Army and the Navy since the outbreak of the war showed significant discrepancies

between their “plans and results.” With regard to the defense of Kujukuri, the Emperor said, “In fact, what my aides-de-camp later told me after seeing the site is very different from what the Chief of the Army General Staff told me. I understand that most of the defenses are incomplete.”

These remarks sent shock waves among the Army leadership. Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, wrote in his diary, “The imperial decision was issued. In short, His Majesty has no expectations for Japan’s future operations.” Kawabe went on to say, “I am afraid His Majesty did not arrive at this view as a result of the debates during the Imperial Conference. That is to say, His Majesty has no expectations for Japan’s future operations. In other words, His Majesty has no trust in the military...It was an expression of his increasing distrust in the military. This distrust was directly expressed by His Imperial Highness the Emperor.” Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief of the First Bureau, General Staff Office, wrote in his diary, “A day of great misfortune. What humiliation.”

In effect, the distrust in the Army that the Emperor made explicit for the first time over the preparations for defending the Home Islands was one of the reasons the Emperor accepted the Potsdam Declaration. This had a greater effect than military reasons in encouraging the Army, especially its General Staff, to give up on the war. While admitting Japan’s military defeat, the Army had asked for an opportunity to somehow strike the enemy. However, the Emperor’s distrust in the Army severed all such glimmers of hope.

Incidentally, according to the “Showa Tenno Jitsuroku,” shortly before issuing his second decision to the Supreme Council on August 14, the Emperor summoned Army Marshals Hajime Sugiyama and Shunroku Hata as well as Navy Marshal-Admiral Osami Nagano and asked for their views. Hata opined that regrettably there was no guarantee that Japan could repel the enemy, and that the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration was inevitable. Both Sugiyama and Nagano responded, “The military still has strength remaining, and its morale is strong. Based on these, it should be able to resist and resolutely repel the invading U.S. Forces.

This shows that the idea of resisting to the very end was deeply ingrained in the military. Consequently, the looming reality of the Battle for the Home Islands and the

diverging views that surfaced between the Emperor and the Army decisively influenced the process of war termination, similar to the shock of the atomic bombings and the Soviet Union's entry into the war.

On August 12, the Emperor called the entire Imperial Family to the Imperial Palace, and explained the reasons for his first decision to the Supreme Council. He said the reasons were the depletion of national strength from the prolonged war, successive defeats, aerial bombings, and "circumstances that do not lead me to believe that the military would be victorious in the Battle for the Home Islands."

For the United States, on the other hand, despite Japan's incomplete and poor preparations for a battle for the Home Islands, potential human losses presented a major issue as the launch of Operation Downfall approached. In other words, Japan's residual force and anticipated suicidal attacks were threats to the United States. Furthermore, the severity and cost of the battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa that the United States incurred due to Japanese military resistance—the death or injury of an estimated 35% of the American forces committed—provided a significant disincentive to proceeding with the invasion.

On June 18, 1945, President Harry S. Truman convened a meeting at the White House to consider Operation Downfall and its expected casualties. At the meeting, opinion was divided, especially regarding the estimated number of deaths and injuries resulting from the operation. William D. Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others noted that nearly 35% died or were injured in the Battle for Okinawa, and forecasted that Operation Downfall would result in a similar death toll. Accordingly, they were reluctant about the operation, and called for easing the terms of unconditional surrender in order to minimize the casualties. Meanwhile, George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, had a more optimistic outlook. In the end, the meeting approved Operation Olympic (invasion of Kyushu) and decided to put Operation Coronet (invasion of the Kanto Plain) on hold for the time being.

On July 2, Secretary of War Stimson submitted a memorandum to President Truman to explain the purpose of the draft Potsdam Declaration. He referred to the fierce fighting on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and at the same time, noted, "If we once land on one of the main islands and begin a forceful occupation of Japan, we shall probably have cast

the die of last ditch resistance.” For this reason, Stimson advised that the United States should strive for the prompt and economical achievement of its objectives, by presenting conditions to Japan.

Of course, at the time, the various departments within the U.S. Government each had their own projections of the number of deaths and injuries from Operation Downfall, which were calculated based on their respective positions. A number of recent studies based on newly released historical records tend to estimate higher numbers of casualties.

For example, Edward J. Drea states that based on “ULTRA,” the cryptographic intelligence on the Japanese military, American forces were aware of the Japanese military’s reinforcements in southern Kyushu. Drea notes that this led to a sharp rise in the United States’ estimate of the number of its deaths and injuries, raising concerns about the operation among its authorities.

Richard B. Frank asserts that on a monthly basis, the U.S. Forces would have incurred record high numbers of war casualties from the invasion of Kyushu.

In any case, concern about the military cost which would be incurred if the United States invaded the Japanese Home Islands led them to reconsider their demand for Japan’s unconditional surrender, and ultimately, the war ended with Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.

Kecskemeti writes, “Our theoretical analysis implies that strong residual capabilities on the losing side are apt to produce a substantial ‘disarming’ effect on the winning side by inclining the winner to make political concessions to the loser as incentives for surrender.” In this regard, Kecskemeti notes that unlike Germany and Italy in the final stage of the war, potential battles in Japan that would reflect Japan’s geographical advantages as an island country, the residual capabilities of the Japanese military, and Japan’s extreme will to resist were regarded as grave threats by the United States. Kecskemeti notes that they thus served as valuable assets in the transactions and negotiations conducted in order to obtain political concessions in exchange for surrender.

Military historian John Ferris notes that Japanese assets and combat that caused the U.S. Forces to incur heavy casualties in the Pacific theater “did achieve some political objectives. Its defeat achieved a victory of a kind.”

Aside from these military considerations of cost-effectiveness, other factors served as incentives for the reconsideration of Operation Downfall. They included war weariness in the United States stemming from the defeat of Germany, which had been the primary enemy, and the resulting termination of the war in Europe, and remorse over the destruction brought about by the final stage of the war against Germany, where the German homeland became the battlefield.

Pearl Harbour Incident

Japan's decision to bomb Pearl Harbor was a blunder of the highest order.¹ It ultimately led to the use of atomic weapons against two Japanese cities, the collapse of the existing Japanese state, the end of the Japanese empire, years of foreign occupation, and death sentences for many of its leaders. Tokyo blundered in steps. Perhaps the greatest misstep was the July 2, 1941, decision to invade southern Indochina. That decision locked into place a confrontation between Tokyo and Washington that Tokyo should have foreseen and that would require dramatic Japanese concessions to defuse. Once that confrontation was initiated, many Japanese leaders felt as if they had no choice but to attack because the United States was preparing to "encircle Japan," cut off its oil supplies, and block the ocean trade that was vital to Japan's imperial power. Alternative paths existed but were not fully explored. Japan gambled that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would neutralize the American Pacific fleet for enough time to allow Japan to consolidate its victories in Asia. Japan badly miscalculated the impact of the surprise attack on America's will and capability to surge military forces in relatively short order.

Imperial Japan Colonizes China

Japan felt slighted at the Paris peace negotiations that ended World War I, cheated at the Washington Naval Conference, and resentful of the West. Western powers held colonies throughout Asia and the world, and Japan sought its own sphere of influence. By 1931, Japan had sent military forces into Manchuria after a fabricated incident and created the puppet state of Manchukuo, which it later annexed. The West protested, and Japan left the League of Nations. Japan's industrialization, like Britain's earlier, created an economy whose production necessarily exceeded both domestic demand and domestic resources, creating the need for expanding markets and sources of raw material. A group of Japanese officers observing events in postwar Germany became obsessed with the

importance of gaining economic autarky, including self-sufficiency through conquest. Japan's economic welfare became dependent on ocean trade and on its navy. The Great Depression resulted in increased tariff barriers and reductions in Japanese exports. While the Depression hit Japan less hard than it did the West, Japanese gold stocks began to decline. Japan became totally reliant on imports of energy and at least thirteen key raw materials. Fearing that their industrial progress would be reversed, Japanese leaders conceived of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, dominated by Japan, as a way to deal with this challenge. They turned to overseas conquest.

By 1937, under pressure from the army, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye's government ordered the invasion of China. Japanese victories at Nanking, Xuzhou, Hankou, Guangzhou, Wuchang, and Hanyang did not fully suppress Chinese nationalist armies, and bitter fighting persisted. Japanese atrocities at Nanking and elsewhere shocked the world.

By 1939 Japan sought to extend its conquests beyond China. The Japanese military was divided as to whether its next move would be north into Siberia or south into Indochina and the Indies. Both had resources Japan needed. The North Strike Group of the Japanese army supported the former and South Army Strike Group (along with the navy) the latter. Russia (now the Soviet Union) and Japan had been rivals since before the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and in 1936 Japan signed an anti-Communist pact with Germany. The Soviet Union in turn allied with China, furnishing financial and military aid. The North Strike Group prevailed, and limited border conflict began in May 1939. In August 1939, Japan lost a massive armored engagement on the Mongolian border against Soviet General Georgy Zhukov. When Japan and Russia signed a cease-fire in September 1939, the Japanese drive to the north came to an end.

In June 1940, Japan made one of several decisions to turn its military attention to the south. By then it had already secured Hainan Island and other launch points for a military strike into Southeast Asia. Events in Europe facilitated this, as Germany had invaded France and the Netherlands, two countries with Asian colonies, creating new opportunities for Japan. Japan began to work with Germany and Vichy France to gain greater access to rice, rubber, and tin from Indochina and with Dutch representatives to

gain access to oil from the Indies. The Japanese sought to avoid competition for these resources and gain a dominant market position.

In September 1940, Japan pressured Vichy France to agree to a limited Japanese right to station troops in northern Indochina. Japan needed these facilities to block the flow of arms and fuel, which were making their way to the Chinese army from Haiphong through Hanoi to Yunnan. Japan immediately violated the terms of the occupation agreement, and fighting broke out with French troops, quickly resulting in a Japanese victory and limited occupation.

U.S. Backlash

Despite its professed neutrality, the United States had significant interests in Asia. Aghast by Japanese atrocities, America provided material assistance to the Republic of China. In December 1937, Japan sank the U.S. gunboat Panay, increasing bilateral tension. By mid-1941, volunteer American pilots flying U.S. aircraft formed the Flying Tigers and saw combat over China.

Meanwhile, naval competition between the United States and Japan intensified. In 1934, Japan renounced its obligations under the Washington Naval Treaty to limit the size of its navy. By 1940, the Japanese fleet had grown to 375 ships, with an emphasis on aircraft carriers. While the United States neglected most of its armed forces in the 1930s, the Navy was an exception. In 1933 the U.S. National Industrial Recovery Act authorized the construction of cruisers and other combatants. By 1940, the United States had a fleet of 478 naval combatants, including fifteen battleships and six aircraft carriers. In addition, in the 1930s, the United States forward deployed much of its Pacific fleet from California to Hawaii to dissuade Japan from further expansion. Japanese officials interpreted the growth and shift of U.S. sea power as a threat to its own sea control, trade, national well-being, and strategy.

In response to Japanese expansionism, the United States also imposed economic sanctions. U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew and Admiral Harold Stark initially cautioned against excessive sanctions, while Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Defense Secretary Henry Stimson, and State Department Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson pressed for tighter ones. In 1939, the United States had already terminated its Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan. By September 1940, Grew changed his

mind in light of Japanese aggression in northern Indochina and sent what historians call his “green light” cable.

That same month the United States halted its exports of scrap iron, steel, and aviation fuel to Japan on the grounds that it was needed at home. The embargo also extended to arms, ammunition, critical raw materials, aircraft parts, and machine tools. In January of 1941, the denial of war material was extended to copper, brass, bronze, zinc, nickel, and potash, causing a major impact on Japanese industry.

In September 1940, Japan had signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy pledging to “assist one another with all political, economic, and military means.” While Japan hoped that this would deter the United States, in fact it compounded the affect of Japan’s occupation of northern Indochina and was taken in Washington as a move to counter American opposition to Japanese expansionism. Then, in April 1941, Japan signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. Two months later Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Japanese cabinet was caught by surprise and debated which way to turn. Despite German pressure, Japan maintained its neutrality with Russia and continued its move to the south. Japan thus began to shape its relationships with the major powers for a coming confrontation with the United States.

Also in April 1941, what we would now call a track II effort took place with two Catholic priests, a Japanese banker, and a Japanese colonel associated with the war ministry. They were nicknamed the “John Doe Associates” and produced what they hoped would be a potential deal to stop the downward spiral in bilateral relations. Under their proposal, Japan would resort to peaceful means in Southeast Asia and support Germany only if the United States attacked Germany first. The United States would restore normal relations with Japan and assist Japan in obtaining raw materials from Southeast Asia, and China would agree to merge governments with the Japanese-supported government in China. While their intentions were good, a thorough review of the episode by the historian R. J. C. Butow concludes that in fact they created confusion by misleading both sides with regard to the origins of various peace proposals. The result was to increase distrust between the two nations. Nonetheless, the episode did demonstrate that there were creative solutions that might have been explored.

Fateful Decision

In a fateful decision in July 1941 that set the final stage for Pearl Harbor, an Imperial Conference decided to occupy southern Indochina, declare the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and call up a million reserves. The move was considered by the Japanese army as a prerequisite to any subsequent move southward. And yet the historian Herbert Feis concludes that “no combination of policies could have been more certain to bring Japan to ultimate defeat.” Under this decision, Japan would not attack the Soviet Union despite pressure to do so from Germany; Japan would not abrogate the Tripartite Pact with Germany; and Japan would secure control over all of Indochina militarily.

From Washington, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Kichisaburo Nomura, warned the foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, that this decision would result in a major Japanese-American rupture. The United States had already embargoed iron, aviation fuel, and munitions a year earlier, and Japanese leaders should have had every reason to believe that the United States would expand these sanctions in response to a Japanese occupation of southern Indochina. Japan still had time to reverse its fateful July decision in response to firm messages from Washington. The home minister, Kiichiro Hiranuma, warned that war with the United States should be avoided at all cost, but the Imperial Conference rejected the warnings.

The minister of war, Hideki Tojo, felt that if Japan attained self-sufficient operations in the south, it could wear down China and withstand a long war with the United States and Britain. There was no serious examination in Tokyo of the possibility of imposition of a total embargo by the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. They were taken by surprise. Given the American reaction in 1940 to Japan’s first incursion into Indochina, this lack of anticipation constitutes a massive error. The navy, which had traditionally served as a break on Japanese General Staff decisionmaking, forcefully supported the decision and created the consensus needed for the invasion.

Franklin D. Roosevelt personally met with Nomura in a final attempt to stop Japan’s incursion into southern Indochina. He suggested that if Indochina could be neutralized without a full Japanese occupation, an oil embargo might be avoided. At that critical moment, however, Vichy France conceded to the Japanese occupation of airfields and ports in southern Indochina. With the door to the rest of Indochina now opened by France, Roosevelt’s warnings not to walk into that open door were disregarded.

In response, the United States first froze all Japanese financial assets in the United States. But an oil embargo was postponed. In a flimsy attempt at compromise, Japan proposed to Roosevelt a deal under which Japanese occupation of Indochina could continue until the war with China was won; the United States would pressure the Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate; and the United States would guarantee Japan's access to Dutch oil from the Indies. That unconstructive deal was rejected by Roosevelt.

In August 1941, Acheson interpreted Roosevelt's earlier decision strictly and took steps to impose what amounted to a de facto oil embargo on Japan by canceling Japan's ability to pay for the oil. Roosevelt did not object. Japan still depended on the United States for 80 percent of its oil; it had about two years in reserve. Meanwhile the United States began encouraging oil companies in the Dutch Indies not to cooperate with Japan. The cumulative impact of sanctions severely stressed the Japanese economy. Despite the clear warning, the Japanese government professed surprise and shock that the Americans would react this harshly.

Throughout 1941, efforts to control the downward spiral were pursued in Washington with some forty or more meetings between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Nomura. In Tokyo, Grew kept in close touch with Konoye. The United States had broken the diplomatic "Purple" code and knew Nomura's instructions in advance. This intelligence made Nomura appear deceptive, and thus made Hull even more suspicious of Tokyo's motives. Washington's official position hardened: By midyear the United States was insisting that Japan leave both China and Indochina and give up all exclusive privileges.

Revisionist historians have questioned Roosevelt's motives during the second half of 1941, arguing that he boxed Tokyo in by giving them no choice but to attack because he sought war with Japan as a back door means of declaring war on Germany. The United States did take a tough line against Japanese aggression in China and Indochina, but Japanese behavior warranted that response. Japan was unwilling to make the kind of concessions that would have met Washington halfway and that might have relieved the economic sanctions the country's behavior triggered.

Moves Toward War

Jeffrey Record's 2009 study of Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor argues that it must be seen in the light of Japan's available alternatives as of fall 1941, "which were either national economic suffocation or surrender of Tokyo's empire on the Asian mainland." That is indeed how Tokyo saw its decision in late 1941. But how did Tokyo find itself in that bind, and could it have been avoided? The historian Eri Hotta notes that Japanese decisionmakers "tended to ignore that such extreme choices grew directly out of their own recent decisions and actions."

In this sense the Japanese blunder was not just the final decision to attack Pearl Harbor; the blunder was also to get trapped in a situation that offered no attractive alternatives. The logic of Japan's decisions to sign the Tripartite Pact, turn south and occupy southern Indochina, and force massive concessions from the Dutch East Indies would lead either to a confrontation with the United States or to a conciliatory strategy by Japan. Japan could have made milder choices earlier on, found nonmilitary means of securing resources to the south, and avoided crippling sanctions. But the Japanese did not look to their own record for an explanation of their predicament. Their decisionmaking was based on conformity, acquiescence, obedience, and intuition. The Japanese leadership did not want to yield to U.S. pressure. Tokyo increasingly had a military decisionmaking culture, and the solutions to that group all appeared to be military. They thought that the solution to an American oil embargo was seizing the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies. The United States again stood in the way.

The decision for war was incremental. In January of 1941, the Japanese military began preliminary planning for war with the United States, including an attack on Pearl Harbor. After the occupation of southern Indochina and the imposition of the U.S. oil embargo, the Japanese navy shifted ground from its earlier opposition to war. The navy chief of staff, Osami Nagano, began arguing that if war with the United States was inevitable, it should start soon, while oil supplies lasted.

Real operational planning started in July 1941 for combined attack on the Indies and the Philippines, and for an attack on Pearl Harbor to neutralize the American Navy—the only force that might stop such an attack to the south. An attack on the Philippines, a U.S. protectorate with sizeable U.S. forces deployed there, would in any event mean war

with the United States. However, these were only contingency plans. As war became more certain, the Japanese military conducted major exercises with aircraft simulating an attack on Pearl Harbor.

On September 6, war against the United States, Britain, and France was formally proposed in the Imperial Council. Konoye secured support from the navy and the emperor for one last chance to seek peaceful solutions with Roosevelt. The army insisted on a tight deadline for Konoye's effort and on receiving in exchange Konoye's support for war should the deadline not be met. Konoye had no choice but to agree. Then the Imperial Council handed Konoye a negotiating position that the United States could not possibly accept. Roosevelt initially accepted Konoye's invitation for a summit, but the meeting never materialized because Washington, Hull in particular, was convinced that the Japanese policies were fixed. They were right. Konoye had no authority to change course and thus no room to negotiate.

When Tojo declared that the deadline had passed, Konoye resigned. The emperor rejected suggestions that Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, a moderate who had some control over the army, be made prime minister on the grounds that the royal family should stay out of politics. Instead, Tojo became prime minister.

On November 2, the emperor gave his general consent to war. Three days later he approved the war plans, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, which would have to take place before January, when weather conditions might make the Japanese fleet's transit difficult. Negotiations continued, and on November 20 Nomura handed Hull the so-called plan B, which Hull deemed clearly unacceptable. Final approval for the attack came on December 1. While the Japanese aircraft carriers sailed, negotiations continued in Washington; the fleet was told not to strike if those negotiations succeeded. But negotiations made no progress, and the fleet struck before war could be declared.

Decision making in Tokyo

Japan was not a dictatorship like Hitler's Germany. Decision making was based on factions and efforts to reach consensus. But a decade of warfare had a massive impact on the decisionmaking culture in Tokyo. By 1940, most of Japan's leaders and ambassadors were military. The military itself had structures independent of civilian control and reported directly to the emperor. Military leaders fell into factions: The navy

was generally less belligerent than its army counterparts. Both groups were needed for a policy consensus, so the navy had an effective veto. The Japanese army fighting in China was particularly belligerent and saw operations against Indochina as a way to relieve military pressure on them. Most military leaders had little exposure to American culture and attitudes, and those who did still underestimated American resilience. Younger military officers tended to be more hawkish and were often unrestrained by senior officers who should have known better. They carried an aggressive Bushido spirit and suffered from what Barbara Tuchman called “cultural ignorance.” And they frequently made decisions without fully exploring their possible consequences.

Underlying the decisionmaking structure and mentality of Japanese decisionmakers was the shadow of assassination and coup. In 1936 a group of young right-wing officers attempted a coup and killed two former prime ministers. Thereafter the military gained much more influence over government. During his peacemaking efforts, an assassination attempt failed against Konoye.

The dominant military leader in Tokyo was Tojo, a career army officer who had served in Switzerland and briefly visited the United States early in his profession.³⁹ His nickname was “razor brain” for his analytical skills and his ability to make quick decisions. But he was said to be without breadth or feeling. Hull said that Tojo was a typical Japanese officer with a “small-bore, straight-laced, one-track mind.” He exhibited an appalling lack of knowledge about events in Europe. Tojo accused Konoye of having a weak character because Konoye foresaw difficulties resulting from Japanese policies. Once Tojo replaced Konoye, war was a near certainty.

Konoye, a prince, led what might be thought of as the peace faction in Tokyo. He was trained as a lawyer and studied Western philosophy. He sent his son to study in the United States. But he also published an essay earlier in his career titled “Reject the Anglo-American Centered Peace.” He had some liberal tendencies and supported “universal male” suffrage. But he relied heavily on the military for political support, and while he would seek compromise, he would not override the military. Throughout the crisis building toward Pearl Harbor, he sought diplomatic solutions to avoid conflict, but his negotiating hand never held adequate compromises.

Tuchman concludes that most civilian leaders akin to Konoye wanted to keep America quiescent while they moved forward with Japan's Asian designs. They thought that this could be managed by bluster, outlandish demands, and intimidation. They failed to realize that this would be counterproductive and stiffen U.S. policies. Japanese officials did not learn the lesson of the embargoes but rather took them as "a challenge." To a great extent, Japanese pride and the threat of economic destruction dictated Japanese policies. The Japanese believed that they were racially and spiritually superior to the effete Americans.

Matsuoka was a career diplomat who received his law degree from the University of Oregon and at one point converted to Christianity. Yet he was enthralled with Hitler, advocated joining the Tripartite Pact as a way to balance the United States, and sought to declare war on the Soviet Union after Hitler invaded. Matsuoka initially opposed the July 2, 1941, decision to invade southern Indochina because he felt that it would undermine Tokyo's ability to declare war on Russia, but he finally joined the consensus decision. Matsuoka also distrusted Nomura, which cast doubt on Nomura's ongoing conversations with Hull. Matsuoka similarly purged the Foreign Ministry of pro-Anglo-American diplomats. According to Feis, "Matsuoka and the men he served showed themselves most clearly as they were: displaced villains out of a 19th century American melodrama who advanced upon their obstinate objective of their affection with white words and black hearts."

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto played a critical and somewhat enigmatic role in the final decision to attack Pearl Harbor. He had perhaps the deciding vote. He had studied at Harvard and served as a naval attaché in Washington. So he knew the United States as well as any senior Japanese officer. His prestige and personality had the potential to sway the final decision on Pearl Harbor either way. The historian Gordon Prange concludes that had Yamamoto put his prestige behind Japan's moderate faction, diplomacy might have had a better chance. Similarly, Eri Hotta determines that "the great irony in Japan's decision to go to war is that its leaders could not have ever conceived of taking such a grand gamble had it not been for Admiral Yamamoto, who was fundamentally against the war." Strategically he argued against the war but operationally he planned for and encouraged the operation. If there were to be war, he wanted to be in charge of it. Once

Yamamoto sided with the army in favor of war, the Konoye faction was incapable of stopping the momentum.

Yamamoto was the chief architect of Operation Hawaii and was responsible for convincing the Japanese Naval General Staff to adopt it. He ultimately commanded the carriers that made the attack. Yamamoto's thinking was complex. He calculated that a Japanese attack to the south against Dutch and British possessions would require most of Tokyo's naval and air assets and would thereby leave Japan itself vulnerable to direct attack by the U.S. Navy. Thus, he wrote, "the only way is to have a powerful air force strike deeply at the enemy's heart at the very beginning of the war and thus to deal a blow, material and moral, from which it will not be able to recover for some time."

Yamamoto's assessment of the impact of an attack on Pearl Harbor was also ambivalent. On the one hand, he told Konoye he had "utterly no confidence" in the outcome of war with the United States if it lasted two years or more. On the other hand, he also predicted that a surprise knockout blow could sink U.S. confidence so it could not be recovered. Like many in the Japanese leadership, he bet that America would have limited staying power and that Japan could hold on long enough so that America would tire of the struggle and "agree to some sort of arrangement." Despite his familiarity with American culture, he too miscalculated America's stamina.

The final decision within the navy to pursue Operation Hawaii was made by Admiral Osami Nagano, chief of the Naval General Staff. Like other naval officers, he had a fatalistic attitude, described as being like a "man in a canoe speeding down rapids leading to Niagara Falls." He approved Yamamoto's plans "to settle a bitter contest in the Navy."

Emperor Hirohito sat on the pinnacle of this decision making structure, but his power was limited. He relied on the military to maintain the throne and him on it. He was personally very concerned about the impact of war with the United States and criticized some officers for being too optimistic about the outcome of a conflict. Tojo wrote in his diary that "whatever the Emperor said it should be so." But Hirohito did not exercise his authority adequately in accordance with his stated concerns about the affect of war with the United States.

In a series of conferences in October, economic ministers and other officials finally began to weigh in with economic arguments against war, and even Tojo seemed to have second thoughts. A suggestion was made to delay the attack on Pearl Harbor until 1942. But it was too late. Senior military officers opposed further delay on operational grounds. A decision was made on November 2 to continue negotiating with the United States and prepare for war at the same time. This appeared to be a less belligerent alternative than immediate war, but it had the same effect. An emissary, Saburo Kurusu, was sent to Washington in a final effort to negotiate peace, but his efforts fell short as Tokyo's deadline approached.

In the months before the emperor's November 2 decision, Tokyo had put itself in a very difficult position, but it in fact had three different alternatives:

The first was the diplomatic path. Bluster had failed. To be successful on this path, Tokyo would have to reverse course and end its occupation of Indochina, hoping that the United States would loosen its economic embargoes in exchange. The failed John Doe Associates initiative is an example of a compromise that might have worked given more trust. But compromise was inconsistent with Japan's military culture. And by then, diplomatic channels were clogged with distrust.

Second, Tokyo could proceed with an attack on Dutch and British possessions but spare Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on the bet that U.S. neutrality would limit an American response. Historians look back at this as perhaps Tokyo's most feasible option given its unwillingness to make concessions on Indochina. But the option was not given serious consideration. It remains unclear how the United States would have responded.

Third, Tokyo could follow the advice of Yamamoto to strike deeply at the enemy's heart and hope that the United States would tire of war in time for Tokyo to consolidate its victories.

Konoye and the navy had resisted the army's more aggressive policies in the past. But Konoye's and then Kurusu's diplomacy had failed in large measure because of Japan's inflexible positions. Yamamoto's logic convinced the navy to support a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The restraints were gone, and the third alternative was chosen.

On December 7, 1941, Yamamoto, commander of the carrier task force north of Hawaii, ordered the attack. Two waves of Japanese aircraft, 353 in total, damaged all

eight battleships in Pearl Harbor. Four were sunk, two of which were raised eventually. Six of the eight returned to service later in the war. American aircraft were clustered together to prevent sabotage, creating an inviting target; 188 aircraft were destroyed. Significantly, the three U.S. aircraft carriers were at sea on routine maneuvers and escaped attack. Japanese intelligence was unaware of these maneuvers. No U.S. submarines were destroyed. A third wave of attack was not ordered by Yamamoto due to fuel shortage; consequently, facilities such as dry docks, ammunition dumps, power stations, and fuel storage facilities were not destroyed. Had the third wave been ordered to strike, the damage might have been more permanent. Despite the tragic losses, Pearl Harbor and most of its fleet were able to recover fairly quickly.

The attack took place before Japan could formally declare war, creating the “day of infamy.” America instantly took a war footing. Six months later, at Midway, Japan sought to finish off the American carriers. Instead, aided by code breaking and some luck, planes from three U.S. carriers sank four of the six Japanese carriers that had struck Pearl Harbor. Midway is seen by military historians as one of the most decisive battles in naval warfare—for America it was what Japan hoped Pearl Harbor would be.

Japan lost 2.3 million people in the war. Many major cities were firebombed. Okinawa was invaded. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were leveled by atomic bombs. After the war, some five thousand Japanese were tried as war criminals throughout Asia; nine hundred were executed. Tojo failed at a suicide attempt and was executed after a trial in Tokyo. Konoye took his own life after hearing that he would be tried as a war criminal. The emperor and his throne were spared to facilitate the occupation.

Japan’s Flawed Model of Success

The decision making process that led Tokyo to attack Pearl Harbor had layers of flaws. At the top of the list was the culture that emerged in Tokyo after years of warfare in China. The information they had was filtered through a prism of militarism, extreme nationalism, arrogance, the urge to conform, a pull toward groupthink, and do-or-die spirit. This affected the ability of Japanese leaders to analyze objectively. Japanese leadership had in the 1930s created a strong consensus on the need to create a new order in Asia and Japan’s dominant role in it. There was some disagreement on how to define and achieve this. But the decisions about how to shape and implement that vision were

increasingly being made by military officers with little understanding of or patience for nonmilitary options.

To this military-dominated culture, sanctions were not reasons to change policies; sanctions were hurdles to overcome. Diplomatic concessions were viewed as weak and a sign of flawed character. Alternative analysis was not prominent and not accepted by the top military leadership. It would have been hard for new knowledge to penetrate or analysis to change the outlook of the military and the plans that flowed from it. Consensus was too strong, and the price of major dissent was too high.

The second flaw was Tokyo's strategic concept itself. Japan felt that it had both a requirement and a right to become the colonial power in China and Indochina. Again, its economy needed guaranteed access to raw materials and export markets. China seemed weak. Europeans had benefited from colonialism in Asia, so why shouldn't an Asian power? The Japanese even thought that they would be seen by the people of Asia as liberating them from European yokes. If they met resistance, they would trample it. International public opinion did not matter.

Nearly every part of this strategic concept proved to be wrong. Japan could have explored alternative means to secure needed raw materials and export markets—for example, in exchange for ending its military occupations in Asia, it could have had preferential trade agreements. The Chinese saw the Japanese as invaders, not liberators. The resulting atrocities set American opinion strongly against Japan and produced a hardening of U.S. policy, including sanctions

The third flaw was to misread American strength and policies. Japan saw the United States as having weak will and capability. The U.S. military had been allowed to deteriorate over a twenty-year period; isolationism and neutrality reflected America's interwar mood. Japanese leaders appreciated that the American economy was much stronger than theirs and that over time America's military could dominate theirs. But they took a short-term view, believing that a quick victory could solidify their control in Southeast Asia, while it would take a year or more for the United States to recover fully and reconstitute its power.

Further, the Japanese saw the United States as trying to encircle them economically and militarily, without recognizing that Japan brought this upon itself and

could reverse it. The United States took actions in response to Japanese aggression—for example, by providing volunteers and military aid to China; by seeking to strengthen its position in the Philippines; by working with Australia, New Zealand, the British in Singapore, and the Dutch in the East Indies; and by increasing economic sanctions. This so-called encirclement was reactive and partial. But the Japanese saw it as eventually cutting off their economic lifeline.

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

On August 1, 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke announced the government's policy to build a so-called "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The term Greater East Asia implied that in addition to the core region of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, the sphere would include Southeast Asia, Eastern Siberia, and possibly the outer regions of Australia, India, and the Pacific Islands. The new policy to expand the boundaries of Japan's empire beyond East Asia emerged after France and the Netherlands fell to Nazi Germany in the late spring of 1940 and forfeited their colonies in Southeast Asia. Japan subsequently advanced into French Indochina in June 1940. Three months later in September 1940, Japan concluded the Triple Axis Pact with Germany and Italy. When diplomacy failed to lift economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941. These actions set the country on a course of brutal occupation of Asia and a destructive war against the United States and its allies that culminated in Japan's total defeat in 1945.

The question of why resource-poor Japan would take on the world's superpower and its allies continues to baffle analysts of the wartime period. Between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese state squeezed the economy through strict rationing in the civilian sector and control of management and labor in order to channel a dwindling supply of precious resources to the military's ambitious production expansion and material mobilization plans.² The drain on resources from the protracted war in China, food and energy shortages, higher import costs as a result of the European war, and rapidly deteriorating trade relations suggested that Japan had little chance of victory in a war against the United States.

Japanese technocrats conceived of the Pacific War as more than a battle of resources. They viewed it as an ideological battle between the architects of a new, fascist

geopolitical order and defenders of the old liberal capitalist order. From the standpoint of planning, the war represented an opportunity to complete Japan's New Order and build the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere. For technocrats, the attack on Pearl Harbor was not only a wager to force the United States to accept Japanese hegemony in Asia, but also a means of reform. The Pacific War was the first step toward constructing a technologically advanced, self-sufficient, regional economic sphere, or Grossraumwirtschaft (kōiki keizai). Reflecting the reformist view of war as an integral part of state reform, Major General and Cabinet Planning Board Chief Akinaga Tsukizō proclaimed that Japan would "build while fighting.

The New Order

Already by the spring of 1941, the New Order movement appeared to have reached a crossroads in which it could either flourish and develop or stagnate and congeal into the "status quo" mold. Launched in 1940 by Kishi Nobusuke and his faction of reform bureaucrats, the movement sought to reorder Japanese society along fascist lines by replacing political parties with a state mass party, subordinating commercial interests to state interests, and replacing class consciousness with national consciousness. These technocrats were concerned that the movement's collapse would not only jeopardize long-term planning, but also place Japan in a critical predicament since it was becoming increasingly cut off from outside resources.

One of the most difficult challenges in establishing the New Order was to obtain the cooperation and expertise of business. Since the 1930s, technocrats had sought to combine state planning with private initiative. Drawing upon the lessons of Manchurian industrialization, technocrats downplayed the anti-capitalist rhetoric of the New Order and recast their policies in more business-friendly terms. In a press interview in August 1942, Kishi distinguished the new control measures from those of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro dating from 1940. He complained that there had been "too much theory" in the proposed reforms and stressed that implementation, not theory, was the overriding concern."

Technocrats also acknowledged that the state ought to defer to business leaders on issues concerning the internal management of their firms. In Manchuria, reform bureaucrats had abandoned the special company system based on the principle of "one

industry, one company” and turned to Nissan president Ayukawa Yoshisuke to reorganize and consolidate the special companies within Nissan’s own corporate structure. Now in Japan, planners sought to address the lackluster performance of the new industry-based control associations.

In a scathing report on the control associations, the cornerstone of the Economic New Order, the Cabinet Planning Board identified the source of their weakness.⁵ The first problem was the lack of enthusiasm and support from business. The report accused business of sabotaging the control associations by refusing to supply the best managers, denying government inspectors access to factories, and generally obstructing their smooth functioning. The second problem was their heavily bureaucratic character. The control associations had become no more than an additional administrative layer, rigidified and unresponsive to the needs of the member firms. The third problem was the lukewarm, noncommittal attitude of the bureaucracy. The various ministries needed to overcome their sectionalism and completely transfer the relevant powers to the control associations. The real challenge was to obtain the expertise of business leaders. Given the top-down, authoritarian nature of the control associations based on the so-called “Führer principle,” their fate was completely dependent upon the ability of the leader to effectively manage the member firms and command their respect and allegiance.

In a major shift in strategy, Kishi struck a compromise with business in the form of the new Munitions Corporation Law of October 1943. Similar to the arrangement made with Nissan in Manchuria, Kishi enticed certain companies to expand production in munitions related areas and meet government targets by providing state subsidies and financial guarantees. The new law essentially allowed the government to bypass the control associations and work directly with selected munitions firms to achieve state goals. As officially designated “munitions companies,” these firms were made accountable to the state, not to shareholders. In exchange, they were granted preferential treatment, subsidies, financing, and a free hand in meeting state targets.

As the Cabinet Planning Board pointed out, however, business was only part of the problem; the other problem was the bureaucracy. In their plans for a “bureaucratic new order” (kankai shintaisei), reform bureaucrats called for a complete overhaul of the bureaucracy, especially in four areas: bureaucratic ethos, civil service employment

system, organizational structure, and duties and responsibilities. Kishi called for a fundamental reorientation of the bureaucracy away from its traditional, status-bound, rulebased approach toward a more task-oriented approach that focused on increasing productivity and performance. The main problem was the power mentality of bureaucrats or bureaucratic sectionalism. He noted that it would be impossible to establish a bureaucratic new order and raise efficiency unless the turf battles among bureaucrats were eliminated. In addition, as a result of the rapid expansion of duties, the bureaucracy had become a cold and impersonal place where department and section heads knew and cared little about the welfare of their staff and ministers. As part of an effort to improve the work environment, he called for higher compensation for bureaucrats, particularly at the middle and junior level.

The most radical proposal was to open up the civil service employment system to the private sector in order to attract new talent and expertise. As Kishi explained, the Meiji bureaucratic appointment ordinance had outlived its purpose of providing a regularized and impartial system of recruitment and training and cultivating esprit de corps among civil servants. With the increase in scope and complexity of administration, particularly in the economic area, officials with technical and practical experience were urgently needed. Bureaucrats ought to be recruited not on the basis of passing the rigorous civil service exam, but on the basis of their skill, knowledge, and practical experience. By abolishing this ordinance and eliminating the examination requirement, people from the private sector could become eligible for public office.

During the Pacific War, administrative reform became a top priority. The cabinet pushed through the Wartime Special Administration Law (Senji gyōsei tokurei hō) and Wartime Special Administration Powers Ordinance (Senji gyōsei shokken tokurei) in March 1943 in order to strengthen policymaking at the executive level and cut through bureaucratic sectionalism and red tape. The former provided for the issuance of imperial ordinances to expand productive power that could overrule existing legislation prohibiting or controlling certain activities and permit intervention in areas under ministerial jurisdiction. The latter greatly increased the authority of the Prime Minister over the ministries with regard to the production of the five priority industries of iron and steel, coal, light metals, ships, and aircraft. The government also established the Cabinet

Advisory Council comprised of leading technocrats and industrialists. The Council provided greater exchange and collaboration between bureaucrats and the private sector. In November 1943, the government streamlined and consolidated the Cabinet Planning Board and the ministries of agriculture, commerce, communications, and railroads into three new ministries: the Ministry of Munitions, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

In addition to mobilizing business and the bureaucracy for war, technocrats sought to boost public confidence in Japan's war capability. Technocrats believed that Japan had a good chance of prevailing against the larger, resource-rich nations. Their optimism was based on a new conception of national strength. Military technocrats had argued that in modern total wars, the definition of national power had changed. Economic power was but one component of national power. Two other factors were equally important - human power and spiritual power, without which materials and funds had no value. Japan was blessed with abundant human power both in terms of its population growth rate and the excellence of the Yamato people, particularly with regard to "brain power" or scientific and technological power. Cabinet Planning Chief Akinaga predicted that the efficient organization and redeployment of labor to productive, warrelated industries and steady population growth would overcome any shortages in labor.

Civilian technocrats claimed that the new type of war was based on a new type of thinking centered on materials and technology, not finance and diplomacy.⁶ As Kishi explained, the meaning of "rich country, strong army" had changed. National wealth and power were no longer measured by a country's national income, but by the quantity and quality or precision of its materials and the ways in which they were organized and mobilized for national defense.⁷ The challenge was to increase production through superior organization and eliminate the contradictions and inconsistencies in the production process. Technocrats held that in the new world order, economies were undergoing a fundamental shift from a money-based economy to a materials-based economy. This shift reflected the dictates of the planned economy in which material balances and quotas, not prices and profits, served as the benchmark for economic activity. But more important, it highlighted the pivotal role of technology in the production process and in the creation of synthetic resources.

Technocrats also sought to provide a new theoretical approach toward measuring national wealth. Mōri Hideoto, a key ideologue of the reformist faction, argued that classical economic theory had become outdated in terms of both its assumptions and methodology. Until recently the nation's resources had been assessed by national income (the total amount of goods and services produced in an economy), which was based upon the individual's pursuit of self interest. As he explained, in classical economic theory, consumption was defined as the individual's fulfillment of desires and needs which are freely determined and restricted only by their marginal utility or the individual's financial means. In the new era of state planning and autarky, however, a distinction was made between state and national (private) consumption. The latter was no longer conceived in terms of the free will of the individual. Since both production and consumption within the bloc were controlled by the Japanese state and "liberated" from foreign control, "national consumption was made free by the state."⁸ Consumption was created, constructed, and planned via the state and only via the state was it made "free."

Mōri defined national wealth (kokumin shiryoku) as the "total capital mobilization of the state" or "total productive power of state capital." State financial resources were distributed for public finance, consumption, and industry for the purpose of contributing toward the war economy and maximizing the efficiency of state planning. National wealth was not assessed in the monetary terms of national income, which also included elements that did not directly contribute to the war economy, but rather in terms of their relative value or contribution toward fulfilling state plans.

Technocrats called for a restructuring of public finance accounting in order to clarify and specify the role of various components of the economy and the different approaches taken toward them. Rather than dividing the budget into a General and Special Accounts, they proposed to create four categories within the General Accounts budget for official finance, re-production or reinvestment, reserves and stockpiling, and welfare. Whereas the state would continue the traditional cost-benefit management approach toward regular day-today official finance, it would adopt what they referred to as the "long term investment approach" toward the other three categories. Welfare, production, and stockpile-related programs were viewed as future public revenue sources and should be funded by public debt. The Special Accounts Budget would in turn draw

upon these four budgets for funds. By rejecting the theoretical basis and methodology of foreign assessments of Japan's national wealth, reformists sought to show how the outside world underestimated the extent of Japan's true wealth and war preparation.

Technocrats argued that national power should be understood in terms of its dynamic force. They held that the synergistic energy derived from its material, human, and spiritual resources and the self-propelling momentum of Japan's advanced national defense state would determine victory in war. According to the government engineer Matsumae Shigeyoshi, the power of the national defense state should not be expressed in the static terms of the size of its air force or number of troops, but rather in the dynamic terms of the state's ability to focus the energies of every aspect of society toward the goals of the perpetual expansion of productive power, technological advance, and increased efficiency both in terms of time, materials, and labor. Matsumae explained the dynamic nature of national power by likening the national defense state to a magnet whose force continually pulls the iron particles in one direction and in turn magnetizes them.⁹ In another mechanical analogy, he compared the national defense state to a top:

A top spins on its axis. The faster the top spins the more it stabilizes. When it spins at a very high speed, it attains a degree of stability by which motion and inertia become indistinguishable. As the rotational power gradually weakens, it begins to totter. At the end, when its rotational speed finally reaches zero, the top falls on its side. The so-called national defense state is a state with tremendous rotational force. Needless to say the essential idea behind the defense state is the dynamic rotation, which concentrates the total power of the state, or the totality of the economy, the military, politics, and culture, at the center

The attempt to redefine national power in terms of such mechanical analogies and other intangible forms of spiritual and organizational power, potential national wealth, and “revisionist” accounting in the face of real material shortages, financial crisis, and human suffering reveals the moral compromises of Japan's technocratic leaders. The utter absurdity of Matsumae's analogy offers three insights into wartime technocratic leadership. First, it conveys the deep contempt of Japan's wartime leaders for public opinion and discourse about politics and matters of life and death such as war. Second, the retreat into abstract formulations about spinning tops and magnets suggests a

difference in degree, not essence, of the shallowness of the theoretical reasoning and rational formulations of technocrats. The top analogy offers a poignant caricature of the seemingly sophisticated, cosmopolitan theories about geopolitics, the new world order, and the national essence. More important, it reveals the alarming irresponsibility of Japan's wartime leaders and their inability or refusal to grapple with real issues determining their nation's fate.

The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere

The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere served as a complex ideological matrix that brought together various strands of Japanese technocratic and right-wing thinking. It fused managerial concepts of the multilateral business structure, leadership principle, and Grossraumwirtschaft with geopolitical ideas of an “organic state” that requires “living space” and Japanese pan-Asianist visions of an Asian liberation into a fascist vision of empire. These strands of thought mutually reinforced each other in their common vision of a hierarchical, organic, functionalist community. It was a product of the collaboration of the military, pan-Asianists, and ultra-nationalists, as well as technically-minded professionals including economic and regional planners, geographers, and engineers.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan came into possession of the precious materials that the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc lacked. In a broadcast to the nation on December 19, 1941, Kishi reported on the vast resources of Asia. The Philippines possessed superior iron ore, abundant flax, as well as coal, chrome and manganese ore. Malaya was the world's largest producer of rubber, tin, iron ore, coal, manganese, tungsten, fluorite, and bauxite. The Dutch East Indies had rich supplies of oil, rubber, tin, coal, iron ore, bauxite, copper, manganese, lead, zinc, chrome, tungsten, mercury, bismuth, and antimony. As for the South Seas, Kishi described it as a treasure house of minerals that have yet to be mined. He noted that there were only a few resources in which Greater East Asia was not self-sufficient. Through science and technology, Japan would create substitutes for these resources.

In early 1942, following the string of Japanese victories over the Allied Powers, Vice Commerce Minister Shiina acknowledged that some people likened Japan's recent acquisition of the vast resources of Southeast Asia to a “cat being given a whale.”¹¹

While admitting that such views of Japanese policy were probably inescapable, Shiina and his colleagues sought to portray the war not as an imperialist one, in which Japan would feast upon the vast resources of Asia, but as a moral and constructive war for the benefit of Asia. Appealing to Asian liberation and brotherhood, they argued that the current war was a “holy war” (seisensō) fought by Japan as the “moral leader” of Asia. Japan would replace the “egotistical,” “power-oriented blocs” of the Western colonial leaders with a Japan-centered “moral bloc” that promoted Asian prosperity and culture.

At the same time, the current battle was depicted as a “war of construction” (kensetsu sensō) in which Japan was building a Grossraumwirtschaft reflecting the modern trend toward national land planning and great power blocs. Technocrats argued, from the standpoint of economic rationality, that the weak, backward countries of Asia could not thrive independently outside of a larger regional bloc. Only through the synergies and economies of scale of such a bloc and the technological leadership of Japan could Asia compete with the West. Moreover, by describing the war as a “hundred year war” technocrats emphasized Japan’s long-term commitment to the Asian region. In the new era of multi-year planning, they explained, the first phase of construction would focus on obtaining essential raw materials needed for military victory against the Allies, followed by the longterm development of basic, civilian industries in Asia.

The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity put forth an alternative, ideological basis and a new unifying, organizational principle to articulate the multiple military, political, economic, cultural, and ethnic ties between Japan and Asia. As a “pan idea” it was based upon the geopolitical theory that the world would be divided into pan-regions consisting of four large economic spheres centered on the “core” industrial regions of the United States, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Within the bloc, “co-prosperity” would replace the Wilsonian ideal of “Open Door” in East Asia. In place of the liberal principles of “selfdetermination” and “self-interest” of the individual Asian countries within the international economy, reformists advanced the principle of “coexistence” of the Asian peoples within a self-sufficient bloc. Its organizational basis would not be free trade based on a country’s comparative advantage in natural resources or profitable market strategy, but rather the organic, hierarchical, functionalist principles of “totalism” (zentaishugi) and the multilateral business organization in which each member country,

according to its ability (kaku minzoku no bun ni ōjite), contributes its raw materials, labor, capital, or technological expertise for the benefit of the bloc as a whole.

Technocrats emphasized that Japan would not replace the West as the new imperialist power in Asia. Rather, Western capitalist colonial “exploitation” of Asia would give way to mutual “co-prosperity” of a liberated Asia resulting from the increased wealth and power produced by the Asian bloc. They argued that Japan, with its technical and industrial expertise, would lead Asia into the new technological era. Ultimately, though, they justified Japanese leadership of the Asian sphere to themselves not in terms of superior Japanese technology, but in terms of the Japanese geopolitical notion of “greater Japan” (dai Nihon), in which Japan is a superior organism that is entitled to grow at the expense of other Asian countries.

Technocrats saw Japan’s position shifting from a peripheral nation in the capitalist world order to a core nation within the concentrically arranged regional bloc. Planners described the co-prosperity sphere as consisting of a “Core Sphere” composed of Japan, Manchuria, North China, the lower Yangtze region and a Sovietoccupied north coastal region, a “Lesser Coprosperity Sphere” composed of the Core Sphere and Eastern Siberia, China, Indochina, and the South Pacific, and a “Greater Coprosperity Sphere” which included the Lesser Co-prosperity Sphere as well as Australia, India, and the Pacific Islands.¹² The latter represented no more than the “outer boundary” or peripheral sphere of the Japan-ManchuriaChina Bloc.

In justifying the new Asian bloc, they promoted the geopolitical concept of “living sphere” to explain the military’s dual strategy of northern and southern advance. In his formulation of the East Asian Cooperative Body in the late 1930s, reform ideologist Mōri had distinguished between Japan’s reformist “continental policy” in north China and its liberal, imperialist “maritime policy” in central and south China. Now he modified his position to argue that the two “living spaces” of the Asian continent and the Pacific Ocean were uniting into a “homogenous single space.” In 1940 he argued that the Pacific Ocean had taken on a new significance and was becoming the foundation of a new world order; he suggested that “...with regard to the historical stage of the life struggle of the Japanese ethnic people, [we] have finally discovered the possibility of organizing the waters of the Pacific Ocean, together with our land, into a living sphere.

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Finally, the sphere presented opportunities for “national land planning,” whose basic goals and principles were laid out in the Cabinet Planning Board’s “Outline for the Establishment of National Land Planning” (Kokudo keikaku settei yōkō).¹⁵ National land planning was conceived as part of Konoe’s New Order movement, but went beyond other New Order plans in incorporating a broader and more comprehensive spatial dimension to planning. Technocrats viewed national planning as the most advanced form of state planning. According to one technocrat, national planning went beyond the narrowly conceived “production technology” (seisan gijutsu) of the Soviet, Manchurian, German, and Japanese five- and four-year plans. These plans merely sought to meet limited, short-term targets for increasing production in industry and agriculture by temporary measures such as extending labor time or installing new equipment within a given geographical setting. National planning represented a new type of “construction technology” (kensetsu gijutsu) in which officials take a long-term - one hundred year - approach and seek the optimal geographical location of industries within the bloc. Now, the state sought to determine the most efficient distribution of the various facilities of the economy, population, culture, and society in order to promote the comprehensive development, use, and preservation of the native land in accordance with the state’s goal.

National land planning was first introduced and promoted by British planners as part of the movement for regional and urban planning. It was advocated as a means to decrease overpopulation and congestion in the major metropolitan areas by promoting satellite cities and towns, incorporating green belt areas, building a nationwide transportation network system, and formulating plans for regional growth. In contrast to the liberal type of national land planning focusing on suburban development, the authoritarian regimes of Soviet Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan looked to national land

planning primarily as a way to expand national productive power. The Soviet Five Year Plans, German Four Year Plans, Manchurian Five Year Plans, and Japanese Four Year Plans represented the first steps toward authoritarian national land planning.

Japanese planners classified national land planning in the various industrialized countries according to two general criteria. First, the state adopted either authoritarian planning from above or democratic planning from below depending on whether it had a liberal or totalist political system. Second, depending upon the particular developmental circumstances and history of a country, the state pursued the goal of either redesigning existing areas (*kokudo saihenseishugi*) or developing new land (*kokudo shinkōshugi*). Among countries which possessed undeveloped frontier land, the United States pursued grassroots planning from below, reflecting its liberal tradition, whereas Soviet Russia imposed centralized planning from above in accordance with its authoritarian political system. Among those countries smaller in scale which lacked open uncultivated land and focused on restructuring developed areas, England attempted bottom-up type liberal planning to address the social problems of industrialization, whereas Germany pursued top-down planning primarily for the purposes of national defense.

Ultimately, technocrats viewed the liberal system as an obstacle to true national land planning. They argued that since liberal countries did not tolerate top-down planning, they could only partly implement national land planning from below. Planning of the vast undeveloped resources in the United States stopped at the regional level because the state was not strong enough to restrain freedom and coordinate the various interests at the local and regional level. In terms of restructuring metropolitan areas in England, the challenges were multiplied. Suburban planning in England never took off because the state was unable to tackle the source of urban congestion: the *laissez-faire* economy, which permits uncontrolled economic and urban development devoid of an overall planning authority and vision.

Technocrats pointed out that national planning was not individual planning expanded to the national level, but rather the task of “determining the order of the land and striving toward its comprehensive functioning at the highest efficiency level.” For this reason, they argued that totalist regimes like Japan and Germany were best suited to carry out national land planning. Moreover, among totalist states, they believed that the

Japanese case was unique because Japan possessed both the challenges of reorganization of their native land and frontier development of its East Asian empire. The Japanese state's goals were to: build a national defense state system in Japan that incorporates strategic spatial planning for defense; establish an autarkic sphere in East Asia to secure resources for Japan; address Japan's social problems of urbanization resulting from rapid industrialization; and coordinate the various plans in a comprehensive way.

The ambitious planning visions, projects, and dreams of Japanese technocrats were soon dashed as the tides of war turned against Japan. But the biggest planning opportunity for Japanese technocrats came after its defeat, when the country faced the daunting task of rebuilding its economy and society from the ground up. From the late 1940s, following America's reversal of its occupation policy so as to make Japan the bulwark against communism in Asia, civilian technocrats emerged as the key architects of Japan's high-growth system. Upon his release from Sugamo prison in 1948, Kishi set about building the Liberal Democratic Party and strengthening the ties between bureaucrats, business, and the public along the lines envisioned in the wartime New Order.

Kishi and his technocratic planners were also a key force behind Japan's postwar economic reentry into Asia. As prime minister from 1957 to 1960, Kishi became the first Japanese head of state to visit the countries of Southeast Asia. He promoted his own vision of "Asian development" that appealed to wartime notions of "co-prosperity," Asian liberation, and stateled growth. Given Japan's controversial wartime past and the trans-war continuities in technocratic personnel, institutions, and concepts, it is not surprising that its Asian partners have continued to view Japanese development projects in the region with a certain amount of distrust. Japan's mixed legacy of planning challenges us to critically examine the ideological basis, politics, and lessons of wartime planning and to squarely confront the contradictions between the ideals and reality of Japan's wartime system

Self-Assessment Questions

1. When did Japan enter the Second World War?
2. What event led the United States to join the war against Japan?
3. In which year did the Pearl Harbour incident occur?
4. What was the main aim of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity?
5. Which country's navy was attacked at Pearl Harbour?
6. Who was the Japanese leader during the Second World War?
7. What was the impact of the Pearl Harbour attack?
8. How did the war affect Japan's economy?
9. What were the consequences of Japan's defeat in 1945?
10. How did the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere influence Asian nations?

Unit – V

China under Deng Xiaoping – Economic reforms – 1976 – 1989 – Jiang Zemin – Hu-Jiniao – Foreign Policy 1949-1990 – Mc Arthur Constitution – Changes in Economy – Hirohito – Mutusihito – Japan and Wold's affairs between 1951-2000

Objectives

- To the study of Deng Xiaoping from 1976 to 1989.
- To the roles of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao in modern China.
- To the McArthur Constitution and its changing economy.
- To Japan's role in world affairs between 1951 and 2000.

China under Deng Xiaoping

Deng Xiaoping did not originate reform and opening — that began under the leadership of Hua Guofeng after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. But Deng provided the steady hand, the clear direction and the political skill for China to succeed. He enjoyed the support of senior cadres who realised that Mao's continuing revolutions brought disaster, but he had the judgment to pace the reforms and keep the support of those who feared the opening of markets, as well as those who feared that the opening would be too slow.

Few people were better prepared for leadership of any country than Deng was when he became the preeminent leader at 74. He had been in charge of local government in Jiangxi Province's Ruijin County in the early 1930s, for the area in the Taihang mountains of Shanshi in the late 1930s and early 1940s and, after World War II, for the border areas of Hebei, Henan, Shandong and Shanshi. From 1949–1952 he was in charge of the entire southwest, with over 100 million people. He had been a wartime military commander (political commissar) for twelve years. In the Huai Hai campaign, where half a million Communist troops fought an even larger number of Nationalist troops, he ended as the front party secretary in charge of all the Communist troops. He had been general secretary of the party from 1956–1966 overseeing all major party affairs. He had been the acting chief of foreign policy, carrying on discussions with high-level foreign visitors during 1974 and 1975. He was finance minister from 1953–1954. He had been hardened by being purged three times. In 1975 he prepared for later modernisation programs by

overseeing the improvement of relations with Chinese scientists, and in 1977 he had reopened universities and revived competitive entrance examinations after a ten-year absence. Perhaps more important than any of these responsibilities in preparing him was his experience working closely with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong for some five decades as they thought about overall strategy for the revolution, domestic political and economic development, and relations with other countries.

To prepare for modernisation Deng developed closer relations with the leading modern countries. He paved the way for closer relations with Europe in his visit to France in 1975. He made the political decisions that paved the way for the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan in 1978, and then went to Japan in October that year in a triumphal visit that won the support of Japanese political and business leaders. He led the introduction of Japanese movies, literature and television series into China, helping Chinese overcome their negative feelings to Japan and learn from Japanese scientists, technicians and industrial leaders. He supervised the negotiations on the normalisation of relations with the United States until the final stages in which he personally carried out negotiations. This was followed by his tour of the United States in January 1979 in which he established good relations with President Carter, with congressional leaders and business leaders.

When Deng came to power in 1978, he feared the increasingly aggressive Soviet Union and Vietnam would take advantage of US withdrawal. He decided he had to attack Vietnam to show the seriousness of Chinese determination to resist and make clear the costs to the two countries if they were to continue to attempt advancement into Asia. But once Deng made his point and the Soviet Union stopped its advances through Southeast Asia, he attempted to pacify the relationship with the Soviet Union so that he could keep military expenses low and concentrate on peaceful economic development.

Deng gradually opened markets in the countryside and then in the cities. He continued government planning and state enterprises but opened more markets as he felt the political situation permitted. But immediately after becoming the preeminent leader he threw open wide the doors to foreign study.

Deng believed that the chaos in the century before the Communists took power in 1949 and the chaos of the decade of the Cultural Revolution had stymied economic

growth, and he was determined to keep the country stable even if it required the use of force to put down protests. He believed that how much a country moved toward democracy depended on how stable the political situation was. He made some moves to grant more freedoms than Mao had, but when public demonstrations interfered with the movement of people in the centre of Beijing he sent in unarmed troops. When this failed to bring order he told his troops to do what was necessary to maintain peace. Several hundred people were killed on 4 June 1989 in his effort to maintain stability. Deng then stepped down from formal positions; but in 1992 when he believed his successors were too cautious in promoting growth and market-opening, he took a trip to the south, successfully lighting fires to ensure that China continued to grow rapidly and that the role of markets continued to expand.

Economic reforms – 1976 – 1989

Deng Xiaoping secured the top leadership position in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1978. Deng was one of China's longest serving political elites ever since the establishment of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in the early 1920s. The diminutive leader (only 150 centimeters tall) was also a veteran of the legendary Long March (October 1934 to October 1935), the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937– 1945), and the Chinese Civil War (1927 to 1950). As such, he was a figure of considerable respect and influence within the CCP. Deng had also witnessed firsthand the dangers of radicalism and an intransigent adherence to ideology rather than pragmatism. He, and numerous other Party elites, such as Liu Shaoqi, who had dared to criticise Mao's economic policies had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. Deng's son, Deng Pufang, had also been left paralyzed by the Red Guards who allegedly threw him out of a third floor window after he was accused of being a 'capitalist roader'. After a period of political exile in Jiangxi province, he was permitted to return to Chinese politics by Premier Zhou Enlai (a Deng supporter) in 1974. When Zhou Enlai died in January 1976, Deng's support base was weakened, and the Gang of Four (led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing) organised another purge aimed at removing Deng from the centre of power. Deng however survived this purge, and when Mao died in September 1976, Jiang Qing and her supporters were politically isolated. In October 1976, the Gang of Four were ousted in a coup d'état. Within a matter of weeks, Deng was the de-facto leader of communist China.

In 1978, Deng brushed aside the less influential and less charismatic Hua Guofeng (whom Mao had nominated as his successor).

From 1978 until his retirement in 1992, Deng was the ‘paramount leader’ of the country. This period witnessed Deng and his supporters cautiously embark on a program of economic reforms that were to have a major influence on China and on the world. In the late 1970s, the Chinese communists chose to abandon economic policies that were centred on inward-looking self-reliance and dogmatic ideological convictions in favour of more pragmatic and outward-looking economic strategies. Deng and his reformist supporters’ objective was to secure the rapid but realistic industrialisation of China, and to ensure the country’s economic development and progress via an opening of the Chinese economy to the outside world. Through these economic reforms and through stronger ties with the world’s major economies, Deng and the reformists hoped to improve the standard of living of all PRC citizens and to build China up into a major political and economic power. Moderate and pragmatic Chinese political elites felt that valuable and painful lessons had been learnt by the failure of campaigns such as the disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958 to 1961) and the turmoil and instability caused by the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976). Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic attitude towards economic reform (while remaining opposed to hurried or major political liberalisation) was arguably best summed up in a speech he made at the Guangzhou conference in 1961, when he said ‘It doesn’t matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat, a cat that catches mice is a good cat.’

While Mao and his supporters had placed a priority on class struggle and socialism, Deng and other reformers argued that domestic political stability and economic development should be China’s number one objective (see ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’). Deng was a committed communist and thus did not reject socialism. Rather he argued that ‘socialism does not mean shared poverty’ and aimed to find a middle ground between a market economy and a political system that was still faithful to Marxist Leninist principles. This difficult intermingling of two very different economic system and a political system was referred to by Deng as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ or a vaguely defined ‘socialist market economy.’ The Chinese leader also called on people to ‘seek truth from facts’ based on study and research rather than strict ideology

(without reference to evidence and experience). Deng and his supporters longed for the day when China could return to its historical position as a leading global economic, military, and political power. Since the late 1920s and early 1930s and the days of the Great Depression, China had largely been a second-tier state economically where the real trading power resided predominantly with the free market capitalist economies of the US, Japan, Western Europe, and other countries that adopted similar economic models (note for example the ‘Four Little Dragons’ – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan). Communist party traditionalists and hard-line ideologues within the PRC however worried that major economic reforms and opening up could leave China vulnerable to exploitation by foreign states as had happened during the ‘Century of Humiliation’ (1839 – 1949). As Cohen observes, ‘those who argued that China could be strengthened by importing foreign technology and expertise without sacrificing its political principles prevailed, but the tension persisted for more than a decade after Mao and Zhou Enlai were gone’ (Cohen, 2000: 442).

One of Deng’s most immediate objectives after coming to power in 1976-78 was to repair the economic and reputational damage and political instability caused by the Cultural Revolution. As Cohen states, ‘they were supported by party leaders less receptive to integration in the world economy, less comfortable abandoning the Soviet-style planned economy, but equally as convinced that Mao’s utopian visions had brought the country to ruin’ (Cohen, 2000: 442). The cautious but powerful traditionalist elements, though recognizing the need for change if the PRC was to progress and become stronger, often forced Deng to slow the pace of his reforms. Despite differences about the pace and direction of reform, the party leadership was determined that China should achieve modernization in the fields of i) agriculture, ii) industry, iii) science and technology, and iv) defense. This objective is referred to as the ‘Four Modernizations’ (first proposed by Zhou Enlai in 1963). Their first success came in the area of agricultural reform where the reformists addressed the dire poverty of many of the PRC’s rural peasantry by incrementally shifting from a Mao-inspired collectivist farming system (note the negative consequences of collectivization during the Great Leap Forward) to one centered around family ownership of land. Under the new system, poor Chinese peasants were given control and ownership of the crops they grew, were given more

money for food quotas they fulfilled, and could lease land from those collectives still under the administration of the government. Once they achieved their quotas for the government, the peasantry could then sell any surplus food and produce in legal free markets, which meant more money at their disposal and a greater incentive to work hard and produce more. As a consequence of these positive changes, there was a dramatic rise in agricultural output and the standard of living of millions of peasants. The extra money made available to millions of Chinese peasants also witnessed a much higher demand for consumer goods, which benefitted and facilitated the rise of the manufacturing and industrial sectors.

The communist leadership also decided to accept foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign loans, and foreign assistance. They also permitted the evolution of a private non-state enterprise sector, which competed with state-owned enterprises (SOEs), thus gradually improving the competitiveness and quality of the PRC's industries and companies. Another positive initiative was the creation of 'Special Economic Zones' (SEZs) since 1980 in coastal areas and cities such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou (in Guangdong Province), Xiamen (in Fujian Province), and Hainan province. In these SEZs, the Beijing government permitted the establishment of preferentially treated free market export-orientated economies, which were hugely successful in encouraging investment and business growth. In the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s, the number of SEZs increased dramatically, and included inland and border region Chinese areas such as the Yangtze River valley (see also the Shanghai Pudong New Zone which was set up in the early 1990s). With the huge and potentially extremely valuable Chinese market place open to the world for business, billions of US dollars and other foreign currencies flowed into China. Foreign investors and companies flocked to the PRC hoping to capitalize on its massive market, immense population, and enormous low-wage and non-unionized work force. The influx of foreign technology and expertise meant that the Chinese could acquire technological advancement in a much shorter time than if they had waited to develop it on their own. The success of other East Asian states such as Japan, and the 'Four Little Dragons' (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) provided Deng and his supporters with some valuable lessons and examples for how to gradually rise as an economic power and to successfully trade with the outside world.

Following the examples of East Asia's wealthiest economies, Deng placed a high priority in cementing positive relations with the United States. As we discussed in a previous class, Beijing and Washington ties went through a period of rapprochement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This culminated in President Richard Nixon's surprise visit to China in February 1972. Despite this, domestic political instability and distractions in both countries however meant that the process of rapprochement slowed dramatically in the mid-1970s until Deng assumed power in 1978. After this, the reform era Chinese and the Americans succeeded in shelving the thorny issue of Taiwan and commenced formal diplomatic relations in 1979. This new relationship had an almost immediate influence on the PRC's economic growth with foreign and particularly US money and investment flowing into the giant country.

Friendship with the United States also proved important as the communist Chinese engaged in a war with their former ally, Vietnam from February until March 1979 (see the Sino-Vietnamese War). The PRC decided to attack Vietnam (an ally of the Soviet Union) in response to Hanoi's decision to invade and occupy Khmer Rouge controlled Cambodia (an ally of China) in December 1978 (see the Cambodian Vietnamese War from April 1977 until September 1989). The war started ostensibly over the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese people within Vietnam, and Vietnam's earlier occupation of some of the PRC-claimed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. At a wider geo-political level however, Beijing suspected that the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was part of a Moscow-backed strategy of extending Soviet influence in South-east Asia via its ally, Vietnam. Both the Americans and the Chinese had an interest in preventing the USSR (a mutual adversary) from strengthening its influence in the region. When the Soviets decided to stay out of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict (and not to support its allies in Hanoi), it showed to the Chinese that Moscow was unwilling to risk a major war with a powerful friend of the United States i.e. China. Beijing also learned some other valuable lessons from the conflict, particularly the realization that the PRC's armed forces, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), badly needed to upgrade and modernize its capabilities. Chinese forces suffered heavy casualties in the war, and had serious problems mobilizing men and equipment into areas of fighting. On a wider level however, it appeared as if the PRC had tipped the balance in the Sino-Soviet split in favor

of China, and justified Beijing's decision to improve relations with Washington. American investment, aid, and goodwill played a huge role in reform era China's rise and economic development. Examples of this support included the transfer of much needed technology, and the training of countless numbers of PRC scientists and engineers in American universities. The US marketplace, the largest in the world, also became the principal destination for Chinese goods and products as the PRC's export sector grew dramatically in the years after the late 1970s. This was reflected in the export statistics with as much as one third of all Chinese exports going to the United States. Despite occasional but manageable tensions over issues such as Taiwan, the overall atmosphere between the two giants for most of the 1980s was positive, with economic, social, and cultural ties becoming stronger year after year.

Its nine per cent rate of growth in gross national product for the years 1978 to 1993 was the fastest of any country in the world (not excepting Thailand whose GNP grew faster for the late 1980s). Despite continued low per capita income, the gross national product of China's billion [1000 million] people overtook that of Germany, placing China third in the world behind the United States and Japan. Many analysts predicted it would have the world's largest economy by the middle of the twenty-first century. Its international two-way trade soared from less than \$15 billion in 1977 to more than \$115 billion in 1990 and nearly \$200 billion by 1993. China joined the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank to become eligible for low-interest loans and economic and technical advisers. In the late 1980s, it became the largest recipient of United Nations Development Programme funding. Its exports were three times that of India's and it was obtaining a hundred times as much foreign direct investment. And its people were eating far better than they had in Mao's day' (Cohen, 2000:444). From the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s, the income of urban residents has increased by 14.1% and the income of rural residents has increased by 11%, reflecting a significant improvement in the standard of living for communist China's citizens. The fastest growing group in the PRC since the late 1970s has been a more educated and politically-informed urban middle class (80 million or 6.15% of the total population in 2007), which has played a major role in feeding consumer spending by acquiring the symbols of middle class life such as modern city apartments, a university

education, books and newspapers, holiday packages, cars, televisions, and so forth (for more details, see Pages 85 and 86 of ‘Rana Mitter, Modern China – A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2008). According to another source, in the years from 1981 to 2005, the percentage of the PRC’s population who live on less than one US dollar (\$1) fell from 85% to 15%. This meant that about 600 million Chinese citizens were lifted out of poverty as a result of the economic changes created by the reform and opening up era.

Divisions within China however (within the political elite between conservatives, party ideologists, and reformers and also at the street level) meant that Deng had to proceed slowly and carefully through uncertain and unprecedented changes for the Chinese dragon. The PRC leader famously referred to this challenge as “crossing the river by feeling for stones” during his famous southern tour of China in 1992. On a negative side, there were numerous problems, which have accompanied China’s economic rise and prosperity. Major issues include rampant corruption and environmental pollution and degradation. Rapid economic development has placed a heavy strain on the availability of natural resources such as oil, gas, and water. This has created frictions within China and between the PRC and its neighbours. Many people fear that the economy is over-heating and that China’s property boom will soon end and result in a property bust and then economic recession. There was also a very apparent ‘income gap’ and income inequality between people who live in the cities of China, particularly along the east coast, and those who continue to live in the countryside. The PRC’s income gap is one of the worst amongst the developing countries of the world, and has resulted in growing frustration amongst the country’s poor people with the Chinese Communist Party and the direction of reform. As China’s economy became more liberal and more vulnerable to the international market, the traditional social securities of communist life in the years before the reform period were also threatened and challenged, for example the traditional guarantee of life-time employment and healthcare. Many wealthy overseas economies complained about the huge influx of cheap Chinese products and called for measures to protect local and domestic manufacturers. In addition, Washington and Beijing have experienced serious disagreements over the PRC’s alleged

artificial undervaluation of the Chinese currency, the yuan (renminbi), so as to make Chinese exports cheaper than competitor economies.

Jiang Zemin

Since Jiang Zemin delivered his controversial speech advocating that private entrepreneurs be allowed to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on July 1, there has been much speculation about the authority of the speech and about the strength of Jiang's position as the party prepares for the Sixteenth Party Congress next fall. As discussed previously in the China Leadership Monitor, such speculation was fueled by a harsh attack on Jiang and his policies by conservative party leaders, led by the retired elder Deng Liqun. In addition, many people expected Jiang's close associate Zeng Qinghong, head of the CCP Organization Department, to be promoted at the party's Sixth Plenum in September last fall from alternate to full member of the party's Politburo, so as to better position him to join the Politburo Standing Committee following the Sixteenth Party Congress. When he was not promoted, there was renewed speculation about Jiang's political strength.

Careful inspection of authoritative commentary, however, suggests that Jiang's political position remains strong, that his speech has been endorsed by the entire top leadership, and that the "expositions" (lunshu) of Jiang will form the basis of the political report at next year's party congress. Moreover, commentary surrounding Jiang's speech has shed much light on what party theoreticians believe to be its most important themes.

Endorsement by the Party Leadership

In the days following the publication of Jiang Zemin's July 1 talk, every member of the Politburo endorsed the speech. Most significantly, given his conservative profile, NPC Standing Committee Chairman Li Peng was cited as endorsing the speech the very day it was given.¹ Two days later, Li, speaking to the party group of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, declared that Jiang's talk "is a Marxist programmatic document comprehensively promoting the construction of the socialist enterprise with Chinese characteristics in the new century and comprehensively promoting the new great engineering project of party building.

Further endorsement came when the Sixth Plenary session of the Fifteenth Central Committee met in Beijing September 24-26. The Communiqué issued at the end of the plenum stated:

The whole plenum highly appraised Jiang Zemin's talk at the grand meeting celebrating the eightieth anniversary of the founding of the CCP. It unanimously believed that the talk ... profoundly expounded the important thought and scientific meaning of the "Three Representatives" ... and that it is a Marxist programmatic document that... has great and far-reaching significance."

Not all plenum communiqés express unanimity about plenum deliberations, and so whatever private disagreements delegates might have had, the party nevertheless put itself on record as supporting Jiang's speech in the most authoritative terms. Such an endorsement puts Jiang in a strong position in the run up to the Sixteenth Party Congress.

Zeng Qinghong

Many people-- including this author--expected Zeng Qinghong to be promoted from alternate to full membership of the Politburo at the Sixth Plenum. Zeng had been expected to be promoted not only because the death of Xie Fei in October 1999 left a vacancy on the Politburo, but because Zeng enjoys a very close personal relationship with Jiang Zemin. It has also been widely believed that Jiang wants Zeng Qinghong to be promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee at the Sixteenth Party Congress to assure Jiang's continued political influence after he steps down from the position of general secretary.⁵ Many rumors swirled around Fifth Plenum in October 2000 concerning the same issue, and there does seem to be some reason to believe that Jiang discussed Zeng's political future with Standing Committee colleagues at Beidaihe prior to that plenum. If there is any truth in the rumor mill, Jiang's advocacy of Zeng met with strong, if artfully expressed, opposition. Because the Sixth Plenum was the last opportunity to promote Zeng to full membership before the upcoming party Congress, many believed that Jiang would make an all-out effort to promote his protégé.

Given the importance of Jiang's July 1 speech, however, it now appears that Jiang was more concerned with getting his ideological legacy approved by the party than with such a potentially divisive issue as the promotion of Zeng Qinghong. Although the CCP has in recent year's exhibited a preference for "step-by-step" promotions, there is no

prohibition -- formally or informally against skipping ranks. When Hu Jintao was promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo in 1992, he was not a member of the Politburo -- full or alternate. When Zhu Rongji was promoted to vice premier in 1991, he was only an alternate member of the Central Committee. Other precedents could be cited. With the strong endorsement of his July 1 speech by the Sixth Plenum, Jiang appears to be in a strong position to shape the composition of the Standing Committee, and it still seems quite likely that Zeng will be promoted to the Standing Committee next year.

Authority of Speech

Given the harsh invective that leftist elders used against Jiang Zemin personally and the content of his July 1 speech, including the accusation that it had not gone through the proper party procedures, it is significant that Hu Jintao, vice president of the PRC and heir apparent to Jiang Zemin, defended the procedures by which the speech was considered and drafted in a September 3 speech to the Central Party School. According to Hu, Jiang Zemin personally expended a great deal of energy and a long time thinking about the speech. It was based on extensive investigation into the domestic conditions and on careful analysis of the "historical lessons concerning the rise and fall, successes and failures of some political parties in the world" an obvious reference to the collapse of the CPSU and the socialist parties of Eastern Europe. Views both inside the party and out were considered, and "finally meetings of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and the Politburo discussed, revised, and determined" the speech. Interviews suggest that the discussions that led into the speech took place over a period of perhaps two years and included officials throughout China, including provincial and sub-provincial officials.

Defending and Explicating Jiang's Speech

In the period since Jiang's speech, party journals--including the Central Party School's newspaper Study Times (Xuexi shibao)--have discussed the meaning of Jiang's speech extensively. These discussions give new insight into the way party theoreticians--particularly those at the Central Party School, who played a role in drafting the speech--have been interpreting the main themes of the speech. In their articles, they have discussed the historical importance of Jiang's ideas, defended admitting private business owners and others into the party, tried to redefine the role of the party in contemporary

Chinese life, and developed the idea of “inner-party democracy.” Taken together, the ideological innovations included in the speech suggest a program of political reform, albeit one stopping short of democratization.

Admitting New Social Sectors into the CCP

The most controversial part of Jiang’s July 1 speech was his call to admit people from new sectors of society into the party. Since this has been widely reported as a call to admit “capitalists” into the party, it is worth noting that Jiang never used the word “capitalists,” even if that was the intent of his remarks. Jiang lists six sectors that have developed in recent years, and then, in the next paragraph, calls for admitting outstanding representatives of these strata into the CCP. Aside from whatever sophistry may have shaped Jiang’s choice of words, it is clear that the call was sensitive, and party commentary has defended it in practical, theoretical, and historical terms.

In practical terms, party commentary has repeatedly emphasized the rapid growth of the private economy and the party’s poor representation in that segment of society. For instance, one article stated that as of the end of 2000, the non-public economy accounted for 50.88 percent of industrial output, but the vast majority of enterprises in the “new economy” do not have party organizations. The article cited the example of Shanghai, which at the end of 1998 had only 353 party organizations in private enterprises and seventy-four in foreign invested enterprises – representing just 0.43 percent and 3.35 percent of those sectors. Without representation in that dynamic segment of the economy, the CCP is bound to end up in the dustbin of history. As one commentary put it, “One lesson of political parties that have lost their ruling positions in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is that they have lost the support of youthful entrepreneurs and young intellectuals.” One can either absorb such new economic actors into the party or push them into opposition.

Theoretically, party theoreticians have argued that, because intellectuals are members of the working class, the emergence of the “knowledge economy” means that the composition of the working class is changing – increasingly it is being improved by the addition of “mental workers.” Obviously the accusation that the CCP was no longer the “vanguard of the working class” was one that cut deeply, and the party responded by arguing that to be the vanguard of the proletariat, the party membership did not have to

come from the working class. What matters is the consciousness of the party members. As Jiang Zemin put it in his July 1 speech, “The criterion for determining if a political party is advanced, whether it is the vanguard of the proletariat, is primarily whether or not its theory and program are Marxist, whether or not it represents the correct orientation of social development, and whether or not it represents the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the people.” In short, what counts is not the class origins of the membership, but their ideology.

To make this argument, party commentators have drawn heavily on the party’s past. As a revolutionary party based in the countryside, the CCP drew heavily on peasants rather than workers. For instance, in 1928 (following Chiang Kai-shek’s bloody purge of Communists) working class party members constituted only ten percent of party membership. In 1929, the figure fell to seven percent, and in 1930 it fell again to 5.5 percent. Even, indeed especially, at that time, there were ideological disputes over the composition of the party. In his 1928 essay, “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains,” Mao Zedong argued that a “party made up almost entirely of peasants” would have to carry out the “ideological leadership of the proletariat.” A party resolution in 1933 criticized “leftists” who argued that “only real proletarians can enter the party.

Party commentators have focused particular attention on the December 1935 Wayaobao resolution because, in that resolution, there are a large number of statements that support the party’s current position. For instance, it states, “It is impossible for the party to gain leadership by relying on the activities of the working class alone. (This is a key point.)” It goes on: “The CCP is the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat. All people who are willing to fight for the CCP’s positions, regardless of their class origins, may join the CCP.” Not only does the Wayaobao resolution support the party’s position on drawing its membership from all segments of society, it also conveniently criticizes those “leftists” who would restrict membership more narrowly. The Wayaobao resolution is also useful because it was shaped by Mao Zedong and favored his insistence that ideology, not sociology, was important to the revolution.

Class Nature of the CCP

Ever since Jiang Zemin gave his initial talks on his “three represents” theory, there has been great speculation that the CCP would give up its “class nature” and try to

become a “party of the whole people” (quanmindang). Theorists from the Central Party School have visited Germany and are said to have studied the approach of the German Social Democratic Party quite closely. Similarly, it is widely rumored that Central Party School theoreticians have carefully studied The Third Way by Anthony Giddens, the British political theorist. Such reports, especially combined with Jiang’s efforts to expand the class basis of the CCP in his July 1 speech, have led to speculation that the CCP will, sooner or later, drop its “communist” label in favor of the more internationally accepted “social democratic” tag.

Whatever consideration may have been given to such ideas in CCP circles, recent commentary has made clear that the party has no such intention; indeed, the emphatic rejection of such ideas appears to forestall their likelihood for some years to come. The outcome of inner-party discussions has instead favored retention of the “communist” label while reinterpreting it in ways that the party leadership apparently thinks will provide sufficient room for maneuver in the coming years. As Hu Jintao put it in his Central Party School speech, “The ancestors cannot be tossed aside (lao zuzong buneng diao).

Zheng Bijian, the executive vice president of the Central Party School who has been active in helping to create the “three represents,” has firmly rejected the idea that the CCP should become a “party of the whole people” (quanmindang). According to Zheng, a party of the whole people would be a catch-all party that would include diverse and conflicting interests; only a party representing the interests of the most advanced class (the workers, redefined to include intellectuals and entrepreneurs) can reconcile divergent interests on the basis of the fundamental interest of the broad mass of the people. In addition, he adds, on a more practical note, that efforts to create a party of the whole people, such as those of Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union, failed. It is necessary, Zheng states, for the CCP to maintain its clear-cut class nature, and not fall into the “foreign trap” of calling the diverse people who have become prosperous in recent years a “middle class.” As Zheng puts it, “We definitely cannot copy Western concepts and include all of the broad mass of contemporary Chinese intellectuals, including science and technology workers, cultural workers, and economic managers, in the category of the

so-called ‘middle class.’ This denigrates, weakens, and even obliterates the working class.

The class nature of the CCP is obviously a sensitive issue. In Jiang’s original talks on the “three represents,” he did not use the term “vanguard of the working class.” However, he obviously had to take critics into consideration when drafting his July 1 speech, for that term is used eight times in the text. Nevertheless, the final time the term appears, Jiang modified it in an important way. He said, “our party can forever be the vanguard of the proletariat and at the same time be the vanguard of the Chinese people and the Chinese race.” It is in such ways that Jiang and the theoreticians who wrote the speech have tried to stretch traditional understandings of the meaning of the “vanguard of the proletariat.”

CCP as Ruling Party

Buried in the often arcane language of the lengthy speech is a theme that may emerge as critical in the months ahead, namely the transformation of the CCP from a “revolutionary party” (gemingdang) to a “ruling party” (zhizhengdang). This change is only implicit in the speech, which uses the term “ruling party” several times but does not contrast that concept with that of a “revolutionary party.” Nevertheless, commentary emanating from the Central Party School has highlighted this shift, pointing to several passages in Jiang’s speech that suggest its importance. In one passage Jiang says, “Our party has already changed from a party that leads the people in the struggle to seize national power to a long-term ruling party (zhizhengdang) that leads the people by holding national political power; [our party] has already changed from a party that leads national construction under the condition of external blockade to a party that leads national construction under the condition of comprehensive reform and opening up.” The Central Party School commentator declares that making clear these two transformations provides a “logical basis for improving many problems in our party’s construction.”¹⁹ Similarly, the Party Building Study Group at the Central Party School stated that it is “extremely important” to clarify that the CCP is a “ruling party.”

The notion that the CCP is a now “ruling party” suggests that its relationship with society and government must be changed to emphasize procedural regularity and institutionalization. This conclusion is underscored by another important passage in

which Jiang speaks of the “laws (guilu) of a communist ruling party.” This is the first time a party document has used such a phrase. In a well known report on political reform, Pan Yue, deputy head of the State Council Office of Economic Structural Reform, argued that the CCP must strive for legitimacy by enhancing attention to formal procedures, and the incorporation of this reference to the “laws” governing ruling parties suggests that ideas such as Pan’s are influential within the party.

Liberal Shanghai theorist Zhu Xueqin has linked the evolution of the CCP from a “revolutionary party” to a “ruling party” to the change in the economic system. He argues that whereas a mobilizational revolutionary party was appropriate to the era of a planned economy, an institutionalized ruling party is necessary for governing over a market economy. Zhu argues that the failure to carry out political reform simultaneously with economic reform has allowed “leftist” ideas to continue and even threaten the recurrence of a Cultural Revolution. He thus calls for carrying out political reform and establishing the concept that the CCP must operate within the bounds of the constitution.

Inner-Party Democracy

One of the most interesting aspects of Jiang’s speech and the surrounding commentary has been the emphasis on “inner-party democracy.” In part, this is an obvious parry of pressures stemming from economic globalization and Western models of democracy. As one article by the Party Building Study Group at the Central Party School put it:

Another reason to improve the party’s leadership system is to guard against the plots of Western hostile forces to “Westernize” and “divide” us. At present, peace and development remain the primary subject (zhuti) of the age, but threats from hegemonism and power politics as represented by the United States will exist continuously. In this severe and complicated struggle, we must have a clear recognition. We must fully recognize that whether or not we can improve the party’s leadership and governance (zhizheng) style is a major question related to the state’s long-term ability to govern and maintain stability

In other words, there is clear recognition that the CCP exists in competition with other models of political organization, and so its proposals to increase inner-party democracy are presented as an alternative to Western-style democratization.

Another reason cited for increasing inner-party democracy is to try to promote cadres who are acceptable to their local constituency, thus reducing conflicts between party secretaries and government leaders and increasing the accountability of party leaders. One of the sources of tension between local cadres and the public has been over the monopoly of power that the former have enjoyed and the temptations to abuse that power; that tension apparently exists not just between cadres and citizens but also within party organizations. As the Party Building Study Group at the Central Party School put it, “In some places the party monopolizes everything and power is overly concentrated. The governing and leadership style of the party in some places remains stuck in the old framework of the planned economy and the party running everything.... Overlapping functions, unclear responsibilities, and so forth are major reasons why party secretaries and government heads are not unified If these problems cannot be solved, they may threaten the ruling position of the CCP.

Thus, party reform focuses largely on the nomination and elections procedures within the CCP, and particularly reform of the party congress system. Party congresses are gatherings of party delegates who are supposed to convene every few years and elect leadership bodies at each level of the party. However, “there are a considerable portion of grassroots party organizations that are unable to convene party congresses or party representative meetings on schedule as required by party charter.... Those that are really able to re-elect grass-roots party committees every three or four years as required by party charter are few and far between; those that convene a party congress every eight or ten years are certainly not in the minority. Some units can’t even remember clearly in what year they last held a party congress.

Given these problems, party theorists have recommended a number of measures to open up and regularize the party congress system. These measures include the regular convening of party congresses, the bottom-up nomination of delegates to party congresses, the election of congress delegates in competitive (cha'e) elections (instead of being appointed by the party committee), allowing congresses to decide their own agenda, and establishing a party congress standing committee system, similar to that in the National People's Congress. Suggested reforms would also include institutionalizing methods of democratic evaluation, democratic recommendation, and democratic election

of leading cadres. Another proposal is to establish a hearing system that could consider different views when the party is contemplating major issues (such as revising the party charter).

These reform suggestions build on a large number of experiments that have been held in recent years, mostly at the lower levels, but extending up to the provincial level to expand the number of people participating in the selection of party leaders.

Downplaying Class Struggle

As the call to broaden the party base by admitting private enterprise owners and other social classes suggests, Jiang's speech played down the theme of class struggle--to the point that the term does not appear in the text. Besides omission, however, the text also played down the historic Marxist theme by stressing to an unprecedented degree the distance between the present "primary stage of socialism" and the future "communist" society. In keeping with the party's rejection of the notion of a "party of the whole people," Jiang insisted that the party's "maximum program" still lay in the realization of communism. However, Jiang also stressed the distance between the present and the future realization of communism. As Jiang pointed out, "the realization of communism will be an extremely protracted historical process. In the past, our understanding of this issue was quite superficial and simplistic." Emphasizing the length of time prior to the realization of communism pari pasu plays down the role of class struggle.

In addition, Jiang's speech used the expression "comprehensive development of people" (ren de quanmian fazhan) seven times without reference to the class nature of humankind.²⁸ This emphasis on human development is in strong contrast to earlier ideological documents that have stressed the class nature of human beings.

Finally, this de-emphasis on class struggle has been extended to China's relations with the rest of the world. In a recent article, Central Party School theoretician Li Zhongjie declared that human society "gradually moves from narrow national history toward broad world history," thus bringing about a "dialectical unity" between China and other nations. This blurring of the difference between "socialism" and "capitalism," both in China and internationally, is a striking and significant turn of events. It flies in the face of official denunciations of "peaceful evolution" that were routine only a few years ago and nationalist sentiment that has arisen in some quarters in recent years.

Hu-Jiniao

The late 1990s witnessed the extraordinary rise of Vice-President Hu Jintao from obscurity to pre-eminence as one of China's most powerful politicians and President Jiang Zemin's heir apparent. If Hu succeeds Jiang, he will lead China's 1.3 billion people into a new era. Over the next decade, he would manage China's emergence as a global power – a leading country with one of the world's largest economies, nuclear weapons and a seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Despite his importance, however, Hu Jintao's personal life and his political views remain opaque because he is an expert at avoiding attention and has only recently served in prominent positions. Yet Hu's political career spans decades and he has been personally involved in crucial events in modern Chinese politics: the suppression of Tibetan uprisings, the aftermath of Tiananmen, and the pivotal 14th Party Congress. Within the Chinese political system, Hu is well known and has an imposing reputation. He has received personal endorsements from China's highest leaders, including Deng Xiaoping. As Jiang Zemin's likely successor at the 16th Party Congress this autumn and the National People's Congress in 2003, Hu Jintao is positioned to become China's political head and a force in world affairs.

One of the most notable aspects of Hu Jintao's career is that he has survived as heir apparent for so long. Chinese politics is littered with potential successors destroyed by factional warfare. Hu's remarkable career is a product of his personal attributes, his political acumen and his talent for navigating factional conflict. Hu is also cautious and has avoided political mis-steps. Unlike most high officials who have developed traditional power bases through military leadership or administering major provinces, Hu built his political power through expertise in personnel and ideological matters. He cultivated a diverse set of powerful patrons whose ideological outlooks ranged from extreme conservatism to liberal reform. Four powerful mentors were instrumental to Hu's success: Gansu Party secretary Song Ping, Premier Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping and President Jiang Zemin. Moreover, Jiang's current support makes Hu Jintao one of China's most powerful figures and Hu is a component in Jiang's apparent plan to retain power after the 16th Party Congress.

Jiang Zemin is expected to relinquish his positions as general secretary of the Communist Party at the 16th Party Congress in the autumn of 2002 and as president in 2003. Hu could ascend to any or all of Jiang's three major positions: president, general secretary or chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Most probably, Hu will become general secretary in 2002 as Jiang has surpassed age limitations, and protocol is pressuring him to step down. Hu may also gain the presidency in 2003, because China's constitution requires Jiang to resign that post. The CMC does not require Jiang to resign the chairmanship, but Hu could also become chairman if Jiang relinquishes that post

Hu Jintao has become Jiang's successor for several reasons. First, Hu is young (aged 59), capable of leading China for many years, and he is a central figure in China's fourth-generation leadership. Secondly, Hu is broadly appealing. His political beliefs are economically mainstream but politically conservative. Hu advocates reforming China's economy, but steadfastly defends the Communist Party's monopolization of political power, making him a "moderate" with wide appeal. Thirdly, Deng's personal endorsement of Hu has carried enduring influence. Next, Hu and Jiang appear to have a solid working relationship, and Jiang has supported several of Hu's key promotions. Finally, Hu has not yet built his own political faction. Although he is associated with the Qinghua and Communist Youth League factions, he will probably owe his ultimate political fortunes to Jiang Zemin and other important sponsors who facilitated his ascent and he may remain reliant on them for some time.

Hu Jintao's Personal History

The young Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao was born in December 1942. Although official sources put his birthplace as Anhui's Jixi county, other accounts have reported that he was born in Shanghai. Little is known about Hu's family background except that his father was an accountant at a local household supplies store. His mother died when he was young. Hu and his two sisters grew up into Taizhou county, Jiangsu province.³ He was only six years old when Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic, and the country experienced Land Reform and the Great Leap Forward before he reached adulthood.

In 1959, the 17-year-old Hu moved from Jiangsu to Beijing's northwestern suburbs to attend Qinghua University, one of China's most prestigious universities. Indeed, Hu's association with Qinghua would be an important factor throughout his political career. Hu majored in hydroelectric engineering and specialized in fluvial multi-purpose power stations. He met his future wife, Liu Yongqing, at Qinghua. Hu and his wife have two children, a son and a daughter.

Hu joined the Communist Party in 1964 and graduated from Qinghua in 1965, just as the Cultural Revolution was consuming Beijing. This timing was fortuitous. Beijing's universities were soon closed because of the growing chaos, making him one of the last students to earn a degree before the educational system was frozen. He accepted a research position at Qinghua University and served as a political counsellor for the next two years. Qinghua's political counsellors, created by university president Jiang Nanxiang, were "double-loaded" – selected as both technical experts and political leaders. As the Cultural Revolution grew, Qinghua University became a headquarters for young Red Guard factions, but at the age of 23, Hu was too old to participate fully in the Red Guard movement composed of younger students.

The late 1960s marked the Cultural Revolution's most radical phase. Qinghua University was the site of extreme violence as clashes erupted between rival Red Guard factions, making Hu an eyewitness to the violent epicentre of Mao's Cultural Revolution. As Harry Harding notes: "At Beijing's Qinghua University, rival factions barricaded themselves in campus buildings behind cement barricades and wire fences, and used catapults to launch chunks of bricks and concrete against their adversaries." The Red Guard factions also turned their aggression on school authorities and scholars. Like many of his intellectual counterparts, Hu came under pressure from these radical groups. He was criticized for being "too individualistic"⁹ and charged with being a member of the "carefree clique".

The deserts of Gansu. The chaos eventually grew too much for Mao, and he ended the mass movement by sending students to the countryside. Hu was sent to the Liujiashia Hydraulic Power Plant in remote Gansu province. He spent more than a decade in Gansu, riding out the end of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death in 1976. When Hu arrived in 1968, he first laboured in a housing construction brigade and then worked as a

technician and deputy Party secretary in the engineering bureau under the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power. This work marked the beginning of his involvement in Party affairs. In 1974, Hu was transferred to the Gansu Provincial Construction Committee and served as deputy head of the Project Design Management Division. Despite the arduous work, Gansu provided an opportunity for the young engineer to improve his political fortunes. Hu caught the attention of the powerful Gansu Party secretary, Song Ping. Song's wife, Chen Shunyao, had been deputy Party secretary of Qinghua while Hu was studying there. The conservative Song Ping liked Hu and became his first political patron. In 1980, Song made Hu deputy director of the Gansu Provincial Construction Committee, a major promotion. Soon, Hu was appointed secretary of the Gansu Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, a crucial opportunity that marked the beginning of his long-term involvement in youth and personnel affairs. Later, under Song's direction, Hu left Gansu for political instruction at Beijing's prestigious Central Party School (Party School of the Central Committee), a training centre for young Party leaders. The young Hu Jintao was rising rapidly and Song had given him a chance to return to Beijing, China's political proving ground.

Hu Yaobang: a liberal mentor. In Beijing, fortune smiled upon the aspiring young leader. Jiang Nanxiang, former Qinghua University president and longtime ally of Hu Yaobang, was serving as vice-president of the Central Party School. As the 12th Party Congress approached in 1982, Premier Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping's chosen successor and powerful reformer, was troubled by the lack of young cadres on the Central Committee. He assigned a search-group the task of selecting young Party members qualified to serve on the Committee. The group began its hunt at the Central Party School in Beijing. One of its members recounts: "We picked [Hu] because he stood out above all the others. His was an easy choice, because what was rare at that time was that he had a university degree, and from Qinghua at that." Once selected, Hu's political portfolio expanded dramatically. The 12th Party Congress elected him an alternate member of the Central Committee. Building on his Youth League experience in Gansu, Hu was also appointed Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee and he became President of the All-China Youth Federation the next year.

While in Beijing, Hu Jintao forged a personal relationship with Premier Hu Yaobang. Despite prior associations with the conservative Song Ping, Hu Yaobang was impressed with the aspiring Hu Jintao and became his second major political patron, indicating Hu's ability to work with and impress diverse sponsors. In the spring of 1984, Hu Jintao accompanied Hu Yaobang on inspection tours of Hubei, Henan and Guizhou provinces. On the tours, Hu Yaobang stressed further agricultural reforms, and he urged promotions for younger cadres because they were capable, had broad knowledge and were "less affected by past convictions.

Hu Jintao's association with Hu Yaobang marked him as a liberal. In November 1984, at Hu Yaobang's urging, Hu Jintao became leader of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the world's largest youth organization with approximately 50 million members. Hu Yaobang had been the general secretary of the Youth League and retained tremendous influence. Also, in early 1985 in probably his first trip abroad, Hu Jintao travelled to North Korea to visit Chinese exchange students.

Going to Guizhou. In July 1985, Hu had a rare opportunity to leave the Youth League and enter executive office when he was appointed Party secretary of Guizhou, China's poorest province. He was 43 years old and the youngest provincial Party secretary in PRC history. His appointment was probably a result of his association with Hu Yaobang, and the transition both tested and heightened his leadership abilities. Moreover, the post strengthened his experience with minority populations, an important factor later in his career. In a speech in July 1985, Hu Jintao outlined his goals for Guizhou: "From the first day I arrived here, I have identified myself with developing and invigorating Guizhou's 176,000 sq km of land and making the province's 29 million people of all nationalities rich and happy." He then outlined the four main components of his plan: utilizing knowledge and talent, strengthening popular unity, seeking pragmatic solutions, and persevering in reforms.

distinguish himself and instituted no major reforms. Still, he made his mark locally. One of his first actions was to embark on an 11-day tour of villages and factories in Guizhou's western border areas. By the time he left Guizhou in 1988, he had visited all 86 counties, cities and districts; often inspecting the poorest areas and gaining a personal understanding of Guizhou's needs. As provincial Party secretary, Hu also hosted the

nation's highest leaders, including Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng, while they made inspection tours.

By meeting foreign officials. In 1986, he received the Australian governor general and met Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke in Canberra. At the invitation of the French Communist Party, Hu travelled to France in July 1988. In Guizhou, he also began formulating his position towards maintaining social stability. Recognizing the importance of economic development for all Chinese, Hu stated that, "we cannot have political stability and unity and economic prosperity without the equality and solidarity of all nationalities." He tempered his beneficent remarks, however, when discussing social unrest. As student demonstrations rocked Chinese universities in 1985, Hu said that "if big-character posters and other practices prevalent during the Cultural Revolution were allowed today, it would jeopardize social stability, scuttle socialist modernization, and hamper the democratic rights of the people.

In January 1987, while Hu Jintao was in Guizhou, conservative leaders forced Hu Yaobang's removal for failing to manage the student demonstrations. Despite the loss of this principal patron, Hu displayed impressive political dexterity by continuing to advance his career. His gratitude to Hu Yaobang endured over the years. While on a trip to Hu Yaobang's hometown in Jiangxi a few years ago, he reportedly made a visit to Hu's tomb and shed tears for his deceased mentor.

Governing Tibet: Hu's greatest political challenge. In late 1988, Hu faced the greatest challenge of his political career when he was asked to become Party secretary for the rebellious Tibetan Autonomous Region. While Hu was in Guizhou in the autumn of 1988, unrest was growing in Tibet. At a festival in Lhasa, Tibet, in November, pro-independence demonstrators crowded the streets, and the police began a crackdown. Tibet Party Secretary Wu Jinghua was under pressure from Beijing to end the growing conflict. Despite his military background and non-Han ethnicity, Wu had tremendous difficulty quieting the province. Unable to suppress the outbreak of violence in Lhasa, Wu Jinghua was recalled to Beijing and dismissed in 1988.

On 9 December 1988, with Deng Xiaoping's support, Hu Jintao was appointed to fill Wu's position and given a mandate to end the disturbances. Amid growing ethnic unrest, Hu became the first civilian Party secretary for the Tibet Autonomous Region in

the history of the People's Republic. He was chosen because of his young age (46), his ideological commitment, and the extensive experience in minority areas gained from his 14 years in Gansu and Guizhou. He arrived in Lhasa on 14 January 1989. In a January 1989 interview, Hu Jintao laid out his priorities: "Tibet is confronted with two major tasks. One is to safeguard unification of the motherland, adopt a clear-cut stand to oppose separatism, and stabilize the situation in Tibet; the other is to continue to carry out economic construction." Events soon forced Hu to focus exclusively on suppressing separatism and to postpone economic construction.

As the 30th anniversary of the 10 March 1959 Tibetan uprising neared, the situation deteriorated dramatically. Police shot and killed dozens of protestors on 5 and 6 March. Reporting on the violence, the New York Times wrote that, "The new party secretary, Hu Jintao, had no sooner taken up his post than the police fired on protesters at a demonstration." On 7 March Beijing imposed martial law in Tibet for the first time in 30 years. Hu acted decisively, co-ordinating the movement of People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Tibet to suppress the uprising. In a radio address on 9 March, Hu commanded security forces to crack down harder: "You must maintain vigilance against separatists now that martial law has been declared, and you must take even sterner measures against those who stubbornly resist." Speaking to Xinhua reporters one week later, Hu stated: "The imposition of martial law, subduing the riots, stopping sabotage, opposing separatism and safeguarding unification, is a major measure to stabilize the situation in Tibet."

The response was swift and brutal. Scholars and journalists estimate that hundreds of Tibetans were killed and many more imprisoned during the period of martial law. Martial law lasted nearly 14 months, ending when Li Peng lifted the order on 30 April 1990. Commenting on the end of martial law, Hu said, "Situations in Tibet are stabilizing, victory has been scored in quelling Lhasa turmoil, and improvement and rectification have seen preliminary results."

In 2001, on the 50th anniversary of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, Hu delivered a speech and referred to the troubles in 1989. "The course of the 50 years of storms and vicissitudes has brought a great truth: it is only the leadership of the Communist Party of China, only in the embrace of the big family of the motherland that Tibet can enjoy

today's prosperity and progress. This is the most important conclusion that we have drawn from the 50 years of Tibet's development." Notably, Hu remains active in Tibetan issues, suggesting an enduring interest in the province.

The aftermath of Tiananmen and Hu Jintao's meteoric rise. When Hu was suppressing riots in Lhasa during the spring of 1989, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese leadership were facing a crisis in Beijing. The student-led democracy movement had occupied Tiananmen Square, paralysing the capital. (The Tiananmen demonstrations were sparked by the death of Hu Yaobang, Hu Jintao's former patron.) On 4 June PLA soldiers opened fire on the demonstrators, killing several hundred civilians. Although the movement was crushed, China's leadership faced a host of problems. Communism was in retreat world-wide. Zhao Ziyang, who had succeeded Hu Yaobang as Deng's successor, was dismissed from office and arrested for siding with the demonstrators. The United States and other nations imposed economic sanctions on China. In short, Beijing was reeling as the communist leadership struggled to reconsolidate its authority.

Outrage over the brutal Tiananmen Square suppression threatened to ignite opposition in other areas of China. Although Hu Jintao maintained stability in Tibet, Shanghai and other areas surged in defiance. Deng Xiaoping delivered a crucial speech on television on 4 June, praising the military for "putting down the counter-revolutionary rebellion." Days later, Beijing television reported that Hu Jintao presided over a Tibet Party committee meeting to study Deng's televised address. Hu's meeting stressed that Deng's speech was vital to stabilizing Tibet and to safeguarding Party leadership. With such a staunch display of loyalty, Hu was one of the first provincial leaders to demonstrate his allegiance to Deng and the centre after the 4 June crackdown. His use of military force to suppress Tibetan unrest presaged the Tiananmen violence, demonstrated his strict conservatism and reaffirmed his loyalty to the besieged leadership.

In late 1990, Hu developed "altitude sickness" and left Lhasa to recuperate in Beijing. This respite gave him an opportunity to expand his network and political base in the capital. Although still Tibet Party secretary Hu remained in Beijing for nearly two years. Because he was young, energetic and politically trustworthy, the top leadership gave him many important projects. He briefed Party elders, wrote reports and presided over government panels. He also became the de facto executive director of the powerful

Communist Party Organization Department (under Song Ping)—a position that would serve him greatly in the future

During this period in Beijing, Hu personally impressed Deng Xiaoping. Deng reportedly praised Hu by saying, “I see this person Hu Jintao as not bad at all.” In January 1992, during his famous “southern tour” (nanxun), Deng again openly praised Hu. Deng became Hu’s third major political patron, and his personal endorsement solidified Hu’s position within the top leadership. His political fortunes soared. Deng was so confident of Hu that he offered him the opportunity to lead organizational preparations for the important 14th Communist Party Congress.

The 14th Party Congress. The 14th Party Congress in late 1992 marked a major personal victory for Deng Xiaoping, elevated Jiang Zemin and significantly changed the Chinese leadership. Having defeated conservative challenges to his economic reforms, Deng’s reform policies were fully endorsed in the congress report. Jiang Zemin presided over the meeting and became president, rounding out his positions as general secretary and chairman of the CMC, and securing his position as China’s next paramount leader. Critical promotions were also on the table at the congress, and Hu Jintao played an important administrative role. He drafted paperwork for Jiang’s elevation to the presidency, helped secure several Politburo positions for Jiang’s allies, and bargained with Qiao Shi, Jiang’s rival, over positions for Qiao supporters.⁵⁶ As older conservatives like Song Ping and Yao Yilin left office, the vacancies allowed for major personnel restructuring and the inclusion of young reformers, including Zhu Rongji and Liu Huqing on the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. With Deng’s direct support, Hu earned himself a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee and he added Party affairs to his portfolio.

The Central Party School. Hu Jintao’s next major advance came in 1993 when he became president of the Central Party School where he had studied after returning to Beijing in 1980. As president, he began grooming the political elite for future leadership positions and widening his political contacts among younger officials. At the school, Hu honed his expertise in personnel matters, paving the way for future participation in personnel decisions. He also became Jiang’s deputy for a leading group on new cadres, an indication that the two were forming a working relationship.

As president of the Central Party School, Hu built a reputation for being an ideological authority and a skilful technocrat. Since his political counsellor days at Qinghua, he has believed that cadres should be both “red and expert” – technically skilled and politically disciplined. He believes these qualities are essential for the Party to meet the domestic challenges brought by modernization and globalization. Hu actively promoted Jiang’s “three represents” campaign (san ge daibiao), that emphasizes making the Party relevant to contemporary conditions and is described as a major contribution to Chinese political theory. In addition, the Politburo approved a leading group, headed by Hu Jintao and Ding Guangen, the Party propaganda chief, to compile The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, a potentially important component in Jiang’s legacy.

The Chen Xitong corruption scandal. In early 1995, Jiang Zemin launched an anti-corruption drive that destroyed Chen Xitong, Politburo member, mayor of Beijing and Jiang’s political rival. Hu Jintao’s help managing the scandal reaffirmed his loyalty to Jiang, established their first serious co-operation and initiated Hu’s involvement in high-level anti-corruption cases.

Chen had been mayor of Beijing since the 1980s, but was extremely corrupt. Though his graft blemished Jiang’s record, Chen had also openly criticized Jiang’s rule. In January 1995, Jiang opened an anti-corruption drive aimed at Chen that soon began unravelling a network of corruption. Investigators implicated Chen and Beijing Vice-Mayor Wang Baosen for bribery involving the lavish Oriental Plaza planned for construction along Wangfujing Avenue. Chen resigned on 28 April and was expelled from the Party. As the shock waves from Chen’s purge spread and other officials were implicated, Hu Jintao played a critical role in managing the fall-out. According to Bruce Gilley, Hu Jintao, as Politburo Standing Committee member with special responsibility for Beijing and for Party affairs, was entrusted with explaining the reasons behind the purge to Beijing cadres. On 29 April, the day after Chen stepped down, Xinhua reported that at a high-level meeting in Beijing, Hu Jintao announced that Wei Jianxing was replacing Chen as Beijing Party secretary: “Hu Jintao pointed out in his speech that the CCP Central Committee’s decision is conducive to Beijing Municipality’s stability, to its work proceeding smoothly in all respects, to deepening the anti-corruption struggle, and

to the Party's cause." Chen's removal was a major victory for Jiang. For Hu Jintao, the episode solidified Hu and Jiang's political relationship.

Deng's passing and the end of an era. Deng Xiaoping's death on 20 February 1997 brought China into a new political era. When Deng's ashes were scattered into the Bohai sea, Hu Jintao received an important honour symbolizing his closeness to Deng: Hu was the only Politburo member to accompany family members and former bodyguards to witness the ceremony.

Deng's death quickly brought political changes to Beijing. At the 15th Party Congress in September 1997, Jiang declared that China should "hold high the banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory." Deng Theory was subsequently incorporated into both the Party and state constitutions. Important personnel changes occurred as well. Li Peng remained on the Politburo Standing Committee, while Qiao Shi, Jiang's rival, lost his position on the standing committee. Given his expertise in personnel matters, Hu is believed to have managed the nomination process for new Central Committee members for this congress. Notably, the first all-civilian Politburo Standing Committee since the Communist Revolution in 1949 was appointed. This change supported the rise of technocrats and strengthened civilian control over the military, important developments for civilian leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Hu gains the vice-presidency. In March 1998 at the Ninth National People's Congress, Hu, at the age of 56, became the youngest vice-president in the history of the PRC. Although the vice-presidency had been a largely ceremonial position, Hu Jintao was determined to make it a powerful post. In another stunning move at the session, the Party leadership declared that military, police and judicial units had to divest them selves of their business interests. Hu was given the unenviable task of overseeing the closure of all PLA businesses and the transfer of assets to local authorities. Xinhua quoted Hu as saying: "The move is part of the anti-corruption work in the army, the armed police and law-enforcement departments to protect their very nature." Condemning cases of corruption and fraud, Hu warned that "criminal responsibility must be sought against those who have committed crimes,"⁷⁰ and he later cautioned that the military "could become a hotbed of corruption.

In December 1998, Jiang chose Hu Jintao to represent China at the ASEAN meeting in Hanoi, bolstering Hu's diplomatic credentials. The meeting marked Hu's first opportunity to represent China at a top-level international conference, and he met other Asian leaders, including Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, South Korea President Kim Dae Jung, and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. As Asian economies struggled to recover from the Asian financial crisis, Hu reassured his colleagues by stating that China will "keep renminbi exchange rates stable, and continue to provide, within its capacity, relevant ASEAN countries with assistance." Although protocol would suggest that President Jiang or Premier Zhu Rongji attend the meeting, it appears that Jiang wanted Hu to improve his international and domestic stature. Furthermore, Hu's performance strengthened his position before the fourth plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee, where Jiang hoped to promote Hu to the Central Military Commission.

The embassy bombing and unexpected opportunities. On 7 May 1999, during the NATO intervention in Kosovo, US bombers unleashed missiles that demolished the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, injuring staff members and killing three Xinhua journalists. Many Chinese believed that America deliberately bombed the embassy in a brutal effort to intimidate China. On 9 May, Hu Jintao appeared on Chinese national television condemning the action. He was the first Chinese official to make a public response. In a judicious mix of nationalism and restraint, Hu called "on the UN Security Council to convene an emergency meeting to discuss and condemn this barbarous act of US-led NATO." Meanwhile he stated that "China firmly supports and protects ... all legal protest activities," and he urged students and other protestors to get back to work. Hu's televised appearance was the first time most Chinese had ever heard him speak. For Hu Jintao, the address was a political windfall that broadened his public appeal and boosted his nationalist credentials. Shortly after the embassy bombing, Hu increased his political power.

Again by acquiring a key position on the Central Military Commission, China's highest military body. On 22 September 1999, Hu was appointed vice-chairman of the CMC, making him only the second civilian (after Jiang Zemin) to serve on the leading group. The move successfully completed Jiang's previous attempts to include Hu in the

CMC. It also consolidated Hu Jintao's power at the highest levels, greatly strengthened his chances to succeed Jiang Zemin and engaged him in military affairs.

Stepping on to the world stage. During 2001, Hu Jintao's profile on the international stage rose significantly when he was received by major foreign leaders with full honours. Hu had been active in Chinese foreign policy towards East Asia and Latin America after becoming vice-president, but his breakthrough into China's big power diplomacy came in October 2001 when he embarked on a five-nation tour of Russia and Western Europe (Britain, France, Germany and Spain). Although Hu discussed important issues when meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin (the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty and post-Taliban Afghanistan) his other meetings were relatively light on substance. The main purpose of the trip seems to have been to raise Hu Jintao's political stature.

In early 2002, Hu had important opportunities to meet US leaders. During President Bush's February summit with Jiang Zemin in Beijing, Hu met Bush twice. On one occasion, Hu introduced President Bush at Qinghua University. At the invitation of Vice-President Cheney, Hu visited New York, Washington, San Francisco and Honolulu in April and May 2002. This was his first trip to the United States. During Hu's carefully scripted visit, he met a cast of senior US political leaders, including President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld and congressional leaders.

Hu-Jiniao – Foreign Policy 1949-1990

Hu Jintao presided China's phenomenal rise as a global power and its turn toward a strident direction in foreign affairs. Hu's foreign policy legacy, therefore, can be found by the answers to the following three important questions. First, to what extent did Hu abandon Deng's low profile diplomacy and reoriented Chinese foreign policy in a more assertive or even aggressive direction supported by its new quotient of wealth and power? Second, how did the Hu leadership perceive China's geopolitical position in making China's foreign policy? Third, was China under Hu ready to take a global leadership role and responsibility as a rising great power? Seeking answers to these questions, this short essay argues that while the Hu leadership never openly abandoned Deng's low profile foreign policy, China was increasingly assertive in defense of the so-called core national interests, reacting stridently to all perceived slights to its national pride and sovereignty.

At Hu's departure, China was in tension with both Western powers and its Asian neighbors, making China "one of the loneliest rising powers in world history."¹ This was a reflection of the Hu leadership's confidence, frustration, and insecurity in the making of China's foreign policy. As a result, China was still obsessed by its immediate interests in response to the daunting internal and external challenges to its regime survival and territorial integrity. Hu thus left a strident and confident as well as frustrated and insecure China in the search for its rightful place.

The Strident Turn to Pursue Core Interests

When Hu took over China's leadership, he followed the *taoguangyanghui* policy—hiding its capabilities, focusing on its national strength-building, and biding its time—set by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s to avoid confronting the US and other Western powers because China's circumscribed national strength and geostrategic position did not allow it to exert big enough clout. As a result, Beijing made pragmatic accommodations to "learning to live with the hegemon," i.e., making adaptation and policy adjustment to accord with the reality of US dominance in the international system and because the US held the key to China's continuing modernization efforts.² In relations with its Asian-neighbors, Beijing continued a "mulin zhengce" (good neighboring policy) to create a peaceful regional environment conducive to its economic development.

Weathering the global economic slowdown better than many Western countries and overtaking Japan as the world's second-largest economy at the end of the Hu administration, China's foreign policy made a strident turn as China's core national interests, defined as "the bottom-line of national survival" and essentially nonnegotiable,³ suddenly became a fashionable term, appearing more and more frequent in the speeches of Chinese leaders and official publications. Chosen obviously with intent to signal the resolve in China's rising power aspirations, Chinese leaders steadily included more and more controversial issues in the expanding list of China's core interests. Pursuing the core interests, China reoriented its foreign policy in a more assertive direction.

In its relationship with Western countries, China no longer avoided appearing confrontational, "berating American officials for the global economic crisis, stagemanaging President Obama's visit to China in November, refusing to back a

tougher climate change agreement in Copenhagen and standing fast against American demands for tough new Security Council sanctions against Iran.” With Western economies floundering and Chinese economic and diplomatic clout rising, a perception of the US in heavy debt to China but still attempting to leverage its superiority to keep China down made Chinese leaders less willing to make adaptation and more ready to challenge the US in defending what they called core interests. In response to US President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in early 2010, instead of following the low profile dictum, China reminded the West of the tough statement that Deng once made: “no one should expect China to swallow the bitter fruit that hurts its interest.”

In its relations with Asian-Pacific neighbours Beijing asserted its core interests to prevail in maritime territorial disputes, even at the expense of appearing the villain. For many decades after the founding of the PRC, China pursued a delaying strategy to avoid using force and escalating the conflicts. In the last two years of the Hu leadership, China embarked on a new pattern of aggressively asserting its suzerainty and sovereignty over the disputed maritime territories. As a reflection, although China’s official statements on core interest issues involving sovereignty and territorial integrity referred almost exclusively to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, Chinese leaders expanded the core interest issues in 2009 to include the maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea, where China confronts a mosaic of disputes over islands and seas also claimed by Southeast Asian nations. Deploying more personnel and installing new equipment to carry out regular sea patrols and law enforcement more frequently and forcefully in the South and East China Seas, China made strong reactions to a chain of incidents in 2009-2012, including China’s repeated attempts to prevent Vietnamese and Philippine vessels from exploring oil and gas in disputed waters in the South China Sea and China’s punitive actions during the Sino-Japanese standoff over Japan’s detention of a Chinese trawler captain and the Japanese government’s decision to nationalise the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. These incidents provoked diplomatic crises during which China displayed its naval warships to support its sovereignty claims. As a result, China’s relations with Asia-Pacific countries have come to a low point not seen in many years.

Confidence, Frustration, and Insecurity

China's strident turn was a reflection of the confidence, frustration, and insecurity of the Hu leadership with the making of foreign policy. China was increasingly confident in its ability to deal with the West and territorial disputes with neighbors, deriving mostly from the enhanced power capacity, particularly its relative success in shrugging off the global financial crisis and maintaining a strong growth trajectory. Perceiving the global balance of power tilting to its favor, China became more willing to proactively shape the external environment rather than passively react to it and forcefully safeguarding its national interests rather than compromise them.

With the increasing confidence, China was frustrated by what it perceived as anti-China forces to prevent China from rising to its rightful place. In particular, China was frustrated by the so-called structural conflict between China as a rising power and the United States as the sole superpower and was therefore convinced that the US would never give up the policy of containing China. Although many Americans blamed China's illiberal political system as one of the main points of friction, the Chinese wondered whether or not conflict would remain and grow starker even if China became democratic, as the US would not want to see China, democratic or not, to be richer and stronger.

This peculiar sense of frustration sustained a popular nationalist sentiment. With a deeply rooted suspicion over the United States and other Western powers and calling for the Chinese government to redeem the past humiliations and take back all "lost territories," popular nationalists asserted increasingly heavy pressures upon the Chinese government to take a confrontational position against the Western powers and adopt tougher measures to claim its maritime territories in the disputes with its Asian neighbors. While the Hu administration came to office and followed its predecessors to make sure that Chinese foreign policy was not dictated by the emotional nationalistic rhetoric, it ended up more willing to follow the nationalist calls to take confrontational position. This strident turn was partially because the government became increasingly responsive to the public opinion as the average Chinese found a growing number of ways to express their nationalist feelings and impose pressure upon China's foreign policy makers to be firm in protecting China's national interests. But more importantly it was because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism. Enjoying an inflated

sense of empowerment, the Hu government became more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the core interests.

With the growing confidence and frustration, the Hu administration was also concerned about the economic and political uncertainties at home because China's rapid economic growth not only created huge social, economic and political tensions but also raised expectations of the Chinese people for the performance of the government. Facing serious challenges from growing public demands related to the government's policies on economic and social inequality, endemic corruption, epidemic pollution, emaciated health care, shredded social services, entrenched industrial overcapacity and swiftly aging population, ethnic conflict, etc, the Hu leadership knew that their legitimacy depended on their ability to meet the various demands from the society. White-knuckling their way through their final years in office before handing over to the next generation of leaders and nervous about maintaining long-term regime legitimacy and social stability, the Hu government would want to do its best to foster its reputation as protector of national pride and domestic stability and take an assertive stance in defending China's core interests, where national pride and regime survival were seen as at stake.

Global leadership and Great Power Responsibility

Vigorously pursuing the core interests, China under the Hu leadership was not ready to take on the role of the global leadership and more international responsibilities as a rising global power. At the first China-US Strategic & Economic Dialogue in Washington, D. C. in July 2009, State Councilor Dai Binguo told his American interlocutors that China's three core interests were maintaining its fundamental system and state security, state sovereignty and territorial integrity and the continued stable development of its economy and society.⁸ These were narrowly defined interests having more to do with the preoccupation of the Hu leadership with regime survival and national security than with China's great power aspirations.

Concentrating mostly on its core interests in a fairly narrow sense, China was reluctant and very selective in taking on global and regional responsibilities. An official Outlook Weekly article, "Hu Jintao's Viewpoints about the Times," proposed a concept of "shared responsibility," which set two important parameters of Beijing's international responsibility. First, China's contributions to the global commonwealth

cannot adversely affect China's core interests. Second, China's international commitments are conditional upon the inputs of other states, especially developed countries and regions such as the United States and the European Union.⁹ As a result, Hu's China did not take on a broad international responsibility to be the visionary and magnanimous global player looking beyond its own often desperate and narrowly focused core interests.

Juggling its emerging great power status with its parochially defined core interests, Chinese scholars debated and expressed at least three views on China's changing international role. One view urged the government to abandon the passive "tiaoguang yanghui" policy and take a "great power" (daguo) responsibility to ensure a "just" world order. The second view called for a modified taoguangyanghui policy to give more emphasis on "youshuo zuowei" (striking some points/successes). The third view was to continue the low key policy. The first view received most attention in the Western media and was also popular among the Chinese people but it was not the official position of the Hu administration, which took the third view although the second view was the actual policy practice. As an expression of this delicate position, Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi had to emphasize the importance of holding on to the low profile policy while called to "act as a responsible big country (power)."

This ambivalent position is a reflection of the dual-identity of China as a rising power and a developing country. While the Hu leadership cherished China's rising power status, it still pretended to be a developing country. Wrapping its great power aspirations in modesty and pointing out that China is still a developing country with only one tenth of the per capita GDP of the US, Premier Wen Jiabao firmly reiterated that "China remains a developing country despite remarkable achievements and its modernization will take a long time and the efforts of several generations." Wen's statement was not simply an expression of modesty because China indeed faced numerous internal social, economic, environmental, demographic and political challenges that could significantly overshadow China's long term economic growth.

The Hu leadership left a complicated foreign policy legacy. Keeping its head low for many years, China raised its head and made a strident turn in its foreign policy. Growingly confident in its increasing power and influence, it, however, was increasingly

frustrated by the perceived containment of the Western powers. In the meantime, the regime's fear of many social, economic and political uncertainties at home also played an important role in Hu's foreign policy making. Constantly struggling to find a balance between taking a broad great power responsibility and focusing on its narrowly defined core interests to play down its pretense of being a global power, China was never "psychologically prepared to play a full 'great power' leadership role in confronting problems."¹² Beijing's assertiveness, therefore, was not joined with a broader vision, making China often reluctant to shoulder greater international responsibilities.

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Mc Arthur Constitution

When the Americans began their occupation of Japan in 1945, they were determined to mold the country in their own image—not a replica of America as it was but a manifestation of the image that they had of America. In addition, the wartime experience meant that they wanted a de-militarized Japan. The result was a massive program of economic, social, and political reform.

Many of these reforms were accomplished by legal edicts (the zaibatsu purge and agrarian land reforms come to mind), but laws are easily amended and did not reach deeply enough into the Japanese sociopolitical structure. Thus it was that the Office of the Supreme Com-mander for the Allied Powers (SCAP, which ran the Occupation) decided to push for far-reaching constitutional re-form. This need was especially important given the American decision to leave the emperor on his throne rather than put him in the defendant's box at the Tokyo Tribunal.

On the other side, the leading Japanese did not believe that the Meiji Constitution had to be scrapped. Instead they saw it as a weak Constitution that had been subverted and needed only minor shoring-up.

How this difference was resolved is the tale of Inoue's book-not the outcome, which we all know, but the process of reconciling the two sides and devising terminology that would be acceptable to both (and it had to be at least minimally acceptable to the Japanese side be-cause SCAP had decided that promulgation by the emperor and passage by the Diet was essential to giving the new Constitution greater legitimacy and establishing democratic precedents).

Part of the difference was mooted, of course, by the fact that the remaining Japanese power structure was not in a position to argue too strongly with SCA Yet much of the rest was resolved b translation finesse, and it is this that interests linguist Inoue.

Advice and consent

When SCAP drew up their initial drafti February 1946, they included, inter alia (i) the emperor as deriving his positio solely from the sovereign will of th people, (ii) individual dignity as the basi of marriage and the family, and (iii) free dom of religion and separation of church and state-all of which had other ramifica tions and all of which created problems for the traditionalists within the Japanese government. The disagreements over the emperor wars perhaps central, and their disposition most revealing. For space reasons, let me simply cite Inoue's dis-cussion of the "advice and consent" clause in Article 3.

For the Americans, it was clearly important that the emperor's powers be checked. For the Japanese, it was clear that, despite all that had been done in his name, the emperor had no serious powers to check. The Japanese, knowing that the emperor was bound to accept the Cabinet's advice and remembering that all laws, imperial ordinances, and imperial prescripts had to be countersigned by a minister of state, saw no need to change the Meiji Constitution's hohitsu (literally "assist" the head of state to carry out his duties).

The Americans wanted to make this "advice and consent" the same way that the advice and consent of the Senate is required, for example, in treaty ratification under the U.S. Constitution. As such, they wanted to institutionalize the idea that the emperor could not take independent initiatives.

In substance, this was no problem-except that SCAP wanted to go one step further and make the Cabinet clearly superior to the emperor (despite the fact that the Senate is not clearly superior to the president in modern practice) and the Japanese wanted to retain the emperor's symbolic position as head of state.

After several false starts, among them *hosa to doi* (literally assistance and agreement, with assistance being in the role of an assistant and agreement being very status-neutral) and *hohitsu-sando* (with *sando* again simple agreement), the two sides finally settled on *jogen to shonin* (advice and approval, with the *ad-vice* still being in the assisting sense but approval the same term as the Japanese side had rejected at one point as perhaps not deferential enough).

The nuances of status were very important, and Inoue recaptures both the two sides' concerns and the flow of the interpellations in the Diet-questions that the government representatives had great difficulty answering because they shared the questioners' misgivings and could not simply plead "SCAP's orders." It is a revealing look

Better misunderstanding

Much of my own work is premised on the assumption that people who understand each other better will get along better-and especially that better understanding can reduce contentious international relations to manageable proportions. Yet Inoue's perceptive book provides a vivid illustration of how and why exactly the opposite was true for Japan-U.S. relations during that crucial period in which Japan's postwar Constitution was being drafted and adopted.

Associate professor of linguistics at the University of Illinois at Chicago, Inoue says she came to this project by accident when she noticed meaning discrepancies in some of the conditional sentences in the Japanese and English text of the Constitution. In pursuing these differences, she eventually concluded that the two texts differed because of conscious and unconscious decisions made by their authors based on the two countries' sociopolitical heritages.

Inoue's, MacArthur's Japanese Constitution is a little technical and may be difficult going in places, but it is well worth the reader's effort.

Changes in Economy

Japan's longest-reigning monarch, Emperor Hirohito, was born Michinomiya Hirohito, on April 29, 1901, in the Aoyama Palace in Tokyo. Hirohito was the first grandson of Emperor Mutsuhito and the first son of Crown Prince Yoshihito (later Emperor Taishō) and Princess Sadako (later Empress Teimei).

Being the first male child in the family, Hirohito was destined to carry on the tradition of an imperial line whose descent is traced in legend from Amaterasu Omikami, the sun goddess in the pantheon of Shinto. According to Japanese tradition, the imperial line began in 660 BC with the legendary Emperor Jimmu, considered as a direct descendent of the sun goddess Amaterasu. Around the third century AD this "imperial clan" defeated rival chieftains and first asserted dominance over central and western Japan. The imperial institution survived for more than 2,600 years despite some individual emperors being deposed and others murdered from court intrigues. For the next several hundred years, power shifted to various aristocratic and military clans. In 1868, the leaders of what is now called the Meiji Restoration claimed the reestablishment of direct imperial rule. Japan became a centralized nation-state with the emperor as the symbol of national unity; loyalty to him was expected to be a sacred duty and a patriotic obligation. Assuming the position of highest priest of the Shinto cult and claiming to be of divine ancestry, the Japanese emperor presented himself with an aura of sacred inviolability.

Hirohito was born into this 2,600-year lineage. Upon his birth, scholars of the imperial court sought an appropriate name for him. They found a passage written by Confucius in the year 500 BC, about instructions given by a Chinese emperor to his young brother that said, "Make yourself broadminded and let people live in comfort." The Chinese character that Japanese pronounce "hiro" was taken from the classic Chinese rendering of the word "broad-minded" and was combined with the word "hito" meaning "benevolence," which is part of the personal name of every Japanese emperor.

Mutsuhito was still emperor when Hirohito was born in 1901. Following imperial custom, the emperor chose to have his grandson raised not by his parents but by a surrogate family that could teach him the merits of honor and discipline. Therefore, while only a few months old, Hirohito was taken to the residence of ex-navy

minister and former vice admiral, Count Kawamura Sumiyoshi. When Kawamura died three years later, in November 1904, at age sixty-seven, Hirohito and his younger brother Chichibu-no-miya Yasuhito Shinno (born in 1902) rejoined their parents at the Togū-gosho, the crown prince's palace in Akasaka. On January 3, 1905, Hirohito's second brother, Takamatsu-no-miya Nobuhito, was born.

The Crown Prince's Education

After Kawamura died, Count Maresuke Nogi, an illustrious warrior of the Japan military, a hero of the First Sino-Japanese War and the war with Russia, became one of Hirohito's tutors. By then, Nogi was an old soldier and the headmaster of a school for the sons of the aristocracy. He taught Hirohito the traditional spirit of Bushido and the way of the samurai. To Hirohito, Nogi personified the virtues of patriotism and the samurai ethic of personal austerity and devotion to duty, which constituted part of the legacy of Tokugawa to Meiji Japan. In addition, Nogi emphasized physical fitness, 'the habit of diligence,' punishment for misbehavior, no leniency in grading, plain living, and military training. Thus schooled from an early age to military principles, Shintoism and respect for the Daigensui, this was effectively a military education.

A firm believer in Confucianism, Bushidō, and the precepts of Zen, Nogi favored a strict military- style education for Hirohito. Under the routine he established; the young prince had a very difficult schedule. He awoke early in the morning for prayers to honor the sun goddess and Emperor Meiji. Then he attended lessons. He was instructed in many subjects considered important for the education of an emperor: math, physics, economics, calligraphy, language (French, Chinese, and Japanese), ethics, martial arts, and natural history. All were part of *teiōgaku*, the making of an emperor. Before the Meiji constitution; monarchs in Japan were educated in subjects such as abstract Confucian philosophical texts and practiced reciting Shinto prayers. Hirohito's education as the future emperor was well prepared and meticulously oriented. First, he attended the Gakushūin Peer's School, from 1908 to 1914, and was tutored by the special institute established for the crown prince's education. An academy called Tōgū-gogakumonsho took over his tutelage from May 4, 1914 until late February 1921.

From 1914 to 1921, Dr. Hirotarō Hattori became Hirohito's teacher of natural history and physics. Under Hattori's guidance, Hirohito read Darwin's theory of

evolution as interpreted by the popular writer Asajirō Oka, whose book *Shinkaron kōwa* (Lectures on evolution) was published in 1904. Hirohito developed at this early age an interest in marine biology. Hattori remained his mentor and chief scientific collaborator for more than thirty years. He accompanied him on many collecting expeditions and also served as his scientific proxy. He wrote to European naturalists and distributing specimen collections on the emperor's behalf.

Hirohito's regular military teachers at the Ogakumonjo School included the president of the peer's school, Ōsako Naoharu. Ōsako, the older brother of General Naomichi, was a general in the early Imperial Japanese Army, and expert on the Russo-Japanese War. Capt. Satō Tetsutarō, who served as a lieutenant in 1892, as chief navigator aboard the gunboat Akagi, delivered lectures to Hirohito on the American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories of naval power, especially those explained in his first two books: *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*. From Mahan's theories, Hirohito learned "how having a strong presence on the seas is one of the biggest factors that help a country win wars and become an influential world power." According to Mahan, control of the sea by a large fleet of battleships was key to successful expansionist. Satō also lectured Hirohito on Western and Japanese military history (including the Battle of the Sea of Japan, [May 1905] in which the combined Japanese fleet with large British-made battleships under Admiral Togō destroyed the Russian Baltic squadron, effectively ending the Russian-Japanese War). Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, Hirohito's uncle, supervised the first stage of his royal nephew's naval training, which started in July 1916. Hirohito's army lecturers were generals Ugaki Kazushige and Nara Takeji. Ugaki was sent as a military attaché to Germany from 1902 to 1904 and again from 1906 to 1907. In 1910, he was promoted to colonel, and in 1915 was promoted to major general. In 1917, he participated in planning the Siberian Expedition to stop the spread of the Russian Revolution into that region.

During Hirohito's last year at the Tōgū-gogakumonsho Academy, Nara drafted a seven-point guideline for the Crown Prince's continued education, stating that he should emphasize military affairs and take a deep interest in commanding the country's

army and navy. Nara prepared him for the different role he was to play as an emperor, taught him the nation's history, which combined elements of nationalism and racism in the myth of his descent from the gods. Under Nara's direction, Hirohito mastered horsemanship and practiced firing weapons.

Sugiura Shigetake, an ultranationalist Confucian educator, lectured Hirohito on the principles that should guide his behavior. In his lectures, Sugiura named several great men in world history whose lives illustrated the value of knowledge. Among them were Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for his philosophy of education and independence of thought; George Washington, for his sense of justice and fair play; and Thomas Robert Malthus, for his ideas on population growth and economic change.

Another fundamental point was that Hirohito had to respect all the rules contained in Meiji's "Charter Oath of Five Articles" (1868), which included the statement, "Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of Imperial rule" and the "Imperial Rescript on Education" (1890).

Sugiura regarded the "Charter Oath" as an important document for political reasons. The document stated that deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion, and that "all classes, high, low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the administration of affairs of state." Sugiura pointed out that the Meiji constitution had endorsed that vision by providing for an elected lower house of representatives, as well as an appointed upper house of peers. Together, the charter of oath and the constitution signified that the Japanese monarchy had reached a new stage in its historical evolution that of constitutional monarchy.

Sugiura's lectures to Hirohito illustrated a crucial link between domestic reform and maritime expansion, while demonstrating a debt to the new ideologies of Japanism and liberalism. His teachings revealed a distinctive strain of colonial thought that envisioned people on the periphery of a unified Japan, from Ōmi merchants to social outcasts, as central agents of expansion. Dynasty Emperor Meiji died on July 30, 1912. His son, Crown Prince Yoshihito, Hirohito's father, became emperor, and Hirohito was formally named Crown Prince in a special national ceremony that was held on November 2 that year. He was eleven years old. Eight years later, Hirohito attained the ranks of major of the Imperial Japanese Army and lieutenant commander of the

Imperial Japanese Navy. A year later, after graduating from the Ogakumonjo School, he began a six-month trip to England and Continental Europe on March 3, 1921. Dressed as a naval officer, he boarded the 16,000-ton Japanese battleship Katori off the coast of Hayama. Several nobles accompanied him, including some cousins and his uncle, Gen. Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni. While for many years, Japanese soldiers and sailors had gone abroad to observe and train, Hirohito's trip was the first time a member of the royal family had left Japan. Two-thirds of the way there, the battleship Katori passed into the Red Sea, then through Egypt's Suez Canal, and stopped at Cairo where the British Lord Allenby gave a garden party. Prince George of England (later King George VI) met Hirohito at the island of Malta and took him to a performance of Othello by an Italian opera company. On April 29, 1921, near Gibraltar, at the mouth of the Mediterranean Sea, Hirohito celebrated his twentieth birthday. At Gibraltar, he visited Britain's naval base and attended some horse races. He arrived in England at Portsmouth's naval base on May 9th. Again, dressed as an admiral, he inspected the crew of a British battleship.

On May 10, 1921, a second member of the British royal family, Prince Edward, known as the Prince of Wales, son of the reigning King George V and Queen Mary, greeted Hirohito. King George invited the Crown Prince and his entourage of eighteen people to stay at Buckingham Palace. In the following days, Prince Edward ushered him through a series of receptions, banquets, and parades. Hirohito visited the British Museum and enjoyed the exhibits. He went to the Bank of England and visited Oxford University. He met Britain's Prime Minister Lloyd George. On May 1, Hirohito and his entourage went to Scotland. There, he met Sir John George Stewart-Murray, Marquis of Tullibardine and 8th Duke of Atholl. Returning to England, he visited the industrial city of Manchester, touring factories, meeting and shaking hands with shipyard workers.

On May 30 Hirohito traveled to France. Arriving in Paris, he visited the Louvre Museum. Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain showed him the battlefields of the war's Western Front. The following day, France's President Alexandre Millerand, previously prime minister, gave a reception for Hirohito at the Elysée Palace. The next day, he visited the Palace of Versailles, France's principal royal residence from 1682 to the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789. Thus, from March 3 to September 3, 1921,

Hirohito and his accompanying relatives and officials toured Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy as the first royal member to have gone abroad. This trip in Europe informed and educated the future emperor about the Western world beyond Japan, its politics, alliances, technological powers, and empire aims.

Under the guidance of Baron Chinda Sutemi, one of the most experienced diplomats in Japan, he learned to appreciate the importance of international peace. “War is a terrible thing,” he said, looking over the ruins of the Battle of Verdun in France, where more than two million soldiers had killed each other, on orders of their superiors, only a few years earlier. Hirohito considered his visit to King George V and the British royal family as the most valuable lesson of the trip. As he said many decades later, “George V intimately explained to me the British constitutional monarchy as it ought to be. Ever since, it has been always on my mind, and I have been constantly thinking about how a monarch under a constitutional monarchy should behave.”

On November 10, 1921, Hirohito at twenty years old was appointed Prince Regent of Japan (Sesshō) to carry on the imperial functions of government because of his father’s debilitating mental illness. It was a difficult task for the young Prince Regent as future emperor. The same year, Britain refused to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and a few months later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that Japanese were ineligible to become U.S. citizens. These decisions angered the Japanese people and encouraged the creation of many secret societies funded by the army, such as the Black Dragon Society, a prominent paramilitary, ultranationalist group in Japan founded by martial artist Uchida Ryohei, which made public threats against anyone who did not follow the precepts of “good Japanese citizenship.” In 1923, Hirohito was promoted from major to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Imperial Japanese Army. In 1924, he married Princess Nagako Kuni. And in 1925, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant commander to that of captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Japan and World’s Affairs between 1951–2000

After World War II Japan entered a new phase of political, economic, and diplomatic transformation. The signing of the **Treaty of San Francisco in 1951** officially ended the Allied occupation and restored Japan’s sovereignty in 1952. This marked the beginning of Japan’s re-entry into the international community. Under the leadership of

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Japan adopted the **Yoshida Doctrine**, focusing on economic recovery and relying on the United States for military protection. This policy shaped Japan's post-war diplomacy and positioned the nation as a peaceful and economically driven country.

During the **1950s**, Japan concentrated on rebuilding its war-torn economy. With the assistance of American aid under the Dodge Plan, Japan experienced industrial revitalization. The outbreak of the **Korean War (1950–1953)** acted as a turning point, as Japan became a crucial supplier of goods and materials for the United Nations forces. This boosted its industries and foreign trade. Japan's foreign policy during this period emphasized alignment with Western powers, especially the United States, as a counterbalance against communist expansion in Asia.

In the **1960s**, Japan began to emerge as a major economic power. The government promoted rapid industrialization, exports, and technological innovation. By joining the **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1964**, Japan became part of the advanced industrialized nations. It also hosted the **1964 Tokyo Olympics**, symbolizing Japan's full recovery and re-entry onto the world stage. Diplomatically, Japan normalized relations with **South Korea in 1965**, signing a treaty that facilitated economic and political cooperation. Japan also provided economic assistance to Southeast Asian countries as part of its post-war reconciliation efforts.

The **1970s** were marked by economic challenges and diplomatic diversification. The **oil crises of 1973 and 1979** severely affected Japan's energy-dependent economy. However, Japan responded by developing energy-efficient technologies and diversifying its energy sources. In world affairs, Japan began asserting a more independent foreign policy. It normalized relations with **China in 1972**, recognizing the People's Republic of China and ending formal ties with Taiwan. Japan's role in regional diplomacy grew, and it emerged as a key trading partner for many Asian nations.

During the **1980s**, Japan reached the peak of its economic growth. It became the world's second-largest economy after the United States. The Japanese model of development—characterized by high savings, technological advancement, and export-led growth—was admired globally. Japan's growing trade surplus with Western countries, however, led to tensions, especially with the U.S., which accused Japan of protectionist

trade policies. The **Plaza Accord of 1985** aimed to correct trade imbalances by appreciating the yen. Japan also increased its overseas investments and aid, becoming one of the largest contributors to global development funds.

The **end of the Cold War in 1991** brought new diplomatic challenges for Japan. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan sought to redefine its security and foreign policies. The **1990–1991 Gulf War** revealed Japan's limited military role due to constitutional restrictions on the use of force. Although Japan contributed financially to the coalition forces, it faced international criticism for "checkbook diplomacy." This experience pushed Japan to play a more active role in international peacekeeping operations, leading to the **1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law**, allowing the Self-Defense Forces to participate in UN missions.

In the **1990s**, Japan also faced domestic and economic difficulties. The collapse of the asset bubble in 1991 led to a prolonged period of economic stagnation, known as the **"Lost Decade."** Despite these internal challenges, Japan continued to engage actively in international organizations like the **United Nations, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO)**. It remained a major advocate for global peace, nuclear disarmament, and sustainable development.

Japan maintained strong relations with the United States under the **US-Japan Security Alliance**, reaffirmed in the 1996 Joint Declaration. At the same time, Japan sought to strengthen its ties with Asian countries through trade, investment, and diplomatic cooperation. Japan's efforts to promote peace and stability in East Asia were evident in its participation in initiatives like the **ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)**.

By the end of the **20th century**, Japan had transformed itself from a war-devastated nation into a democratic, technologically advanced, and economically powerful state. It had played a significant role in shaping the post-war global order through peaceful diplomacy, economic cooperation, and technological innovation. Though limited militarily by its pacifist constitution, Japan emerged as a key player in world affairs, balancing its alliance with the West and its partnership with Asian neighbors.

In summary, from 1951 to 2000, Japan's role in world affairs evolved from a dependent nation under U.S. influence to an independent global leader in economics and

diplomacy. Its contributions to peace, reconstruction, and development reflected a new identity one that replaced militarism with modernization and aggression with international cooperation.

Self Assessment Questions

- Who introduced major economic reforms in China between 1976 and 1989?
- What was the main aim of Deng Xiaoping's reforms?
- Who succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the leader of China?
- What was Jiang Zemin known for in Chinese politics?
- During whose rule did the McArthur Constitution come into effect in Japan?
- What the McArthur Constitution bring to Japan's political system?
- Who was Emperor Hirohito of Japan?
- What was the role of Emperor Mutsuhito in Japan's modernization?
- How did Japan's economy change between 1951 and 2000?
- What was the main feature of China's foreign policy from 1949 to 1990?

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